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(a)  Examine whether there is a relationship between crime levels and sentencing in Tasmania. 
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environments? 
3. Sentencing options 
Examine the suitability of present sentencing options (including options provided in the Youth 
Justice Act 1997) and to consider whether any changes should be made to existing options and 
whether new sentencing options should be introduced.  
4. Role of victims 
Consider whether the interests of victims are adequately dealt with in the sentencing process 
and to what extent the objective of section 3(h) [that of recognising the interests of victims] has 
been met. In particular to consider the efficacy of compensation orders and the victims’ levy. 
5. Role of the community 
(a) Consider the level to which the objective in section 3(f) of the Sentencing Act [of promoting 
public understanding of sentencing practices and procedures] has been met and make 
recommendations as to how the public can be informed of the sentencing process.  
(b) Consider how community attitudes towards sentencing should be ascertained.  
(c) Examine whether any mechanism could be adopted to more adequately incorporate 
community views into the sentencing process. 
Point 3 on Sentencing Options includes sentencing options provided in the Youth Justice Act. 
However, it was decided to exclude issues relating to young offenders with a view to picking this up at 
a later stage. 
On 24 April 2002, the Institute was requested by the Attorney-General to extend the terms of reference 
by incorporating the issue of parole into the project. The letter outlined a proposed amendment to the 
Sentencing Act to require the courts to impose a non-parole period for every sentence which exceeds 
12 months. Two amendments to the Corrections Act were also foreshadowed: first, a requirement that 
the Parole Board publish reasons for its decisions and secondly, requiring the Parole Board to take into 
account victim impact statements in its decision-making. The letter requested the Institute to make 
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sexual offenders. 
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Summary of recommendations 
Recommendation 1 
That short sentences of imprisonment should continue to be a sentencing option for the 
reasons given in para 3.2.14. 
 
Recommendation 2 
The principle of restraint in the use of imprisonment should be enacted by inserting an 
amendment into the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 13A, providing: 
(1)  that a court must not sentence an offender to imprisonment unless the offence, or a 
combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so serious 
that neither a fine nor a community sentence can be justified for the offence.  
(2)  if a sentence of imprisonment is justified under subsection (1) the sentence must be for 
the shortest term that in the opinion of the court is commensurate with the seriousness 
of the offence. (3.2.18) 
 
Recommendation 3 
The Tasmanian Law Reform Institute does not recommend enacting a legislative provision 
requiring courts to give reasons for short sentences of imprisonment. (3.2.21) 
 
Recommendation 4 
That post release interventions be made available for short-term prisoners in appropriate cases 
and particularly for prisoners with partly suspended sentences with supervision. (3.2.23) 
 
Recommendation 5 
Advantage should be taken of the opportunity imprisonment presents by continuing to direct 
resources to evidence-based rehabilitative programs for prisoners in the areas of cognitive 
behavioural therapy, sex offender treatment and drug treatment programs.  
 
Recommendation 6 
In addition, education and work programs should be introduced. 
 
Recommendation 7 
Program participants should be supported after release with appropriate social support and 
after-care to ensure that any program gains are not lost. 
 
Recommendation 8 
The Institute does not recommend that courts be given the power to defer sentence for the 
reasons given in para 3.2.44. 
 
Recommendation 9 
Notwithstanding criticisms of the suspended sentence, the Institute is of the view that the 
suspended sentence is a useful sentencing option that should be retained (see para 3.3.26). 
 
 
Tasmania Law Reform Institute  Sentencing  
2 
Recommendation 10 
The Institute found no evidence that suspended sentences are overused or used 
inappropriately. Therefore it does not recommend that length-based or offence-based 
restrictions be imposed on the power to order suspended sentences (3.3.27 – 3.3.30).  
 
Recommendation 11 
The Institute recommends that to remove confusion about the nature of the suspended 
sentence, legislative guidance be given in the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) about the imposition 
of suspended sentences that does not interfere with judicial discretion (3.3.31- 3.3.32). The 
proposed s 23A is as follows: 
 A court must not impose and suspend a term of imprisonment (wholly or partly) unless, having 
regard to the provisions of this Act (and in particular s 13A), it has first determined that it would 
be appropriate in the circumstances that the offender be imprisoned for the term of 
imprisonment imposed.  
 
Recommendation 12 
To give suspended sentences some punitive bite, the Institute recommends that instead of 
permitting combined orders, the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 24 be amended so that it lists a 
range of additional conditions that may be attached to a suspended sentence (3.3.36). The new 
provision should be modelled on the following: 
(1)  An order of a court suspending the whole or part of a sentence of imprisonment is 
subject to the condition that the offender must not commit another offence punishable 
by imprisonment during the specified period.1 
(2)  Such an order may be made subject to such additional conditions as the court considers 
necessary and expedient including the following conditions: 
         • that the offender be subject to the supervision of a probation officer; 
         • that the offender be required to perform community service; 
         • that the offender be required to undertake a rehabilitation program; 
         • that the offender undergo specified medical or psychiatric treatment; 
         • a restorative requirement. 
 
Recommendation 13 
The Institute recommends that to avoid the offender being punished more than once for 
breaching the same sentence that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 8(1) be amended so that a 
suspended sentence cannot be combined with a community service order, a probation order or 
a rehabilitation program order (see 3.3.38).  
 
Recommendation 14 
To ensure that the needs of the offender are addressed and to enhance the opportunities that a 
suspended sentence presents to address those needs, it is recommended that where there is 
reason to think that an offender may benefit from any ‘additional conditions’, the court should 
require a pre-sentence report addressing the issue of ‘additional conditions’ that should be 
included in the order. This recommendation would require an amendment to s 24 (see 3.3.39). 
 
Recommendation 15 
The Institute recommends that a review be conducted to see if improvements introduced to 
address the neglect in instituting breach proceedings have been successful. (3.3.41) 
 
                                                
1  This merely makes explicit the current position: see s 27(1). 
Summary of Recommendations 
3 
Recommendation 16 
If breach proceedings still appear to be lax, the Institute recommends discussions between the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Police Prosecutions, Department of Justice, Community 
Corrections, Supreme and Magistrates Courts to develop protocols for dealing with breaches 
and the introduction of computer software to automatically notify apparent breaches. (3.3.41) 
 
Recommendation 17 
The Institute recommends that s 27 of the Sentencing Act be amended to empower the 
prosecution to make an oral application to have a breach of a suspended sentence dealt with 
when a court is sentencing an offender for an offence the conviction for which constitutes a 
breach of the condition of a suspended sentence that an offender not commit an imprisonable 
offence. (3.3.42) 
 
Recommendation 18 
To promote the deterrent value of the sanction and to enhance the integrity of the sanction in 
the eyes of the community, the Institute recommends that in dealing with breach cases there 
be a statutory presumption in favour of activation. (3.3.43)  
 
Recommendation 19 
The Institute recommends that ‘front-end’ home detention be introduced as a sentencing 
option and that it be called ‘home detention’. (3.4.11, 3.4.13) 
 
Recommendation 20 
That it should not be a condition of a suspended sentence but a custodial sentence located in 
the sentencing hierarchy between an immediate sentence of imprisonment and a wholly 
suspended sentence of imprisonment. (3.4.12) 
 
Recommendation 21 
That home/residential confinement be a core condition of the order but courts should have the 
discretion to impose additional orders to reflect the needs of the offender or the restorative 
aims of the sentence. (3.4.14) 
 
Recommendation 22 
That a home detention assessment report be a prerequisite of a home detention order. (3.4.15) 
 
Recommendation 23 
That a court must not make a home detention order unless the offender consents and signs an 
undertaking to comply with their obligations under the order. (3.4.15)  
 
Recommendation 24 
That consent of co-residents be a prerequisite of the order and consent should be able to be 
withdrawn at any time. (3.4.15) 
 
Recommendation 25 
That offenders sentenced to home detention not be eligible for remissions or parole. (3.4.16) 
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Recommendation 26 
That there be no limits on the length of the order but that judicial officers be required to 
review orders in excess of six months. (3.4.17) 
 
Recommendation 27 
That there should be no offence-based exclusion criteria, however, an offender who poses a 
significant risk in terms of committing a further violent offence should not be eligible for a 
community custody order. (3.4.18) 
 
Recommendation 28  
That the courts should have a discretion to order home detention be served in a place other 
than the offender’s home in appropriate cases (e.g. in cases of domestic violence offences and 
homeless offenders). (3.4.15, 3.4.19) 
 
Recommendation 29 
That additional resources be allocated to Community Corrections for preparation of 
assessment reports, supervision of home detainees and provision of home detention programs. 
(3.4.20) 
 
Recommendation 30 
The Institute does not recommend that periodic detention be introduced as a sentencing option 
at this time (for the reasons outlined in para 3.5.9). 
 
Recommendation 31 
For the reasons outlined in paras 3.6.7 – 3.6.8, the Institute does not recommend the 
introduction of the intensive correction order in Tasmania, either as a means of serving a 
sentence of imprisonment or as a sentencing option in its own right. 
 
Recommendation 32 
The Institute does not recommend that a generic community sentence should replace 
community service orders and probation orders, (3.7.13) however, it does recommend that s 
28 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) be amended so that supervision or attendance at a 
‘rehabilitation program’ for domestic violence offenders is made available as an optional 
condition of a community service order. (3.7.13) 
 
Recommendation 33 
The Institute recommends that s 8(2)(a) and (b) (which allow a CSO to be combined with a 
probation order or a rehabilitation order) be omitted. (3.7.13). This conforms with the 
Institute’s view that sanction stacking is undesirable, but there should be flexibility in relation 
to conditions of sentencing orders (see above para 3.3.36). 
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Recommendation 34 
The Institute recommends that community service order assessments assess an offender’s 
need for supervision and programs, suitability for work and availability of programs. (3.7.13) 
 
Recommendation 35 
The Institute recommends that the Part 6 (Fines) of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) be amended 
to include the power to impose a community service order where the penalty prescribed is a 
mandatory minimum fine or imprisonment. (3.7.14) 
 
Recommendation 36 
The Institute does not recommend that the power to impose a community service order be 
broadened so it is available for offences that are not punishable by imprisonment. If an 
offender cannot pay a fine, the judicial officer should impose a conditional release order. 
(3.7.14) 
 
Recommendation 37 
The Institute also recommends that the New Zealand practice of remitting up to 10 per cent of 
the aggregate of the total of community service hours be further explored by the Justice 
Department. (3.7.15) 
 
Recommendation 38 
The Institute recommends that the Justice Department conduct a review of the community 
service order scheme2 to ensure the availability of adequate resources to provide projects in 
country areas, a diversity of projects so that women and others with dependants, those with 
health problems and disabilities have suitable work and that promising findings from projects 
such as the UK’s Pathfinder project can be implemented in this state. (3.7.16) 
 
Recommendation 39 
The Institute does not recommend a generic community sentencing order for the reasons 
outlined in para 3.8.13. (and see 3.7.13) 
 
Recommendation 40 
The Institute does not recommend altering the place of probation orders in the hierarchy of 
sanctions to indicate that it is a more serious sanction than a community service order for the 
reasons given in para 3.8.20. 
 
Recommendation 41 
In the Institute’s view there are two basic problems with probation orders that need to be 
addressed. First, there is a need to restore confidence in probation orders as an independent 
sentencing option (as evidenced by the fact that 90 per cent of probation orders in the 
Supreme Court and more than 50 per cent of orders in the Magistrates Court are combined 
with a more serious penalty) and secondly, there is the lack of resources devoted to 
community corrections. To help restore the reputation of probation orders as a credible 
independent sentencing option, the Institute recommends: 
• that the Justice Department conduct a breach study of probation orders to inform 
guidance for probation and judicial officers in relation to breach proceedings. 
 
                                                
2  The Institute understands that such a review is now underway. 
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• that a review be conducted to determine a range of evidence-based programs for 
introduction in Tasmania to enhance the potential of probation to reduce recidivism and 
encourage desistance and that resources be made available to offer these programs to 
appropriately targeted offenders. 
• that such programs be supported by proper assessment, motivation, case-management 
and reinforcement of learning to follow-up and support program effects. 
• that the possibility of ongoing supervision by the court be considered for certain 
categories of offenders on probation orders. 
 
Recommendation 42 
The Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 7(e) be amended to empower 
courts to fine an offender without recording a conviction. (3.9.6) 
 
Recommendation 43 
The Institute recommends that Monetary Penalties Enforcement Act 2005 (Tas) be amended 
to omit the power of the Director of the Monetary Penalties Enforcement System to order 
suspension of an offender’s driver’s licence or vehicle registration for failure to comply with 
an enforcement order issued for fine default. (3.9.13) 
 
Recommendation 44 
The Institute recommends that the government establish a feasibility study to investigate how 
a day fine scheme could be introduced into Tasmania. (3.9.19)  
 
Recommendation 45 
Pending the introduction of unit fines, the Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 
(Tas), Part 6 be amended to insert a new provision: 
(a) requiring a court to inquire into an offender’s financial circumstances before fixing the 
amount of a fine; 
(b) providing the amount of the fine should reflect the seriousness of the offence; 
(c) that in fixing the fine a court should take into account the offender’s financial 
circumstances; 
(d) empowering the court to make a financial circumstances order, requiring the offender to 
provide the court with such financial details as it requests. (3.9.20)  
 
Recommendation 46  
The Institute recommends: 
• that the Justice Department follow-up conditional release orders and report on breach 
rates annually; 
• that a reconviction study be done to ascertain the outcomes of conditional release 
orders. (3.10.4) 
 
Recommendation 47 
The Institute recommends that if the evaluation of the Court Mandated Diversion of Drug 
Offenders program proves promising: 
• each of the three levels of the program should continue; and 
• the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) should be amended to enable offenders convicted in the 
Supreme Court to be made subject to drug treatment orders. (3.11.7) 
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Recommendation 48 
The Institute recommends that:  
• the offences of breach of a community service order, breach of a probation order and 
breach of a rehabilitation program order be abolished and replaced with breach 
provisions similar to those in s 27 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas); 
• the procedures for follow-up and actioning breaches of community orders be radically 
overhauled.(3.12.3) 
 
Recommendation 49 
The Institute supports the use of victim impact statements. They are a valuable tool in the 
sentencing process which assist the court in assessing the effects of the crime on the victim, 
and provide the victim with a voice in the sentencing process. The courts’ use of VIS can be 
therapeutic and empowering for victims. To ensure that provision of a VIS provides a positive 
experience for victims, the Institute recommends that the advice given by the Victims 
Assistance Unit and other victim services assisting with VIS continue to ensure the focus is 
on the symbolic and communicative function of VIS rather than its impact on the sentencing 
outcome. It recommends that this be explained in the Victims Support Service’s brochure. 
(4.2.9 – 4.2.12) 
 
Recommendation 50 
The Institute recommends retaining the right of the family victims in homicide cases to make 
a VIS. However, as in the previous recommendation, it recommends that advice to victim 
should make it clear that this is but one factor the court will consider in imposing sentence 
 and that it cannot lead to the court putting a greater value on one life rather than another. 
(4.2.13) 
 
Recommendation 51 
The Institute recommends that research be conducted in this jurisdiction to examine the value 
of VIS to the courts and victims. (4.2.14) 
 
Recommendation 52 
The Institute recommends a pilot community conferencing program for young adults 
modelled on both the New South Wales pilot and on Tasmania’s youth justice experience 
with conferencing. (4.3.5) 
 
Recommendation 53 
The Institute is of the view that the interests of victims would be better served by making 
some fundamental changes to compensation orders including making a compensation order a 
sentencing option in its own right.  
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Recommendation 54 
The Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 68(1) be amended omitting the 
requirement that compensation orders must be made for injury loss, destruction or damage if 
the offence is burglary, stealing, robbery, arson or injury to property. Instead courts should be 
required to consider making a compensation order in cases where injury, loss, destruction or 
damage has been caused by the offence and where such an order is not made, give reasons for 
not doing so. This requirement should be inserted in s 8A of the Act. (4.4.16) 
 
Recommendation 55 
The Institute recommends that the option of making a compensation order should be included 
in the list of sentencing orders in s 7 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) rather than as an 
ancillary order in Part 9. The provision should state [a court may] ‘with or without recording a 
conviction make a compensation order for injury, loss, destruction or damage suffered by a 
person as a result of the offence’. (The provisions relating to compensation orders in Part 9 
will have to be relocated). (4.4.17) 
 
Recommendation 56 
The Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) be amended to provide that in 
determining the amount of a compensation order the court may take into account, as far as 
practicable, the financial circumstances of the offender and the nature of the burden that its 
payment will impose.3 (4.4.18 - 4.4.19) 
 
Recommendation 57 
The Institute recommends a review of the administrative procedures and resources associated 
with the making of compensation orders to enable them to be ‘adequately attended to’.4 
(4.4.20) 
 
Recommendation 58 
The Institute recommends that courts be empowered to make a compensation order in 
addition to imprisonment, community service order or a fine (this will require amendments to 
s 8 of the Act). It also recommends that courts be given the discretion to make compensation a 
condition of a suspended sentence, a home detention order, a community service order or a 
probation order. (4.4.16) 
 
Recommendation 59 
The Institute recommends that payment of compensation orders be enforced in the same 
manner as fines. It therefore recommends that: 
• This be clarified in (the relocated) s 69 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) (enforcement 
as a judgment debt) by adding a provision that enforcing the fine in this way does not 
preclude action being taken under s 47 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) for fine default; 
• That the definition of ‘fine’ in s 3 of the Monetary Penalties Enforcement Act 2005 
(Tas) be amended to include ‘or the Supreme Court’ after the words ‘Magistrates Court’. 
(4.4.1) 
 
                                                
3  For a similar provision see Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 86(2). See also Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 
53(3). 
4  Director of Public Prosecutions, submission, 2. 
Summary of Recommendations 
9 
Recommendation 60 
To increase the amount that compensation levies contribute to the criminal injuries 
compensation fund that the Victims of Crime Compensation Act 1994 (Tas) be amended to 
adopt a scale which increases the amount payable and better reflects the seriousness of the 
offence. (4.5.6) 
 
Recommendation 61 
That a levy be imposed on infringement notices as well as on court imposed sentences as is 
done in South Australia. (4.5.6) 
 
Recommendation 62 
That the time for payment for levies be a standard 14 days from conviction or release from 
prison with a discretion for the court to otherwise order. (4.5.7) 
 
Recommendation 63 
That the nature of the compensation levy be explained in the Victims Support Services 
brochure for victims to counter any misperception that the levy represents compensation for 
their injury or loss. (4.5.8) 
 
Recommendation 64 
The Institute supports the current parole model in which parliament sets the minimum non-
parole period, the court determines the parole eligibility date and the Parole Board determines 
the date of release for parole eligible offenders. (5.1.11) 
 
Recommendation 65 
In the light of the inconsistencies that have emerged between judges in sentencing practices 
relating to the extension of non-parole periods and the denial of parole eligibility, the Institute 
recommends that s 17 be amended to include a requirement that the court state a period that is 
equal to the statutory non-parole period unless it is satisfied having regard to the 
circumstances that it is required to consider in s 17(4) that an extension of that period is 
necessary or parole should be denied. (5.2.17) 
 
Recommendation 66 
It is recommended that s 17(7) be amended so that when a sentence of more than 12 months 
imprisonment is imposed and an order is made under s 17(2)(a) that an offender is not eligible 
for parole or an order is made under s 17(2)(b) setting a non-parole period, reasons for such 
an order are given. (5.2.18) 
 
Recommendation 67 
It is recommended that a court be required to state that an offender is not eligible for parole 
when parole eligibility is denied by requiring a court to make an order under s 17(2)(a) or (b). 
(5.2.18)  
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Recommendation 68 
The Institute does not recommend increasing the statutory non-parole period in the 
Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) s 68(1) and the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 17(3) beyond half of 
the period of the operative sentence.5 (5.3.10 – 5.3.12) 
 
Recommendation 69 
The Institute recommends that the Corrections Act 1997(Tas) s 72(2B)(b) be amended to 
better reflect the role of the victim statement in a Board’s deliberations by adding an 
additional sub-paragraph referring to the ‘matters relevant to the risk of the offender re-
offending and the sorts of conditions which should be imposed on any parole order in relation 
to contact with the prisoner.’ (5.4.7- 5.4.9) 
 
Recommendation 70 
The Institute recommends that Parole Board decisions should be published on the Parole 
Board’s website. (5.5.3) 
 
Recommendation 71 
It does not recommend that Parole Board hearings should be open to the public for the reasons 
given in para 5.5.5. 
 
Recommendation 72 
The Institute recommends that the issue of whether current sentencing practices for sexual 
offences are appropriate should be further investigated by using a range of methods including 
specially designed focus groups and deliberative polls to build upon current research studies 
that are investigating this issue. (6.2.12) 
 
Recommendation 73 
The Institute recommends retaining the common law principles in relation to the sentencing of 
juvenile offenders and does not recommend altering the current position which allows the 
Director of Corrective Services to transfer juvenile offenders to Ashley Detention Centre. 
(6.2.13 – 6.2.14) 
 
Recommendation 74 
The Institute opposes the use of mandatory minimum penalties for sex offenders. (6.4.5) 
 
Recommendation 75 
The Institute does not recommend the introduction of standard non-parole periods for sex 
offences. (6.4.8) 
 
                                                
5  Operative sentence is the term used in the Corrections Act 1997 (see definition in s 3) – it means the period of 
imprisonment that is not suspended. 
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Recommendation 76 
The Institute does not recommend the introduction of provisions for post-sentence detention 
and supervision orders on the grounds that existing provisions for preventive detention and 
monitoring of released sexual offenders are adequate. The Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 19 
already provides for dangerous criminal declarations, which can be made at any time during a 
sentence of imprisonment of an offender who is eligible for such an order. To add a new and 
separate set of provisions for post sentence detention would be unnecessary duplication and 
confusing. (6.4.25) 
 
Recommendation 77 
The Institute does not recommend that the trigger conditions for a dangerous offender 
declaration should be extended. However, it does suggest that consideration be given to 
amending s 19 so that courts have the option of making a supervision order after the end of 
the offender’s sentence of imprisonment as an alternative. (6.4.26) 
 
Recommendation 78 
To ensure that an application for a dangerous criminal declaration can be heard when the 
sentencing judge is not available, it is recommended that sub-section (1A) be inserted into s 
19 to provide that if the sentencing judge has ceased to hold office or in other special 
circumstances, another judge may hear an application for a dangerous criminal declaration. 
(6.4.27) 
 
Recommendation 79 
The Institute does not recommend the introduction of civil commitment procedures to detain 
sex offenders beyond the expiry of an offender’s sentence for the reasons given in para 6.4.29. 
 
Recommendation 80 
The Institute recommends that for the protection of the public the best possible evidence-
based sex offender treatment programs should be made available in the prison system and in 
the community and that prisoners on sex offender treatment programs should be receive 
follow-up treatment and support after their release. (6.4.30) 
 
Recommendation 81 
The Institute does not recommend that chemical castration should be a sentencing option or a 
condition of a sentencing order but when appropriate it be made available to offenders who 
consent as part of their treatment program. (6.4.32) 
 
Recommendation 82 
The Institute recommends that the issue of the appropriateness of sentencing patterns for 
sexual offenders be referred to the proposed Sentencing Advisory Council. (6.5.2) 
 
Recommendation 83 
The Institute recommends that the government allocate funding for the publication of easily 
accessible and digestible general crime and sentencing information including annual 
sentencing statistics to promote public understanding of crime and sentencing matters. This 
would also remedy the information deficit in relation to sentencing practices in magistrates’ 
courts and promote consistency. (7.1.18) 
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Recommendation 84  
The Institute recommends that a number of strategies are necessary to improve public 
education about crime and sentencing including:  
• continuation of sentencing workshops and making them available on a more regular 
basis by calling on more judges and magistrates to assist with them; (7.1.25) 
• updating and expanding the materials for the You be the Judge multi-media package to 
ensure that it is useful and relevant for school and community groups; (7.1.25) 
• ensuring that the ‘Judge for Yourself’ booklet is widely available or a booklet that 
includes data about crime trends as well as sentencing information; (7.1.26) 
• reviewing the outcome of the Jury Sentencing Study to see if it supports supplying 
COPS and an information booklet to jurors as a regular and ongoing procedure. (7.1.27) 
 
Recommendation 85 
The Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) include separate sections for the 
purposes of the Act and the purposes of sentencing. 
 
Recommendation 86 
In the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 3, para (b) and (e) should be replaced with the following: 
(b)  to provide the courts with the purposes of punishment; 
(e)  to preserve the authority of the law and to promote respect for the law. 
 
Recommendation 87 
It recommends that to better promote the interests of victims and to complement the 
recommendations in Part 4, that the purposes of sentencing include restoration (reparing the 
harm caused by the offence and restoring the relations between the offender, the victim and 
the community). 
 
Recommendation 88 
The purposes of sentencing should provide: 
A court can impose a sentence on an offender for one or more of the following purposes only: 
(a)  to ensure that the offender is punished justly for the offence; 
(b)  to deter the offender and others from committing the same or similar offences; 
(c)  to promote the rehabilitation of the offender; 
(d)  to protect the community by limiting the capacity of the offender to re-offend; 
(e)  to denounce the conduct of the offenders; and  
(f)  to promote the restoration of relations between the community, the offender and the 
victim. (7.1.35 - 7.1.36) 
 
Recommendation 89 
The Institute does not recommend a legislative listing of common law sentencing principles 
or the relevant factors that should be taken into account in imposing sentence on the grounds 
that such legislative listing is unnecessary, complex and has dangers. (7.1.44) 
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Recommendation 90 
The Institute emphasises the importance of research which aims to ascertain informed public 
opinion. It therefore recommends that priority be given to allocating resources to public 
opinion sentencing research in Tasmania. In particular it is recommends that the ARC 
research team on the Sentencing and Public Confidence project be invited to conduct focus 
groups in Tasmania with appropriate financial support. (7.2.12) 
 
Recommendation 91 
For the reasons outlined in para 7.3.10, the Institute does not recommend introducing a 
statutory maximum penalty for each crime in the Criminal Code to replace the general 
maximum in s 389 of 21 years. 
 
Recommendation 92 
The Institute recommends the creation of an independent statutory sentencing advisory 
council (the Sentencing Advisory Council) with a broad membership (of approximately 10 
persons) drawn from persons with experience in community issues affecting courts, victim 
support or advocacy groups, judges and magistrates, academics in relevant disciplines, 
experienced defence and prosecution lawyers and those with experience in the operation of 
the criminal justice system. (7.3.36) 
 
Recommendation 93 
The primary role of the Sentencing Advisory Council should be to bridge the gap between the 
community, courts and government by informing, educating and advising on sentencing 
matters. More specifically it should have the following functions: 
•  the provision of accessible sentencing data; 
•  the provision of accessible data on crime trends; 
• gauging public opinion on sentencing matters; 
•         coordinating strategies to educate the public on crime and sentencing issues; 
•  conducting research on sentencing matters; 
•   consulting with government bodies, stakeholders and members of the public on 
sentencing matters; and  
•   advising the Attorney-General on sentencing matters. (7.3.36) 
 
Recommendation 94  
The Institute recommends that the proposed Council be supported by a full-time secretariat 
and a budget that can fund this and the outsourcing of some of its tasks and functions. (7.3.41) 
 
Recommendation 95 
That guideline judgments should not be introduced at this stage in the absence of broad 
judicial and professional support for them from the legal profession. (7.3.46) 
 
Recommendation 96 
That, if a sentencing advisory council is established, after it has had the opportunity to 
consolidate its operations, it be requested to review the introduction of guideline judgments 
for magistrates and judges. (7.3.47) 
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Executive Summary and 
Recommendations 
Part 1: Sentencing trends 
Examine whether there has been a change in sentencing trends in Tasmania for major crimes and 
summary offences. 
Sentencing is the process by which people who have been found guilty of offending against the 
criminal law have sanctions imposed upon them in accordance with that law.1 The sentence of the 
court is the most visible aspect of the criminal justice system’s response to a guilty offender. Public 
dissatisfaction with sentencing is endemic. Public opinion polls suggest that sentences are too lenient. 
There appears to be a perception that sentences are becoming more lenient. And sentences attract the 
criticism that there are inconsistencies between judicial officers. Sentencing trends and prison 
statistics were examined to explore the issue of changes in sentencing patterns for major crimes 
and summary offences. The issue of consistency between judicial officers was investigated and 
sentencing data was examined to demonstrate what courts see as the appropriate sentencing range 
for particular offences. 
For most offences Supreme Court sentences have not decreased 
Sentencing patterns in the Supreme Court over the three periods examined in the report (1978-1989, 
1990-2000 and 2001-2006) are remarkably consistent. Analysing changes in the median sentence for 
each crime showed no change to be the most likely outcome with decreases and increases about equal. 
For many crimes the proportion of custodial sentences are the same or similar. Reductions in the use 
of imprisonment are rare and for no crime was the reduction significant.  
For a small number of crimes there have been increases in the percentage of custodial sentences and 
the median sentence which are statistically significant. For more than ten counts of burglary the 
increase in the percentage of custodial sentences is significant and there is also an increase in the 
median sentence. For one count of stealing the increased use of custodial sentences is significant and 
there are significant increases in the use of custodial sentences for both drug trafficking and robbery. It 
also appears prison sentences have become longer for serious assaults and for sexual offences 
involving young people. Sentences for one or two counts of rape and sentences for indecent assault are 
the only sentences where the median custodial sentence has become shorter. This is further explored in 
Part 6. Overall, the percentage of custodial sentences was 79 per cent in the earlier period, 83 per cent 
in the second period and 87 per cent in the third period. If there is a perception that sentencing is 
becoming more lenient this is not borne out by the evidence of Supreme Court sentencing patterns. If 
anything sentencing has become more severe. 
In relation to the consistency of sentences, a comparison between the sentences imposed by judges for 
the most frequent offences of robbery and assault failed to reveal any statistically significant 
differences. 
                                                
1 A Freiberg (2002) Pathways to Justice, at 30 citing Victorian Sentencing Committee (1988) Report: 
Sentencing, at 15. 
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Magistrates Court sentencing patterns 
As the Report observes, tracking sentencing trends in the Magistrates Court is limited by data 
collection issues. Until 1 July 2003, there was no state-wide database for the Magistrates Court. Due to 
significant differences in the data collection periods used in the Report, the data can only be a rough 
indicator of sentencing trends. Comparisons of the percentage custodial sentences for assault and 
motor vehicle stealing suggest a stable custodial sentencing pattern with an increased median sentence 
for assault and a decreased median for motor vehicle stealing. For stealing, the median is the same but 
there appears to be less use of custodial sentences. Overall the rate of custodial sentences appears to 
have increased.  
Inconsistency in use of custodial sentences in the Magistrates Court 
Sentencing in the Magistrates Court was also examined for consistency between magistrates and 
consistency between regions (south, north and north-west) in terms of the number of offenders 
sentenced to custody and the median sentences. An examination of all sentences imposed since 1 July 
2003 for four common offences (assault, motor vehicle stealing, stealing and burglary) revealed 
inconsistency in the use of a custodial sentences between magistrates. There were inconsistencies 
between magistrates for sentences for assault in particular, but also for motor vehicle stealing, stealing 
and burglary. Some magistrates had custodial sentencing rates for some offences which were 
statistically significantly more than the mean and some had rates which were significantly less than the 
mean. Comparing the regions also showed some differences. 
Prison statistics do not support perception of increased leniency 
Prison statistics on average time served by released prisoners fail to support the perception of 
increased leniency. This data shows quite consistent patterns with a trend for slightly longer terms of 
imprisonment. 
Part 2: Crime levels 
(a) Examine whether there is a relationship between crime levels and sentencing in Tasmania. 
(b) What role can sentencing legislation and sentencing measures have in achieving the Tasmania 
Together Goals in relation to perceptions of safety and achieving safe environments? 
There are two main sources of crime data available in Australia that seek to measure crime levels. 
These are (1) administrative records obtained from police agencies and (2) crime victim surveys.  
Crime rate lower than 10 years ago 
Recorded crime statistics in Tasmania for the last 25 years suggest a general increase in crime until 
1997-98 followed by a decrease until 2005, with the crime rate increasing slightly in 2005-06. The 
crime rate is now lower than it was 10 years ago but higher than it was 20 years ago. In the last five 
years, there has been a general downward trend for offences against property. In contrast, there has 
been an increase in the rate for offences against the person. However, it is possible that offence rates 
for rape and robbery may have stabilised. In general terms, the Tasmanian trend is in accord with 
national trends.  
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Below Australian average for recorded crime 
In the Australian context, Tasmania is below the national average of recorded crimes for the crimes of 
robbery, burglary and motor vehicle theft. National recorded crime rate data is no longer available for 
assault and sexual assault, so comparisons with other states and territories cannot be made. However, 
victim surveys suggest that Tasmania has the lowest rate after Victoria for personal crimes (robbery, 
assault and sexual assault). 
No empirical evidence of relationship between crime levels and sentencing 
It is commonly assumed that the way to tackle rising crime and unacceptable levels of crime is by 
tougher sentencing. While on the face of it a plausible explanation for the decrease in crime after 1998 
might be the increased imprisonment rates, experts caution against such reasoning. While this may be 
a ‘common sense’ assumption, a clear causal link between crime levels and harsher sentencing 
practices is not supported by empirical evidence. The belief that sentencing can reduce crime is 
based on the assumption that this can be achieved through general deterrence, incapacitation, 
specific deterrence or rehabilitation. 
The evidence of the general deterrent effect of harsher penalties is limited and provides no basis for 
expecting that general penalty increases, which do not involve an unacceptably harsh punishment, will 
reduce the crime rate. The availability of punishment clearly contributes to general deterrence but it is 
the prospect of getting caught that has deterrent value rather than alterations in the severity of 
sentences. Excluding offenders from society by imprisoning them does prevent them committing 
crimes while they are in prison. But estimates of the incapacitative effect of increasing the prison 
population have proved elusive and it has been suggested not only that drastic increases in 
imprisonment are necessary to achieve an impact on crime levels but also that crime reduction 
effects are likely to be temporary. The other basis for assuming sentencing can impact on crime is 
by the penalty acting as a deterrent to the offender (specific deterrence) or by it having a 
rehabilitative effect. The fact that so many sentenced prisoners re-offend (between one-half and 
two-thirds) casts doubt upon imprisonment as a deterrent. The evidence is that there is no 
discernible difference between reconviction rates for prison and for community penalties. This 
also suggests that imprisonment itself is not effective in reforming offenders. While long-standing 
scepticism surrounding the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs inside and outside the prison 
embodied in the mantra ‘Nothing Works’ is now rejected as unscientific overstatement, renewed 
optimism about rehabilitation cannot justify advocating an increase in imprisonment. 
If criminal justice and sentencing policy is to be evidence-based, then increased sentence severity with 
the aim of reducing crime is not the appropriate response. 
The role of sentencing in achieving the Tasmania together goals 
Tasmania Together has goals that were formulated in 2001 and revised in 2006 in relation to safe 
environments and perceptions of safety. The identified challenges include halving the crime rate by 
2020 and ensuring at 92 per cent of people feel safe in their homes at night and 97 per cent of people 
feel safe in their homes by day by 2020. Fear of crime is undoubtedly a problem and dissatisfaction 
with the criminal justice system appears widespread. Dissatisfaction with sentencing clearly damages 
public confidence in the criminal justice system and fuels fear. Dissatisfaction is caused by the 
perception that sentences are too lenient, that sentences are inconsistent, that judges and magistrates 
lack accountability and that the current system is inaccessible and that judges and magistrates are not 
sufficiently responsive to public concerns. Given that crime levels are largely unaffected by sentencing 
levels, it is wrong to attempt to appease public concern by law and order rhetoric that includes 
increasing sentencing severity. Instead, public confidence in the criminal justice system could be 
addressed in three ways: 
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Promote understanding of sentencing practice 
Studies have shown that in general, the public lacks knowledge of sentencing practice and that 
those most dissatisfied with the criminal justice system are those whose perceptions are 
particularly inaccurate. Improving understanding of sentencing practice should lead to an 
improvement in public confidence and a reduction of fear of crime. 
Review aspects of the system that undermine public confidence 
An examination of sentencing options may indicate that the available options are inadequate. Some 
existing options may be misunderstood and contribute to criticism of the system. Part 3 of this paper 
undertakes a review of sentencing options. Parole is another aspect of the criminal justice system that 
has attracted public criticism. Parole will be considered in Part 6 
Taking public opinion into account 
Ways of taking public opinion into account in sentencing are examined in Part 7. 
These three ways of improving public confidence relate to perceptions of public safety and fear of 
crime rather than actual community safety and crime reduction. Crime levels are largely unaffected by 
sentencing levels so sentencing reforms cannot significantly impact on crime level. It has been shown 
that the intuitive appeal of the assumption that crime levels are easily controlled by sentencing 
measures collapses in the face of the empirical evidence and normative arguments to the contrary. 
Given the limited impact sentencing can have on crime levels, the public should not be encouraged to 
think that crime can be solved by punishment. This is not to say there is no room for improvement and 
that resources could not be used more effectively and imaginatively. We should endeavour to sentence 
smarter. 
Part 3: Sentencing options 
Examine the suitability of present sentencing options (including options provided in the Youth Justice 
Act 1997 (Tas) and consider whether any changes should be made to existing options and whether new 
sentencing options should be introduced. 
This part reviews existing sentencing options and considers whether any additional sentencing options 
should be adopted. 
Imprisonment 
There are strong arguments in favour of a low imprisonment rate. Imprisonment is the most 
expensive sentencing option. It may incapacitate offenders while they are in prison, but it achieves 
little else in terms of crime reduction. A reconviction study in Tasmania shows that 62 per cent of 
offenders given unsuspended sentences of imprisonment re-offended within a two year period. 
Ways of encouraging restraint in the use of imprisonment should be considered. 
Retention of short sentences 
Short prison terms are common. In Magistrates’ Court in 2003-04, 67 per cent of prison 
sentences were three months or under and 89 per cent six months or less and in the Supreme Court 
from 2001-2006, 18 per cent were three months or under and 47 per cent six months or less. 
While commonly used, it seems short prison sentences are particularly ineffective for most 
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offenders. While short periods of imprisonment have all of the adverse effects of imprisonment 
(loss of the deterrent effect of imprisonment on a first offender, exposing minor offenders to 
more serious offenders, and negative effects on family, housing and employment) without any 
benefits (too short to deploy therapeutic programs) and minimum incapacitative effects, the 
Institute’s view is that Tasmania should not follow jurisdictions that have abolished short 
sentences of imprisonment. The Institute’s view is that their abolition would leave an undesirable 
gap in the sentencing continuum. 
Recommendation 
1. That short sentences of imprisonment should continue to be a sentencing option for the reasons 
given in para 3.2.14. 
Statutory recognition of the principle of restraint in the use of custody 
Tasmania is the only State that does not give statutory recognition to the principle of restraint in the 
use of imprisonment. The Institute considers that a statutory statement of restraint in the use of 
custody does service as a salutary reminder of the principle of parsimony and is an encouragement of 
such restraint. The data on magistrates’ sentencing practice that reveals disparities in magistrates’ 
views of the custody threshold demonstrates the need for more guidance as to when a custodial 
sentence is appropriate. The purpose of the statutory provision is to encourage non-custodial sentences 
rather than short custodial sentences, and when only a custodial sentence is appropriate to urge that it 
is as short as possible. 
Recommendation 
2. The principle of restraint in the use of imprisonment should be enacted by inserting an amendment 
into the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 13A, providing: 
(1)  that a court must not sentence an offender to imprisonment unless the offence, or a 
combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so serious that 
neither a fine nor a community sentence can be justified for the offence.  
(2)  if a sentence of imprisonment is justified under subsection (1) the sentence must be for the 
shortest term that in the opinion of the court is commensurate with the seriousness of the 
offence. (3.2.18) 
No legislative requirement for reasons justifying short sentences 
The Institute considered whether there should be a statutory requirement in Tasmania for courts to 
give reasons for imposing a custodial sentence. The Institute’s view is that enacting the principle of 
restraint in the use of imprisonment (Recommendation 2) is sufficient to discourage the use of short 
prison sentences in inappropriate circumstances and that requiring reasons for short sentences could 
well become an empty incantation. 
Recommendation 
3. The Tasmanian Law Reform Institute does not recommend enacting a legislative provision 
requiring courts to give reasons for short sentences of imprisonment. (3.2.21) 
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More post-release support for short term prisoners and partially suspended sentences 
The Institute explored the English idea of “Custody Plus” as a means of attempting to reduce the 
reconviction rate of offenders. Custody Plus refers to a short period of imprisonment (up to 13 weeks) 
followed by supervision in the community of at least 52 weeks. The Institute’s view is that the same 
goals could be achieved by providing post-release support for short term prisoners and those given 
partly suspended sentences.  
Recommendation  
4. That post release interventions be made available for short-term prisoners in appropriate cases and 
particularly for prisoners with partly suspended sentences with supervision. (3.2.23) 
Improving the rehabilitative potential of custody 
The Institute also examined ways of improving the rehabilitative potential of custody. Whilst 
imprisonment cannot be justified on the basis of either its rehabilitative or deterrent effects on those 
sentenced to it, there is scope for improving the reconviction rates of prisoners by some selected and 
properly targeted programs. On the basis of international evidence-based reviews of rehabilitative 
programs for prisoners the following are cost effective programs: 
• cognitive behavioural therapy; 
• sex offender treatment; 
• drug treatment programs; 
• education and work programs. 
These programs need to target the dynamic risk factors of individual offenders with appropriate 
programs, and in addition, appropriate social support and after-care must be provided to ensure 
program gains are not quickly lost on release. 
Recommendations  
5. Advantage should be taken of the opportunity imprisonment presents by continuing to direct 
resources to evidence-based rehabilitative programs for prisoners in the areas of cognitive behavioural 
therapy, sex offender treatment and drug treatment programs. 
6. In addition, education and work programs should be introduced. 
7. Program participants should be supported after release with appropriate social support and after-care 
to ensure that any program gains are not lost. 
No need to defer the commencement of sentence 
It has been suggested that courts should be given greater flexibility in relation to sentences of 
imprisonment by deferring the commencement date or ordering that it be served over separate periods. 
However, the Institute is not persuaded of the need to defer sentences of imprisonment. 
Recommendation 
8. The Institute does not recommend that courts be given the power to defer sentence for the reasons 
given in para 3.2.44. 
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Suspended sentences of imprisonment 
A suspended sentence is one, which although imposed is not activated or not wholly activated but 
suspended on conditions similar to probation and parole. Suspended sentences are a popular 
sentencing measure in Tasmania. In Tasmania more than half of all sentences of imprisonment are 
wholly suspended. Suspended sentences have been criticised on many grounds: 
(1) The disjuncture between the legal view and the public view of suspended sentences. From the 
legal point of view they are the penultimate sanction but the public regards them as less severe 
than probation or a small fine. Offenders given a suspended sentence are regarded as ‘walking 
free’. 
(2) The reasoning process for imposing suspended sentences is said to be illogical, as the court takes 
into account the same factors in deciding to suspend a sentence of imprisonment as it takes into 
account in determining whether a sentence of imprisonment is warranted at all.  
(3) It is further argued that suspended sentences are ineffective as a deterrent and do not result in a 
reduction of the prison population.  
(4) Suspended sentences are seen to have the potential for net-widening and sentence inflation.  
(5) It has also been argued that suspended sentences violate the principle that sentences should be 
proportional.  
(6) A concern raised in relation to suspended sentences is that many offenders breach the conditions 
without consequences.  
The Issues Paper asked whether changes were needed to make the suspended sentence a more logical, 
credible and effective sentencing option. Several options for change have been considered to address 
the criticisms of suspended sentences.  
No abolition of suspended sentences 
The Institute acknowledges the criticisms of suspended sentences but considers that to abolish the 
suspended sentence would be to remove a valuable tool, one which enables courts to mark the 
seriousness of the offence by imposing a sentence of imprisonment while showing mercy in the 
particular case by suspending it. There is also the fear that removing it will have a significant impact 
on the imprisonment rate – a very real fear in this jurisdiction where more than half of the sentences of 
imprisonment imposed are wholly suspended. 
No restriction on the availability of suspended sentences 
The Institute considered whether legislative limits should be placed on the length of suspended 
sentences. After analysing the sentence length of suspended sentences, the Institute’s view is that it is 
unnecessary to restrict the length of suspended sentences. Another method of restricting the 
availability of suspended sentences would be to place offence based restrictions, limiting the 
availability of wholly suspended sentences for serious offences to exceptional circumstances. The 
Institute found no evidence that wholly suspended sentences are being used inappropriately for serious 
crimes in Tasmania. The Institute also found no conclusive evidence of net-widening for less serious 
offences. The Institute does not recommend that length-based or offence-based restrictions be 
imposed on the power to order suspended sentences. 
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Need for guidance as to the use of suspended sentences 
The Institute’s view is that the confusion about the way suspended sentences are supposed to operate, 
the uncertainty of the current law and the impact of the decision in Dinsdale v The Queen,2 means that 
it is desirable for guidance to be given about the imposition of the suspended sentence. It is 
recommended that the legislative guidance not interfere with judicial discretion. 
Need to increase the punitive and rehabilitative elements  
The Institute acknowledges that one of the most compelling criticisms of the suspended sentence is its 
confusing nature. It is difficult for the public to accept that it is indeed the penultimate sanction (the 
ultimate sanction being actual imprisonment). The Institute considers that the idea of adding 
supervision, program or community service requirements to bolster the credibility of the suspended 
sentence as a serious penalty is an attractive one. However, the Institute does not recommend that 
courts be required to impose additional conditions. However, it does recommend that the Sentencing 
Act 1997 s 24 be amended to make explicit the kinds of conditions that can be attached to a wholly or 
partly suspended sentence. The Institute also recommends that a new provision (s 24A) be inserted 
into the Sentencing Act 1997, providing that where there is reason to think that an offender may 
benefit from ‘additional conditions’ the court should order a pre-sentence report addressing these 
issues. There would be no requirement to order a pre-sentence report in cases where there was no need 
for special conditions. 
Need to reform breach proceedings 
Only five per cent of breached suspended sentences result in proceedings. The Institute’s view is that 
this is unacceptable. The Institute commends the efforts of the Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Tasmania Police to ensure that proceedings for breach are initiated in all cases but acknowledges the 
obstacles that currently exist to achieving improvements in actioning breach. The Institute considers 
that a review should be undertaken to explore whether the administrative changes put in place have 
produced improvements. This review should investigate breaches of all conditions of the sentence and 
not merely the requirement not to commit an imprisonable offence. If breach proceedings still appear 
to be lax, the Institute recommends discussions between the DPP, Police Prosecutions, Department of 
Justice, Community Corrections, Supreme and Magistrates Courts to develop protocols for dealing 
with breaches and the introduction of computer software to automatically notify apparent breaches. 
To facilitate enforcement of breaches of suspended sentences, the Institute also recommends that the 
prosecution be given power to make application at the time of sentence for the breaching offence for 
the breach to be dealt with simultaneously. 
The Institute’s view is that there is merit in tightening the consequences of breach by enacting a 
presumption in favour of activation of the sentence on proof of breach. This would mean that the 
sentence of imprisonment would be activated on proof of breach, either in whole or in part, unless the 
Court concludes that it would be unjust to do so. 
Recommendations 
9. Notwithstanding criticisms of the suspended sentence, the Institute is of the view that the suspended 
sentence is a useful sentencing option that should be retained (see para 3.3.26). 
10. The Institute found no evidence that suspended sentences are overused or used inappropriately. 
Therefore it does not recommend that length-based or offence-based restrictions be imposed on the 
power to order suspended sentences (3.3.27 – 3.3.30). 
                                                
2 (2000) 202 CLR 321. 
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11. The Institute recommends that to remove confusion about the nature of the suspended sentence, 
legislative guidance be given in the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) about the imposition of suspended 
sentences that does not interfere with judicial discretion (3.3.31- 3.3.32). The proposed s 23A is as 
follows: 
A court must not impose and suspend a term of imprisonment (wholly or partly) unless, having regard to the 
provisions of this Act (and in particular s 13A), it has first determined that it would be appropriate in the 
circumstances that the offender be imprisoned for the term of imprisonment imposed. 
12. To give suspended sentences some punitive bite, the Institute recommends that instead of 
permitting combined orders, the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 24 be amended so that it lists a range of 
additional conditions that may be attached to a suspended sentence (3.3.36). The new provision should 
be modelled on the following: 
(1)  An order of a court suspending the whole or part of a sentence of imprisonment is subject to the 
condition that the offender must not commit another offence punishable by imprisonment during 
the specified period.3 
(2)  Such an order may be made subject to such additional conditions as the court considers 
necessary and expedient including the following conditions: 
          • that the offender be subject to the supervision of a probation officer; 
          • that the offender be required to perform community service; 
          • that the offender be required to undertake a rehabilitation program; 
          • that the offender undergo specified medical or psychiatric treatment; 
          • a restorative requirement. 
13. The Institute recommends that to avoid the offender being punished more than once for breaching 
the same sentence that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 8(1) be amended so that a suspended sentence 
cannot be combined with a community service order, a probation order or a rehabilitation program 
order (see 3.3.38). 
14. To ensure that the needs of the offender are addressed and to enhance the opportunities that a 
suspended sentence presents to address those needs, it is recommended that where there is reason to 
think that an offender may benefit from any ‘additional conditions’, the court should require a pre-
sentence report addressing the issue of ‘additional conditions’ that should be included in the order. 
This recommendation would require an amendment to s 24 (see 3.3.39). 
15. The Institute recommends that a review be conducted to see if improvements introduced to address 
the neglect in instituting breach proceedings have been successful. (3.3.41) 
16. If breach proceedings still appear to be lax, the Institute recommends discussions between the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Police Prosecutions, Department of Justice, Community Corrections, 
Supreme and Magistrates Courts to develop protocols for dealing with breaches and the introduction 
of computer software to automatically notify apparent breaches. (3.3.41) 
17. The Institute recommends that s 27 of the Sentencing Act be amended to empower the prosecution 
to make an oral application to have a breach of a suspended sentence dealt with when a court is 
sentencing an offender for an offence the conviction for which constitutes a breach of the condition of 
a suspended sentence that an offender not commit an imprisonable offence. (3.3.42) 
                                                
3  This merely makes explicit the current position: see s 27(1). 
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18. To promote the deterrent value of the sanction and to enhance the integrity of the sanction in the 
eyes of the community, the Institute recommends that in dealing with breach cases there be a statutory 
presumption in favour of activation. (3.3.43) 
Home detention 
Home detention is not a sentencing option in Tasmania. A home detention order confines offenders to 
their homes during specified times for the duration of the sentence under strict supervision and 
conditions. It can operate as a sentence in its own right (front-end home detention) or as a form of 
conditional release after a period of full-time imprisonment (back-end home detention). It may involve 
electronic monitoring. Its claimed advantages include reduced imprisonment rates with cost benefits 
and avoiding disruption to employment and family life. Problems include net-widening and 
discriminatory operation. 
The adoption of home detention as a sentencing option in its own right 
Notwithstanding the dangers of net-widening, the Institute recommends the adoption of home 
detention as a sentencing option in its own right (front-end home detention). To avoid net-widening, 
the sanction should be construed as a form of custody with the court being first required to impose a 
term of custody before making a home detention order. In order to facilitate offenders pursuing 
treatment if necessary, compensating the victim where possible and taking steps to make restoration to 
the community where appropriate, home/residential confinement should be the core condition of the 
order but it should be multidimensional with additional conditions that reflect the additional needs of 
the offender or the restorative aims of the order. 
Court to obtain assessment report and the need for consent 
In order to protect the offender’s family, the Institute recommends that before making a home 
detention order, the court should obtain an assessment report which addresses the suitability of the 
offender for such a disposition, the impact of the order on third parties and the environment in which 
the offender will be confined. The consent of co-residents should be a precondition. 
No discretion to make home detention longer than term of custody it replaces 
The Institute considered whether it was desirable that courts have a discretion to make a home 
detention order longer than the term of custody it replaces. On balance, it was decided that this was not 
appropriate. Although a sentence served by way of home detention is less severe than a sentence 
served in prison, offenders sentenced to home detention do not have access to remissions or parole so 
in effect will generally spend longer in detention. The Institute also recommends that no limits be 
placed on the length of the order, but judicial officers will be required to review orders in excess of six 
months. The Institute did not consider it desirable to exclude specific offences from home detention 
orders. However, offenders who pose a significant risk to society should be excluded. Offenders 
convicted of a domestic violence offence should not be returned home to serve the sentence although 
they could be required to serve it in a community-based residence with appropriate conditions to 
protect the victim. 
Need for additional resources 
While the Institute recommends that home detention orders be introduced in Tasmania, it should not 
be introduced unless Corrective Services are given additional resources to devote more time to 
surveillance and support of offenders. Provision should also be made for home detention programs to 
be available to ensure adequate support and supervision. 
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Recommendations 
19. The Institute recommends that ‘front-end’ home detention be introduced as a sentencing option 
and that it be called ‘home detention’. (3.4.11, 3.4.13) 
20. That it should not be a condition of a suspended sentence but a custodial sentence located in the 
sentencing hierarchy between an immediate sentence of imprisonment and a wholly suspended 
sentence of imprisonment. (3.4.12) 
21. That home/residential confinement be a core condition of the order but courts should have the 
discretion to impose additional orders to reflect the needs of the offender or the restorative aims of the 
sentence. (3.4.14) 
22. That a home detention assessment report be a prerequisite of a home detention order. (3.4.15) 
23. That a court must not make a home detention order unless the offender consents and signs an 
undertaking to comply with their obligations under the order. (3.4.15) 
24. That consent of co-residents be a prerequisite of the order and consent should be able to be 
withdrawn at any time. (3.4.15) 
25. That offenders sentenced to home detention not be eligible for remissions or parole. (3.4.16) 
26. That there be no limits on the length of the order but that judicial officers be required to review 
orders in excess of six months. (3.4.17) 
27. That there should be no offence-based exclusion criteria, however, an offender who poses a 
significant risk in terms of committing a further violent offence should not be eligible for a community 
custody order. (3.4.18) 
28. That the courts should have a discretion to order home detention be served in a place other than the 
offender’s home in appropriate cases (e.g. in cases of domestic violence offences and homeless 
offenders). (3.4.15, 3.4.19) 
29. That additional resources be allocated to Community Corrections for preparation of assessment 
reports, supervision of home detainees and provision of home detention programs. (3.4.20) 
Periodic detention  
Periodic detention involves imprisoning offenders for limited periods but allowing them to spend the 
remainder of their time at home, at work or otherwise in the community. It is not a sentencing option 
in Tasmania. It has the same kind of advantages as home detention. In addition to possible net-
widening, its disadvantages include the capital cost of increasing detention facilities, operational 
difficulties and compliance rates. 
No periodic detention 
The Institute considers that there is a real advantage in seeking to avoid some of the negative impacts 
of imprisonment such as disruption of employment, family life and education. In view of the capital 
costs in building appropriate facilities, the Institute’s view is that the most pressing need is for 
resources for programs rather than bricks and mortar.  
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Recommendation 
30. The Institute does not recommend that periodic detention be introduced as a sentencing option at 
this time (for the reasons outlined in para 3.5.9).  
Intensive correction orders 
An intensive correction order is an intermediate sanction which is available in Victorian and 
Queensland. It is not a sentencing option in Tasmania. In Victoria and Queensland, intensive 
correction orders are an enhanced community service and probation order combined. The model in 
Victoria has core conditions which include requirements to report twice per week (at a minimum) and 
12 hours attendance for community work (eight hours minimum) and counselling treatment or 
education. Additional conditions could include curfew restrictions and electronic monitoring. 
No intensive correction orders 
The advantages of an intensive correction order are similar to home detention and periodic detention. 
It also enables to offender to return a benefit to the community in the form of work on community 
projects but at the same time it has an element of punishment. The Institute’s view is that the concept 
of an intensive correction order is a confusing one which does not convey whether it is in essence an 
enhanced probation order or an enhanced community service order. Evidence also suggests that 
increased supervision or surveillance does not operate to prevent re-offending. 
Recommendation 
31. For the reasons outlined in paras 3.6.7 – 3.6.8, the Institute does not recommend the introduction 
of the intensive correction order in Tasmania, either as a means of serving a sentence of imprisonment 
or as a sentencing option in its own right. 
Community service orders 
Community service orders require an offender to perform unpaid work or other activities in the 
community for a specified number of hours under the direction of a probation officer or supervisor. It 
is a sanction that has a punitive element, a rehabilitative element and a restorative element.  
Retention of community services orders 
After reviewing the operation of community service orders and considering the submissions received, 
the Institute’s view is that community service orders are a credible, logical and effective sentencing 
option. Community service orders have consistently high completion rates. There is no comprehensive 
reconviction data for community services orders. The data that is available suggests that offenders 
sentenced to community service alone perform better that those offenders sentenced to probation alone 
or community service order and probation order. 
The Institute considered whether to recommend adopting a generic community sentence with a menu 
of options including compulsory unpaid work, supervision by a probation officer, attendance at 
programs etc. This was rejected in favour of retaining community service orders as a distinct option 
with a number of changes that are set out in the list below. 
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Recommendations 
32. The Institute does not recommend that a generic community sentence should replace community 
service orders and probation orders, (3.7.13) however, it does recommend that s 28 of the Sentencing 
Act 1997 (Tas) be amended so that supervision or attendance at a ‘rehabilitation program’ for domestic 
violence offenders is made available as an optional condition of a community service order. (3.7.13) 
33. The Institute recommends that s 8(2)(a) and (b) (which allow a CSO to be combined with a 
probation order or a rehabilitation order) be omitted (3.7.13). This conforms with the Institute’s view 
that sanction stacking is undesirable, but there should be flexibility in relation to conditions of 
sentencing orders (see above para 3.3.36). 
34. The Institute recommends that community service order assessments assess an offender’s need for 
supervision and programs, suitability for work and availability of programs. (3.7.13) 
35. The Institute recommends that the Part 6 (Fines) of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) be amended to 
include the power to impose a community service order where the penalty prescribed is a mandatory 
minimum fine or imprisonment. (3.7.14) 
36. The Institute does not recommend that the power to impose a community service order be 
broadened so it is available for offences that are not punishable by imprisonment. If an offender 
cannot pay a fine, the judicial officer should impose a conditional release order. (3.7.14) 
37. The Institute also recommends that the New Zealand practice of remitting up to 10 per cent of the 
aggregate of the total of community service hours be further explored by the Justice Department. 
(3.7.15) 
38. The Institute recommends that the Justice Department conduct a review of the community service 
order scheme4 to ensure the availability of adequate resources to provide projects in country areas, a 
diversity of projects so that women and others with dependants, those with health problems and 
disabilities have suitable work and that promising findings from projects such as the UK’s Pathfinder 
project can be implemented in this state. (3.7.16) 
Probation orders 
A Probation order is a sentence which requires an offender to be under the supervision of a probation 
officer and to obey the reasonable directions of that officer. The period of probation must not exceed 
three years. Probation is a sentencing option that has been available to courts in Tasmania since 1934. 
Probation orders have the advantage of promoting rehabilitation by maintaining community contacts 
and allowing for remedial intervention in a cost effective way.  
Need to revitalise probations orders 
The Institute has reviewed the operation of probation orders. It rejects the idea of a generic community 
sentencing order in favour of preserving the distinct identity of different community sentencing 
options, including probation orders. However, it has recommended that supervision by a probation 
officer be an optional condition of wholly suspended sentences, community service orders and a core 
condition of home detention. As a distinct sentencing option in its own right, the probation order has 
waned in popularity and the Institute sees a real need to revitalise it as credible stand-alone sentencing 
option.  
                                                
4  The Institute understands that such a review is now underway. 
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The Institute’s view is that actions need to be taken to restore the reputation of probation orders as a 
reputable sentencing option and recommendation 41 outlines the steps it sees as necessary.  
Need for rigorous monitoring 
The Institute recommends that if probation orders are to be perceived as an effective sentencing 
option, orders must be rigorously monitored, action must be taken in respect of breach when 
appropriate and a consistent approach adopted to breach by the courts. The Institute recommends that 
the Justice Department conduct a breach study to investigate the incidence of breach of orders and the 
outcomes of breach proceedings. To ensure the response to breaches of orders is consistent, fair and 
firm, it is recommended that guidelines be created for probation officers and judges and magistrates. 
Based on systematic research reviews, there is now a wealth of literature available on the effectiveness 
of a wide range of rehabilitative programs and effective case management and practitioner skills in 
supervision. The Institute recommends that a thorough review be undertaken to determine a range of 
evidence-based programs that can be made available for offenders to address both their criminogenic 
needs and utilise their strengths. 
Recommendations 
39. The Institute does not recommend a generic community sentencing order for the reasons outlined 
in para 3.8.13. (and see 3.7.13) 
40. The Institute does not recommend altering the place of probation orders in the hierarchy of 
sanctions to indicate that it is a more serious sanction than a community service order for the reasons 
given in para 3.8.20. 
41. In the Institute’s view there are two basic problems with probation orders that need to be 
addressed. First, there is a need to restore confidence in probation orders as an independent sentencing 
option (as evidenced by the fact that 90 per cent of probation orders in the Supreme Court and more 
than 50 per cent of orders in the Magistrates Court are combined with a more serious penalty) and 
secondly, there is the lack of resources devoted to community corrections. To help restore the 
reputation of probation orders as a credible independent sentencing option, the Institute recommends: 
• that the Justice Department conduct a breach study of probation orders to inform guidance for 
probation and judicial officers in relation to breach proceedings. 
• that a review be conducted to determine a range of evidence-based programs for introduction in 
Tasmania to enhance the potential of probation to reduce recidivism and encourage desistance 
and that resources be made available to offer these programs to appropriately targeted offenders. 
• that such programs be supported by proper assessment, motivation, case-management and 
reinforcement of learning to follow-up and support program effects. 
• that the possibility of ongoing supervision by the court be considered for certain categories of 
offenders on probation orders. 
Fines 
The fine is the most common sanction in the Magistrates Court, but is rarely imposed in the Supreme 
Court. A fine cannot be imposed unless a conviction is recorded. The Institute recommends that courts 
should have the discretion to fine without recording a conviction.  
Improving the enforcement procedure for fines 
A common difficulty with fines is enforcement. However, it is an issue that the government has in 
hand with the enactment of the Monetary Penalties Enforcement Act 2005. This Act creates a new 
statutory scheme to improve the procedure for the enforcement of fines. The Institute has considered 
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the power of the Director of the Monetary Penalties Enforcement System to order suspension of an 
offender’s driver’s licence or vehicle registration for failure to comply with an enforcement order 
issued for fine default. While this measure has an instinctive appeal, the Institute is concerned that 
experience in other jurisdictions reveals real problems with this method of fine enforcement. It is 
inevitable that the introduction of licence and registration cancellation as a sanction for fine default for 
non-traffic offences will promote the use of unregistered vehicles and increase the incidence of driving 
while disqualified. This measure has the potential to cause real hardship to certain groups of people, 
such as the young, the disadvantaged and people from rural areas where access to public transport is 
limited. The Institute therefore recommends that the provisions in the Monetary Penalties 
Enforcement Act 2005 that allow the Director of the Monetary Penalties Enforcement System to 
impose the sanctions of suspension of driver licences and car registration for fine default be repealed. 
Making fines fairer 
Fines raise the issue of unequal impact. In imposing a fine, a court must determine the level of fine 
that reflects the seriousness of the offence and then make an appropriate adjustment downwards if the 
offender is unable to pay. There is no power in Tasmania to increase a fine on the grounds of the 
affluence of the offender. In the case of a mandatory minimum fine, there is no discretion to reduce the 
amount of the fine below the minimum. An option to address the principles of equity before the law 
and equal impact is a ‘day fine’ or ‘unit’ fine. Day fines require that the amount of the fine be 
calculated as a proportion of the daily income of the offender. The Institute is attracted to the day or 
unit fine concept. It has the potential to achieve more and fairer fining. However, the Institute 
recognises that it is not currently feasible within the Tasmanian framework to introduce day or unit 
fines. As a long-term strategy, the Institute recommends that the government set up a project to 
investigate how a day fine scheme could be introduced in Tasmania. In the meantime, the Institute 
recommends enactment of the English approach that requires courts to consider the offender’s 
financial circumstances whether this has the effect of increasing or reducing the amount of the fine. 
Recommendations 
42. The Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 7(e) be amended to empower 
courts to fine an offender without recording a conviction. (3.9.6) 
43. The Institute recommends that Monetary Penalties Enforcement Act 2005 (Tas) be amended to 
omit the power of the Director of the Monetary Penalties Enforcement System to order suspension of 
an offender’s driver’s licence or vehicle registration for failure to comply with an enforcement order 
issued for fine default. (3.9.13) 
44. The Institute recommends that the government establish a feasibility study to investigate how a 
day fine scheme could be introduced into Tasmania. (3.9.19) 
45. Pending the introduction of unit fines, the Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 
(Tas), Part 6 be amended to insert a new provision: 
(a) requiring a court to inquire into an offender’s financial circumstances before fixing the amount 
of a fine; 
(b) providing the amount of the fine should reflect the seriousness of the offence; 
(c) that in fixing the fine a court should take into account the offender’s financial circumstances; 
(d) empowering the court to make a financial circumstances order, requiring the offender to provide 
the court with such financial details as it requests. (3.9.20) 
Conditional release order (section 7(f) orders) 
A court may, with or without recording a conviction, adjourn proceedings for a period not exceeding 
60 months and, on the offender giving an undertaking with conditions attached, order the release of the 
offender. If the offender observes the conditions, at the end of the adjournment period, the offender 
will be discharged or the offence dismissed. Non-compliance with the conditions will expose the 
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offender to being re-sentenced for the original offence as well as to being fined for the breach. 
However, breach of the conditions of the order is not made an offence. 
Need to monitor outcomes 
The Institute’s view is that breach of a conditional release order should not be an offence. This accords 
with the current position. However, it is unsatisfactory that there is no data on outcomes of these 
orders so the extent to which orders are breached or followed up is unknown. If conditional release 
orders are never followed-up and breaches never dealt with, it is pointless having such orders. To 
ensure that conditional release orders are a credible sentencing option, the Institute recommends that 
the Justice Department follow-up orders and report on breach rates annually. It also recommends that a 
reconviction study be done to ascertain the extent to which offenders have been of ‘good behaviour’ 
and the outcomes of these orders. 
Recommendation 
46. The Institute recommends: 
• that the Justice Department follow-up conditional release orders and report on breach rates 
annually; 
• that a reconviction study be done to ascertain the outcomes of conditional release orders. 
(3.10.4) 
Rehabilitation program orders and drug treatment orders 
No recommendation in relation to rehabilitation program orders 
The Institute makes no recommendations in relation to rehabilitation program orders for domestic 
violence offenders. These orders became available from 30 March 2005 as part of the Safe at Home 
program. No such orders have been made in the Supreme Court and the most recent Justice 
Department Annual Report does not record the number made in the Magistrates Court. 
Drug treatment orders 
In the Issues Paper, one of the discussion points asked whether there was a need for a specialised order 
for offenders convicted of drug and drug-related offences. In 2005 the Institute accepted a reference on 
the feasibility of a drug court pilot and embarked on the project with funding from the Law 
Foundation of Tasmania. However, it became clear that the government had opted for a court 
mandated diversion project rather than a drug court. In mid 2007 the pilot program for drug offenders 
called Court Mandated Diversion for drug offenders (CMD) was introduced. There are three levels or 
tiers in the program. The first level is a bail diversion program which operates post plea and allows 
diversion to drug treatment for up to 12 weeks as a condition of bail. Court review is possible through 
additional mentions. At the second level, drug treatment can be made available in several ways. This 
includes as a condition of a suspended sentence or a probation order, or offenders on community 
service orders can be referred to drug treatment using the standard condition to attend ‘other programs 
as directed by a probation officer’.5 The drug treatment order at the third level is supported by 
amendments to the Sentencing Act that provide that if a court is constituted by a magistrate, it may 
record a conviction and make a drug treatment order. 
                                                
5 Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 28(g). 
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The retention of CMD 
Funding for the program is in some doubt after June 2008 and at this stage no drug treatment orders 
can be made after 31 May 2008. Of equal concern is the issue of ongoing funding for treatment that 
supports suspended sentences, probation orders and community service orders. The Institute 
recommends that if the evaluation of CMD proves promising, each of the three levels of the program 
should continue and drug treatment orders should also be made available to offenders convicted in the 
Supreme Court by referral to the Magistrates Court when appropriate. There should also be power for 
the Supreme Court to make a drug treatment order. 
Recommendation 
47. The Institute recommends that if the evaluation of the Court Mandated Diversion of Drug 
Offenders program proves promising: 
• each of the three levels of the program should continue; and 
• the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) should be amended to enable offenders convicted in the Supreme 
Court to be made subject to drug treatment orders. (3.11.7) 
Breach of non-custodial orders 
Breach of a community service order, breach of probation, breach of a rehabilitation order and breach 
of a drug treatment order constitute an offence. The breach offence is not used for breach of a 
suspended sentence or for conditional release orders. It appears that the purpose of the breach offence 
is procedural rather than punitive. It provides a mechanism to allow the person to be brought back to 
the court. 
Overall of procedures in relation to breach of sentencing orders 
The Institute’s view is that procedures in relation to breach of sentencing orders need to be radically 
overhauled. In relation to suspended sentences the failure to follow-up breaches of suspended 
sentences and probation orders has been highlighted. A study of breach of suspended sentences found 
that action was only taken in five per cent of breaches of wholly suspended sentences. 
The Institute recommends that expeditious procedures be put in place to enable offenders to be 
brought back to court when necessary to ensure that sentencing orders are credible. It recommends 
offences of breach of community service, probation and rehabilitation order be abolished and replaced 
with legislative provisions similar for breach of a suspended sentence and breach of a conditional 
order. 
Recommendation 
48. The Institute recommends that:  
• the offences of breach of a community service order, breach of a probation order and breach of a 
rehabilitation program order be abolished and replaced with breach provisions similar to those in 
s 27 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas); 
• the procedures for follow-up and actioning breaches of community orders be radically 
overhauled.(3.12.3) 
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Part 4: Role of Victims 
(a)  Consider whether the interests of victims are adequately dealt with in the sentencing process and 
to what extent the objective of section 3(h) [that of recognising the interests of victims] has been 
met. 
(b)  In particular consider the efficacy of compensation orders and the victims’ levy. 
The role of victims in the criminal justice system has traditionally been a very limited one. However, 
in recent decades attempts have been made to accommodate the interests of victims in the criminal 
justice system. An objective of the Sentencing Act is to recognise the interests of victims. This report 
considers the extent to which the Act and the sentencing process achieves this aim. 
Victim Impact Statements (VIS) 
The effect of the crime on the victim is relevant to the exercise of sentencing discretion. When a 
person is found guilty of an offence, a victim of that offence may provide the court with a written 
statement that gives particulars of any injury, loss or damage suffered by the victim as a direct 
consequence of the offence and describes the effect of the offence on the victim.  
VIS is a valuable tool in the sentencing process 
In the Issues Paper, the Institute asked for comments in relation to any issues arising out of giving 
legal recognition to VIS that need to be addressed and whether victims should have the option of 
furnishing a VIS without having that statement read out in court. Since the release of the Issues Paper, 
many of the problems and concerns in relation to VIS have either been addressed by the introduction 
of appropriate safeguards or answered by research. It is no longer a requirement of the legislation that 
the VIS must be read out in court. While VIS remains controversial, the Institute’s view is that VIS is 
a valuable tool in the sentencing process.  
Value of VIS to victims and secondary victims needs clarification and examination 
The Institute’s view is that issues associated with the value of VIS to victims and secondary victims 
warrant further clarification and examination. The Institute recognises that providing a VIS and the 
court’s use of it in sentencing comments to acknowledge the effects of the crime on the victim can 
have a positive impact on the victim. However, to ensure that victims do not see the primary purpose 
of VIS as affecting the sentencing outcome, and to avoid disappointing victims, the Institute 
recommends that the advice given by the prosecution, by the Victims Support Services, Victims of 
Crime Services and Sexual Assault Services continue to make this point and that it be included in the 
Victims Support Services’ brochure. 
The Institute recommends that research be conducted to examine the effectiveness of VIS as a tool for 
the courts and for victims. 
Retention of right of secondary victims to make a VIS 
The Institute recommends retaining the right of the family of victims in homicide cases to make a VIS. 
However, it recommends that advice to victims should make it clear that this is but one factor the court 
will consider in imposing sentence and that it cannot lead the court putting a greater value on one life 
rather than another.
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Recommendations 
49. The Institute supports the use of victim impact statements. They are a valuable tool in the 
sentencing process which assist the court in assessing the effects of the crime on the victim, and 
provide the victim with a voice in the sentencing process. The courts’ use of VIS can be therapeutic 
and empowering for victims. To ensure that provision of a VIS provides a positive experience for 
victims, the Institute recommends that the advice given by the Victims Assistance Unit and other 
victim services assisting with VIS continue to ensure the focus is on the symbolic and communicative 
function of VIS rather than its impact on the sentencing outcome. It recommends that this be explained 
in the Victims Support Service’s brochure. (4.2.9 – 4.2.12) 
50. The Institute recommends retaining the right of the family victims in homicide cases to make a 
VIS. However, as in the previous recommendation, it recommends that advice to victims should make 
it clear that this is but one factor the court will consider in imposing sentence and that it cannot lead to 
the court putting a greater value on one life rather than another. (4.2.13) 
51. The Institute recommends that research be conducted in this jurisdiction to examine the value of 
VIS to the courts and victims. (4.2.14) 
Victim mediation 
The Sentencing Act 1997, s 84(1) provides that courts may order or receive a mediation report prior to 
sentence. A mediation report is a report by a mediator about any mediation or attempted mediation 
between the offender and victim. These provisions have been rarely used if at all. Victim offender 
mediation has been carried out on an ad hoc basis by the Justice Department for a number of years, 
usually using external mediation services. In the Issues Paper, the Institute asked questions in relation 
to why there had been so few referrals for mediation reports.  
A pilot community conference program for young adults 
The Institute’s view is that victim offender mediation appears to have been overtaken by another 
restorative justice measure, namely, community conferences. In the juvenile justice area, the 
community conference or ‘family group conference’ has proved extremely popular. Legislation exists 
in Tasmania for community conferences, which are primarily an alternative to court proceedings for 
young offenders. However, they may also be ordered by a magistrate prior to sentencing a youth. The 
Institute considers that community conferencing may be an appropriate program for young adult 
offenders in Tasmania. 
Recommendation 
52. The Institute recommends a pilot community conferencing program for young adults modelled on 
both the New South Wales pilot and on Tasmania’s youth justice experience with conferencing. 
(4.3.5) 
Compensation Orders 
To promote a focus on victims, the Sentencing Act 1997 made compensation orders mandatory for 
burglary, stealing, robbery, arson and injury to property and gave compensation orders priority over 
fines where the offender has insufficient means to pay both. Currently, a compensation order is an 
ancillary order. An examination of the use of compensation orders under the Act suggests that these 
provisions have failed to fulfil the promise of compensating victims of property crime. Despite 
provisions requiring the courts to make orders in respect of convictions for the above offences where 
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there is evidence of loss, it appears orders are not made in the majority of those cases, and of those 
made, very few are paid. 
Making compensation orders discretionary 
The Institute’s view is that a more realistic approach than the current mandatory approach to 
compensation orders is to require courts to consider making an order rather than to require them to do 
so. Compensation orders should be discretionary. However, the Institute also considers that the court 
should be required to consider whether a compensation order should be made in every case where it 
appears to the court that another person has suffered injury, loss, destruction or damage as a result of 
the offence. If a compensation order is not made, the court should have a duty to give reasons for not 
doing so. 
Making compensation order a sentencing option in its own right 
The Institute considers that compensation orders should no longer be ancillary orders but included in 
the list of sentencing orders in the Sentencing Act 1997, s 7. It would automatically follow that the 
making of a compensation order would be relevant to the sentencing discretion, but this would not 
deflect the court from imposing a custodial sentence or a community service order if that is what the 
offence justifies. 
The offender’s means should be relevant 
The Institute considers that the offender’s means should be relevant to the amount of a compensation 
order.  
Need for greater resources 
Based on the study of compensation orders, the Issues Paper suggested that neither courts nor 
prosecutors had done all they could to make compensation orders more successful. Greater efforts 
could be made to adduce evidence of loss at the sentencing stage as part of the normal information 
supplied to the court. Adequate resources need to be provided to prosecutors to enable this to be done. 
There needs to be a review of the administrative procedures and resources associated with the making 
of compensation orders to enable them to more fully utilised.  
Combination orders and compensation as a condition of a sentencing option 
The Institute’s view is that it is possible to combine a compensation order with other sentencing orders 
such as a suspended sentence, a community service order or a probation order to add a reparative 
element to a primarily punitive, denunciatory or rehabilitative sentence. A compensation order could 
also be combined with a conditional release order. Compensation can be a possible condition of a 
suspended sentence, a community service order or a probation order. 
Need for enforcement 
The Institute considers that payment of compensation orders be enforced in the same manner as fines.  
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Recommendations 
53. The Institute is of the view that the interests of victims would be better served by making some 
fundamental changes to compensation orders including making a compensation order a sentencing 
option in its own right.  
54. The Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 68(1) be amended omitting the 
requirement that compensation orders must be made for injury loss, destruction or damage if the 
offence is burglary, stealing, robbery, arson or injury to property. Instead courts should be required to 
consider making a compensation order in cases where injury, loss, destruction or damage has been 
caused by the offence and where such an order is not made, give reasons for not doing so. This 
requirement should be inserted in s 8A of the Act. (4.4.16) 
55. The Institute recommends that the option of making a compensation order should be included in 
the list of sentencing orders in s 7 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) rather than as an ancillary order in 
Part 9. The provision should state [a court may] ‘with or without recording a conviction make a 
compensation order for injury, loss, destruction or damage suffered by a person as a result of the 
offence’. (The provisions relating to compensation orders in Part 9 will have to be relocated). (4.4.17) 
56. The Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) be amended to provide that in 
determining the amount of a compensation order the court may take into account, as far as practicable, 
the financial circumstances of the offender and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose.6 
(4.4.18 - 4.4.19) 
57. The Institute recommends a review of the administrative procedures and resources associated with 
the making of compensation orders to enable them to be ‘adequately attended to’.7 (4.4.20) 
58. The Institute recommends that courts be empowered to make a compensation order in addition to 
imprisonment, community service order or a fine (this will require amendments to s 8 of the Act). It 
also recommends that courts be given the discretion to make compensation a condition of a suspended 
sentence, a home detention order, a community service order or a probation order. (4.4.16) 
59. The Institute recommends that payment of compensation orders be enforced in the same manner as 
fines. It therefore recommends that: 
• This be clarified in (the relocated) s 69 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) (enforcement as a 
judgment debt) by adding a provision that enforcing the fine in this way does not preclude action 
being taken under s 47 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) for fine default; 
• That the definition of ‘fine’ in s 3 of the Monetary Penalties Enforcement Act 2005 (Tas) be 
amended to include ‘or the Supreme Court’ after the words ‘Magistrates Court’. (4.4.1) 
Compensation Levies 
Convicted offenders are required to pay compensation levies which are used to help fund criminal 
injuries compensation awards for personal injuries. The levy is $50 for convictions in the Supreme 
Court and $20 for convictions in the Magistrates Court. Offences attracting a levy include all crimes 
and many summary offences including drink driving and negligent driving. They are enforced in the 
same manner as fines. It has been argued that levies create an unfair burden on poorer offenders, 
particularly those convicted of driving offences, and that they compound the problems of 
imprisonment of offenders for fine default. 
                                                
6  For a similar provision see Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 86(2). See also Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 
53(3). 
7  Director of Public Prosecutions, submission, 2. 
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Retention of compensation levies 
The Institute’s view is that levies are a useful means of funding criminal injuries compensation. 
However, the Institute considers that changes should be made to the scheme to improve its function. 
The levy is not about compensation or punishment but in effect a revenue raising device which should 
be easily calculated. A flat rate for a sentence irrespective of the number of offences should be 
prescribed with scales based on the most serious conviction. The levy should be imposed on 
infringement notices as well as on court imposed sentences. 
The time for payment should be a standard period, namely 14 days from conviction or release from 
prison, with a discretion to the judicial officer to otherwise order. 
Need for greater victim information 
The Institute is aware that victims sometimes misconstrue compensation levies and see the levy as in 
some way representing compensation for injury or damage suffered. It is therefore recommends that 
the nature of the levy be explained in the Victims Support Services’ brochure for victims.  
Recommendations 
60. To increase the amount that compensation levies contribute to the criminal injuries compensation 
fund that the Victims of Crime Compensation Act 1994 (Tas) be amended to adopt a scale which 
increases the amount payable and better reflects the seriousness of the offence. (4.5.6) 
61. That a levy be imposed on infringement notices as well as on court imposed sentences as is done in 
South Australia. (4.5.6) 
62. That the time for payment for levies be a standard 14 days from conviction or release from prison 
with a discretion for the court to otherwise order. (4.5.7) 
63. That the nature of the compensation levy be explained in the Victims Support Services brochure 
for victims to counter any misperception that the levy represents compensation for their injury or loss. 
(4.5.8) 
The Victims Register 
The Charter of Victims Rights provides that victims have the right to be advised on request of an 
offender’s release from custody in cases of sexual assault or other personal violence. The Charter has 
not been formally adopted by the Tasmanian Parliament but aspects of it have been implemented. 
When the Issues Paper was released, the Victims’ Register had just been established to create the 
ability to provide victims with release information. Some responses to the Issues Paper showed 
concerns in relation to the early stages of the development of the Victims’ Register.  
The Victims’ Register is now well established in Tasmania and is an automated database that 
enables registered victims to be provided with broad range of information in relation to the 
sentence and release of the offender. 
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Part 5: Parole 
(a) Consider and comment upon the legislative requirement that judges and magistrates state the 
non-parole period. 
(b) Consider the length of the minimum non-parole period. 
(c) Consider and comment upon the legislative requirement that the Parole Board take into account 
a Victim Impact Statement (VIS) provided to it and not make a decision until a victim whose 
name has been entered on the Victims’ Register has been given an opportunity to make a VIS. 
(d) Consider and comment upon the legislative requirement that the Parole Board publish its 
decisions. 
Parole is a system of early, supervised release. Models of parole vary between jurisdictions. In 
Tasmania the current model provides that offenders serving sentences of 12 months or more are 
normally eligible for release after six months or one-half of the sentence, whichever is longer. 
However, this will not be the case where the sentencing judge has extended the non-parole period or 
ordered that the offender is not to be released on parole. Legislative changes in 2002 mean that a 
failure by the sentencing judge to specify a non-parole period also makes an offender ineligible for 
parole. The release of prisoners eligible for parole is decided by the Parole Board. 
Parole has clear economic benefits. It reduces the prison population and the costs of supervision are 
less than the costs of incarceration. It can be argued it offers offenders an incentive to rehabilitate. 
Although it cannot be confidently claimed that parole prevents recidivism, there is some evidence to 
suggest that it has a marginally positive effect. 
Retention of discretionary parole 
The Institute supports the retention of the current model of parole in Tasmania. Discretionary parole, 
rather than automatic parole release, provides offenders with an incentive to address offending 
behaviour by participating in rehabilitation programs, it assists with the management of offenders in 
custody by proving an incentive for good behaviour and it encourages offenders to develop post-
release plans. 
Recommendation 
64. The Institute supports the current parole model in which parliament sets the minimum non-parole 
period, the court determines the parole eligibility date and the Parole Board determines the date of 
release for parole eligible offenders. (5.1.11) 
Stating the non-parole period as part of the sentence 
Prior to the 2002 amendments to the Parole Act 1975, it was quite rare for courts either to make an 
order that the offender not be eligible for parole or to extend the statutory non-parole period. A 
primary purpose of requiring the judge to state a non-parole period was ‘truth in sentencing’. In other 
words it was aimed at transparency by requiring the judge to be more explicit about when an offender 
was eligible for release. It has also had the result that judges have increased the non parole period 
beyond the minimum period much more often than prior to the amendments. Prior to the amendments, 
there was a prima facie presumption in favour of a non-parole period of half the sentence. This 
presumption has gone and non-parole periods have increased as a percentage of the operative 
sentence. 
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Retention of requirement to stipulate non-parole period 
The Institute supports the requirement for a judge or magistrate to stipulate the non-parole period at 
the time of the sentence on the grounds that a failure to do so confuses the public and the victim about 
what the sentence means in practice. 
Re-instate prima facie right to apply for parole after half the sentence 
The Institute is concerned that there appears to be inconsistency between the judges in the way in 
which they approach fixing the non-parole period. The Institute considers that legislation should re-
instate the prima facie right of a prisoner to apply for parole after half the sentence has been served by 
inserting in s 17 a provision to the effect that the court shall state a period that is one-half of the period 
of the sentence unless it is satisfied that the circumstances it is required to consider in s 17(4) require 
an extension of that period or a no non-parole period to be set. 
Reasons to be given in all cases 
There are clear drafting problems with the Sentencing Act 1997, s 17. The Institute considers it 
incongruous to require reasons when a judge orders that an offender is not eligible for parole but not to 
require reasons when parole is denied because no non-parole period is set. The Institute recommends 
that s 17(7) be amended so that it requires reasons to be given for specifying a non-parole period and 
for denying parole for all sentences of imprisonment in excess of 12 months. It is also recommended 
that a court be required to state that an offender is not eligible for parole when parole eligibility is 
denied by the court. 
Recommendations 
65. In the light of the inconsistencies that have emerged between judges in sentencing practices 
relating to the extension of non-parole periods and the denial of parole eligibility, the Institute 
recommends that s 17 be amended to include a requirement that the court state a period that is equal to 
the statutory non-parole period unless it is satisfied having regard to the circumstances that it is 
required to consider in s 17(4) that an extension of that period is necessary or parole should be denied. 
(5.2.17) 
66. It is recommended that s 17(7) be amended so that when a sentence of more than 12 months 
imprisonment is imposed and an order is made under s 17(2)(a) that an offender is not eligible for 
parole or an order is made under s 17(2)(b) setting a non-parole period, reasons for such an order are 
given. (5.2.18) 
67. It is recommended that a court be required to state that an offender is not eligible for parole when 
parole eligibility is denied by requiring a court to make an order under s 17(2)(a) or (b). (5.2.18)  
Should the statutory non-parole period be extended in Tasmania? 
No alteration to statutory non-parole period 
The minimum period that a prisoner must serve before being eligible for parole varies between 
jurisdictions. The Institute acknowledges that there is some support for increasing the statutory non-
parole period from 50 per cent of the sentence and that a number of other jurisdictions have done so or 
have introduced variable proportions depending on offence type and sentence length. The Institute’s 
view is that there is no need to increase the statutory non-parole period beyond half of the period 
of the operative sentence. The operative sentence means the period of imprisonment that is not 
suspended. The requirement that judges are to address the non-parole period in every case 
sufficiently addresses concerns that a statutory non-parole period of one half of the sentence fails 
to recognise the gravity of the offence. If the judge is of the view that the nature and 
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circumstances of the offence warrant increasing the non-parole period, this can be done. It is also 
noted that generally, where statutory non-parole periods have been increased, this has not been done 
with the aim of increasing the length of prison sentences. The primary aim has been to promote truth 
in sentencing by ensuring that prisoners spend a greater proportion of the pronounced sentence in 
prison. This has meant that adjustments have to be made to sentences imposed to decrease their length. 
Recommendation 
68. The Institute does not recommend increasing the statutory non-parole period in the Corrections 
Act 1997 (Tas) s 68(1) and the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 17(3) beyond half of the period of the 
operative sentence.8 (5.3.10 – 5.3.12) 
Victim Statements 
Amendments to the Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) s 72, provide a mechanism for informing victims of 
an offence that the release of the offender is to be considered by the Board and that they may provide a 
written statement to the Board. Victims whose names appear on the Victims Register managed by 
Victims Support Services are invited to provide a victim statement. The statement is described as one 
that gives particulars of any injury loss or damage suffered by the victim as a direct result of the 
offence and describes the effects on the victim of the commission of the offence.  
The Issues Paper suggested the provision of a victim impact statement to the Parole Board in the terms 
of s 72B of the Corrections Act was inappropriate and incompatible with the basis of parole decisions 
and the purposes of parole. It could mislead victims because it suggests parole is a re-sentencing 
exercise, which it is not. However, a victim’s statement concerning the prisoner’s release and fears in 
relation to it are relevant to the Board’s deliberations. The Institute’s initial concerns that providing 
victim statements to the Board which focus on victim impact may lead victims into thinking that 
parole is a re-sentencing exercise which allows the Board to deny parole on the basis of past or 
ongoing impact of the offence on the victim does not seem to have created problems in practice.  
Amendment to Corrections Act 1997  
The Institute still considers that the Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) s 72(2B)(b) and s 72(4) should be 
amended to reflect the kinds of information about protections of victims that would be useful to both 
the Board and victims. The Institute acknowledges that both what the victim is told by Victim Support 
Services or the Victims of Crime Services and what the Parole Board says in its reasons are likely to 
mean much more to victims than the terms of s 72(2B) of the Corrections Act 1997 (Tas). It also 
acknowledges the importance of symbolic reasons for providing information about victim impact as 
well as instrumental reasons. Nevertheless, it recommends that s 72(2B)(b) be amended to better 
reflect the role of the statement in a Board’s deliberations by adding an additional sub-paragraph 
referring to the ‘matters relevant to the risk of the offender re-offending and the sorts of conditions 
which should be imposed on any parole order in relation to contact with the prisoner.’ 
Recommendation 
69. The Institute recommends that the Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) s 72(2B)(b) be amended to better 
reflect the role of the victim statement in a Board’s deliberations by adding an additional sub-
paragraph referring to the ‘matters relevant to the risk of the offender re-offending and the sorts of 
conditions which should be imposed on any parole order in relation to contact with the prisoner.’ 
(5.4.7- 5.4.9)  
                                                
8  Operative sentence is the term used in the Corrections Act 1997 (see definition in s 3) – it means the period of 
imprisonment that is not suspended. 
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Publication of Parole Board Decisions and open hearings 
Need to publish Parole Board decisions 
The Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) requires the Parole Board to publish reasons for making a parole order 
and to give a copy of those reasons to any victim who has provided a victim statement to the 
Board. However, this does not appear to be happening in all cases. The provisions in relation to 
publication of the Board’s decisions improve the accountability of the Board and the transparency 
of the criminal justice system. The Institute recommends that Parole Board decisions should be 
published on the Parole Board’s website. 
No open hearings 
Another way of ensuring accountability and transparency of Parole Board decisions would be to 
make Parole Board hearings open to the public. Hearings are not currently open to the public in 
Tasmania. The Institute is of the view that opening parole board procedures is not justified. It agrees 
that this would increase formalities, prolong hearings and would not assist in the resettlement of 
offenders. The interests of transparency and improving public confidence in parole would be better 
served by publishing reasons for granting parole. 
Recommendations 
70. The Institute recommends that Parole Board decisions should be published on the Parole Board’s 
website. (5.5.3) 
71. It does not recommend that Parole Board hearings should be open to the public for the reasons 
given in para 5.5.5. 
Part 6: Sexual offenders 
Consider whether the protection of society requires legislative change to the Sentencing Act 1997 
(Tas) and the Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas) in relation to sentencing sexual offenders 
At the request of the Attorney-General, in December 2006 the terms of reference of the 
sentencing project were amended to include consideration of whether the protection of society 
requires legislative change to the Sentencing Act and the Youth Justice Act in relation to 
sentencing sexual offenders. The Institute has approached the issue referred to it by the Attorney-
General in four steps:  
(1) by attempting to address the general question of whether current sentencing practices for rape 
and sexual offences in Tasmania are appropriate; 
(2) by asking whether the protection of society justifies special measures for sex offenders; 
(3) by reviewing sentencing legislation in other jurisdictions which aims to both protect society 
against sex offenders and to improve public confidence in the criminal justice system’s response 
to sex offending; 
(4)  by outlining an approach to address the criticism from some quarters that sentences for sex 
offenders are too lenient. 
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Are current sentencing practices for rape and sexual offences appropriate? 
Sentences for one and two counts of rape have reduced but there is no clear answer about 
appropriateness 
Trying to determine if current sentencing practices for rape and sexual offences in Tasmania are 
appropriate is difficult. Relying on public outcry or media criticism of isolated cases is an unreliable 
guide of informed public opinion. Examining the sentencing ranges for a particular offence is an 
advance on this but there are problems in deciding what is an appropriate range of sentences for any 
particular offence. Deciding an appropriate sentencing range for rape in particular is difficult because 
doing so requires an intuitive judgment about what rape is worth and what rape is worth in comparison 
with other crimes. In theory, comparisons with average sentences imposed in other jurisdictions could 
assist but this can be misleading because of the many differences between jurisdictions in custodial 
sentences, release practices and counting rules for sentencing statistics. Moreover, on some measures 
the sentence may be more severe and on others less severe. The Institute is unable to answer the 
question whether current sentencing practices for rape and sexual offences are too lenient. Examining 
the median sentence for one and two count of rape suggests that sentences have become more lenient.  
Need for further research 
The Institute suggests that what is an appropriate sentencing level for rape and other sexual offences is 
an issue that needs further consideration. This could be done in a number of ways. It could be made a 
focus of investigation in the University of Tasmania’s jury sentencing study which is exploring the use 
of jurors as a means of ascertaining informed public opinion This should be supplemented by further 
research by way of either a deliberative poll or focus groups. Consideration could be given to 
including a range of participants in focus groups, such as victim representatives, lawyers, and other 
experts with an interest in the issue. Another Australian study presents opportunities to obtain 
informed public opinion about sentencing in Tasmania. This sentencing project, which is funded by 
the Australian Research Council, proposes to use both representative surveys with sentencing 
vignettes and focus groups to elicit public opinion about sentencing issues. It is suggested that efforts 
be made to include Tasmania in the later stages of the study.  
Youth must remain a mitigating factor 
The Institute rejects the suggestion that youth should cease to be a mitigating factor. All Australian 
jurisdictions have accepted that special considerations apply in the sentencing of youthful offenders, 
even in cases as serious as rape. The special approach to the sentencing of children is based upon 
public interest as well as mercy. The Institute also supports the existing arrangements for determining 
where sentences of imprisonment are served. 
Recommendations 
72. The Institute recommends that the issue of whether current sentencing practices for sexual 
offences are appropriate should be further investigated by using a range of methods including specially 
designed focus groups and deliberative polls to build upon current research studies that are 
investigating this issue. (6.2.12) 
73. The Institute recommends retaining the common law principles in relation to the sentencing of 
juvenile offenders and does not recommend altering the current position which allows the Director of 
Corrective Services to transfer juvenile offenders to Ashley Detention Centre. (6.2.13 – 6.2.14) 
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Does the protection of society justify special measures for sex offenders? 
Currently there are two special sentencing measures that apply to sex offenders in Tasmania, namely 
sex offender registration orders and dangerous offender declarations.  
Sex offender registration orders 
An offender who is subject to reporting obligations under a sex offender registration order must 
provide the Registrar with a list of personal details, including address, names of children with whom 
he or she has regular unsupervised contact, name and place of employment, including voluntary work 
and practical training, club or organisation membership or affiliation if children participate, and 
vehicle registration details. The offender must notify of changes and interstate travel, as well as 
providing an annual report.  
Dangerous offender declarations 
Under the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 19, a dangerous offender declaration can be made. Such 
offenders receive an indeterminate sentence if it is warranted for the protection of the public. Sexual 
offenders who are declared dangerous because they are a continuing danger to the community are held 
in custody until the court is satisfied that they no longer constitute a danger. In the Institute’s view, 
very persuasive arguments for creating further exceptions to the principle of proportionality would be 
needed to justify the imposition of any further preventive detention measures.  
Sex offenders not more likely to re-offend than other offenders 
Research evidence suggests that special provisions targeting sex offenders cannot be justified on the 
grounds that sex offenders are more likely to re-offend than other categories of offenders. There is no 
evidence that this is so. 
Sentencing options for sex offenders 
No mandatory minimum penalties 
The Institute’s view is that mandatory minimum penalties for rape or sexual offences are 
inappropriate. They can lead to injustice because of inflexibility, they redistribute discretion so that the 
(less visible) decisions by the police and prosecuting authorities become more important, they lead to 
more trials as offenders are less likely to plead guilty and there is little basis for believing that they 
have any deterrent effect on rates of serious crime. 
Recommendation 
74. The Institute opposes the use of mandatory minimum penalties for sex offenders. (6.4.5) 
No standard non-parole period of sex offenders 
‘Standard non-parole period’ is defined as the ‘non-parole period for an offender in the middle range 
of objective seriousness. It differs from the statutory minimum non-parole period discussed in Part 5. 
The parole scheme in Tasmania applies once the judge has determined the appropriate sentence for a 
particular offender. In contrast, a standard non-parole operates in relation to particular offences by 
identifying a reference point to guide sentencing discretion for the non-parole period component of a 
sentence for specific offences in addition to setting the maximum penalty. Standard non-parole periods 
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for sexual offences could be one way of addressing the perception of lenient sentencing for sex 
offences and the apparent decline in sentencing severity for one and two counts of rape. However, this 
is not an approach the Institute recommends.  
While research shows that public knowledge of sentencing practices is woeful and that the public 
consistently underestimate the severity of sentencing practices, there is no reason to believe that 
specifying standard non-parole periods in legislation will have any impact on improving public 
understanding of, and public confidence in, sentencing practices. Standard non-parole periods also 
restrict judicial discretion and can lead to injustice in individual cases. Thirdly, even if only used for 
sexual offences, there will be problems in determining what should be the standard non-parole period 
for rape, aggravated sexual assault, indecent assault and maintaining a sexual relationship with a 
young person. There are also difficulties in relation to sentences for multiple offences. Finally, the 
offence of maintaining a sexual relationship can cover such a wide range of offending, from three 
instances of indecent assault to multiple counts of rape, that a standard non-parole period for such an 
offence would require so many departures from the standard that it would be meaningless and no more 
helpful than current sentencing statistics.  
Recommendation 
75. The Institute does not recommend the introduction of standard non-parole periods for sex offences. 
(6.4.8) 
No additional provisions for longer than proportionate sentences or indefinite sentences for sex 
offenders 
The Institute does not support either enacting provisions to allow courts to impose longer than 
proportionate sentences for sex offenders or the introduction of indeterminate sentences specifically 
for sex offenders. Tasmania already has dangerous offender provisions which allow courts to impose a 
disproportionate sentence to protect the public. A sentence imposed under dangerous offender 
legislation is indeterminate. 
No need for an additional post-sentence detention scheme 
Concern with how to manage the small number of high risk offenders whose term in prison is about to 
end has led some Australian states to introduce legislation to enable offenders to be supervised in the 
community or held in further detention after their sentence has ended.  
The Institute acknowledges that it is possible to argue that the greater good of protecting the public 
from a real risk that an offender who has caused considerable harm by offending sexually justifies a 
scheme which allows preventive detention or supervision. However, sex offenders are currently 
subject to sex offender registration orders on their release from prison and they can be subject to a 
dangerous offender declaration if they have a prior conviction for rape or indecent assault and such an 
order is necessary to protect the public from harm. The Institute notes that dangerous offender 
applications under s 19 of the Sentencing Act 1997 can be made during a term of imprisonment as well 
as at the same time that the term of imprisonment is imposed. In effect, Tasmania already has a post-
sentence preventive detention scheme.  
The Institute has given consideration to the issue of whether there is a need to change the trigger 
conditions for a dangerous offender declaration or to extend the measure to give the court the option of 
imposing supervision rather than detention. It is not persuaded of the need to change the trigger 
conditions by abandoning the requirement for a prior conviction for an offence of violence, for 
example. Dangerous criminal declarations should continue to be confined to exceptional cases.  
The Institute acknowledges that in some cases it may be appropriate to make an application for a 
dangerous offender declaration during an offender’s term of imprisonment, but is of the view that 
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where possible the application should be made at the time of sentence. Currently the legislation 
provides that a dangerous offender application has to be made to the judge before whom an offender is 
convicted or brought up for sentence after being convicted. This could create problems if the 
sentencing judge has ceased to hold office during an offender’s term of imprisonment. It is therefore 
recommended that s 19 of the Sentencing Act 1997 be amended to insert a provision to the effect that 
if the sentencing judge has ceased to hold office or in other special circumstances, another judge may 
consider an application to declare an offender a dangerous criminal. 
Government to consider supervision in community under dangerous offender legislation 
The option of ordering supervision as an alternative to detention is something that could be considered 
by the government. This would entail amendments to s 19 of the Sentencing Act 1997 and would of 
course have significant resource implications.  
Recommendations 
76. The Institute does not recommend the introduction of provisions for post-sentence detention and 
supervision orders on the grounds that existing provisions for preventive detention and monitoring of 
released sexual offenders are adequate. The Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 19 already provides for 
dangerous criminal declarations, which can be made at any time during a sentence of imprisonment of 
an offender who is eligible for such an order. To add a new and separate set of provisions for post 
sentence detention would be unnecessary duplication and confusing. (6.4.25) 
77. The Institute does not recommend that the trigger conditions for a dangerous offender declaration 
should be extended. However, it does suggest that consideration be given to amending s 19 so that 
courts have the option of making a supervision order after the end of the offender’s sentence of 
imprisonment as an alternative. (6.4.26) 
78. To ensure that an application for a dangerous criminal declaration can be heard when the 
sentencing judge is not available, it is recommended that sub-section (1A) be inserted into s 19 to 
provide that if the sentencing judge has ceased to hold office or in other special circumstances, another 
judge may hear an application for a dangerous criminal declaration. (6.4.27) 
No sexual offender predator laws 
A number of US states have sexual predator laws which allow civil commitment procedures to detain 
sex offenders beyond the expiry of an offender’s sentence. This is a procedure that allows for the 
detention of sex offenders at the end of their sentence within the mental health system. There are six 
reasons for the rejection of this model: (1) sex offenders do not clearly fit within the boundary of the 
mental health system; (2) use of civil commitment merely transfers preventive detention from criminal 
to civil system; (3) inpatient medical model may undermine treatment efforts for sex offenders who do 
not have a mental illness; (4) it may violate human rights; (5) diverts focus on the potential for 
restorative justice alternatives; (5) significant resource implications that may limit the availability of 
resources for the treatment of individuals with mental illnesses who have not offended. 
Recommendation 
79. The Institute does not recommend the introduction of civil commitment procedures to detain sex 
offenders beyond the expiry of an offender’s sentence for the reasons given in para 6.4.29. 
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Sex offender treatment and chemical castration 
Government should continue to fund sex offender treatment programs 
There is now considerable evidence that some forms of treatment are effective for sex offenders. The 
Institute recommends that the government continues to fund sex offender treatment programs both in 
an out of prison and that, in particular, more resources be devoted to the follow-up of offenders after 
their release whilst on parole. 
Chemical castration should be available to offenders who consent as part of their treatment 
program 
Drug treatments are sometimes used in the treatment of sex offenders. The Institute does not support 
making chemical castration compulsory – either as a mandatory order if the necessary trigger 
conditions are satisfied or by giving courts a discretion to make a sentencing order which compels the 
offender to submit to drug treatment. However, if an offender chooses to have this form of treatment 
and it is medically indicated and appropriate for the offender, it should be made available by 
correctional authorities as part of an offender’s treatment program. 
Recommendations 
80. The Institute recommends that for the protection of the public the best possible evidence-based sex 
offender treatment programs should be made available in the prison system and in the community and 
that prisoners on sex offender treatment programs should be receive follow-up treatment and support 
after their release. (6.4.30) 
81. The Institute does not recommend that chemical castration should be a sentencing option or a 
condition of a sentencing order but when appropriate it be made available to offenders who consent as 
part of their treatment program. (6.4.32) 
What is the appropriate response to the public perception that sentences for sex offenders 
are too lenient? 
It may be that while the protection of society cannot be shown to require measures in addition to 
dangerous offender declarations and sex offender registration orders such as extended detention 
orders, longer than proportionate measures or mandatory penalties, the existing penalties for sex 
offenders are regarded as too lenient on the grounds that they do not adequately reflect the seriousness 
with which the public views such crimes. To put this in another way, it is not a question of giving 
courts the power to impose penalties for sex offenders that infringe the principle of proportionality. 
Rather it is a question of whether existing penalties for sex offenders are disproportionately lenient – 
that they fail to adequately denounce such offences or to recognise the seriousness of such offences 
and the culpability of those who commit them. 
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Need for further research to determine whether current sentencing practices are too lenient 
The Institute has been unable to answer the question whether current sentencing practices for sex 
offences are too lenient. This is an issue which requires further research. It has been suggested that this 
could be done as an extension of the University of Tasmania’s jury sentencing study and Mackenzie’s 
ARC research (see para 6.2.12). In Part 7, the Institute recommends that a Sentencing Advisory 
Council be established to bridge the gap between the community, courts and government by 
informing, educating and advising on sentencing matters. Exploring the issue of the appropriate 
sentencing levels of sexual offences is a matter that could be undertaken by such a body taking into 
account the research findings from the Jury Sentencing Study and the ARC study. 
Recommendation 
82. The Institute recommends that the issue of the appropriateness of sentencing patterns for sexual 
offenders be referred to the proposed Sentencing Advisory Council. (6.5.2) 
Part 7: Role of the community 
(a) Consider the level to which the objective in section 3(f) of the Sentencing Act [of promoting 
public understanding of sentencing practices and procedures] has been met and make 
recommendations as to how the public can be informed of the sentencing process. 
(b) Consider how community attitudes towards sentencing should be ascertained. 
(c) Examine whether any mechanism could be adopted to more adequately incorporate community 
views into the sentencing process. 
One of the stated purposes of the Sentencing Act is to ‘promote public understanding of sentencing 
practices and procedures.’ While consolidation of sentencing legislation may assist to promote public 
understanding of sentencing practice and procedure, at most it is a preliminary step.  
The need for a well-informed public 
Robust evidence of public opinion about sentencing in Tasmania is limited and research on public 
knowledge of sentencing and criminal justice issues scanty. However, the limited research that exists 
suggests that the Tasmanian public is probably as uniformed as is the public in other jurisdictions. 
Low levels of public knowledge about crime and sentencing are a matter of concern because there is 
strong international evidence that dissatisfaction with sentencing practice is due, at least partly, to a 
number of aspects of public misperception and misinformation. 
How should the public be better informed about sentencing? 
In light of the evidence that a lack of public confidence in the criminal justice system and punitive 
attitudes are linked with misperceptions about crime and sentencing patterns, improving public 
knowledge of crime and sentencing is a priority. 
Government funding for the publication of crime and sentencing information 
The Institute’s view is that there needs to made available simple factual information about crimes and 
sentencing indicating the range of sentences handed down in the Supreme Court and the Magistrates 
Court each year for specific offences in such a way as to communicate the ‘going rate’ for specific 
sorts of crime. In addition to sentencing data, information on crime rates should also be made more 
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accessible. The Institute’s view is that there are a number of deficiencies in sentencing data that need 
to be addressed. First, there is no available data on sentencing patterns in the Magistrates Court. There 
are also limitations in the Supreme Court sentencing database.  
Recommendation 
83. The Institute recommends that the government allocate funding for the publication of easily 
accessible and digestible general crime and sentencing information including annual sentencing 
statistics to promote public understanding of crime and sentencing matters. This would also remedy 
the information deficit in relation to sentencing practices in magistrates’ courts and promote 
consistency. (7.1.18) 
The continuation of and the development of additional public education campaigns, printed 
booklets and sentencing workshops 
The Institute’s view is that a variety of approaches is needed to improve public information about 
sentencing. Existing approaches such as sentencing workshops should be continued. While the 
Institute is aware that the provision of accessible information by booklet and on websites has 
limitations, it supports the use of a sentencing information booklet and notes that the Judicial 
Conference of Australia’ booklet ‘Judge for Yourself’ is already available in the Supreme Court and 
electronically on the Supreme Court website. The Institute also recommends reviewing the results of 
the study that is currently underway in Tasmania which is exploring the use of jurors both as a means 
of educating the public about sentencing matters and using them as a source of public opinion. 
Preliminary results indicate that jurors do take an interest in the sentencing outcome and many discuss 
it with friends and family. 
The Institute agrees with the Justice Department submission that rather than piecemeal and unrelated 
efforts to improve public knowledge of crime and sentencing matters, a comprehensive and carefully 
targeted public education campaign may be more effective. However, resources for this will always be 
an issue. 
Public relations and court media officers not a priority 
Media reporting does play a critical role in the development of public opinion on sentencing. 
However, the Institute is not convinced that the appointment of a media liaison officer is a priority and 
recommends instead the strategies listed below as a starting point.  
Recommendation 
84. The Institute recommends that a number of strategies are necessary to improve public education 
about crime and sentencing including:  
• continuation of sentencing workshops and making them available on a more regular basis by 
calling on more judges and magistrates to assist with them; (7.1.25) 
• updating and expanding the materials for the You be the Judge multi-media package to ensure 
that it is useful and relevant for school and community groups ; (7.1.25) 
• ensuring that the ‘Judge for Yourself’ booklet is widely available or a booklet that includes data 
about crime trends as well as sentencing information; (7.1.26) 
• reviewing the outcome of the Jury Sentencing Study to see if it supports supplying COPS and 
an information booklet to jurors as a regular and ongoing procedure. (7.1.27) 
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Provision of legislative statement of purposes of sentencing 
As noted, the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) contains little detail in relation to sentencing principles and 
goals. The Institute is somewhat sceptical of the educative value of including a list of purposes of 
sentencing in the Sentencing Act. Legislation may be easily accessible by members of the public but 
the extent to which the public access legislation to become better informed is open to question. 
However, there are no disadvantages in listing the purposes and it could be seen as having some value 
as a symbolic attempt to communicate with the public and improve the transparency of sentencing 
goals, particularly as the Act currently fails to acknowledge that retribution and restoration are goals of 
sentencing. 
Recommendations 
85. The Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) include separate sections for the 
purposes of the Act and the purposes of sentencing.  
86. In the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 3, para (b) and (e) should be replaced with the following: 
             (b)  to provide the courts with the purposes of punishment; 
             (e)  to preserve the authority of the law and to promote respect for   the law 
87. It recommends that to better promote the interests of victims and to complement the 
recommendations in Part 4, that the purposes of sentencing include restoration (reparing the harm 
caused by the offence and restoring the relations between the offender, the victim and the community).  
88. The purposes of sentencing should provide: 
 A court can impose a sentence on an offender for one or more of the following purposes only: 
 (a)  to ensure that the offender is punished justly for the offence; 
 (b)  to deter the offender and others from committing the same or similar offences; 
 (c)  to promote the rehabilitation of the offender; 
 (d)  to protect the community by limiting the capacity of the offender to re-offend; 
 (e)  to denounce the conduct of the offenders; and  
             (f) to promote the restoration of relations between the community, the offender and the 
victim. (7.1.35 – 7.1.36) 
No statutory list of sentencing factors 
The Institute has considered whether the Sentencing Act 1997 should incorporate a list of matters 
relevant to sentence. While the Institute has recommended a legislative statement of the purposes for 
which a sentence may be imposed, a legislative list of factors that should be taken into account is more 
problematic for a number of reasons. The common law is clear about the factors that are relevant and 
not relevant. However, it is more problematic to develop a list of factors as there are issues about 
whether factors should be classified as aggravating or mitigating, whether certain factors should be 
mandatory or discretionary and how the list should be structured. There are also dangers in such a list. 
Politicians can be subjected to public pressure to add and remove matters from the list as part of a 
tough on crime agenda. The Institute is of the view that the relevant factors are well known to judicial 
officers and the matter is best left to the common law which is not in need of restatement. The Institute 
is of the same view in relation to giving statutory recognition to sentencing principles. 
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Recommendation 
89. The Institute does not recommend a legislative listing of common law sentencing principles or the 
relevant factors that should be taken into account in imposing sentence on the grounds that such 
legislative listing is unnecessary, complex and has dangers. (7.1.44) 
Ascertaining community attitudes towards sentencing 
The importance of ascertaining informed public opinion as part of the development of appropriate 
policies directed at crime and sentencing cannot be over-stated. Politicians and judicial officers should 
not alter sentencing policies and practices in response to popularist calls for harsher penalties that are 
based on people’s perceptions of crime levels and sentencing severity. Appropriate decisions can only 
be made by acting on informed public opinion. Ways of ascertaining public opinion are critically 
evaluated in Part 7 of this report. 
Need for research to ascertain informed public opinion 
Media polls are not an appropriate way of ascertaining informed public opinion. In order to understand 
the nature of informed public opinion, it is necessary to have a combination of large scale 
representative surveys combined with the qualitative aspects of the deliberative focus groups. There 
are currently two research projects underway which have the potential to go some way to providing 
both public knowledge of crime and justice issues and public opinion on sentencing in Tasmania. The 
Jury Sentencing Study is a Tasmanian based study funded by the Criminal Research Council and 
preliminary findings confirm the potential of this approach to ascertain public opinion about 
sentencing. The second project is an Australian Research Council study of public opinion which 
combines a large scale representative survey with a focus group approach. Only Stage 1 of this study 
includes Tasmania. However, by the provision of additional funding, the opportunity exists to extend 
this project to Tasmania in Stage 2 and the focus groups. The Institute recommends that this be done. 
Public opinion research is a costly exercise. However, when policy decisions purport to be based on 
public opinion it is essential that it be done. The criminal justice system (and therefore politicians and 
judges) should be responsive to the community it was designed to protect. But being responsive to the 
community means responding to informed public judgment not mass public opinion. For these reasons 
the Institute recommends that priority be given to public opinion research as a means making the 
criminal justice system properly responsive to the public. 
Recommendation 
90. The Institute emphasises the importance of research which aims to ascertain informed public 
opinion. It therefore recommends that priority be given to allocating resources to public opinion 
sentencing research in Tasmania. In particular it is recommends that the ARC research team on the 
Sentencing and Public Confidence project be invited to conduct focus groups in Tasmania with 
appropriate financial support. (7.2.12) 
Incorporating community views into the sentencing process 
It is generally agreed that governments, policy makers and judicial officers should have regard to 
informed public opinion on sentencing when enacting sentencing legislation, formulating policy, 
imposing sentence or giving appellate guidance on sentencing. New mechanisms are being developed 
to incorporate a public voice into the criminal justice system. Sentencing advisory bodies, councils, 
panels and commissions with a mandate to incorporate public opinion in their advice to policy makers 
and judges are the obvious example of such a mechanism. More traditional means of taking public 
opinion into account occur by judges responding to public opinion in their sentencing decisions and by 
parliament setting and amending maximum penalties to reflect public views of offence seriousness. 
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Judges reflect informed public opinion 
Case law demonstrates that public opinion, which is to be factored into sentencing decisions, is 
informed public opinion, and the task of ascertaining this is delegated to the judge. Taking into 
account the restrained moral sense of the community, opinion which is rational and balanced will 
exclude the views of bigots, racists and other extreme views. However, it leaves open the question of 
how judicial officers are to discover what is the true nature of informed public opinion, legitimate 
community expectation or the restrained moral sense of the community.  
No new statutory maximum penalties for crimes 
Statutory maximum penalties set by parliament for particular offences are intended to reflect the 
relative severity with which the community perceived particular offences. They provides a legislative 
view of the gravity of the offence. In Tasmania almost all summary offences have their own statutory 
maximum but this is rare for indictable offences. Instead of providing a separate maximum penalty for 
each offence, the Code provides an overall maximum term of imprisonment of 21 years for offences 
dealt with in the Supreme Court and leaves it to the courts to place the various crimes into different 
categories of gravity.  
A statutory maximum penalty often bears little relationship to the usual sentence for a particular crime 
as the maximum penalty must be set very high to allow for the gravest possible crime of that nature. 
At most, the maximum penalty reveals the relative seriousness of particular crimes. As a method of 
taking public opinion into account, it is the view of the Institute that a statutory maximum is 
ineffective. 
Recommendation 
91. For the reasons outlined in para 7.3.10, the Institute does not recommend introducing a statutory 
maximum penalty for each crime in the Criminal Code to replace the general maximum in s 389 of 21 
years. 
Guideline judgments and a sentencing advisory body 
Guideline judgments can provide a mechanism for taking public opinion into account. A guideline 
judgment is a judgment of an appeal court which goes beyond the facts of the particular case before it 
and suggests a starting point or range for dealing with variations of an offence. They are not intended 
to be construed rigidly but leave judges free to tailor the sentence to the facts of the particular case. A 
sentencing advisory body also provides a means for incorporating public opinion into the sentencing 
process by having members of the public on the body and by conducting public consultations. A 
sentencing commission or body and guideline judgments can together create a mechanism for 
providing community input into the judicial sentencing process. However, without guideline 
judgments, sentencing councils can still have a role in providing community input into sentencing 
policy as the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council demonstrates. Conversely, guideline judgments 
have functions and advantages in addition to their potential as a mechanism for community input into 
the sentencing process. 
There is a need for a sentencing advisory body 
Independently of the issue of guideline judgments, research undertaken by the Institute suggests that 
there is role for some kind of sentencing body. The following tasks have been identified in this report 
as important ones for tackling sentencing issues in Tasmania: 
• the provision of accessible sentencing data for both the Supreme Court and the Magistrates 
Court which informs the courts and the public about what is happening in sentencing and may 
assist to address issues of inconsistencies in sentences in Magistrates Courts discussed in Part 1;  
• the provision of accessible data on crime trends; 
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• the provision of information about recidivism rates, completion and breach rates in relation to 
conditional orders such as suspended sentences and community service orders; (3.10.4) 
• reviewing procedures for breach of conditional orders; (3.12.3) 
• gauging public opinion on sentencing; 
• the co-ordination of strategies to educate the public on crime and sentencing issues;  
• a feasibility study of day fines; (3.9.14-3.9.16) 
• research on the value of VIS in Tasmania; (4.2.14) 
• a community conferencing pilot for young adults; (4.3.5); 
• a review of the administrative procedures associated with compensation orders; (4.4.21) 
• a review of the appropriate penalty range for rape and sexual offences. (6.2.12) 
 
If such a body were to be created, it should also have the following general functions: 
• a media-liaison role on sentencing issues;  
• to conduct research on sentencing matters; 
• to consult with government departments and other interested persons and bodies as well as 
member of the general public on sentencing matters; 
• to advise the Attorney-General on sentencing matters. 
Recommendations 
92. The Institute recommends the creation of an independent statutory sentencing advisory council 
(the Sentencing Advisory Council) with a broad membership (of approximately 10 persons) drawn 
from persons with experience in community issues affecting courts, victim support or advocacy 
groups, judges and magistrates, academics in relevant disciplines, experienced defence and 
prosecution lawyers and those with experience in the operation of the criminal justice system. (7.3.36) 
93. The primary role of the Sentencing Advisory Council should be to bridge the gap between the 
community, courts and government by informing, educating and advising on sentencing matters. More 
specifically it should have the following functions: 
•  the provision of accessible sentencing data; 
•  the provision of accessible data on crime trends; 
• gauging public opinion on sentencing matters; 
•  co-ordinating strategies to educate the public on crime and sentencing issues; 
• conducting research on sentencing matters; 
•  consulting with government bodies, stakeholders and members of the public on sentencing 
matters; and  
•  advising the Attorney-General on sentencing matters. (7.3.36) 
94. The Institute recommends that the proposed Council be supported by a full-time secretariat and a 
budget that can fund this and the outsourcing of some of its tasks and functions. (7.3.41) 
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No support by judges or Director of Public Prosecutions for guideline judgments 
In theory the Institute believes there is a case for guideline judgments as a means of promoting 
consistency and providing a mechanism for community input into the sentencing process. However, it 
notes that such a proposal was opposed by the then Chief Justice, the then senior puisne judge and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions. In view of these objections, the Institute has come to the conclusion 
as that guideline judgments should not be recommended. However, the Institute recommends that, if 
the proposed Sentencing Advisory Council is established, the matter be reconsidered. The Council 
should be given some time, at least 12 months, to consolidate its operations before being given the 
task of reviewing the introduction of guideline judgments. 
Recommendations 
95. That guideline judgments should not be introduced at this stage in the absence of broad judicial 
and professional support for them from the legal profession. (7.3.46) 
96. That, if a sentencing advisory council is established, after it has had the opportunity to consolidate 
its operations, it be requested to review the introduction of guideline judgments for magistrates and 
judges. (7.3.47) 
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Part 1 
Sentencing Trends 
Examine whether there has been a change in sentencing trends in Tasmania for major crimes 
and summary offences. 
1.1 Introduction 
What is sentencing? 
1.1.1 Sentencing is the process by which people who have been found guilty of offending against 
the criminal law have sanctions imposed upon them in accordance with that law.1 The sentence of the 
court is the most visible aspect of the criminal justice system’s response to a guilty offender. While the 
courts are central to the sentencing process, they do not have sole responsibility for sentencing. The 
responsibility for determining the amount and nature of a sentence is shared by the legislature, the 
judiciary and the executive government. The legislature determines the types of sentencing options 
available to the courts and the amount of discretion available within those options for particular 
offences. Legislation places special limits on the sentencing powers of magistrates’ courts and on 
courts dealing with juvenile offenders. Sentencing legislation also provides guidance to courts in 
relation to the use of some sanctions. But to a great extent, courts, and judges in particular, are left 
with a wide discretion to determine sentence. In deciding upon a sentence a judge or magistrate takes 
into account the seriousness of the offence, facts in relation to the offender, the offender’s response to 
the charges, the aims of sentencing, sentencing principles and the range of sentences imposed for 
similar offences. The executive branch of government has a servicing role in relation to the sentence: 
that of giving effect to the sentence by administering prisons and community options. In addition the 
executive can modify the sentence by releasing offenders on parole, by granting remissions or 
pardoning the offender. 
Evaluating sentencing 
1.1.2 So although the courts do not have the sole responsibility for sentencing, it is the courts, the 
judges and magistrates who pronounce sentence in individual cases and it is their role which is the 
most visible. The pronouncement of sentence is the symbolic and public declaration of how society 
regards the offence and the offender, and how society should respond to this. In imposing sentence the 
courts represent the public interest. Given the public nature of sentencing it is essential that the 
sentencing process is a just and fair one. There are two main criteria by which the community will 
determine whether sentences are just and fair. First, the punishment imposed must be seen as 
appropriate – of ‘sufficient severity that it is possible to say that a breach of the law, when detected, is 
attended by significant consequences’.2 Secondly, sentences must be consistent. For sentencing to be 
seen as appropriate and consistent the sentencing process must be transparent and the public must be 
properly informed about the sentencing process. In addition the public must believe that judicial 
officers are responsive to public concerns.  
                                                
1  A Freiberg, Pathways to Justice (2002) 30, citing Victorian Sentencing Committee, Report: Sentencing, (1988) 15. 
2  Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) para 26. 
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1.1.3 In deciding upon an appropriate sentence, the judge or magistrate endeavours ‘to make the 
punishment fit the crime, and the circumstances of the offender, as nearly as may be’.3 Judicial 
discretion is regarded as essential to ensuring justice in the individual case so that there is flexibility 
for the sentencer to respond to the particular facts. Equally, consistency is essential. Like cases should 
be treated similarly and unlike cases differently. As Mason J of the High Court said in Lowe v The 
Queen: 
Just as consistency in punishment – a reflection of the notion of equal justice – is a 
fundamental element in any rational and fair system of criminal justice, so inconsistency in 
punishment, because it is regarded as a badge of unfairness and unequal treatment under the 
law, is calculated to lead to an erosion of public confidence in the integrity of the 
administration of justice.4 
1.1.4 Gleeson CJ stated the principle of consistency in the following way in Wong v The Queen: 
All discretionary decision-making carries with it the probability of some degree of 
inconsistency. But there are limits beyond which such inconsistency itself constitutes a 
form of injustice. The outcome of discretionary decision-making can never be uniform, but 
it ought to depend as little as possible upon the identity of the judge who happens to hear 
the case. Like cases should be treated in a like manner.5  
1.1.5 Sentencing can never be uniform because of the vast range of factors to be considered when 
sentencing an offender with the consequence that it is unlikely that any two cases will be identical. For 
this reason a distinction is drawn between consistency in approach to sentencing and consistency in 
sentencing outcomes.6 Consistency of approach requires courts to apply the same purposes and 
principles of sentencing, and to consider the same types of factors when sentencing.7 It also requires 
that courts have regard to the collective wisdom of other judicial officers by treating the range of 
sentences that have been passed for a particular offence as a guide. Reference to purposes, principles 
and factors would be of little use unless viewed against the background of the scale of penalties 
usually imposed for a particular offence including the kinds of cases that pass the custody threshold. 
Consistency in outcome is concerned with the type and quantum of sentences imposed in similar 
cases. While it is said that consistency in approach should be the goal rather than consistency in 
outcomes because of the differences between cases, the two are related. Consistent outcomes in similar 
cases are more likely if a consistent approach is adopted and substantially different outcomes in 
similar cases may indicate differences in approach. 
1.1.1 While consistency is regarded as an important value by the courts and as a consequence the 
importance of referring to sentencing statistics as a yardstick is acknowledged,8 this is not to say that 
the courts do not and should not consciously alter the severity of sentences for a particular crime. If 
Parliament increases the maximum penalty for an offence, this is treated as a signal that courts should 
regard the offence more seriously and increase the severity of the penalty for the offence accordingly. 
Other reasons for change include increases in the incidence of an offence, which may be regarded as 
grounds for increasing the severity of the penalties for it, and changing public attitudes to a type of 
offence may justify the courts reviewing the penalty range for that particular offence. 
1.1.2 Public dissatisfaction with sentencing appears endemic. Sentences are not, it seems, seen to 
be just and appropriate. Public opinion polls suggest sentences are inappropriate because they are not 
severe enough. There also appears to be a perception that sentences are becoming more lenient. There 
is also an issue of whether they are just. As is explained in Part 7, research demonstrates that public 
                                                
3  Webb v O’Sullivan [1952] SASR 65, 66 (Napier CJ). 
4  (1984) 154 CLR 606, 610-611. 
5  (2001) 207 CLR 484, 591. 
6  See the New South Wales Sentencing Council’s discussion of this in How Best to Promote Consistency in Sentencing in 
the Local Court, 2005, 121-17. 
7  ALRC (2006), above n 2, 154. 
8  See K Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (2nd ed. 2002) para 2.337. 
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opinion tends to be based on misperceptions about sentencing and crime patterns. How public opinion 
should be ascertained and misperceptions addressed will be discussed in Part 7. This Part seeks to 
answer the question of whether there has been a change in sentencing trends in Tasmania for major 
crimes and summary offences. As well as consistency over time, it also seeks to explore the issue of 
consistency between judicial officers. As explained above, consistency is a criterion of just and fair 
sentences and an important element of public confidence in sentencing. 
1.2 Trends in the Supreme Court 
1.2.1 Assessing sentencing trends over time is not an easy task where data availability is limited 
and the jurisdiction is a small one. Differences in offence seriousness in different periods and 
differences in the definitions of crimes make any conclusions drawn from apparent trends extremely 
tentative. Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to examine trends in sentencing for the most 
common crimes. Given the relatively small numbers of sentences imposed by the Supreme Court for 
each offence, a year-by-year comparison for most offences was not possible. This was only attempted 
for assault and robbery.9 For all other offences a comparison was made between three periods: usually 
1978-1989, 1990-2000 and 2001- 2006. The first two periods correspond with data collected for the 
two editions of Sentencing in Tasmania.10 The data for the third period was recorded from the 
Supreme Court’s sentencing database for the purposes of this report. It was not possible to perform 
individual statistical tests on changes in the length of median custodial sentences, however, more 
global comparisons were possible looking at changes in the number of crimes for which there was no 
change in the median, an increase or a decrease over the periods. Changes in the percentage of 
custodial sentences for each of the crimes were also analysed.11 For assault and robbery, where there 
were more sentences imposed, the sentencing trends by year were examined.12  
Changes in the median sentence 
1.2.2 Tables 1, 2 and 3 in Appendix A show the median sentences for each crime included in the 
table in the three periods. They show that the median sentence for some crimes remained the same, for 
others there were increases and for others, decreases. Because it was not possible to perform 
individual statistical tests on changes in the length of median sentence for each crime, statistical tests 
were performed to investigate whether there were significant differences between the percents of 
increase and decrease, both for total numbers and for crimes broken down by sentence length. This 
data is shown in Table 1. No significant differences were found, although it should be noted that these 
tests were not as sensitive as tests using the full data on individual sentences. In other words looking at 
changes in median sentences, no change was the most common outcome and the differences in the 
percentage increase and decrease were not significant.  
                                                
9  This data was analysed using Kendall’s rank order correlation, two-tailed with a significance level of .05.  
10 K Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (1990), and K Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (2nd ed 2002). For some offences the 
periods were different – e.g. for stealing and burglary data collected for the earlier period was for 1983-1989 and for 
burglary in the latter period it was 1994-2000. 
11  The differences in percents were assessed using chi squared tests where numbers were sufficient and Fisher’s exact test 
otherwise. 
12  Burglary would seem to be another obvious choice for a year-by-year comparison of trends but changes to the boundaries 
between burglary and aggravated burglary made this difficult. 
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Table 1: Numbers of crimes for which there was a decrease, no change, or an increase in median sentence 
between the periods 
Change in median 
sentence 
Change 78-89 to 90-00 Change 90-00 to 01-06 
  <1year 1 year+ Total <1 year 1year + Total 
count 7 4 11 6 9 15 
Decrease 
percent 33% 20% 27% 30% 38% 34% 
count 11 4 15 10 7 17 
No change 
percent 52% 20% 37% 50% 29% 39% 
count 3 12 15 4 8 12 
Increase 
percent 14% 60% 37% 20% 33% 27% 
count 21 20 41 20 24 44 
Total 
percent 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Offences against the person 
1.2.3 Sentencing patterns for the most common (non-sexual) offences against the person are 
shown in Table 1 of Appendix A. The sentencing trends show consistent patterns for most offences 
against the person. In some cases there appears to be a trend for more severe sentences. For serious 
assaults contrary to ss 170 and 172 of the Criminal Code the median sentences tended to be higher in 
the second and third periods than the first and the proportion of custodial sentences also tended to be 
higher in the second and third periods. However, the increases in the proportion of custodial sentences 
are not significant. For assault contrary to s 184 of the Code, the median sentences were almost the 
same but the percentage of custodial sentences increased slightly for sentences of one count and for 
global sentences but again not significantly.  
Fig 1: assault (1 count), median sentences, Supreme Court, 1978-2006 
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1.2.4 Figs 1 and 2 show the sentencing trends by year for assault over a 24-year period. Given the 
number of single count sentences (custodial and non-custodial) handed down in each of the years 
varied, some fluctuations in sentencing patterns are inevitable. Despite this, sentencing patterns appear 
quite stable. The median ranged from three months to six months but was usually between three 
months and five months. The proportion of custodial sentences was usually between 60 per cent and 
90 per cent. Despite a slight trend upwards for sentences of assault in the later periods suggested by 
Table 1 in Appendix A, the year-by-year data indicates no statistically significant trends upward nor 
downwards in either the median sentence length or the use of custodial sentences for assault.13 
                                                
13 A Kendall’s rank-order correlation test (two-tailed) was used with a significance level of 0.05. 
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Fig 2: assault (1 count), percentage custodial sentences, Supreme Court, 1978-2006 
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Sexual offences 
1.2.5 The median sentence for one count of rape has dropped from four years in the first period 
(1978-1989) to two years one month in the third period (2001-2006) and the median sentence for two 
counts is also lower in the second two periods compared with the first (see Table 2 in Appendix A). 
Non-custodial sentences for rape remain virtually unknown. The median sentence for one and two 
counts of indecent assault is also lower. On the face of it, this suggests sentencing has become more 
lenient for one and two counts of rape and indecent assault. However, changes in the definition of rape 
resulted in offences which were in the first period defined as indecent assault (such as non-consensual 
fellatio) being included in the definition of rape in the second and third periods and the more invasive 
kinds of indecent assault (such as digital penetration) being covered by aggravated sexual assault in 
the two later periods. Therefore one would expect the median for rape and indecent assault to be lower 
in the second and third periods. However, this does not explain the reduction in the median from the 
second to the third period.  
1.2.6 In contrast, for sexual intercourse with a young person the sentences imposed appear to have 
increased in severity, with higher median sentences and higher (although not statistically significantly 
higher) percentages of custodial sentences. The median sentence for maintaining a sexual relationship 
with a young person has also increased. Sentencing patterns for sexual offences are discussed in more 
detail in Part 6. 
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Robbery, property offences and other offences 
1.2.7 For most property offences, the median sentence has hardly varied over the three periods 
analysed (see Table 3 in Appendix A).14 Exceptions are global sentences for over 10 counts of 
burglary and sentences for setting fire to property. For more than 10 counts of burglary there was both 
an increase in the median and an increased percentage of custodial sentences which was statistically 
significant between the first and second periods. However, for under 10 counts sentencing patterns 
were stable.15 For setting fire to property the decrease in the median sentence was off-set by an 
increase in the proportion of custodial sentences in the most recent period, however, this was not 
significant. While the median for one count of stealing was four months in each period, there was a 
significant increase in the percentage of custodial sentences in the second period, an upward trend 
which was maintained in the most recent period. 
1.2.8 For trafficking in a prohibited plant and trafficking in a narcotic there appears to be a slight 
trend to shorter custodial sentences but less use of non-custodial orders.16 The increase in the use of 
custodial orders was significant in the period 2001-2006.  
1.2.9 As a result of amendments in the Code in 1988, robbery with violence was replaced with 
four separate crimes: robbery, aggravated robbery, armed robbery and aggravated armed robbery. 
Table 3 (in Appendix A) combines these categories of robbery (robbery all) as well as displaying 
armed and unarmed robbery separately from 1990. For robbery (all) it shows the median sentence and 
the percentage of custodial sentences increased in the second period with the median sentence 
dropping slightly in the third period. The increase in the percentage of custodial sentences in the 
second period was statistically significant. This data for armed robbery (including aggravated armed 
robbery) and unarmed robbery (robbery and aggravated robbery) between 1990-1995, 1996-2001 and 
2002-2006 suggests that while sentencing may have become more severe for robbery overall, this is 
because sentencing for unarmed robbery has become harsher. Sentences for armed robbery have 
remained stable. 
1.2.10 The trends by year for all robberies combined are shown in Figs 3 and 4. By reason of the 
small numbers, fluctuations are to be expected. The median ranged from 10 to 24 months and the 
percentage of custodial sentences was between 70 per cent and 100 per cent with no significant trends. 
                                                
14  Note that the three periods vary for robbery, burglary and drug offences.  
15 For one count of burglary there was an increase in the proportion of custodial sentences in the third period but this was 
not statistically significant.  
16  Drug trafficking is now one offence: trafficking in a controlled substance contrary to the Misuse of Drugs Act 2001, and 
the two separate drug trafficking offences in the Poisons Act have been repealed. For the purpose of Table 3 in Appendix 
A, trafficking in a controlled substance was separated into trafficking in a prohibited plant or substance and trafficking in 
a narcotic. 
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Fig 3: robbery, median sentences, Supreme Court, 1990-2006 
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Fig 4: robbery, percentage custodial sentences, Supreme Court, 1982-2006 
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Conclusion  
1.2.11 Sentencing data suggests that the sentencing patterns in the Supreme Court over the last 25 
years or so are strikingly consistent. For many crimes the median prison sentence and the proportion 
of custodial sentences are the same or similar. Reductions in the use of imprisonment are rare and for 
no crime was the reduction significant. For some crimes there have been increases which are 
statistically significant. For more than 10 counts of burglary the increase in the percentage of custodial 
sentences is significant and there is also an increase in the median sentence. For one count of stealing 
the increased use of custodial sentences is significant and there are significant increases in the use of 
custodial sentences for drug trafficking and robbery. It also appears prison sentences have become 
longer for serious assaults17 and for sexual offences involving young people.18 Rape and indecent 
assault appear to be the only crimes where the median custodial sentence has become shorter. This 
will be further explored in Part 6. Overall, the percentage of custodial sentences was 79 per cent in the 
earlier period, 83 per cent in the second period and 87 per cent in the third period. Analysing changes 
in the median sentence for each crime showed no change to be the most likely outcome with decreases 
and increases about equal (see Table 1). If there is a perception that sentencing is becoming more 
lenient this is not borne out by the evidence of Supreme Court sentencing patterns. If anything 
sentencing has become more severe.  
                                                
17 Wounding and grievous bodily harm and acts intended to cause bodily harm. 
18 Maintaining a sexual relationship with a young person and sexual intercourse with a young person.  
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Consistency between judges 
1.2.12 As well as examining sentencing patterns by comparing decades, sentencing patterns for 
individual judges were examined for two of the most frequent offences: robbery and assault for the 
years 1990-2006. The six judges with the most sentences were included.19 It is acknowledged that this 
kind of comparison is fraught with problems. It cannot be assumed that each judge dealt with offences 
of the same degree of seriousness, or that the offenders were comparable. This comparison is made 
with these caveats in mind. Calculations were made of the median and average custodial sentences, 
percentage of custodial sentences and percentage of sentences not suspended (wholly or partly). As 
Fig 5 and 6 show, judges were quite consistent, with no judge standing out as the most lenient or most 
severe on these measures. There were no statistically significant differences between the judges on any 
of the percent measures.20 
Fig 5: Assault, Sentences by Judges in the Supreme Court, 1990-2006 
 
Fig 6: Robbery, Sentences by Judges in the Supreme Court, 1990-2006. 
 
                                                
19 These were not exactly the same for each offence. While there is a maximum of six judges at any one time there were a 
number of changes in the composition of the Bench from 1990-2006 with retirements and new appointments.  
20 The differences in percents were assessed by chi squared tests. 
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1.3 Trends in the Magistrates Court 
1.3.1 Most sentencing is done in the Magistrates Court. While custodial sentences are imposed in 
less than 20 per cent of summary offences heard in a year, about 80 per cent of prison sentences are 
imposed by the Magistrates Court, although most are short sentences (about 70 per cent are for three 
months or less) and many of these short sentences are wholly suspended. Tracking sentencing trends 
in the Magistrates Court before 2003 is difficult because there was no state-wide database until 1 July 
2003. The Issues Paper used data that had been collected for two editions of Sentencing in Tasmania, 
namely a three-month state-wide sample from 1988 of the Magistrates Court’ sentences which was 
collected manually for the first edition and data extracted from the Hobart Magistrates Court’ database 
for 1999-2000 for the second edition. However, data extracted for this report from the state-wide 
database has shown that there are differences in sentencing practices between the south of the State, 
the north and the north-west (see 1.3.12 below). This means that the two data-sets collected for 
Sentencing in Tasmania cannot be compared for the purposes of showing trends over time. However, a 
comparison of the 1988 three-month state-wide sample and data from 1 July 2003 is possible using 
sentences for one count of assault, stealing and motor vehicle stealing. Broad changes in custodial 
sentences are also examined using Bartels’ data gathered for the suspended sentences project.  
Custodial sentences 
1.3.2 Table 2 suggests that the use of custodial sentences for assault and motor vehicle stealing has 
been stable and that the median sentence for assault has increased from one to two months but has 
dropped from three months to two for motor vehicle stealing. For stealing the median is the same but 
there appears to be less use of custodial sentences.  
Table 2: Custodial sentences in the Magistrates Court comparing 1988 sample with 2003-2007 sample for 
various offences* 
Offence Years Total no. No. custodial % custodial Median (months) 
88 74 21 15 1 Assault 
03-07 2807 472 17 2 
88 72 30 42 3 Motor vehicle stealing 
03-07 212 90 42 2 
88 427 127 30 1 Stealing 
03-07 1767 233 13 1 
*Due to significant differences in data collection time period these figures should be taken as indicative only. 
Non-custodial sentences 
1.3.3 Fig 7 uses data from two sources: first, Bartels’ sentencing database which was compiled 
from data supplied by the Justice Department for sentences imposed by the Magistrates Court from 1 
July 2003 to 30 June 2004 and secondly, the 1988 three-month sample of sentences used in the first 
edition of Sentencing in Tasmania. Because of changes in terminology over this period the use of 
probation is difficult to assess. Under the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), probation means conditional 
release subject to the supervision of a probation officer, whereas under the old sentencing regime it 
meant an order to be of good behaviour with conditions which did not necessarily include supervision. 
For this reason the term bond is used to cover probation in its current and old usage. In other words 
‘bond’ covers all conditional release orders. As with Table 2, significant differences in the data 
collection periods mean that figures are indicative only. Moreover, possible differences in the range of 
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offences dealt with by courts of summary jurisdiction over these periods mean that caution is required 
in reading too much into the figures. 
1.3.4 Fig 7 shows the distribution of sentence types over the two periods. It suggests: 
• Overall custodial sentences (which included wholly suspended sentences) have increased; 
• Community service orders have declined to 4 per cent of sentences; 
• Fines are the most frequently imposed sanction. Their use appears to have increased somewhat 
from 60 per cent to 69 per cent in the most recent period.  
Fig 7: Sentence type distribution in the Magistrates Court 
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Consistency between magistrates 
1.3.5 While there were difficulties in examining sentencing trends over time, the Justice 
Department’s database for the Magistrates Court, which contains all sentences imposed since 1 July 
2003, enabled sentencing patterns between magistrates to be examined for this period. As explained 
above, in comparing sentences it cannot be assumed magistrates deal with similar cases in terms of 
type of offence and type of offender. In the 12-month sample of sentences used by Bartels in her study 
there were significant differences in the cases dealt with by magistrates on the basis of gender and 
offence.21 The comparison undertaken for the purposes of this Report attempted to minimise this 
difficulty by comparing sentences for four offences separately, namely assault, motor vehicle stealing, 
stealing and burglary. Sentences for one count only were analysed and in the case of burglary, 
sentences for one count of burglary and one count of stealing were selected. For each of these offences 
the sample was taken from 1 July 2003 until a date in 2007.22 Given the size of the sample, particularly 
in the case of assault where twelve of the magistrates had imposed more than 100 sentences for one 
count of assault, it is likely that these magistrates were dealing with similar kinds of cases. Magistrates 
imposing less than 10 sentences for a particular offence were excluded (but were included in the 
regional comparison).  
1.3.6 As Table 3 shows, there appear to be significant differences between magistrates in their use 
of custodial sentences for assault. Overall custodial sentences for assault were imposed in 17 per cent 
of cases but this ranged from five per cent to 51 per cent. Four magistrates imposed sentences 
significantly above the mean rate (Magistrate 4, 6 and 17) and three magistrates imposed sentences 
significantly below this rate (Magistrate 5, 15, 18 and 19). These differences could not be explained in 
                                                
21 Lorana Bartels, Sword or Sever? The Use and Utility of Suspended Sentences in Tasmania (PhD thesis, University of 
Tasmania, 2008) 4.3.6.5. 
22  For burglary data was extracted from sentences imposed from 1/7/03 to 29/6/07 for the other offences from 1/7/03 to 
14/12/07. 
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terms of a greater use of wholly suspended sentences by those who imposed custodial sentences more 
often. Nor was there is a lot of difference in the mean sentences imposed. The three magistrates who 
imposed custodial sentences more often did not tend to impose shorter sentences. 
Table 3: Custodial and Fully Suspended Sentencing Rates by Magistrate: Assault 
Assault 
Magistrate 
no. n = 
Instances 
custodial 
% 
custodial 
Instances 
fully 
suspended 
% of 
custodial 
sentences 
fully 
suspended 
Median term 
in months (for 
non, partial 
and fully 
suspended 
sentences) 
1 184 37 20.1 18 49 2.0 
2 113 22 19.5 17 77 1.0 
3 234 27 11.5 25 93 1.0 
4* 51 26 51.0 17 65 2.0 
5** 37 2 5.4 1 50 0.5 
6* 95 32 33.7 21 66 2.5 
7 121 14 11.6 10 71 1.5 
9 39 8 20.5 7 88 1.5 
11 210 38 18.1 26 68 1.0 
12 138 23 16.7 16 70 2.0 
13 278 70 25.2 35 50 3.0 
14 302 44 14.6 28 64 2.0 
15** 182 13 7.1 8 62 3.0 
16 84 21 25.0 12 57 2.0 
17* 172 55 32.0 41 75 2.0 
18** 271 16 5.9 12 75 2.3 
19** 286 16 5.6 9 56 2.5 
Total 2797 464 16.6 303 65 2 
* Chi Square test indicates that the custodial sentencing rate for this Magistrate is statistically significantly above the mean 
rate (19%). 
**Chi Square test indicates that the custodial sentencing rate for this Magistrate is statistically significantly below the mean 
rate (19%). 
1.3.7 Tables 4 and 5 shows the sentencing patterns for motor vehicle stealing and stealing. Motor 
vehicle stealing attracts a higher proportion of custodial sentences than assault with a mean of 44 per 
cent. The proportion of custodial sentences ranged from 23 per cent to 71 per cent. One magistrate 
imposed custodial sentences significantly above the mean of 44 per cent (Magistrate 17) and three 
imposed custodial sentences significantly below the mean (Magistrates 14, 15 and 18). Two of these 
magistrates also tended to impose shorter sentences. Because the numbers of cases of motor vehicle 
stealing are low, it is possible that these differences could be explained by differences in the prior 
criminal record of the offenders.  
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Table 4: Custodial and Fully Suspended Sentencing Rates by Magistrate: Motor Vehicle Stealing 
Motor Vehicle Stealing 
Magistrate 
no. n = 
Instances 
custodial 
% 
custodial 
Instances 
fully 
suspended 
% of 
custodial 
sentences 
fully 
suspended 
Median term 
in months (for 
non, partial 
and fully 
suspended 
sentences) 
4 12 7 58.0 2 28.6 2.0 
6 21 9 42.9 3 33.3 2.0 
11 21 12 57.1 5 41.7 2.5 
12 13 4 30.8 0 0.0 1.2 
13 45 20 44.4 7 35.0 2.5 
14** 12 3 25.0 0 0.0 2.0 
15** 12 3 25.0 2 66.7 1.0 
16 15 8 53.3 2 25.0 1.0 
17* 14 10 71.4 3 30.0 2.0 
18** 13 3 23.1 1 33.3 1.0 
19 10 3 30.0 0 0.0 3.0 
Total 188 82 43.6 25 30.5 1.8 
* Chi Square test indicates that the custodial sentencing rate for this Magistrate is statistically significantly above the mean 
rate (42.05%). 
**Chi Square test indicates that the custodial sentencing rate for this Magistrate is statistically significantly below the mean 
rate (42.05%). 
Table 5: Custodial and Fully Suspended Sentencing Rates by Magistrate: Stealing 
Stealing 
Magistrate 
no. n = 
Instances 
custodial 
% 
custodial 
Instances 
fully 
suspended 
% of 
custodial 
sentences 
fully 
suspended 
Median 
term in 
months (for 
non, partial 
and fully 
suspended 
sentences) 
1 90 8 8.9 6 75.0 3.0 
2 37 5 13.5 5 100.0 1.0 
3 112 17 15.2 13 76.5 1.0 
4 41 8 19.5 4 50.0 1.0 
5 23 3 13.0 3 100.0 0.7 
6 70 10 14.3 7 70.0 1.5 
7 137 27 19.7 5 18.5 1.0 
9 15 1 6.7 1 100.0 0.5 
11 120 9 7.5 7 77.8 0.5 
12 82 15 18.3 11 73.3 0.7 
13 277 28 10.1 13 46.4 1.0 
14 101 8 7.9 7 87.5 2.0 
15 145 13 9.0 8 61.5 1.0 
16 99 8 8.1 4 50.0 0.9 
17* 129 39 30.2 21 53.8 1.0 
18** 120 4 3.3 3 75.0 4.0 
19 147 15 10.2 11 73.3 3.0 
Totals 1745 218 12.5 129 59.2 1 
* Chi Square test indicates that the custodial sentencing rate for this Magistrate is statistically significantly above the mean 
rate (16.3%). 
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**Chi Square test indicates that the custodial sentencing rate for this Magistrate is statistically significantly below the mean 
rate (16.3%). 
1.3.8 For stealing, Table 5 shows that the proportion of custodial sentences ranged from 3 per cent 
to 30 per cent with a mean of 12.5 per cent. One magistrate’s use of custodial sentences was 
significantly above the mean (Magistrate 17) and one was significantly below (Magistrate 18).  
Table 6: Custodial and Fully Suspended Sentencing Rates by Magistrate: Burglary/Stealing 
Burglary/Stealing 
Magistrate 
no. n = 
Instances 
custodial 
% 
custodial 
Instances 
fully 
suspended 
% of 
custodial 
sentences 
fully 
suspended 
Median term 
in months (for 
non, partial 
and fully 
suspended 
sentences) 
1* 16 13 81.3 4 25 6 
2 9 5 55.6 1 11.1 6 
3 27 11 40.7 10 37 3 
4 6 2 33.3 - 0 1.5 
5 5 3 60 1 20 0.933 
6 21 11 52.4 5 23.8 3 
7** 25 6 24 2 8 2.5 
9 3 1 33.3 - 0 2 
11 36 19 52.8 11 30.55 3 
12 20 13 65 4 20 4 
13 53 23 43.4 8 15.1 3 
14 28 17 60.7 8 28.6 3 
15 34 14 41.2 8 23.52 2 
16 32 17 53.1 7 21.875 3 
17* 25 20 80 10 40 3 
18** 57 20 35.1 12 21.1 3 
19 44 26 59.1 10 22.7 3 
Totals 441 221 50.1 101 22.9 3 
Chi Square test indicates that the custodial sentencing rate for this Magistrate is statistically significantly above the mean rate 
51.2%). 
**Chi Square test indicates that the custodial sentencing rate for this Magistrate is statistically significantly below the mean 
rate (51.2%). 
1.3.9 Table 6 shows sentences for one count of burglary and one of stealing. Custodial sentences 
ranged from 24 per cent to 81 per cent with two magistrates (Magistrates 7 and 18) imposing 
significantly fewer custodial sentences than the mean and two (Magistrates 1 and 17) imposing 
significantly more custodial sentences. Magistrate 1 also appears to impose longer sentences of 
imprisonment, with a median of six months compared to the overall mean of three months. 
1.3.10 The sentencing patterns for assault, motor vehicle, stealing and burglary were compared to 
see if magistrates tended to be consistently more lenient, moderate or severe on the measures of 
percentage of custodial sentences imposed. Table 7 shows the magistrates ranked by mean rank. 
Where a magistrate’s custodial sentencing rate is significantly above or below the mean rate this is 
shown (by shading and asterisks). 
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Table 7: Custodial sentencing rate ordered by mean rank 
Magistrate 
no. Assault 
Motor 
Vehicle 
Stealing 
Stealing Burglary/Stealing 
 n = % +/- n = % +/- n = % +/- n = % +/- 
17 172 32.0 +* 14 71.4 +* 129 30.2 +* 25 80 +* 
4 51 51.0 +* 12 58.3 + 41 19.5 + 6 33.3 – 
6 95 33.7 +* 21 42.9 – 70 14.3 + 21 52.4 + 
12 138 16.7 + 13 30.8 – 82 18.3 + 20 65 + 
2 113 19.5 + 8 50.0 + 37 13.5 + 9 55.6 + 
16 84 25.0 + 15 53.3 + 99 8.1 – 32 53.1 + 
13 278 25.2 + 45 44.4 + 277 10.1  53 43.4 – 
1 184 20.1 + 1 0.0  90 8.9 – 16 81.3 +* 
11 210 18.1 + 21 57.1 + 120 7.5 – 36 52.8 + 
5 37 5.4 –* - -  23 13.0 + 5 60 + 
14 302 14.6 – 12 25.0 –* 101 7.9 – 28 60.7 + 
19 286 5.6 –* 10 30.0 – 147 10.2 – 44 59.1 + 
7 121 11.6 – 4 25.0 – 137 19.7 + 25 24 –* 
3 234 11.5 – 7 14.3 – 112 15.2 + 27 40.7 – 
9 39 20.5 – 3 33.3 – 15 6.7 – 3 33.3 – 
15 182 7.1 –* 12 25.0 –* 145 9.0 – 34 41.2 – 
18 271 5.9 –* 13 23.1 –* 120 3.3 –* 57 35.1 –* 
+* indicates a custodial sentencing rate significantly higher than the mean rate;  
+ indicates a rate above the mean rate;  
–* indicates a rate significantly below the mean rate; and  
– indicates a rate below the mean rate. 
1.3.11 Table 7 shows that some magistrates stand out as being consistently severe across a number 
of offences and others as consistently more lenient. One magistrate imposed a significantly higher 
percentage of custodial sentences than the mean for all four offences. And one magistrate who 
imposed a significantly lower proportion of custodial sentences for assault also did so for motor 
vehicle stealing, stealing and burglary. A number of magistrates were quite consistent in their rankings 
whilst others were not. However, no magistrate whose custodial sentencing rate was significantly 
above the median for an offence had a custodial sentencing rate for another offence which was 
significantly below the median and no magistrate with a rate significantly below the median had a rate 
for another offence significantly above it. Overall 10 magistrates imposed a proportion of custodial 
sentences that was significantly different from the mean for at least one offence.  
A comparison of sentences by region 
1.3.12 In responses to the Issues Paper it was suggested by the Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania 
that magistrates in northern Tasmania were considerable harsher than those in the south and north-
west.23 This was explored by aggregating the sentencing data for assault, motor vehicle stealing and 
stealing for the individual magistrates into regions. The results appear in Table 8.  
                                                
23  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, submission, 2.  
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Table 8: Custodial Sentences by Region for Assault, Motor Vehicle Stealing, Stealing and 
Burglary/Stealing  
Region Assault Motor Vehicle Stealing Stealing Burglary/Stealing 
 % Median % Median % Median % Median 
South 21.6 2 46.4 2 14.2 1 50.4 3 
North 12.6 2 34.8 2 9.1 3 61.4 3.6 
North-West 8.5 2 18.2 1.3 9 1 37.2 3 
All 16.6 2 42.2 2 12.5 1 50.1 3 
1.3.13 This shows that there are differences between the regions in the use of custodial sentences 
for the four offences examined with the south imposing a higher percentage of custodial sentences for 
three of the offences and the north-west imposing the smallest percentage for all four offences. For 
motor vehicle stealing the proportion of custodial sentences was significantly higher than the mean (of 
33.2%) in the south and was significantly less than the mean in the north-west. Sentences in the 
northern region were found to be more severe for one count of burglary and stealing and the median 
sentence for one count of stealing was higher with three months in the north compared with one month 
in the south and north-west.  
1.4 Imprisonment rates and average time served by 
released prisoners 
1.4.1 Imprisonment rates could be regarded as a crude measure of sentencing trends. However, 
they are only a broad indicator of punitiveness and increases in imprisonment rates can be explained 
by a range of factors of which increased sentencing severity is but one. Increases in the crime rate and 
improved clear up rates also have an impact.  
1.4.2 There was little change in the imprisonment rate between 1982 (78 per 100,000) and 1997 
(74 per 100,000). Since 1998 the trends have been upward. In Australia, imprisonment rates have 
increased from 129 per 100 000 of adult population in 1995 to 164.7 per 100 000 of adult population 
in 2007.24 In Tasmania, the rate of imprisonment has increased from 82 per 100 000 of adult 
population in 1996 to 146 per 100 000 of adult population in 2007.25 Over the past 10 years, there has 
been an increase in the prison population from 285 prisoners in 1996 to 541 prisoners in 2007 with a 
high of 551 in 2005.26 
1.4.3 A more accurate measure of punitiveness is average time served in prison for particular 
offences over time. However, it should be noted that in addition to the sentence imposed, the impact of 
remissions and parole release can affect time served. The Issues Paper examined a number of offences 
for which average yearly numbers of released prisoners were reasonably high to explore trends in time 
served since the financial year 1985-1986. It showed a slight upward trend for drink driving and 
assault and reasonably stable figures for burglary with an increase in the 2000-2001 financial year. For 
all sentenced offenders, the average time served by released prisoners in the years since 1985-1986 
was found to have increased. More recent data looking at trends over the last decade has confirmed 
this trend.  
                                                
24  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Cat. No. 4512.0 ABS (2007). 
25  Ibid. 
26  ABS, Persons in Corrective Services, Quarterly Comparisons, Cat No. 4512.0 ABS (2007). 
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Fig 8: Drink driving, average time served (days) by released prisoners, 1997/98 – 2006/07 (average no. per 
financial year = 89; min = 79; max = 118) 
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Fig 9: Assault, average time served (days) by released prisoners, 1997/98 – 2006/07 (average no. per 
financial year = 196.2; min = 142; max = 238) 
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Fig 10: Burglary, average time served (days) by released prisoners, 1997/98 – 2006/07 (average no. per 
financial year = 209.9; min = 137; max = 308) 
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1.4.4 Average days served for drink driving, assault and burglary have all tended to increase, 
conforming to the patters for all offences (see Fig 12 below.) 
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Fig 11: All Sentenced Offences, average time served (days) by released prisoners, 1997/98 – 2006/07 
(average no. per financial year = 165.4; min = 110; max = 221) 
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Summary 
1.4.5 Using the limited data available, sentencing patterns appear relatively stable and consistent 
over time. Certainly there is no evidence supporting increased leniency, if anything sentencing may 
have become more severe.  
1.4.6 Data was available to analyse Supreme Court sentences from 1978 to 2006 for some crimes. 
Numbers were too small for a year-by-year comparison for most crimes so three periods were 
analysed – usually 1978-1989, 1990-2000, and 2001-2006. This revealed that there was consistency in 
median sentences and percentage of custodial sentences for most crimes. For some crimes there were 
significant increases in the percentage of custodial sentences imposed. Global sentences for more than 
ten counts of burglary increased in severity – the increase in percentage of custodial sentences was 
statistically significant and the median sentence increased. Significant increases in the percentage of 
custodial sentences for one count of stealing, drug trafficking and robbery were found. Sentences 
appear to have become more severe for serious assaults and for sexual offences involving children. 
The only sentences that appear to have become more lenient are for one and two counts of rape and 
sentences for indecent assault. 
1.4.7 A state-wide database for outcomes in the Magistrates Court only became available in 2003. 
However, some idea of changing patterns can be gleaned from comparing a 1988 three-month state-
wide sample of sentences with sentences imposed since 1 July 2003. Comparisons of the percentage of 
custodial sentences for assault and motor vehicle stealing suggest a stable custodial sentencing pattern 
with an increased median sentence for assault (from one to two months) and a decreased median for 
motor vehicle stealing (from two months to one month). For burglary and stealing the custodial rate 
has increased but it has decreased for sentences for one count of stealing. Overall the rate of custodial 
sentences appears to have increased. The problems with the size of the earlier sample make any 
conclusions that can be drawn from the data tentative. However, the inference of quite stable 
sentencing patterns with a trend to more severe sentences is supported by data on average time served 
for released prisoners. 
1.4.8 Sentencing consistency was also explored by a comparison of sentences between judges and 
magistrates. Comparing judges’ sentences for robbery and assault showed little disparity between 
judges on three measures: proportion of custodial sentences, use of suspended sentences and the 
median sentence. For these crimes judges appear to be reasonably consistent. Whether they are 
consistent in their use of wholly suspended sentences and non-parole periods will be explored in later 
parts of this report.  
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1.4.9 Magistrates Court sentencing data was analysed from two perspectives. First, consistency 
between magistrates and secondly, consistency between regions. To examine the claim that there are 
disparities between magistrates in the sentences they impose, their sentences for four common 
offences were compared. This revealed that there do appear to be inconsistencies between magistrates 
for sentences for assault in particular, but also for motor vehicle stealing, stealing and burglary. Some 
magistrates had custodial sentencing rates for some offences which were statistically significantly 
more than the mean and some had rates which were significantly less than the mean. This suggests that 
the custody threshold for each of these offences can differ depending on which magistrate hears the 
case. While the possibility of relevant differences in offence severity and offender factors cannot be 
discounted, it does appear that there is some inconsistency in sentences imposed in the Magistrates 
Court.  
1.4.10 The second claim that was explored was the assertion that magistrates in the north are more 
severe than magistrates in the south and north-west. This was not found to be the case for the custodial 
rate for three of the four offences – only for burglary was the custodial rate higher. Sentences in the 
north were found to be more severe with respect to the median sentence for one count of stealing 
where the median was three months in the north but one month in the south and in the north-west. For 
these four offences sentences appeared to be more lenient in the north-west on the measure of 
custodial sentencing. How these inconsistencies between magistrates and regions should be addressed 
is discussed in the final part of this Report. 
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Part 2 
Crime Reduction 
(a) Examine whether there is a relationship between crime levels and sentencing in 
Tasmania. 
(b) What role can sentencing legislation and sentencing measures have in achieving the 
Tasmania Together Goals in relation to perceptions of safety and achieving safe 
environments? 
2.1  (a) Crime levels and sentencing 
Introduction 
2.1.1 A major obstacle to more effective policies to reduce the level of serious crime is the 
‘common sense view of crime’.1 Elements of ‘Law and Order Commonsense’ include the view that we 
have soaring crime rates and that the solution lies, in part, in tougher penalties. Similarly, it is assumed 
that rising crime can be attributed to more lenient sentencing, or at least to sentencing that is not tough 
enough. All too often these assumptions require no empirical verification and are taken for granted as 
the starting point for solutions to the crime problem. In seeking an evidence-based response to the 
crime problem, this section of the report explores the relationship between crime levels and 
sentencing. The issue of sentencing trends was explored in Part 1, so this Part begins with the issue of 
crime trends before moving on to consider the relationship between crime levels and sentencing.  
Crime levels 
2.1.2 Crime is not a static phenomenon. Over time and in different social conditions there are 
changes in the types of crime committed, the frequency with which different crimes are committed and 
who commits them. However, if criminologists are agreed about one thing, it is that caution is required 
in interpreting crime statistics as a measure of ‘real’ levels of crime. As a measure of crime they have 
many flaws. Some argue that all the figures tell us is how various institutions deal with crime and the 
ways in which an action comes to be called criminal.2 Crime statistics are at best a flawed indication of 
real crime levels. 
2.1.3 There are two main sources of crime data available in Australia that seek to measure crime 
levels. These are (1) administrative records obtained from police agencies, and (2) crime victim 
surveys.3  
2.1.4 Official statistics that are traditionally relied upon as a measure of crime levels are crimes 
recorded by the police, data which is based on crimes reported by the public to the police and crimes 
detected by the police. Weaknesses of such official statistics are that police statistics are incomplete 
                                                
1  Russell Hogg and David Brown, Rethinking Law and Order (1998). 
2  John Lea and Jock Young, What is to be Done about Law and Order (1984). 
3  See Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Information Paper: Measuring Crime Victimisation, Australia: The Impact of 
Different Collection Methodologies, Cat. No. 4522.0, ABS, (2002). 
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and represent an estimated less than one third of all criminal conduct. Moreover, reporting rates differ 
significantly between offences, with a high reporting rate for homicide and motor vehicle stealing and 
a much lower rate for crimes such as sexual assault.4 Changing attitudes to crimes like domestic 
violence and sexual assault can increase reporting rates with increases in reported crime rates 
reflecting an increased willingness to report rather than an actual increase in crime. Changes in 
policing policy, such as special initiatives targeting particular offences, and different recording 
procedures may also inflate or decrease recorded crime figures (without a corresponding increase or 
decrease in the amount of crime committed).5 
2.1.5 An alternate measure of crime is victimisation data obtained through victim surveys. These 
involve surveys of individuals in the community about their experiences of crime. These surveys may 
reveal crimes that are not captured in the recorded crime data (the so called ‘dark figure’ of crime).6 
They also provide an insight into reporting patterns for different offences and in this way can be used 
to contextualise police data. Again, there are limitations to this type of data. Morgan and Weatherburn 
suggest that police data and survey data both: 
• include events which are either not criminal, or not in the identified legal category 
of crime (lay interpretations of ‘robbery’ may be far removed from legal 
definitions); and 
• omit some serious offences ostensibly within their scope, such as domestic 
assaults.7  
2.1.6 In Australia, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) National Crime and Safety Survey,8 
the ABS Personal Safety Survey9 and the International Crime Victims Survey10 are large-scale 
community surveys that provide a useful adjunct to the recorded crime data. 
2.1.7 With these cautionary comments in mind, the trends in Tasmania in relation to recorded 
crime will be discussed.  
Recorded crime in Tasmania 
2.1.8 Recorded crime statistics in Tasmania for the last 25 years suggest a general increase in 
crime until 1997-98 followed by a decrease until 2005, with the crime rate increasing slightly in 2005-
06. The crime rate is now lower than it was 10 years ago but higher than it was 20 years ago (see Fig 
12).  
                                                
4  See ABS, Crime and Safety, Australia, Cat. No. 4509.0, ABS, (2005). 
5  See Frank Morgan and Don Weatherburn, ‘The Extent and Location of Crime’ in Andrew Goldsmith, Mark Israel and 
Kathleen Daly (eds), Crime and Justice: A Guide to Criminology (3rd ed, 2006) 15, 19-22, for a discussion of the 
criticisms of recorded crime data and responses to those criticisms. 
6  See Clive Coleman and Jenny Moynihan, ‘Haunted by the Dark Figure: Criminologists as Ghostbusters?’ in Mike 
Maguire (ed), Understanding Crime Data: Haunted by the Dark Figure (1996) 1. 
7  Frank Morgan and Don Weatherburn (2006), above n 5, 25. 
8  The latest is ABS 2005, Crime and Safety, Australia, Cat. No. 4509.0, 7, ABS, Canberra. 
9  See ABS, Personal Safety, Australia, 2005, Cat. No. 4906.0, ABS, (2005). 
10  The latest is Holly Johnson, Crime Victimisation in Australia Key Results of the 2004 International Crime Victimisation 
Survey, Research and Public Policy Series No 64, Australian Institute of Criminology (2005). 
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Fig 12: Total recorded offence rate per 100,000 population for financial years 1982-2006 
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Source: Compiled from Department of Police and Emergency Management, Tasmania, Annual Reports 1982-2006 and ABS, 
Population by Age and Sex, Australian States and Territories, 1982-2006, Catalogue No 3201.0. 
2.1.9 This overall crime rate reflects the changes in the rate of offences against property, which 
represent about 80 per cent of all offences.11 Fig 13 and Fig 14 show the rates for offences against 
property and offences against the person for the same period.12 They indicate that while the rate for 
offences against property declined after 1998, the rate for offences against the person has steadily 
increased so that the rate in 2005-06 was four times the 1981-82 rate, whereas the rate for offences 
against property has increased over that period but is not double the 1981-82 rate. 
Fig 13: Recorded offences against property, rate per 100,000 population, financial years ending 1982-2006 
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Source: Compiled from Department of Police and Emergency Management, Tasmania, Annual Reports 1982-2006 and ABS, 
Population by Age and Sex, Australian States and Territories, 1982-2006, Catalogue No 3201.0. 
                                                
11  The four categories in the police recorded crime data are: offences against property, offences against the person, fraud 
and related offences, and other offences. In 2005-06 crimes against property were 79 per cent and offences against the 
person 13 per cent: see Department of Police and Emergency Management, Annual Report, (2006) Appendix A, 62.  
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Fig 14: Recorded offences against the person, rate per 100,000 population, financial years ending 1982-
2006 
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Source: Compiled from Department of Police and Emergency Management, Tasmania, Annual Reports 1982-2006 and ABS, 
Population by Age and Sex, Australian States and Territories, 1982-2006, Catalogue No 3201.0. 
2.1.10 The data for specific property offences (see Fig 15) shows that burglary of buildings (private 
and commercial premises) has declined since 1998 and that the number of such burglaries is 
comparable with the number recorded in 1982-1991. Stealing is also continuing to show a downward 
trend. While all categories of offences against property have declined since earlier peaks, injury to 
property, burglary of motor vehicles and motor vehicle stealing increased in the last financial year.  
Fig 15: Selected offences against property, number recorded by the police, financial years ending 1982-
2006 
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Source: Department of Police and Emergency Management, Tasmania, Crime Analysis System.  
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Fig 16: Selected offences against the person, number recorded by the police, financial years ending 1982- 
2006. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
year
robbery rape murder & manslaughter   
Source: Department of Police and Emergency Management, Tasmania, Crime Analysis System 
Fig 17: Assault, number recorded by the police, financial years ending 1982-2006 
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Source: Department of Police and Emergency Management, Tasmania, Crime Analysis System. Note: included are assault 
under the Tasmanian Criminal Code and assault Police Offences Act. 
2.1.11 As indicated above, recorded offences for crimes against the person cannot be regarded as 
reflecting the true rate for these offences so the increasing number of recorded assaults (see Fig 17) 
and rape (see Fig 16) does not mean that the crime rate for these offences is increasing. For example in 
2004-05 there was a sharp increase in the number of recorded assaults, which has been attributed to an 
increase in the reporting of assaults related to family violence incidents as result of the Tasmanian 
Government’s Safe at Home initiative.13 Similarly, the increasing number of rapes recorded in the 20 
years between 1982 and 2002 can be attributed to a widening of the definition of rape and an increased 
willingness to report and to record complaints of rape. Numbers of recorded robberies peaked in 1998-
99 and have since fluctuated. Fig 16 suggests that the steady increases in recorded robberies and rapes 
may be levelling out. The homicide rate has remained largely stable with the exception of the year of 
the Port Arthur massacre (1996).  
                                                
13  Department of Police and Emergency Management, Annual Report 2005-2006 (2006), Appendix A. 
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Tasmania in the Australian context 
2.1.12 The ABS publishes recorded crime data (based on police statistics) for eight categories of 
offences – homicide, assault, sexual assault, robbery, kidnapping, unlawful entry with intent (UEWI), 
motor vehicle theft and other theft.14 This represents about 60 per cent of all crime recorded by the 
police.15 The ABS recorded crime data shows that property crime has undergone a decline in recent 
years. However, it should be noted that property crime has a long way to go before it reaches the 
levels it was at in the 1970s when recorded rates were under 500 per 100,000 for household break and 
enter and under 400 per 100,000 for motor vehicle stealing.16  
Fig 18: Australian trends in property crime, rates per 100,000 population, 1996 -2006 
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Source: Compiled from ABS, Recorded Crime – Victims, Cat no. 4510.0 (2006). 
2.1.13 From 1996 to 2001, the rate for UEWI was steady but between 2001 and 2006 it declined by 
43 per cent (from 2,245 to 1,271 per 100,000 population). The rate of motor vehicle theft increased 
from 1993 to 2001 but decreased thereafter and in 2006 had the lowest rate (365 per 100,000) since 
national reporting began in 1993.17 Other theft figures are only available from 1995 onwards. As Fig 
15 shows, the rate increased from 1996 to 2001 and since then has declined. Broadly, the Tasmanian 
downward trend in property crime in the last decade matches the national trend. 
2.1.14 Fig 19 shows the national trends in recorded violent crime categories of assault, sexual 
assault, robbery and homicide. Assaults make up the vast majority of recorded violent crimes and the 
overall trend has been upwards in the period from 1996 to 2005. Robbery is the second largest 
category. The robbery rate peaked at 137 per 100,000 in 2001, the highest recorded since 1996.18 Since 
2001 the rate has declined to 84 per 100,000 in 2006.19 However the 1996 robbery rate was 
considerably higher than the rates in the 1970s and 1980s as was the assault rate.20 
                                                
14  The latest is ABS, Recorded Crime, Victims, Australia 2006, Cat. No. 4510.0, ABS, (2006). 
15  Australian Institute of Criminology, Australian Crime, Facts & Figures 2006, AIC (2006) 8. 
16  D Weatherburn, Law and Order in Australia: Rhetoric and Reality (2004) 11, citing Australian Institute of Criminology 
Statistics (Satyanshu K Mukherjee and Dianne Dagger, The Size of the Crime Problem in Australia, Australian Institute 
of Criminology (1990) which, it should be noted, are not directly comparable with ABS data). 
17  ABS 2006, Recorded Crime, victims, Australia 2006, Cat. No. 4510.0, 4, ABS, (2006). 
18  Australian Institute of Criminology, Australian Crime, Facts & Figures 2006, AIC (2006) 12.  
19  ABS 2006, Recorded Crime, Victims, Australia 2006, Cat. No. 4510.0, 8, ABS, (2006), Table 1. Note also the caveats in 
relation to robbery data in Explanatory Notes, para 21. 
20  Weatherburn (2004), above n 16, 12-13. 
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Fig 19: Australian trends in violent crime, rates per 100,000 population, 1996-2006 
Source: Australian 
Institute of Criminology, Australian crime: facts and figures 2007 (2008). 
2.1.15 As a consequence of finding inconsistent recording practices between states and territories 
for assault and sexual assault in particular, the ABS no longer publishes crime rates per 100,000 for 
states and territories for the various categories of crime collected and accordingly cross-jurisdictional 
comparisons cannot be made after 2004. Instead, indexes are provided to assist in interpreting change 
within a jurisdiction. Figs 20-22 show Tasmanian rates in comparison with national data for the years 
1993-2004 for robbery, UEWI (burglary) and motor vehicle theft, categories of crime that are likely to 
be less susceptible to differences in recording practices. Tasmania is below the national rate of 
recorded crime for the crimes of robbery (Fig 20), burglary (Fig 21), and motor vehicle theft (Fig 22). 
The robbery rate has been consistently the lowest. 
Fig 20: Robbery, rate per 100,000 population in Australia, Tas, NSW, Vic and SA, 1993-2004  
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Source: ABS, Recorded Crime, victims, Australia, [various issues] Cat 4510.0.  
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Fig 21: Burglary, rate per 100,000 population in Australia, Tas, NSW, Vic and SA, 1993-2004 
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Source: ABS, Recorded Crime, victims, Australia, [various issues] Cat 4510.0  
Fig 22: Motor vehicle stealing, rate per 100,000 population in Australia, Tas, NSW, Vic and SA, 1993-2004 
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Source: ABS, Recorded Crime, victims, Australia, [various issues] Cat 4510.0  
Victim surveys 
2.1.16 The ABS Crime and Safety, Australia 2005, reported that the 2005 victimisation prevalence 
for household crime (break-in, attempted break-in and motor vehicle theft) was 6.2 per cent compared 
to 8.9 per cent in 2002.21 For break-in and motor vehicle theft, the rates were 3.3 per cent and 1 per 
cent compared to 4.7 per cent and 1.8 per cent in 2002. In 2002, comparisons with 1998 and 1993 
surveys showed very small changes in the prevalence of victimisation for household crime.22 
Unfortunately, changes in the wording of the questions and the survey samples limit the value of 
comparisons between the earlier 1975 and 1983 surveys and the later surveys although they do suggest 
an increase in break and enter in the 1980s.23 The 2005 survey showed the lowest levels of prevalence 
of victimisation for household crimes were in Tasmania (4.5 per cent). This was a substantial 
reduction from 9.3 per cent in 1998.  
2.1.17 The 2005 victimisation prevalence rate for personal crime (robbery, assault and sexual 
assault) in Australia was unchanged from the 2002 figure of 5.3 per cent. For robbery the rate declined 
from 0.6 per cent in 2002 and 0.4 per cent in 2005 - the increase from 1998 to 2002 was not 
                                                
21  ABS, Crime and Safety, Australia, 2005, Cat. No. 4509.0, ABS, (2005), 4. 
22  ABS, Crime and Safety, Australia, 2005, Cat. No. 4509.0, ABS, (2005). 
23  Weatherburn (2004), above n 16, 14. 
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statistically significant. However, between 1983 and 1993 the estimated prevalence of robbery 
doubled.24 The prevalence rate for assault was 4.8 per cent in 2005 and 4.7 per cent in 2002. 
Comparisons with earlier surveys suggest the prevalence of assault declined between 1983 and 1993 
but increased between 1998 (4.3 per cent) and 2002. In Tasmania, the prevalence rate for personal 
crimes was 4.7 per cent which was the second lowest after Victoria (4.5 per cent). Changes in assault 
and robbery victimisation rates in Tasmania in 2005 from 2002 were not statistically significant. The 
Australian component of the 2004 International Crime Victimisation Survey also suggests rates of 
crime victimisation have declined in Australia with 17 per cent of the sample experiencing at least one 
incident of crime in the previous 12 months, down from 24 per cent in 2000. Declines were 
statistically significant for personal theft (without violence), burglary and theft of property from motor 
vehicles.25 
2.1.18 The crime surveys support the recorded crime data in suggesting a real decline in the new 
millennium in burglaries and motor vehicle theft in Australia. In relation to robbery, the victim 
surveys confirm the increase in robbery in the 1980s and the decline since 2001. For assault the picture 
is less clear. However, it could be argued that increases in police-recorded assault is an artefact of 
increased reporting, as steady increases in recorded assaults are not reflected in the same increases in 
the prevalence rates for this crime in victim surveys. 
Australia in the international context 
2.1.19 The homicide rate in Australia has remained quite stable over the last 25 years or so with a 
rate usually of about 2 per 100,000. This rate falls between Canada, which usually has recorded a 
slightly higher rate than Australia, and the United Kingdom, which has a slightly lower rate. Over the 
last 30 years or so the US homicide rate has been, on average, about four times that of countries such 
as Australia, Canada, England and Wales and Germany.26 The US rate declined in the 1990s and 
plateaued from 2000 at a rate just under 6 per 100,000.27 The Australian robbery rate was lower than 
the US rate and marginally lower than the rate in England and Wales. Victim surveys suggest that 
Australia has higher crime rates than many other industrialised countries,28 but that comparatively, 
these rates are declining. In the International Crime Victimisation Survey of seventeen industrialised 
countries conducted in 2000, Australia had the highest victimisation rate for burglary, theft and assault 
and was second to England and Wales for car theft, and second to Poland for robbery (with England 
and Wales).29 In the 2005 survey, the victimisation rate in Australia for burglary was 6th out of 30 
surveyed countries, 8th for assault and car theft and 14th for robbery.  
The relationship between crime levels and sentencing 
2.1.20 We have seen that sentencing levels appear to have remained quite stable in Tasmania over 
the last 25 years. There have been increases in severity for some offences and apparent reductions in 
severity for some others. Overall the patterns appear stable with perhaps an upward trend. Over the 
same period, crime statistics suggest that the level of reported crime increased until 1997-98 but 
thereafter it fell, so the crime rate is now higher than it was 20 years ago but lower than it was 10 years 
ago. Despite the fall in the crime rate after1999, the imprisonment rate in Tasmania has increased 
                                                
24  From .6 per cent to 1.2 per cent, but note that the questions are not comparable with the later surveys: Weatherburn 
(2004), above n 16, 15.  
25  Holly Johnson, Crime Victimisation in Australia Key Results of the 2004 International Crime Victimisation Survey, 
Research and Public Policy Series No 64, Australian Institute of Criminology (2005). 
26  Satyanshu Mukherjee, ‘Crime Wave: Australia in Context’ in Duncan Chappell and Paul Wilson (eds), Australian Crime 
and Criminal Justice (2005) 21-22. 
27  Ibid, 53. 
28  Mostly European countries with the addition of Japan, US, Canada and Australia. 
29  John van Kesteren, Pat Mayhew and Paul Nieuwbeerta, Criminal Victimisation in Seventeen Industrialised Countries: 
Key-findings from the 2000 International Crime Victims Survey (2000) Ministry of Justice <http:///www.minjust.nl/b-
organ.wodc/publicaties/> at 1 November 2007. 
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since that time. From 1999 to 2001 the rates (based on 30 June Prison census) stabilised at around 98 
per 100,000 only to jump to 149.9 in 2005 and then drop slightly to 140.6 in 2007.30. 
2.1.21 While on the face of it a plausible explanation for the decrease in crime after 1998 might be 
the increased imprisonment rate, experts caution against such reasoning. It seems that there is little 
evidence to suggest that changes in the crime rates are attributable to sentencing practice or sentence 
severity. The fact that an inverse relationship can be found between imprisonment rates and crime 
rates does not mean that higher rates of imprisonment cause less crime. An apparent relationship 
between crime rates and imprisonment might be due to some third factor (the omitted variable 
problem) or might be because high crime rates were pushing imprisonment down (the simultaneity 
problem).31.However, public opinion clearly links crime rates to sentencing and this is reinforced by 
the media, politicians and even by the courts. The media commonly blames lenient sentencing (and 
occasionally low clear-up rates) for rising crime, or crime rates which are at an unacceptably high 
level. Media-hype and community anxiety about crime is exploited by some politicians who use the 
rhetoric of ‘Law and Order’ and ‘Tough on Crime’ to attract votes. 
2.1.22 The courts could also be said to contribute to the perception of a causal link between 
sentencing practice and crime rates by emphasising general deterrence as a goal of sentence in 
sentencing remarks. While expert opinion may be divided about the extent to which prison reduces 
crime,32 there is little support for the proposition that harsher sentencing brings about any significant 
reduction in the crime rate. In reviewing the literature on the relationship between crime rates and 
sentencing, it is useful to consider the assumptions underlying the assertion that there is a causal 
relationship. Four bases for the link are commonly suggested: 
• First, it is suggested that the imposition of penalties can operate as a general deterrent. In other 
words that the imposition of a penalty at a certain level will induce persons who may be tempted 
to commit crime to desist out of fear of the penalty. The assumption is that increasing the level of 
penalties will reduce crime though general deterrence. 
• Another basis on which common sense or intuition may suggest increasing sentencing severity 
may reduce crime rates is incapacitation. Even if imprisonment fails to deter or rehabilitate at least 
it may make the imprisoned offender incapable of offending for the period of their imprisonment. 
• A third basis for suggesting that increasing penalties may reduce crime is specific deterrence; 
increasing penalties may reduce reconviction rates of convicted offenders by deterring them from 
reconvicting.  
• Less often it is suggested imprisonment may operate as a cure, that offenders may be rehabilitated 
by the process.  
2.1.23 Each of these ‘common sense’ assumptions will be considered in the light of the empirical 
evidence. It could also be argued that increased sanctions control crime by strengthening social norms 
against proscribed behaviour. It would appear that most people obey the law because of their moral 
beliefs rather than fear of incurring a penalty. However, the limited research available suggests that 
public views of the seriousness of an offence are not much affected by their beliefs about the sanction 
actually imposed for the offence.33 The process is more subtle with the possibility that ‘punishment 
levels influence social norms only slowly and over time’.34 
                                                
30  ABS, Prisoners in Australia, Cat. No. 4517.0, ABS, (2007). 
31  Weatherburn (2004), above n 16, 122 
32  Ibid, 123.  
33  Ibid, 117. 
34  Ibid. 
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General deterrence 
2.1.24 Evaluating the deterrent effect of harsher penalties is notoriously difficult. For example, it is 
difficult to separate deterrent effects from the impact of other influences such as situational factors and 
so a statistical association which appears to establish cause and effect may have an entirely different 
explanation. A well-known review of deterrence research35 states that the ideal research project would 
include: 
• the use of variables that adequately distinguish severity from certainty of punishment; 
• adequate controls for other possible influences on crime rates; and 
• satisfactory methods of examining whether and to what extent changes in criminal justice policies 
actually alter potential offenders’ beliefs concerning the risks of punishment. 
2.1.25 Few studies meet these criteria. While reviews of deterrence research accept there is some 
evidence that the probability of sanctions can affect offence rates, there is much more scepticism of 
such a relationship between severity of sanction and offence rates. In other words, it is the prospect of 
getting caught that has the deterrent value rather than alterations in the severity of sentences. Some of 
the research will be reviewed to illustrate the problem of isolating deterrent effects from other 
explanations and the inconclusiveness of the evidence in support of the deterrent effect of harsher 
penalties. 
Mandatory sentencing in Western Australia and the Northern Territory 
2.1.26 Mandatory sentencing in Western Australia provided a research opportunity to examine the 
general deterrent efficacy of increased penalties. The Crime (Serious and Repeat Offenders) Act 1992 
(WA) aimed to reduce the number of high-speed pursuits involving stolen vehicles. The legislation 
was officially justified on grounds of deterrence, involved dramatic changes in penalties (mandatory 
18 month custody time followed by detention at the governor’s pleasure for the main target group) and 
was extremely well publicised and well known.36 While there was another car chase death on the day 
following the passage of the legislation, there were no such deaths in the following seven months and 
the Government pointed to this lull as evidence of a deterrent effect.37 However, deaths on the roads 
are an inappropriate measure of deterrent effects of the legislation because they reflect too many other 
variables including such factors as police pursuit practices, which changed from early 1992 with many 
more pursuits being aborted. Broadhurst and Loh38 examined a number of variables including police 
pursuits of stolen vehicles, thefts from motor vehicles and motor vehicle thefts and showed that the 
rate of motor vehicle theft had declined significantly in the months before the introduction of the 
legislation and thereafter increased following its introduction. The conclusion reached is that the 1992 
Act had no deterrent effect. An evaluation of the three strikes burglary laws also failed to show 
evidence of a deterrent effect. This law came into effect in November 1996 and mandated a 12-month 
minimum sentence of imprisonment for offenders convicted of home burglary on the third and 
subsequent occasions. Home burglaries had increased significantly from 1991 to 1995 but had 
declined in 1996. This decline could not be attributed to the new laws because they only came into 
force in November of that year. In 1997, the burglary rate did not decline but remained constant and it 
increased in 1998. The monthly figures showed a sharp increase after the introduction of the laws. 
Morgan concluded, ‘burglary rates appear to have a lifecycle that is to some extent seasonal and that 
operates quite independently of punishment levels’.39 Before the Senate’s Legal and Constitutional 
References Committee, the Western Australian Department of Justice conceded that the legislation 
had no impact on the rate of burglary and the Committee concluded that the mandatory sentencing 
                                                
35  Andrew Von Hirsch et al, Criminal Deterrence and Sentencing Severity: an Analysis of Recent Research (1999). 
36  Neil Morgan, ‘Capturing Crims or Capturing Votes? The Aims and Effects of Mandatories’ (1999) 22 University of New 
South Wales Law Review 267, 271. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Roderic Broadhurst and Nini Loh, ‘The Phantom of Deterrence: The Crime (Serious and Repeat Offenders) 
Sentencing Act’ (1993) 26 The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 251. 
39  Neil Morgan, ‘Mandatory Sentences in Australia’ (2000) 24 Criminal Law Journal 164, 172. 
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legislation has not brought about a reduction in the rate of home burglaries in Western Australia.40 Nor 
did the Northern Territory mandatory sentences for property offences appear to have a deterrent effect. 
The scheme, which came into effect in March 1997 provided a range of mandatory penalties, which 
for adults consisted of a minimum term of 14 days for a first offender, 90 days for a second offender 
and 12 months for third and subsequent offenders. The legislation was repealed in October 2001. 
Available data for about two years before the repeal of the legislation and two years after showed 
recorded property offences increased in the two years before and then decreased in the two years after. 
While it has not been claimed this demonstrates mandatory sentencing did not have a deterrent effect 
on level of property crime, it does suggest that the mandatory sentencing regime was not as ‘dominant 
a factor influencing the level of crime as may have been expected at the time that mandatory 
sentencing was introduced’.41 
Capital punishment 
2.1.27 Research on capital punishment for homicide is sometimes relied upon by some 
commentators to demonstrate that penalty severity has no impact on deterrence and by others to 
demonstrate quite the opposite. In the case against deterrence it has been claimed that in the United 
States, comparisons of the murder rates in ‘abolitionist’ and ‘retentionist’ states give no indication of 
which are the abolitionist states.42 In New Zealand between 1924 and 1962 the death penalty was in 
force, abolished, reintroduced, in abeyance and then abolished again. The murder rate fluctuated but 
the fluctuations bore no discernible relationship to the status of the death penalty.43 A study of 
Queensland data showed murder rates fell from 1911, and this trend was not halted by the abolition of 
capital punishment in 1922.44 There are some econometric studies reporting results showing support 
for a strong deterrent effect of capital punishment.45 However, a recent review of 74 research studies 
has concluded that three decades of deterrence research has failed to deliver conclusive evidence that 
capital punishment deters homicide more effectively than life imprisonment.46 Moreover, the majority 
of studies – including the more sophisticated econometric studies – favour the no deterrence 
conclusion.47  
Successful deterrents? 
2.1.28 The introduction of the breathalyser, acknowledged as having an impact on road traffic 
casualties, is generally accepted as evidence of a deterrent effect, although this appears to be due to an 
increased subjective probability of sanctions rather than simply an increase in penalty severity.48 Later 
studies examining the potential deterrent effect of increased enforcement by the police suggest that a 
                                                
40  Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Human 
Rights (Mandatory Sentencing for Property Offences) Bill 2000 (2002) 21. 
41  Northern Territory Office of Crime Prevention, Mandatory Sentencing for Adult Property Offenders: the 
Northern Territory Experience (2003) 10. 
42  Nigel Walker, Why Punish? (1991) 15. 
43  Ibid, 16. 
44  RN Barber and PR Wilson, ‘Deterrent Aspect of Capital Punishment and its Effect on Conviction Rates: The 
Queensland Experience’ (1968) 2 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 100, 108. 
45  Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H Rubin and Joanna M Shepherd, ‘Does Capital Punishment have a Deterrent 
Effect? New Evidence from Post Moratorium Data’ (2003) 5 American Law and Economics Review 344, 
376. 
46  Janet Chan and Deborah Oxley, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Review of the Research 
Evidence, Contemporary Issues in Crime and Justice No 84, New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics 
and Research (2004). 
47  Ibid.  
48  H Lawrence Ross, ‘Law, Science and Accidents: the British Road Safety Act of 1967’ (1973) 2 Journal of 
Legal Studies 1; Ross Homel, ‘Penalties and the Drink Driver: a Study of One Thousand Offenders’ (1981) 
14 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 225. Even with drink driving there are problems 
with a deterrence strategy because of optimism about the risk of being caught, ignorance of the penalty and 
the amount of alcohol that produces a reading over the limit: David Riley, ‘Drink Drivers: the Limits of 
Deterrence’ (1981) 24 Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 241. 
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general crime prevention strategy with publicity and attempts to change people’s attitudes is likely to 
be more effective than either sentencing or enforcement changes alone.49 An example of an apparently 
successful deterrent is Harding’s finding that an additional penalty for carrying a firearm in a robbery 
deterred some robbers from carrying a firearm.50 This suggests that general deterrence may be more 
effective for planned crimes than impulsive crimes. Burglars, however, do not appear to be susceptible 
to deterrence, but to be short-term hedonists or eternal optimists rather than rational calculators.51 If 
active burglars consciously refuse to dwell on the possibility of being caught as another study 
suggests, increasing the penalty is unlikely to have an impact on their decision-making.52 
General deterrence: conclusions 
2.1.29 The issue in relation to general deterrence and sentencing levels is whether the severity of 
sentence has an impact on crime levels. There is no dispute that the absence of a punishment structure 
(police, courts and sentences) would lead to an increase in crime. The overall system deters many 
offences that would otherwise be committed. The existence of a specific offence, such as using a 
mobile phone whilst driving may well discourage that behaviour. And it is likely that if robbery, for 
example, were known to be punishable only by a trivial penalty, that this would have an impact on the 
robbery rate. The issue for sentencing is whether harsher sanctions – in the sense of penalty increases 
within plausible limits - have the effect of deterring would-be offenders. Would a three or four-year 
sentence for armed robbery deter more people than a two-year sentence? 
2.1.30 Reviews of the deterrence literature show there is no scientific basis for expecting that 
general penalty increases, which do not involve an unacceptably harsh punishment, will do anything to 
control the crime rate.53 While there are some reviews that claim increases in sentencing severity deter 
crime,54 these reviews have been criticised for being selective, incomplete and for relying on studies 
that can be explained by mechanisms other than general deterrence such as incapacitation and specific 
deterrence.55 Similarly, there are individual studies that are occasionally held out as evidence that 
harsher sentences deter crime, but again these studies have been dismissed on the basis of 
methodological problems such as measurement problems and data selection issues as well as problems 
of differentiating increased severity from other causes.56 The majority of both reviews of the evidence 
and individual studies deny that there is conclusive evidence supporting the deterrent effectiveness of 
increasing the severity of sanctions. A recent review by Doob and Webster of both reviews of the 
literature and individual studies, including scenario based studies and studies of offenders’ thought 
processes, goes further and argues that the time has come to accept the null hypothesis: variation in 
sentence severity does not cause a variation in crime rates.57 
2.1.31 So while the deterrent effectiveness of increasing penalty severity has intuitive/common 
sense appeal, the evidence to support its effectiveness is lacking. We do not know how to determine 
the increase in penalty severity that is required, how to communicate the increase to the target 
audience or whether the severity of penalties has reached saturation point. If we want evidence-led 
                                                
49  Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (4th ed, 2005) 77 citing David Riley, Drink Driving: The 
Effects of Enforcement, Home Office Research Study 121 (1991). 
50  Richard Harding, ‘Rational Choice in Gun Use in Armed Robbery’ (1990) 1 Criminal Law Forum 427. 
51  Ashworth (2005), above n 49, 77 citing Trevor Bennett and Richard Wright, Burglars on Burglary (1984) ch 
5-6. 
52  Lucia Benaquisto (1997), ‘The Non-Calculating Criminal: Inattention to Consequences in Decisions to 
commit Crime, unpublished paper cited by Anthony Doob and Cheryl Webster, ‘Sentence Severity and 
Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis’ 30 Crime and Justice 143, 183. 
53  Deryck Beyleveld, A Bibliography of General Deterrence Research (1979); von Hirsch et al (1999), above n 
35; Ashworth (2005) above n 49, 81. 
54  E.g. Donald E Lewis, ‘The General Deterrent Effect of Longer Sentences’ (1986) 26 British Journal of 
Criminology 47. 
55  Doob and Webster (2003), above n 52, 149, 152. 
56  See ibid, 155-173, for a critique of these studies. 
57  Doob and Webster (2003), above n 52. 
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policies, increasing penalty severity to reduce offending is not one.58 Moreover, in addition to the 
empirical criticisms of general deterrence, there are principled objections to it – it is unfair to impose a 
disproportionately harsh sentence on one offender in order to deter several others from committing a 
similar offence.59 That we sometimes knowingly harm non-offenders for the benefit of others (e.g. 
quarantine, compulsory acquisition) is no answer because these measures do not have the censuring 
dimension that punishment has.60 
Incapacitation 
2.1.32 Collective incapacitation involves imprisoning offenders for longer or imprisoning more 
offenders to reduce crime or perhaps imprisoning all offenders convicted of particular crimes. 
Selective incapacitation involves selecting offenders who are at high risk of offending and imprisoning 
them for longer. 
2.1.33 Collective incapacitative polices cannot be justified in cost-benefit terms. For crimes such as 
burglary, imprisonment does have an incapacitative effect in that those imprisoned tend to be the most 
frequent offenders and imprisoning them does prevent them offending whilst they are imprison.61 But 
it does not follow that increasing the imprisonment rate is a good way to reduce crime. The Halliday 
Report concluded that the precise measure of the incapacitative effects of imprisonment is elusive. 
While some Home Office estimates suggest the prison population in England and Wales would need 
to increase by around 150 per cent for a reduction in crime of 10 per cent, there are indications that 
such a reduction may well be only temporary with crime rates returning to normal and more offenders 
in the system consuming more resources.62 In the US it has been estimated that a 10 per cent reduction 
in the crime rate would require a doubling of the imprisonment rate.63 In New South Wales it has been 
estimated that doubling the average length of imprisonment for burglary would increase the prison 
population by about eight percentage points.64 Clearly, substantial increases in imprisonment are 
needed for even modest reductions in crime. Doubling the period of time offenders spend in prison or 
doubling the number of people we imprison will not result in halving the crime rate.65 
2.1.34 It must also be recognised that incapacitation will not work if the shoes of those imprisoned 
are filled by someone else.66 In the US, one of the results of the War on Drugs was that one-fourth of 
all prison beds were occupied by offenders convicted of drug possession and dealing. Researchers 
estimating the incapacitative effect of this suggest that this policy has had the effect of increasing and 
not reducing the crime rate because of the effect of replacement: removal of one dealer opens up the 
opportunity for another to enter.67  
2.1.35 Incapacitative strategies are said to work most effectively when they are selective - when 
high risk re-offenders are targeted either on the basis of assessments of dangerousness or on the basis 
of a prediction method that identifies certain high risk offenders. However, this strategy has been 
                                                
58  See also The Home Office, Making Punishments Work: Report of a Review of the Sentencing Framework for 
England and Wales (The Halliday Report) (2001) 8. 
59  Ashworth (2005), above n 49, 77, 80; Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Sentencing, Report No 
44 (1988). 
60  Ashworth (2005), above n 49, 67. 
61  The fact that only one person is imprisoned for every 1000 offences committed does not mean that doubling the 
imprisonment rate will only affect about one tenth of one per cent of offences: see Don Weatherburn, Jiuzhao Hua and 
Steve Moffatt, ‘How Much Crime Does Prison Stop? The Incapacitation Effect of Prison on Burglary’ (2006) (93) Crime 
and Justice Bulletin. 
62  The Halliday Report (2001), above n 58, 9. 
63  Weatherburn (2004), above n 16, 125. 
64  Weatherburn, Hua and Moffatt (2006), above n 61, 6. 
65  See Weatherburn (2004), above n 16, 124-125 for an explanation of this; see also Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters, 
(1996) 138-139. 
66  Weatherburn (2004), above n 16, 125. 
67  William Spelman, ‘The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion’ in Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman (eds), The 
Crime Drop in America (2000) 97, 116. 
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shown to have major flaws. First, predictions of future criminality are inherently unreliable and with 
false positives rates that can reach two in three.68 So for each future high-rate offender incapacitated, 
two other people would have to be imprisoned for an extended period.69 Moreover, calculations of the 
incapacitative effects of such strategies have been shown to be exaggerated.70 ‘Three-strikes and 
you’re out’ is a crude example of selective policies. In the Western Australian context, neither the 
1992 laws nor the 1996 laws had a selective incapacitative effect. The 1992 laws were introduced with 
the claim they would incapacitate hard-core juvenile offenders. In fact they impacted primarily on 
older Aboriginal men in remote localities.71 As Mackenzie has concluded from the international 
literature, the impact on minority groups of incapacitative strategies is disastrous.72 
2.1.36 As well as empirical objections to incapacitative policies, there are principled objections to 
incapacitation as a rationale for increasing sentence length. It is morally objectionable to punish an 
offender beyond their just deserts in order to increase the future safety of others, particularly if the 
successful prediction rate is low.73 Spelman has suggested that the most effective programmes are 
those that give the predicted high risk offenders sentences that are about 20 times as long as those 
given to the low risk group. Clearly this is ethically unacceptable as the high rate offender group 
commit crimes only two or three times more often than the low rate group.74 
Specific deterrence and rehabilitation 
2.1.37 Specific deterrence raises two questions. First, whether the use of tougher penalties deters 
those convicted, and secondly, whether imprisonment deters those convicted more effectively than 
other penalties. Research on the deterrent effect of tougher penalties suggests no such effect or 
inconsistent effects.75 Two Australian examples demonstrate this general conclusion. Briscoe studied 
the impact of increasing the statutory penalties for drink driving in New South Wales – the maximum 
penalties were doubled as well as the minimum disqualification periods. She found that this led to 
substantial increases in the penalties actually imposed by the courts but there was no change in the 
rates of recidivism among drink drivers in Sydney and only a very slight reduction in recidivism 
among drink drivers in the country.76 In the Northern Territory the deterrent impact of the three strikes 
legislation was explored on those sentenced for a property offence under the legislation. It was found 
that there was no appreciable change in the rates of reconviction rates of those sentenced to a second 
strike compared to the first strikers suggesting the possibility of a second strike had no increased 
deterrent effect.77 
2.1.38 The fact that so many prisoners re-offend (the usual estimate is between a half and two-
thirds) explains scepticism about the effectiveness of prisons to deter those sentenced (or to reform 
them). The evidence suggests that comparing conviction rates for custody with community penalties 
                                                
68  Ashworth (2005), above n 49, 80; and see ALRC, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Report No. 
103 (2006) 138. 
69  Tonry has suggested the best prediction methods over-predict by three or four to one: Tonry (1996), above n 65, 139. 
70  Ashworth (2005), above n 49, 81; Weatherburn (2004), above n 16, 126. 
71  N Morgan, ‘Why we should not have mandatory penalties: theoretical structures and political realities’ (2002) 23 
Adelaide Law Review 141, 153. 
72  Doris Mackenzie, ‘Reducing the criminal activities of known offenders and delinquents: Crime prevention in courts and 
corrections’ in Lawrence W Sherman, D P Farrington, Doris Layton MacKenzie and Brandon C. Welsh (eds) Evidence-
Based Crime Prevention (2002) 330, 386. 
73  Ashworth (2005), above n 49, 81. 
74  W Spelman (2000), above n 67, 118. 
75  Weatherburn, Hua and Moffatt (2006) above n 61, 2. 
76  Suzanne Briscoe, The Impact of Increased Drink Driving Penalties on Recidivism Rates in NSW, Alcohol Studies 
Bulletin No 5, New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (2004). 
77  Northern Territory Office of Crime Prevention, Mandatory Sentencing for Adult Property Offender: The Northern 
Territory Experience (2003) 5-6: the reconviction rates after one strike were 26 per cent for indigenous offenders and 11 
per cent for non-indigenous offenders and 27 per cent for indigenous offenders and 10 for non-indigenous after two 
strikes.  
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generally shows no significant differences in reconvictions rates.78 One comparative study of 
reconviction rates following various types of sentence, which took account of age, type of offence and 
previous record, found that custodial sentences perform slightly worse than expected for all offenders 
other than the few first offenders. The proportion reconvicted within two years of release was 54 per 
cent for prison, 49 per cent for community service and 42 per cent for ‘straight’ probation.79 
Weatherburn agrees with the general conclusion that there is little difference in the offending rates 
between similar offenders given custodial and non-custodial penalties.80 In support, he cites a US 
study in which a group of drug offenders given a probation order were compared with a group of drug 
offenders sentenced to prison.81 After controlling for factors that might have affected the rate and 
speed of re-offending, it was found that the offenders given a prison sentence performed worse than 
those given probation on each measure of re-offending, namely charges, conviction, imprisonment and 
elapsed time. Bartels’ Tasmanian study is consistent with these findings with unsuspended sentences 
performing worst (see below para 3.2.3).  
2.1.39 English evidence also suggests that reconviction rates following release from prison are 
generally lower as the length of sentence increases. This is thought to be due to the characteristics of 
offenders who are given longer sentences (such as the nature of the offences they commit) and the 
higher proportion of such offenders who receive parole supervision. It is suggested that once 
allowance is made for the characteristics of offenders receiving different sentences and the known 
beneficial effect of parole, there is no clear relationship between sentence length and propensity to re-
offend.82 
Rehabilitation 
2.1.40 Rehabilitation fell into disfavour because of lack of evidence of its effectiveness and also 
because of the possibility of imposing oppressive and disproportionate punishment in the name of 
treatment. However, it now appears that ‘Nothing works’ is an overstatement.83 Criminologists no 
longer accept that treatment programmes are ineffective in reducing crime. More sophisticated 
research techniques such as ‘meta- analysis’ of large numbers of small rehabilitative programs shows 
positive results can be obtained in favourable circumstances with selected offenders.84 As a 
consequence, the pessimism of the of last decades of the twentieth century has been replaced by a 
cautious optimism that some programmes are effective in reducing the criminal behaviour of at least 
some offenders. This optimism was exemplified in England by the Halliday Report which suggested 
that based on the international evidence, by using risk assessment and identifying programs most 
likely to work for the offender in question, it may well be possible to reduce re-offending by five to 
                                                
78  Christopher Nuttall, Peter Goldblatt and Chris Lewis, Reducing Offending: An Assessment of Research Evidence on Ways 
of Dealing With Offending Behaviour, Home Office Research Study 187 (1998) 90; and see Weatherburn (2004), above n 
16, 122. 
79  Ashworth (2005), above n 49, 267 citing Charles Lloyd, George Mair and Mike Hough, Explaining Reconviction Rates: a 
Critical Analysis, Home Office Research Study 135 (1994). 
80  Weatherburn (2004), above n 16, 122. 
81  Cassia Spohn and David Holleran, ‘The effect of Imprisonment on Recidivism Rates for Felony Offenders: A focus on 
Drug Offenders’ (2002) 40(2) Criminology 329, 357. 
82  Nuttall, Goldblatt and Lewis (1998), above n 78, 93. An earlier study had shown no difference in re-offending rates 
between shorter and longer sentences: S R Brody, The Effectiveness of Sentencing: A Review of the Literature, Home 
Office Research Study 35 (1976). 
83  ‘Nothing works’ was and is a socially constructed reality rather than a scientific truth: Rick Sarre (2001) ‘Beyond “What 
Works?” A 25-year Justice Retrospective of Robert Martinson’s Famous Article’ 34 Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Criminology 38. 
84  Ashworth (2005), above n 49, 83 citing James McGuire, What Works: Reducing Reoffending (1995); Julie Vernard, Carol 
Hedderman and Darren Sugg, ‘The Influence of Cognitive Approaches’ in The Home Office, Changing Offenders 
Attitudes and Behaviour: What Works? Home Office Research Study 171 (1997); Lawrence W Sherman, et al, 
Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising (1997); Mackenzie (2002), above n 72. More recent 
reviews support these conclusions: Steve Aos, Marna Miller and Elizabeth Drake, Evidence-Based Public Policy Options 
to Reduce Future Prison Construction, Criminal Justice Costs and Crime Rates (2006); Gemma Harper and Chloe Chitty 
(eds) The Impact Of Corrections on Re-Offending: A Review of ‘What Works’, Home Office Research Study 291 (3rd ed, 
2005).  
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fifteen percentage points. Instead of ‘nothing works’ it argued for ‘what works’ strategies and 
programs, meaning a rigorous analysis of what works in preventing re-offending.85 Consequently there 
has been a roll-out of rehabilitative programmes in that country based on ‘what works’ principles.  
2.1.41 Increased optimism about the possibilities of achieving some improvement in recidivism 
rates by adopting new programs for prisoners in no way justifies increasing the use of imprisonment 
beyond current levels. All it suggests is that more effort should be put into rehabilitative programs for 
offenders sentenced to custodial and non-custodial options. The implications of the international 
research on what works will be further discussed in Part 3: Sentencing Options. 
Conclusion 
2.1.42 If criminal justice and sentencing policy is to be evidence-based, then increasing sentence 
severity with the aim of reducing crime is not the appropriate response. This is a point that has been 
made by criminologists for years. The challenge is to get this message across. Whether a sentencing 
council or other body should be established in Tasmania to assist in disseminating information about 
crime and sentencing, and to provide a policy buffer between the public and the government will be 
considered in Part 7. 
2.2 (b)  The role of sentencing in achieving the Tasmania 
Together Goals 
2.2.1 The terms of reference require the Institute to explore the role that sentencing legislation and 
sentencing measures have in achieving the Tasmania Together Goals in relation to perceptions of 
safety and achieving safe environments. The Tasmania Together Goals were formulated in 2001, and 
revised in 2006. Goal 2 dealt with community perceptions of safety and actual safety and standard 1 
related to safety and perceptions of safety in public places and private homes and it had a number of 
indicators and targets that relate to perceptions of crime and crime levels. The revised Goal 2, standard 
1 and the targets and indicators are similar. However, the indicator relating to percentage of people 
who feel safe on public transport has been abandoned. The table below sets out the revised indicators 
that are relevant to crime from Goal 2 standard 1 together with baseline data, targets for 2005, 2010, 
2015 and 2020, and the latest data. 
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Table 9: Tasmania Together Goals relating to perceptions of crime and crime rates 
Indicator Targets Latest Data 
1.2 Percentage of people who feel safe at 
home 
2001/02: 92.5% (day) 80% (night) 
Source: Department of Police and 
Emergency 
2005:94% (day) 86% 
(night) 
2010: 96% (day) 88% 
(night) 
2015: 97% (day) 90% 
(night) 
2020: 97% (day) 92% 
(night) 
2004/05: 95% (day) 86% (night) 
Source: National Police Survey (AC 
Nielson) 
1.3 Percentage of people who feel safe in 
public places 
2001/02: 86.1% (day) 
Source: Department of Police and 
Emergency 
2005: 90% (day) 46% 
(night) 
2010: 92% (day) 48% 
(night) 
2015: 94% (day) 52% 
(night) 
2020: 96% (day) 56% 
(night) 
2004/05: 91% (day) 50% (night) 
Source: National Police Survey (AC 
Nielson) 
1.4 Percentage of people who feel safe on 
public transport 
2001/02: 50.3% (day) 22.2% (night) 
Source: Department of Police and 
Emergency 
2005: 59% (day) 30% 
(night) 
2010: 65% (day) 33% 
(night) 
2015: 68% (day) 36% 
(night) 
2020: 70% (day) 40% 
(night) 
2004/05: 57% (day) 29% (night) 
Source: National Police Survey (AC 
Nielson) 
1.4 Crime victimisation rate 
April 1998: 13.6% 
Source: Crime and Safety Australia (ABS 
4509.0) 
 
2005: 12% 
2010: 8% 
2015: 7% 
2020: 6% 
April 2005: 8.7% 
Source: Progress Report 2006 (2006), 
Tasmania Together 2020. 
 
1.5 Reported level of family violence 
2000/01: 1300 domestic violence 
incidents 
Source: Department of Police and 
Emergency Management 
2005: 10% compounding 
reduction 
2010:10% reduction on 
2005 
2015 10% reduction on 
2010: 
2020: 10% reduction on 
2010 
2004/05: 4095 
Source: Department of Police and 
Emergency Management 
1.6 Proportion of adult offenders 
convicted again in 2 years 
2001/02: 23% 
Source: Department of Justice 
To be established in 2007  
Source: Goals and Benchmarks (2006) Tasmania Together 2020 <http://www.tasmaniatogether.tas.gov.au/goals_and 
_benchmarks at 18 August 2007; Progress Report 2006 (2006), Tasmania Together 2020, 
<http://www.tasmaniatogether.tas.gov.au/our_progress/progress_ report> at 18 August 2007. 
2.2.2 As Table 9 indicates, the 2005 targets were met for feelings of safety at home and feelings of 
safety in public places. The target victimisation rate of 12 per cent for the percentage of persons who 
were victims of robbery, assault or sexual assault or who lived in households that were victims of 
break-in, attempted break-in or motor vehicle theft was also met by a victimisation rate of 8.7 per cent 
as reported in the 2005 Crime and Safety Survey. However, the target for perceptions of safety on 
public transport were not met with performance in 2004-05 data slipping back to below the 2005 
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target.86 Nor were the targets for level of family violence achieved with significant increases in reports 
of family violence since 2000/01.87 The 2006 Report did not report on the recidivism indicator.  
Improving perceptions of safety 
2.2.3 The rationale for addressing the issue of fear of crime in the Tasmania Together Goals is that 
quality of life is related not only to how safe people actually are but also is related to their perceptions 
of safety. Setting targets in relation to percentages of people who feel safe raises the issue of how one 
determines at what level an objective risk justifies a feeling of safety. As Weatherburn has noted, 
‘[t]he same objective risk that troubles you may not bother me in the slightest’.88 This difficulty aside, 
there are two ways of improving perceptions of safety from crime: first, by clarifying any 
misconceptions and overestimates of the objective risks and secondly, by reducing the actual risk. 
Ways in which sentencing measures and legislation may be able to impact on actual risk is discussed 
below. It is difficult to see how sentencing measures and legislation can impact on misperceptions 
about the risk of falling victim to offences such as assault, robbery and burglary. However, such 
misperceptions can be tackled in other ways, and addressing them may assist in improving confidence 
in the criminal justice system as well as improving perceptions of safety.  
What do we know about public perceptions of crime?  
2.2.4 An ABS Survey in Tasmania in 1998 showed that eight out of ten Tasmanians aged 18 and 
over were worried (very worried or slightly worried) about having their home broken into and almost 
two thirds were worried about being mugged or robbed.89 The ABS Crime and Safety Surveys also 
gather national data on feelings of safety at home alone at day and night.90 Tasmania Together relies on 
the National Police Survey conducted by AC Nielson for its benchmark in relation to feelings of safety 
– in the latest data reported 95 per cent of people 18 years and older feel safe in their homes in the day 
and 86 per cent of people feel safe at night. Just 50 per cent of people feel safe in public places at night 
(see Table 9). While it is difficult to say what level of risk justifies fear or concern, other research 
findings suggest that perceptions of risk are out of kilter with the facts. The public in general have a 
poor understanding of crime rates and do not know whether crime rates are falling or increasing.91 
Most people overestimate the risk of falling victim to crimes such as car theft, assault and robbery.92 
Moreover, there is no systematic link between the prevalence of common offences such break and 
enter, robbery and assault and the level of public concern in that state about these offences.93 Research 
in Britain links misperceptions and misinformation about crime with worry about crime and feelings 
of safety. Based on the British Crime Survey, Finney reports that misperceptions about changes in 
crime rates were associated with increased worry about crime and fear when walking alone after dark 
or being home alone at night and a lack of confidence in the criminal justice system.94 Canadian 
evidence has shown that people with high levels of fear are more likely to be punitive and lack 
confidence in the criminal justice system.95 As levels of fear increased (measured by feelings of safety, 
walking alone at night or at home alone at night) so did levels of punitiveness. Misconceptions about 
crime and sentencing have also been shown to be linked with punitiveness. Hough and Roberts have 
                                                
86  Tasmania Together Board, Parliament of Tasmania, Progress Report 2006 (2006) 23. 
87  Ibid, 24. 
88  Weatherburn (2004), above n 16, 3. 
89  ABS, Community Safety, Tasmania, Cat. No. 4515.6, ABS (1999) 7 and Table 17 (note that worried includes slightly 
worried as well as very worried). 
90  ABS, Crime and Safety Survey, Cat. No. 4509.0, ABS (2005). 
91  Don Weatherburn and David Indermaur, Public Perceptions of Crime Trends in New South Wales and Western Australia, 
Crime and Justice Bulletin No 80, New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (2004). 
92  Don Weatherburn (2004), above n 16, 3, citing Don Weatherburn, Elizabeth Matka and Bronwyn Lind, Crime Perception 
and Reality: Public Perceptions of the Risk of Criminal Victimisation in Australia, Crime and Justice Bulletin 28 (1996). 
93  Ibid. 
94  Andrea Finney, ‘Perceptions of Changing Crime Levels’ in Sian Nicholas and Alison Walker (eds), Crime in England 
and Wales 2002/2003: Supplementary Volume 2: Crime Disorder and the Criminal Justice System – Public Attitudes and 
Perceptions, (2004) 25, 32. 
95  Jane Sprott and Anthony Doob, ‘Fear, Victimisation and Attitudes to Sentencing, the Courts and the Police’ (1997) 39 
Canadian Journal of Criminology 275, 281. 
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found that misperceptions about such facts as changes in crime rate, the proportion of crime that 
involves violence and the number of burglars sent to prison were significantly associated with a belief 
that sentences are too lenient.96 
2.2.5 While there are problems with ascertaining public opinion by means of media polls and 
representative surveys (see para 7.2.2 below), these methods of measuring public opinion consistently 
demonstrate that a majority of respondents think that sentencing is too lenient and that judges are 
unresponsive to community concern about crime. Various media polls and crime prevention and 
customer satisfactions surveys conducted by TASPOL have suggested a widespread view that courts 
are too soft on offenders and that this hampers the police.97 The Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 
has consistently reported that over 70 per cent of respondents agree that people who break the law 
should be given stiffer sentences (the figure was 70 per cent in 2003) with a trend to slightly less 
punitive attitudes.98 
2.2.6 Given that international evidence suggests fear of crime is linked with dissatisfaction with 
sentencing,99 increasing the severity of penalties may be an attractive knee-jerk response to fear of 
crime. However, given that crime rates are largely unaffected by sentencing levels any attempts to 
improve perceptions of community safety by increasing sentencing severity would be disingenuous 
and exploitative. There is a tendency for some politicians to exploit the unsophisticated nature of the 
public debate about crime, a debate which is premised on the notion that most crime is processed by 
the criminal justice system and governments can achieve decisive changes in the extent of crime by 
modifications to the criminal justice system. A vigorous law and order policy may well appease public 
concern in the short-term and attract votes but it is nothing more than pragmatic populist policy 
making. While our government should respond to the demands of the electorate, it should not 
encourage it to think that crime can be solved by increasing the severity of punishment.  
2.2.7 This is not to say that sentencing levels, sentencing measures or sentencing policy have no 
role in achieving the Tasmanian Together Goals relating to perceptions of community safety. 
Dissatisfaction with sentencing and perceptions of leniency clearly damage public confidence in the 
criminal justice system and exacerbate fear of crime. To reiterate comments made in Part 1 of this 
paper, more subtle criticisms of sentencing include:100 
• Accountability: the current system, with judges and magistrates exercising broad discretionary 
powers, is not sufficiently accountable; 
• Consistency: current practices are inconsistent; 
• Transparency: the current system is inaccessible (except to lawyers) and is not open to scrutiny; 
• Responsiveness: judges and magistrates are out of touch and are not sufficiently responsive to 
public concerns. 
2.2.8 Public confidence in the criminal justice system could be addressed by righting 
misconceptions as to accountability and consistency, and responding to perceptions of leniency, a lack 
of transparency and unresponsiveness by: 
• promoting public understanding of sentencing practice; 
• reviewing aspects of the system that may undermine public confidence; and 
                                                
96  Mike Hough and Julian Roberts, ‘Sentencing Trends in Britain: Public Knowledge and Public Opinion’ (1999) 1 
Punishment & Society 11. 
97  E.g., Operation Switch On (interviews with Claremont Residents) and Neighbourhood Watch Survey.  
98  D Indermaur and L Roberts, ‘Perceptions of Crime and Justice’ in S Wilson et al, Australian Social Attitudes: The First 
Report, (2005) 141, 155. 
99  Sprott and Doob (1997), above n 95, 281.  
100  Neil Morgan, ‘A Sentencing Matrix for Western Australia: Accountability and Transparency or Smoke and Mirrors?’ in 
Neil Hutton and Cyrus Tata (eds), Sentencing and Society: International Perspectives (2002) 65. 
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• establishing mechanisms for feeding in public attitudes to the criminal justice system. 
2.2.9 In addition, because misconceptions about crime trends are also linked with fear of crime, 
improving public knowledge about crime could help reduce fear of crime. 
Promoting understanding of crime trends and sentencing practice 
2.2.10 Australian studies are consistent with the research from other countries. The public has very 
little accurate information about either crime or punishment trends. People perceive crime to be 
constantly increasing, over-estimate the proportion of recorded crime that involves violence, and over-
estimate the percentage of offenders who re-offend. The public also under-estimates the severity of 
sentencing practices (e.g. the imprisonment rate), and over-estimates the percentage of prisoners 
released on parole and the proportion of prison terms served in the community on parole.101 
Misperceptions about sentencing practice correlate with a belief that sentences are too lenient: the 
lower the estimated use of imprisonment, the greater is the belief that sentencing is too lenient. This 
suggests that those dissatisfied with the criminal justice system are those whose perceptions are 
particularly inaccurate. Therefore, it seems that misperceptions about crime and sentencing practice 
contribute to public dissatisfaction. Moreover, misperceptions are linked with fear. A better 
understanding of crime and sentencing practice should lead to an improvement in public confidence 
and a reduction in fear of crime. How this should be done is considered in Part 7. 
Reviewing aspects of the system that undermine public confidence  
2.2.11 An examination of sentencing options may indicate that the available options are inadequate. 
Some existing options may be misunderstood and contribute to criticism of the system. A review of 
sentencing options is undertaken in Part 3 of this paper. Parole is another aspect of the criminal justice 
system that has come under public criticism. It is sometimes viewed as a charade which makes a 
mockery of the criminal justice system by reducing the sentence below the level needed to adequately 
punish the crime. It is also criticised as giving priority to offender considerations rather than those of 
the victim. Parole will be considered in Part 6. 
2.2.12 Changing the rationale of punishment is not something that can be effectively achieved by 
legislation. However, as a longer-term goal the possibility of changing the fundamental rationale of 
punishment from the mix of desert and goal based considerations should be considered. The emphasis 
placed by courts on general deterrence for example implies promises of crime prevention that cannot 
be met.  
Taking public opinion into account 
2.2.13 The manner and extent to which public opinion about crime should shape sentencing theory 
and practice are dealt with in Part 7.  
Sentencing smarter to reduce actual risk of crime, reduce victimisation rates and improve 
recidivism rates 
2.2.14 The strategies addressed so far relate to improving public perceptions of public safety rather 
than actual improvements in public safety by reductions in the crime rate. As discussed above in the 
section on the relationship between crime levels and sentencing, because crime levels are largely 
unaffected by sentencing levels, sentencing reform cannot significantly impact on crime levels and 
hence the Tasmania Together Goals relating to community safety and crime reduction. It has been 
shown that the intuitive appeal of the assumption that crime levels are easily controlled by sentencing 
measures collapses in the face of the empirical evidence and normative arguments to the contrary. As 
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the Institute has argued in relation to the general deterrent effect of sanctions, the time has come to 
accept the null hypothesis – increasing the severity of penalties does not reduce crime by deterring 
would-be offenders. Incapacitation is equally problematic. Collective incapacitative policies cannot be 
justified in cost-benefit terms, and selective incapacitation suffers from the problem of over-prediction 
and is morally objectionable. As for specific deterrence, research evidence provides little support for 
the proposition that more severe sanctions deters those convicted. Nor does imprisonment deter those 
convicted more effectively than non-custodial sanctions. However, while the public should not be 
encouraged to think that crime can be solved by punishment, there are undoubtedly improvements that 
could be made in using public resources more efficiently and imaginatively. The evidence that those 
imprisoned do no better than those given non-custodial sanctions suggests that reducing imprisonment 
may be a cost-effective option. A wider range of sentencing options and reserving custodial sentences 
for particularly serious offenders may allow expenditure to be redirected to measures which are likely 
to have more potential to address re-offending. At the same time, integrating criminal justice with 
broader social issues is something that should be part of government policy. The international 
evidence now suggests there is also some scope for addressing the issue of recidivism of offenders 
through rehabilitation – if recidivism rates could be improved this could impact on crime levels. Ways 
of sentencing smarter will be discussed in Part 3. 
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Part 3 
Sentencing Options 
Examine the suitability of present sentencing options (including options provided in the Youth 
Justice Act 1997 (Tas) and consider whether any changes should be made to existing options 
and whether new sentencing options should be introduced. 
3.1 Sentencing options 
Introduction 
3.1.1 The sentencing options for courts dealing with adult offenders are set out in the Sentencing 
Act 1997 (Tas) s 7. They are: 
• a sentence of imprisonment (at least some of which must be actually served); 
• a drug treatment order; 
• a wholly suspended sentence of imprisonment; 
• a community service order; 
• a probation order; 
• a rehabilitation program order; 
• a fine; 
• an adjournment with an undertaking (section 7(f) order);  
• conviction only; 
• dismissal without conviction. 
3.1.2 In this Part, existing sentencing options will be reviewed and additional sentencing options 
considered. It is recognised that changing the sentencing framework is only part of the issue and that 
there are important questions of resources that need to be addressed. Providing properly resourced and 
staffed programs to address the criminogenic needs of offenders is not simply a matter of financial 
resources. It has much wider implications for community corrections and prisons. 
3.2 Imprisonment 
3.2.1 The Supreme Court has the power to impose sentences of imprisonment for all crimes. The 
maximum is 21 years except for murder and treason, which attract maxima of life imprisonment.1 The 
power of magistrates to impose a sentence of imprisonment for summary offences depends on the 
penalty provisions attached to the offence. The usual maximum ranges from three months to 12 
                                                
1  Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 389(3).  
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months. For indictable offences that are heard by magistrates the offender is liable to 12 months 
imprisonment for a first offence and three years for a subsequent offence.2  
3.2.2 A sentencing principle of particular relevance to the choice of imprisonment as a sanction is 
that imprisonment is a punishment of last resort to be imposed only where a non-custodial sentence is 
inappropriate. There are four good reasons for this principle:  
• doubts about the rehabilitative potential of custody;  
• belief in its deleterious effects; 
• doubts about the preventive effect of custody; and  
• human rights and humanitarian concerns.3 
3.2.3 International evidence indicates that reconviction rates for released prisoners are poor and 
that taking into account age, type of offence and previous record, prisoners perform worse than those 
given other sentences.4 A reconviction study of offenders dealt with in the Supreme Court in Tasmania 
has found similarly poor reconviction rates for prisoners, particularly those sentenced to fully served 
or unsuspended sentences. While half of the sample of all offenders sentenced by the Supreme Court 
re-offended within two years, 62 per cent of offenders given unsuspended sentences re-offended in 
that period, with 42 per cent of offenders receiving wholly suspended sentences and 52 per cent 
receiving non-custodial sentences. Only those with no prior convictions performed best when given a 
prison sentence (unsuspended or partly suspended).5 This suggests that prison in itself neither 
effectively rehabilitates nor deters prisoners. To what extent it makes offenders worse is difficult to 
establish. However, such factors as loss of employment, loss of housing, loss of contact with family, 
increased financial problems and possible deterioration in physical and mental health are all known 
adverse effects of imprisonment.6 As for other preventive effects, the absence of evidence of a general 
deterrent effect from greater use of custody has been discussed in Part 2. Part 2 also demonstrated that 
the incapacitative effect of imprisonment is marginal. While imprisonment does succeed in 
incapacitating those imprisoned for the duration of the sentence, incapacitation as a penal policy is 
hardly persuasive when so many re-offend on release and when so few offenders are actually 
convicted.7 The very limited role that the imprisonment rate has on the crime rate been recognised for 
many years by the judiciary. In a review of aspects of sentencing conducted in 1994, consultations 
with the judiciary, magistrates and others found a general scepticism about the effectiveness of 
imprisonment in terms of crime reduction.8 Having a low imprisonment rate does not mean that a 
community is less safe than a community with a higher imprisonment rate. Tasmania’s imprisonment 
rate is the six highest at 140.6 per 100,000 of the adult population compared with the Australian rate of 
169.4 per 100,000.9 It by no means follows that those jurisdictions with higher rates are safer.  
3.2.4 A relevant factor in considering imprisonment rates is the issue of cost. The Productivity 
Commission reports that nationally in 2005-2006 the total net cost per prisoner per day, comprising 
recurrent expenditure, depreciation, debt servicing fee, and user cost of capital, was $240 per day or 
$87, 600 per year. The cost per prisoner in Tasmania was just under this.10 The latest Department of 
Justice Annual Report reports the cost was $222 in 2006-2007.11 The fact that imprisonment is the 
most expensive sentencing option, that imprisoned offenders perform no better in terms of re-
                                                
2  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 13. 
3  Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (4th ed 2005), 266-269.  
4  See Part 2; see also Ashworth (2005) above n 3, 267. 
5  L Bartels (2007), ‘The weight of the Sword of Damocles: A reconviction analysis of suspended sentences in Tasmania’ 
under review with the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology. 
6  Ashworth (2005) above n 3, 266; Alison Liebling and Shadd Maruna, The Effects of Imprisonment (2005) ch 1. 
7  Ashworth (2005) above n 3, 268. 
8  L Jones, Review of Certain Criminal Penalties, Tasmanian Department of Justice (1994) 126. 
9  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Prisoners in Australia 2007, Cat. No. 4517.0, ABS, (2007) 18.  
10  Steering Committee, Parliament of Australia, Report on Government Services 2007 (2007) [7.22].  
11  Tasmanian Department of Justice, Annual Report 2006-2007 (2007), 42.  
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offending and often worse than similar offenders given other sentences, leads to the conclusion that 
attempts should be made to curtail the use of imprisonment.  
3.2.5 In the light of the strong arguments in favour of restraint in the use of imprisonment, the 
Issues Paper invited submission in relation to the following strategies: 
• abolishing sentences of 3 months or less; 
• statutory recognition of imprisonment as a last resort; 
• requiring reasons for short sentences; 
• reforming the use of short custodial sentences. 
Prohibiting short sentences 
3.2.6 The Issues Paper asked whether the possibility of abolishing sentences of three months or 
less should be explored. Very short sentences of imprisonment are common in Tasmania. In 
Magistrates Courts in 2003-2004, 67 per cent of custodial sentences were for three months or less and 
89 per cent six months or less.12 In the Supreme Court from 2001-2006, 18 per cent of sentences of 
imprisonment were three months or less and 47 per cent six months or less. Western Australia 
abolished terms of imprisonment of three months or less in 1996 following the recommendations of 
the Halden Report,13 and in 2004 this was extended to sentences of six months or less. Section 86 of 
the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) provides that a term of six months or less can only be imposed if the 
aggregate of sentences exceeds six months, if the offender is already serving another term or if the 
term is imposed for a prison disciplinary offence. The context of the 1996 change was the very high 
imprisonment rate in Western Australia (second behind the Northern Territory), an outdated 
sentencing regime with relatively few alternatives to imprisonment and insufficient use of the options 
that did exist.14 The Act aimed to encourage sentencers to avoid short custodial sentences by the carrot 
of new non-custodial options and the stick of the prohibition. In New South Wales, investigating the 
issue of banning sentences under six months was one of the first tasks given to the Sentencing 
Council. The Council released its report in 2004.15 The same year, the Tasmanian Leader of the 
Opposition and the Shadow Attorney-General released a policy statement advocating the abolition of 
short terms of imprisonment. In the responses to the Issues Paper that addressed this issue, only 
Tasmania Police and the Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania expressed support for this proposal.  
Arguments supporting the abolition of short terms of imprisonment 
3.2.7 It is argued that short periods of imprisonment should be avoided because they have all of 
the deleterious effect of imprisonment (loss of the deterrent effect of imprisonment on a first offender, 
exposing minor offenders to more serious offenders, and negative effects on family, housing and 
employment) without any benefits (too short to deploy therapeutic programs) and minimum 
incapacitative effects. Cost saving is also raised as an argument. A study by the Bureau of Crime 
Statistics and Research (BOCSAR), modelling the impact of the abolition of sentences of six months 
and less in New South Wales, predicted a big impact on the flow of prisoners with the number of new 
prisoners received dropping from 150 per week to 90 per week. The impact on the stock of prisoners 
would be smaller of course – it was predicted that the prison population would be reduced by about 10 
per cent with savings of between $33 million and $47 million in the recurrent costs of housing 
prisoners.16 The authors also predicted that the abolition of short terms of imprisonment could reduce 
the remand population because if a prison sentence was less likely, it may be more difficult to justify 
                                                
12  From database created by Lorana Bartels, Ph D student, Faculty of Law. 
13  Joint Select Committee, Parliament of Western Australia, Report of the Joint Select Committee on Parole (The Halden 
Report) (1991). 
14  Neil Morgan, ‘Business as Usual or a New Utopia? Non-custodial Sentences Under Western Australia’s New Sentencing 
Laws’ (1996) 26 University of Western Australia Law Review 364, 365. 
15  New South Wales Sentencing Council, Abolishing Prison Sentences of 6 Months or Less (2004). 
16  Bronwyn Lind and Simon Eyeland, ‘The Impact of Abolishing Short Prison Sentences’ Crime and Justice Bulletin No 
73, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (2002).  
Part 3: Sentencing Options 
95 
refusal of bail.17 It has also been argued that the questionable rehabilitative and deterrent value of short 
prison terms has implications in terms of the costs of re-offending by ex-prisoners.18 
Arguments against the abolition of short terms of imprisonment 
3.2.8 First, the cost impact of abolishing short prison terms has been questioned. Even assuming 
that short sentences will be replaced with alternative sentences, there will be cost implications 
associated with these alternatives. Some offenders will breach these alternatives in any event or re-
offend and attract a prison sentence within a short time so that the cost of imprisonment is simply 
deferred.19 It has also been argued that there are cost implications associated with the use of remand. 
While a possible decrease in remands in custody has been predicted (because if a prison sentence is 
unlikely, a refusal of bail would be more difficult to justify),20 Morgan has warned that if judicial 
officers no longer have the option of a short sentence, custodial remands may be used as an 
alternative.21 
3.2.9 A major concern with abolishing short terms is that sentencers might simply increase the 
length of shorter sentences in order to ensure that certain offenders serve a period of imprisonment. 
This has been termed ‘sentence creep’ and would have the opposite effect to that intended: increasing 
the use of custody rather than reducing it. It has been suggested that in Western Australia, following 
the abolition of sentences of three months or less, the number of four month sentences increased. 
There is also a perception that courts have adopted more punitive remand practices, achieving a ‘short, 
sharp shock’ by remanding in custody before ultimately giving a non-custodial penalty.22 However, in 
support of the effectiveness of abolition it has been argued that there was no shift from sentences of 
three months or less towards longer sentences after abolition,23 and there was a decrease in the prison 
population between 2001 and 2002 with a substantial decrease of 20 per cent in the indigenous 
imprisonment rate. But as this decrease was some five years after the legislation was introduced and 
has not continued, it may not be due to the abolition of short prison terms.24 The New South Wales 
Sentencing Council concluded that the impact of abolishing terms of six months and less was not yet 
known, and recommended that New South Wales await an evaluation before adopting a similar 
proposal.25 A number of respondents to the Issues Paper mentioned the ‘sentence creep argument’ as a 
reason for opposing the abolition of short terms of imprisonment.26 
3.2.10 Against the proposal it has been argued that removing the option to impose a short prison 
sentence is an unnecessary fetter on judicial discretion and that in some circumstances a short prison 
sentence may be appropriate. Breach of a non-custodial sentence may be one such circumstance. The 
New South Wales Sentencing Commission lists a number of examples including the following: 
• a short prison sentence may be proportionate to the offence in question; 
• although the offence is minor, the offender’s criminal history and attitude to rehabilitation may 
suggest that full-time imprisonment as the option of last resort has been reached; 
• an offender may have repeatedly refused to comply with alternative non-custodial options; 
                                                
17  Ibid, 4; see also submission by the Department of Corrective Services to the NSW Sentencing Council, above n 15, 91-
92. 
18  NSW Sentencing Council (2004), above n 15, 11.  
19  See ibid, 63-66. 
20  Lind and Eyland (2002), above n 16, 4; Department of Corrective Services submission to the NSW Sentencing Council, 
above n 15, 61.  
21  Neil Morgan, ‘The Abolition of Six-month Sentences, New Hybrid Orders and Truth in Sentencing: Western Australia’s 
Latest Sentencing Laws’ (2004) 28 Criminal Law Journal 8, 16. 
22  Ibid, 15-16; see also Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of Federal 
Offenders, Report No 103 (2006) [7.69]. 
23  See reference to letter from Director General, WA Department of Justice, in the NSW Sentencing Council’s Discussion 
Paper, above n 15, 16. 
24  NSW Sentencing Council (2004), above n 15, 16. 
25  Ibid, 21. 
26  The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, submission, 2; Craig Mackie, Legal Aid Commission consultation, 1 October 
2002. 
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• an offender may be refused bail and have spent a period of under six months in custody and the 
circumstances of the offence make it appropriate that the sentence imposed be back-dated to the 
date of arrest. 
3.2.11 The then Chief Justice in his response makes a similar point, namely that short prison 
sentences are a useful sentencing choice in some circumstances. He argues: 
The question is posed generally and does not have regard to situations where the offender is 
any event going to be incarcerated. Thus a blanket prohibition on sentences of three months 
or less would operate even if they were to be made cumulative upon an existing sentence. 
… 
There are many crimes at the lower end of the scale which warrant sentences of three 
months or less whether suspended or not: prison offences, minor sexual assaults, and some 
acts of defilement, actual assault, perverting justice by the giving of a false name to name 
but a few.27 
3.2.12 Some of the situations mentioned could be addressed by allowing exceptions to rule, and in 
Western Australia, short terms can be imposed if the offender is already serving a prison sentence or if 
the term is imposed for a prison offence. However, the range of possible situations identified when a 
short sentence would be appropriate suggests that short prison sentences should be retained rather than 
abolished. 
3.2.13 A further objection to abolishing short terms of imprisonment is that it is likely to require an 
increase in the maximum penalties for some offences. Many offences in the Police Offences Act 1935 
(Tas) attract three month maxima. In Western Australia, Morgan reports that while there is a long list 
of offences that are no longer imprisonable, most of these offences are unenforced, irrelevant or never 
attracted a prison sentence in any event. On the other hand, enhanced maxima of nine or 12 months 
apply to offences that in practice are likely to attract a prison sentence.28 Morgan points out that 
enhancing the maxima is not a neutral exercise. An increased penalty indicates that Parliament intends 
the offence be dealt with more severely and sentencing practices should reflect such changes.29 
Enhancing the maximum penalty for some offences would also have flow-on effects for other maxima.  
The Institute’s view 
3.2.14 Abolishing short terms of imprisonment has the appeal of substituting more cost effective 
measures for less serious offences. However, the Institute is of the view that the arguments against 
such a proposal are persuasive. The gap which would be left in the sentencing continuum could lead to 
counterproductive practices such as the use of custodial remands to circumvent the rules and the 
imposition of longer custodial sentences (‘sentence creep’). Moreover, the proposal creates problems 
for dealing with breaches of non-custodial sentences and prison disciplinary offences, disrupts the 
penalty scale and has undesirable implications for the nexus between suspended sentences and 
imprisonment. 
Recommendation 
1. That short sentences of imprisonment should continue to be a sentencing option for the reasons 
given in para 3.2.14. 
                                                
27  The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, submission, 2. 
28  Morgan (2004), above n 21, 15. 
29  Ibid, 15. 
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Statutory recognition of the principle of restraint in the use of imprisonment  
3.2.15 Tasmania is the only State that does not give statutory recognition to this principle. It does 
nevertheless apply as part of the common law and courts here have quite frequently referred to it.30 It 
is also a principle to which there is widespread international assent.31 The Issues Paper asked whether 
greater strength could be given to the principle by embodying it in legislation. Section 5(1) of the 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) provides that a court must not sentence an offender 
to imprisonment unless it is satisfied, having considered all possible alternatives, that no penalty other 
than imprisonment is appropriate. The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) contains a similar provision in s 17A. In 
addition, s 17B provides that a court is not to impose a sentence of imprisonment on an offender for 
certain offences relating to property or money of a total value of $2000 or less unless the court is 
satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to warrant such a sentence. Section 11 of South 
Australia’s Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 is a more detailed provision. It provides that a 
sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed unless: 
• the defendant has shown a tendency to violence towards other persons; or 
• the defendant is likely to commit a serious offence if allowed to go at large; or 
• the defendant has previously been convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment; or 
• any other sentence would be inappropriate, having regard to the gravity or circumstances of the 
offence. 
3.2.16 It is argued that incorporating this principle into sentencing legislation serves as a salutary 
reminder of the importance of the principle of parsimony, particularly when imprisonment is being 
considered.32 Three submissions strongly supported enacting such a statutory statement. For instance 
the Tasmanian Catholic Justice and Peace Commission stated that since studies show that 
imprisonment is not an effective deterrent, statutory recognition should be given to the principle of 
imprisonment as a last resort.33 
3.2.17 Against such a statutory provision it could be argued that it is unlikely to achieve any more 
than the common law principle and is, in any event, ‘merely teaching grandmother to suck eggs’. The 
then Chief Justice was of the view that such a statement is unnecessary and stated ‘[m]otherhood 
statements to that effect are easily misunderstood.’34 Indeed formulating the principle in terms of 
imprisonment as a sanction of last resort has been criticised because it implies that custody may 
justifiably be used for someone who persistently commits minor offences, and for whom other 
measures have been tried.35 
The Institute’s views 
3.2.18 The Institute agrees with the Australian Law Reform Commission that a statutory statement 
of restraint in the use of custody does serve as a salutary reminder of principle of parsimony and an 
encouragement of such restraint. The Institute considers that data on magistrates’ sentencing practice 
in Part 1 revealing disparities in magistrates’ views of the custody threshold demonstrate the need for 
more guidance as to when a custodial sentence is appropriate. However, to avoid misunderstanding, 
the formulation should not be in terms of using imprisonment as a last resort. Rather, the principle 
should be one that argues for the use of non-custodial sentences rather than custodial ones, and shorter 
custodial sentences rather than longer ones.36 The recommended formulation is based on ss 152 and 
                                                
30  Kate Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (2nd ed, 2002) [9.118]. 
31  United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (1990) Resolution VIII para 5(e). 
32  ALRC (2006), above n 22, 7.64. 
33  Tasmanian Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, submission, 2. 
34  Submission, 1. 
35  Ashworth (2005), above n 3, 266. 
36  Ibid. 
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153 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) and provides that the court must not sentence an offender 
to imprisonment unless it is of the opinion that the offence/s was so serious that neither a fine nor a 
community sentence can be justified for the offence and if it does so decide the sentence must be for 
the shortest term that is commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. It should be noted that 
urging that prison terms be a short as possible does not mean that short prison terms are to be 
encouraged. The Institute accepts the criticisms of very short terms of imprisonment that are outlined 
above (see para 3.2.7). Rather, the purpose of the statutory provision is to encourage non-custodial 
sentences rather than short custodial sentences, and when only a custodial sentence is appropriate to 
urge that it is as short as possible. 
Recommendation 
2. The principle of restraint in the use of imprisonment should be enacted by inserting an amendment 
into the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 13A, providing: 
(1)  that a court must not sentence an offender to imprisonment unless the offence, or a combination 
of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so serious that neither a fine nor 
a community sentence can be justified for the offence.  
(2)  If a sentence of imprisonment is justified under subsection (1) the sentence must be for the 
shortest term that in the opinion of the court is commensurate with the seriousness of the 
offence. (3.2.18) 
Reasons justifying short sentences 
3.2.19 There is no statutory requirement in Tasmania for courts to give reasons for imposing a 
custodial sentence. However, for many years it has been regarded as ‘most desirable’.37 The New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission recommended that judges and magistrates should provide 
reasons justifying any decision to impose a sentence of imprisonment of six months or less with the 
hope it would encourage more appropriate use of imprisonment. To ensure that this requirement would 
not merely attract token compliance, it was also recommended that courts should not only provide 
reasons for any decision to impose a sentence of six months or less but also should expressly state why 
a non-custodial sentence was not appropriate.38 Section 5(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 
1999 (NSW) implements this recommendation. Some responses to the Issues Paper recommended 
enacting such a provision in Tasmania.39  
3.2.20 There is some evidence that there has been a downward trend in the number of prisoners 
serving prison sentences of 6 months or less in New South Wales, however, it is unclear whether this 
is attributable to the introduction of s 5(2). Moreover, submissions to the Sentencing Council 
suggested the provision was ineffectual in reducing short terms of imprisonment and that the 
requirement for reasons has become an ‘empty incantation’.40 The Sentencing Council has 
recommended amending s 5 so that in addition to requiring reasons for a sentence of six months or less 
it provides that a court may not impose such a sentence unless it is satisfied that it is appropriate. In 
assessing this, a list of circumstances is provided.41  
The Institute’s views 
                                                
37  Conlan v Arnol [1979] Tas SR (NC 9). 
38  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 79 (1996) 166-169; implemented in Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 5(2).  
39  Legal Aid Commission Tasmania, submission and Warwick Dunstan, submission. 
40  New South Wales Sentencing Council (2004), above n 15, 65-66. 
41  Ibid, 23, 29. 
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3.2.21 The Institute is of the view that enacting the principle of restraint in the use of imprisonment 
as recommended above is sufficient to discourage the use of short prison terms in inappropriate 
circumstances and that requiring reasons for short sentences could well become an empty incantation. 
Adding a lengthy provision listing circumstances when short sentences may be appropriate adds 
unnecessary complexity to sentencing legislation. In any event, if a court has not said enough to 
indicate that it has made the decision that a sentence other than a short prison term is appropriate, the 
sentencing discretion could miscarry.42 
Recommendation  
3. The Tasmanian Law Reform Institute does not recommend enacting a legislative provision 
requiring courts to give reasons for short sentences of imprisonment. (3.2.21) 
Reforming the use of short custodial sentence in the UK 
3.2.22 In the UK, the Halliday Report on sentencing reform43 and the white paper, Justice for All,44 
denounced short custodial sentences (defined as sentences of less than 12 months imprisonment) 
because they involved no support or supervision after release (which occurred automatically at the half 
way point), did not allow the correctional services to do any meaningful rehabilitation work with 
prisoners and had unacceptably high reconviction rates. A bold new penalty structure was 
recommended and has since been adopted.45 The new structure introduces three new custodial 
sentences of less than 12 months: a revamped suspended sentence; intermittent custody and custody 
plus. Custody plus should not be imposed if a sentence of intermittent custody can be justified and 
intermittent custody should not be ordered if a suspended sentence could be justified. In turn, a 
suspended sentence should not be imposed if a non-custodial penalty could be justified. Custody Plus 
consists of a minimum period of two weeks and a maximum period of 13 weeks in custody which is 
served in full, followed by a compulsory period of supervision of at least 26 weeks in the community, 
within an overall ‘sentence envelope’ of up to 51 weeks. During the period in the community, 
offenders are to be subject to rigorous requirements designed to address the particular factors that 
underlie their criminal behaviour and cause them to re-offend. The conditions of the community 
portion of the sentence are either set by the court or determined by the National Offender Management 
Service at the time of release. In effect courts are prevented from imposing a sentence of less than 12 
months unless it is Custody Plus, a suspended sentence or intermittent custody.46 
3.2.23 The New South Wales Sentencing Council has recommended that consideration be given to 
introducing a form of ‘custody plus’ subject to considerations of cost effectiveness and other resource 
and supervision issues.47 The advantage of such a proposal was seen to lie in improvements in the 
rehabilitation and reintegration of short-term prisoners by provision of post release supervision and 
continuity of rehabilitative programs post release.48  
                                                
42  See for example Clayton v Mulcahy Serial No A19/1990. 
43  Home Office, Making Punishments Work: A Review of the Sentencing Framework for England & Wales (Halliday 
Report). This report was published in July 2001 with a consultation phase through to 31 October 2001. 
44  This paper was released on 17 July 2002 (CM 5563). 
45  Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK). 
46  For a fuller description of the proposals see Ashworth (2005) above n 3, 271-281. 
47  New South Wales Sentencing Council (2004), above n 15, 5. 
48  Ibid, 24-26. 
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3.2.24 The Issues Paper asked whether the English idea of ‘custody plus’ should be explored in 
Tasmania as a means of reducing the reconviction rate of offenders. The Department of Justice and 
Industrial Relations submitted that the idea of custody plus had merit: 
The English idea of ‘Custody Plus’ which involves a tailor made ‘envelope’ of supervision 
and rehabilitation strategies, appears to have significant merit as a possible means of 
reducing recidivism and it allows sentencing to be customised to the offence and the 
offender. This may also encourage increased community confidence in sentencing, 
particularly if magistrates were required to outline the details of the ‘envelope’ when 
handing down a sentence.49  
3.2.25 In the consultations, Community Corrections Launceston was also attracted to the idea of 
‘custody plus’. 
3.2.26 Custody plus has generally been commended as a bold and positive step towards addressing 
the problems of short prison sentences.50 However, Ashworth has pointed out the possible pitfalls of 
introducing such a measure. First, the aim of reducing offending in a group of offenders that will 
include many difficult cases (such as persistent minor offenders who are often socially dislocated) may 
be difficult to achieve. Secondly, there is the risk of net-widening51 – that if custody plus is the type of 
short sentence that courts have been waiting for, there is the risk it will be used even more frequently 
than short terms of imprisonment, perhaps as a community sentence with teeth. Custody plus may lead 
to longer sentences for offenders who otherwise would have received a sentence of only one or two 
months imprisonment. For such offenders the effective minimum is over six months in total. If 
sentencers take the view that custody plus fails to deliver the amount of custody they think appropriate 
in a given case (the maximum is 13 weeks) they may impose a sentence of 12 months – just above the 
limit for custody plus – when the case does not warrant a sentence of that length.52 
The Institute’s views 
3.2.27 The Institute agrees with need to address the issue of the reconviction rates of short-term 
prisoners. Bartels’ reconviction study suggests that offenders on shorter sentences – those under 12 
months – may be more likely to be reconvicted than offenders with longer sentences.53 This conforms 
with English data which shows longer sentences are associated with lower reconviction rates.54 
Avoiding short terms of imprisonment where possible and providing support and rehabilitation in the 
community post release are clearly desirable goals. However, rather than risking the pitfalls of custody 
plus, the Institute is of the view that the same goals could be achieved by providing post-release 
support for short-term prisoners and partly suspended sentences with conditions tailored to meet the 
needs of the particular offender in appropriate cases. The success of such a strategy is likely to depend 
on the availability of effective interventions for this group of offenders. Where the offender does not 
require such support, but a short prison sentence is necessary because of the seriousness of the offence, 
the introduction of an additional intermediate sanction or community custody may provide a solution. 
This will be considered below (see 3.4). All short-term prisoners should be assessed to determine their 
needs on release and provided with appropriate support if necessary. The issue of tailored conditions 
                                                
49  Department of Justice and Industrial Relations, submission, 12. 
50  Ashworth (2005), above n 3, 279. 
51  Net-widening refers to the use of a more severe sentencing order than required to achieve the purpose of the sentence in a 
particular case. 
52  Ashworth (2005), above n 3, 279-281. 
53  Bartels (2007), above n 5, Table 13: 50 per cent of offenders with sentences under six months were reconvicted within 
two years and 55 per cent of offenders with sentences between six months and under 12 months compared with 46 per 
cent for offenders with sentences between 12 and 18 months and 40 per cent between 18 and 24 months. However, these 
differences were not statistically significant. 
54  Jack Cunliffe and Adrian Shepherd, Re-offending of adults: results from the 2004 cohort, Home Office Statistical 
Bulletin, (2007) 2. 
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for partly suspended sentences is taken up in the discussion of suspended sentences (see para 3.3.36 
below). 
Recommendation  
4. That post release interventions be made available for short-term prisoners in appropriate cases and 
particularly for prisoners with partly suspended sentences with supervision. (3.2.23) 
Improving the rehabilitative potential of custody 
3.2.28 The point has been made (2.1.41 and 3.2.3) that high conviction rates for released prisoners 
mean that imprisonment cannot be justified as a rehabilitative measure. Nor can sentencers have any 
confidence that prison is more effective as an individual deterrent than less severe sanctions. However, 
it is now widely accepted that there are some rehabilitative programs that work for some prisoners and 
that reconviction rates can be reduced by properly resourced and targeted programs. Reviews of the 
international evidence suggests that the following rehabilitative programs have been shown to have 
positive outcomes in reducing recidivism among prisoners:  
• cognitive behavioural therapy;  
• sex offender treatment; 
• drug treatment programs; 
• education and work programs. 
Cognitive behavioural therapy 
3.2.29 Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) attempts to change behaviour by changing the 
problematic thought processes of offenders that contribute to criminal behaviour.55 It seems there are 
at least twenty types of cognitive behavioural therapies which generally fall into two groups: first, 
moral reasoning and development and secondly, information processing.56 Mackenzie’s review of the 
evidence (based on a review of the research literature and meta-analyses up to the end of 1999) 
focused on Moral Reconation Therapy which has a moral reasoning and development focus and 
Reasoning and Rehabilitation, which focuses on information processing. Mackenzie concluded that 
both therapies were effective in reducing the recidivism of offenders.57 A recent review, a report by 
Aos, Miller and Drake for the Washington State Institute for Public Policy, confirms this finding on 
the basis of 25 studies, many of them too recent to be included in Mackenzie’s review. The authors 
estimated that cognitive behaviour therapy in prison or the community can be expected to reduce 
recidivism rates by 6.3 per cent. In other words, without the program about 63 per cent of offenders 
will recidivate with a new conviction after a 13-year follow-up, but if they participated in the evidence 
based cognitive behavioural therapy program, their recidivism rate would probably drop to 59 per 
cent, a 6.3 per cent reduction.58 Together with an assessment of its cost effectiveness, this finding led 
Aos et al to put it second in the list of recommended programs for adult offenders in Washington 
State.59 A 2005 Home Office Research Study review of ‘what works’ agreed there was robust 
international evidence to support the effectiveness of cognitive behavioural treatment programs in 
                                                
55  Doris Layton Mackenzie, ‘Reducing the Criminal Activities of Known Offenders and Delinquents: Crime Prevention in 
the Courts and Corrections’ in LW Sherman, DP Farrington, BC Welsh and DL Mackenzie, Evidence-Based Crime 
Prevention, (2002) 330, 366. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Ibid, 366-370. 
58  Steve Aos, Marna Miller, and Elizabeth Drake, Evidence-Based Public Policy Options to Reduce Future Prison 
Construction, Criminal Justice Costs and Crime Rates, Washington State Institute for Public Policy, (2006) 8. 
59  Ibid, 12. 
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reducing recidivism.60 However, the evidence from evaluations in England and Wales of two prison-
based cognitive skills programs (Enhanced Thinking Skills and Reasoning and Rehabilitation) were 
mixed, a result which was explained by methodological limitations of the studies and implementation 
difficulties such as rapid expansion of the programs affecting program quality after initial promising 
signs of success.61  
3.2.30 It is pleasing to note that in November 2006, the prison service introduced a new cognitive 
skills program and that by Spring 2007, about one hundred inmates had completed the course.62 The 
program, called ‘Preparing for Change’, covers issues such as self-awareness, learning to change, 
anger and stress management, communication and interpersonal skills, problem solving and goal 
setting.63 A second introductory cognitive skills program, ‘Taking up Change’ has also been 
introduced for maximum security prisoners. In 2008 the Integrated Offender Management Unit will 
offer a formal induction program for all sentenced inmates that will include participation in ‘Preparing 
for Change’. In addition to these introductory programs a more intensive program utilising a range of 
methods such as relapse prevention planning, problem solving, safety planning, mood management 
techniques and cognitive behavioural models has been introduced to target general offending 
behaviour. This 100-hour program called ‘Making Choices’ was introduced in February 2008. It was 
developed in New Zealand and has been used in Queensland and New South Wales. Another program, 
‘Offending is not the Only Choice’, a 44-hour cognitive skills program, has been run in the women’s 
prison. 
Sex offender treatment 
3.2.31 Due to the comparatively low recidivism rates of untreated sex offenders, robust evaluation 
of sex offender treatment is difficult and is even more dependent on meta-analysis. Mackenzie 
concluded that prison-based sex offender programs using cognitive behavioural therapy were a 
promising method for reducing sex offender recidivism, caution being due to the scientific merit of the 
studies.64 More recent reviews are more definite. On the basis of six studies Aos et al claimed that sex 
offender treatment in prison with aftercare can be expected to reduce recidivism rates by an average of 
seven per cent.65 Preliminary indications from a national sex offender treatment program in England 
and Wales suggest the program is having an impact on reconvictions for sex or violent offences.66 
3.2.32 There have been two Australian reviews of the international evidence of the efficacy of sex 
offender treatment programs. Both agree that the answer to the question, ‘does sex offender treatment 
work?’ is a cautious ‘yes’ – the evidence does support the existence of small but significant reductions 
in sexual recidivism following cognitive behavioural treatments.67 Gelb suggests that this is 
particularly true for sex offender treatment programs delivered in the community. Citing an evaluation 
of a support program for released sex offenders, she also highlights the benefits of social support and 
follow-up assistance for prisoners after release.68 
3.2.33 Over the years there have been many calls for more and better sex offender treatment 
programs. In 2007 a new sex offender program was introduced to replace the program offered in a 
                                                
60  Mia Debidin and Jorgen Lovbakke, ‘Offending Behaviour Programs in Prison and Probation’ in Gemma Harper and 
Chloe Chitty (eds), The Impact of Corrections on Re-Offending: A Review of ‘What Works’, Home Office Research Study 
291 (3rd ed, 2005) 31, 33. 
61  Ibid, 38. 
62  Steven Kons, ‘Prison Programs in the Tasmanian Prison Service’ (2007) 97 Law Letter 13.  
63  Ibid. 
64  Mackenzie (2002), above n 55, 371. 
65  Aos, Miller and Drake (2006), above n 58, 9. 
66  Debidin and Lovbakke (2005), above n 60, 44. 
67  Denise Lievore, Recidivism of Sexual Assault Offenders: Rates, Risk Factors and Treatment Efficacy, Australian Institute 
of Criminology, (2004) 102; Karen Gelb, Recidivism of Sex Offenders, Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council (2007) 37. 
68  Gelb (2007), above n 67, 36-37, citing Robin Wilson, Janice Picheca and Michelle Prinzo, Circles of Support and 
Accountability: an Evaluation of the Pilot Project in South-Central Ontario (2005). 
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therapeutic community. It is an open program tailored to accommodate medium risk of offending (132 
hours) through to high and very high risk (up to 360 hours). 
Drug treatment 
3.2.34 Drug treatment for prison inmates may be delivered from a therapeutic community, which 
operates as a 24-hour live-in facility within the prison or it may be offered as an out-patient type 
program. Mackenzie’s conclusion that prison-based therapeutic communities (with or without 
community after-care) are effective in reducing the recidivism of prisoners69 is supported by Aos et 
al’s 2006 review which also found out-patient drug treatment programs for inmates to be effective.70 
The Home Office ‘what works’ report acknowledged that the evidence base for England and Wales 
was limited and that the indications from evaluations suggesting prison-based drug treatment programs 
were effective needed to be treated with some caution.71 It was emphasised that the gains made in 
prison can be quickly lost. ‘One of the most consistent findings from the drug treatment literature is 
that outcomes are most favourable for offenders who participate in, and complete, after-care.’72 It is 
noted that with drug treatment, housing and other forms of social support are needed as part of the 
package. 
3.2.35 Drug and alcohol programs at Risdon Prison have been expanded in recent years. A program 
called ‘Getting Smart’ has recently been introduced. It is a 22-hour program which was developed in 
the United States and has also been offered in Queensland. The Salvation-Army is contracted to 
provide the program at the Ron Barwick Minimum Security Prison in 2007-2008. In early 2008, 
‘Pathways’, a more intensive 120-hour program commenced. It is part of the same family as ‘Getting 
Smart’ and participants will be able to join ‘Getting Smart’ maintenance groups for follow-up. A drug 
and alcohol program called ‘Substance Abuse is not the Only Choice’ will be offered in 2008 in the 
women’s prison.  
Education and work programs 
3.2.36 On the basis of an early review of the effectiveness of vocational programs in prisons, John 
Braithwaite suggested that such programs may ‘emerge as one of the few types of intervention which 
can have an impact on crime.’73 However, in relation to academic education that is not directed at any 
particular skill, he found insufficient evidence that investment in academic education for prisoners is a 
way of reducing crime.74 More recent reviews show increasing confidence in the effectiveness of 
prison education as a crime reduction tool. While Mackenzie found adult basic education to be a 
promising strategy,75 Aos et al estimated general education programs in prison reduce recidivism on 
average by seven per cent.76 According to both Mackenzie and Aos et al, vocational education 
programs in prisons and residential settings are effective in reducing recidivism.77 Evidence from the 
British experience is more equivocal and the message from the Home Office review is that for 
education and employment related interventions to be effective, housing and other forms of social 
                                                
69  Mackenzie (2002), above n 55, 376. 
70  Aos, Miller and Drake (2006), above n 58, 9. 
71  Robin Elliott-Marshall, Malcolm Ramsay and Duncan Stewart, ‘Alternative Approaches to Integrating Offenders into the 
Community’ in Gemma Harper and Chloe Chitty (eds), The Impact of Corrections on Re-offending: a Review of ‘what 
works’, Home Office Research Study 291 (3rd ed, 2005) 57, 64.  
72  Ibid. 
73  John Braithwaite, Prisons, Education and Work, (1980) 29. 
74  Ibid 36. Of course, as Braithwaite recognised, such education has a worth of its own irrespective of its effect on 
employment and recidivism (at 28). 
75  Mackenzie (2002), above n 55, 358. 
76  Aos, Miller and Drake (2006), above n 58, 9: based on 17 evaluations a number of them very recent. 
77  Mackenzie (2002), above n 55, 364-365; Aos, Miller and Drake (2006), above n 58, 9 (this includes a 2005 Queensland 
study). 
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support are also needed and that there is a need for prisons to arrange adequate aftercare and support 
before prisoners are released.78 
Knowing what works for prisoners is not enough 
3.2.37 The ‘what works’ literature emphasises that it is not enough to know ‘what works’. We also 
need to know ‘what works for whom and why’. To be effective these programs need to be carefully 
designed to target dynamic risk factors, namely the specific characteristics of offenders that can be 
changed in treatment and that are predictive of the individual’s future criminal activities. There is 
consensus in the international literature that the main dynamic risk factors are attitudes, cognitions, 
behaviours, education training and employment, substance abuse, accommodation and interpersonal 
relationships.79 To identify these needs, effective assessment systems are clearly a prerequisite. For 
prisoners to benefit from rehabilitation programs, they need to be properly targeted to the prisoners’ 
individual needs. In other words, effective rehabilitation programs need to use ‘multiple treatment 
components’80 or a ‘multi-modal’81 and individually targeted approach which aims to provide 
offenders with items selected from a menu of cognitive skills training, drug treatment, sex offender 
treatment, educational and vocational training and help in securing accommodation. 
The Institute’s views 
3.2.38 The terms of reference for this project did not explicitly include a review of the rehabilitation 
programs that are offered or could be offered to Tasmanian prisoners. However, the issue is clearly 
relevant to the Tasmania Together targets of reducing recidivism rates (terms of reference 2(b)). 
Whilst imprisonment cannot be justified on the basis of either its rehabilitative or deterrent effects on 
those sentenced to it, there is scope for improving the reconviction rates of prisoners by some selected 
and properly targeted programs. On the basis of international evidence-based reviews of rehabilitative 
programs for prisoners the following are cost effective programs: 
• cognitive behavioural therapy; 
• sex offender treatment; 
• drug treatment programs; 
• education and work programs. 
3.2.39 It is pleasing that since the opening of the new Risdon Prison Complex in August 2006, new 
rehabilitation programs have been introduced in four areas: cognitive skills, drug and alcohol, sex 
offender programs and a prison mentor program.82 While some of these programs such as sex offender 
programs and drug treatment programs appear to be most effective when delivered within a 
therapeutic community within the prison, the outcomes are also worthwhile for the type of out-patient 
programs being offered at Risdon. The research evidence consensus is that programs need to target the 
dynamic risk factors of individual offenders with appropriate programs, and in addition, appropriate 
social support and after-care must be provided to ensure program gains are not quickly lost in release. 
The Integrated Offender Management Unit at Risdon with six program staff is limited in the courses it 
can offer. It is important that adequate resources are devoted to this Unit so that it can offer an 
adequate range of programs and repeat them regularly.  
                                                
78  Elliott-Marshall, Ramsay and Stewart (2005), above n 71, 68; C Chitty ‘The Impact of Corrections on Re-offending: 
Conclusions and the way Forward’ in Gemma Harper and Chloe Chitty (eds), The Impact of Corrections on Offending: a 
Review of ‘what works’, Home Office Research Study 291 (3rd ed, 2005) 75, 78.  
79  Mackenzie (2002), above n 55; Gemma Harper at al, ‘Factors Associated with offending’ in Gemma Harper and Chloe 
Chitty (eds), The Impact of Corrections on Offending: a Review of ‘what works’, Home Office Research Study 291 (3rd 
ed, 2005) 17, 29. 
80  Doris Layton Mackenzie, What Works in Corrections: Reducing the Criminal Activities of Offenders and Delinquents, 
(2006) 385. 
81  Haper et al (2005), above n 79, 67. 
82  Similar mentor programs elsewhere have proved promising. 
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Recommendations  
5. Advantage should be taken of the opportunity imprisonment presents by continuing to direct 
resources to evidence-based rehabilitative programs for prisoners in the areas of cognitive behavioural 
therapy, sex offender treatment and drug treatment programs.  
6. In addition, education and work programs should be introduced.  
7. Program participants should be supported after release with appropriate social support and after-care 
to ensure that any program gains are not lost. 
Deferral of commencement of prison sentences 
3.2.40 Some time ago the Legislative Council Select Committee on Correctional Services and 
Sentencing in Tasmania recommended that courts be given the power to defer sentence for a limited 
time to enable offenders sentenced to imprisonment to put their affairs in order prior to the 
commencement of their sentence.83 
3.2.41 When a sentence of imprisonment is passed it takes effect from the day on which it is 
imposed, or, if the offender is not in custody, on the day on which the offender is apprehended under 
the warrant of imprisonment issued in respect of the sentence. There is no power to defer a sentence 
except to order that a sentence be served cumulatively with a sentence the offender is already serving 
or liable to serve. The Select Committee was concerned with cases where an offender had been free 
for many months after being charged, where neither conviction nor imprisonment were inevitable and 
where the offender was employed and would not present any greater danger to the community after the 
sentence had been imposed than in the months preceding the trial or sentence. It was argued that 
deferral of the sentence of imprisonment in such a case would provide an opportunity for the 
arrangements to be made to retain employment to the benefit of the offender, the offender’s family and 
also to the community. Holland was cited as an example of effective use of this practice. 
3.2.42 The idea of deferral of prison sentences has very recently been floated by the Minister for 
Corrective Services in Western Australia.84 Rather than providing a means for offenders to organise 
their affairs, it was suggested as a means of reducing overcrowding in the prison system which was 
reported to be about 20 per cent over capacity.85 The system would apply to tax evasion, bank fraud, 
social security fraud and other white collar offenders who posed no flight risk or threat to community 
safety. The proposal was attacked by the Opposition who claimed it would do little to relieve 
overcrowding.86  
3.2.43 A number of responses to the Issues Paper addressed the power to defer imprisonment. The 
Department of Justice and Industrial Relations expressed concern about the public acceptability of 
such a measure. The need for inclusion of adequate risk assessment material in pre-sentence reports 
was adverted to and the comment was made that if imprisonment were to be reserved only for 
dangerous, persistent or those guilty of serious crimes, the introduction of sentence deferral would be 
unnecessary.87 Deferrals were also opposed by Tasmania Police on the grounds of the threat to the 
credibility of the criminal justice system, particularly where the offender re-offended before serving 
the sentence. The need for such an option was also questioned on the grounds that there is generally 
                                                
83  Legislative Council Select Committee, Parliament of Tasmania, Correctional Services and Sentencing in Tasmania 
(Wing Committee Report) (1999) 135. 
84  Janine MacDonald, ‘White Collar Crimes May Have to Book Cells for Later’, The Australian (Sydney), 10 September 
2007, 5. 
85  Ibid. 
86  Ibid.  
87  Department of Justice and Industrial Relations, submission, 12. 
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sufficient time prior to trial and sentence for an offender to arrange their affairs.88 Only one submission 
supported deferral.89  
The Institute’s views 
3.2.44 The Institute is not persuaded of the need to defer sentences of imprisonment. It agrees that 
there is normally sufficient time prior to trial and sentence and even between an early plea of guilty 
and sentence for an offender to arrange his or her affairs. 
Recommendation 
8. The Institute does not recommend that courts be given the power to defer sentence for the reasons 
given in para 3.2.44. 
3.3 Suspended sentences of imprisonment 
3.3.1 A suspended sentence is a prison sentence, which although imposed is not activated or not 
wholly activated but is suspended on conditions similar to probation and parole. The power to impose 
a suspended prison sentence in Tasmania is a broad one.90 Any sentence of imprisonment can be 
wholly or partly suspended91 and there is no maximum or minimum operational period (i.e. the period 
during which breach will put the offender at risk of having the suspended sentence activated). 
However, because it is a prison sentence its imposition first requires a decision that a sentence of 
imprisonment of a specific length is appropriate before the decision is made to suspend it. Breach of a 
suspended sentence is not an offence but, if proved, it exposes the offender to an order that the 
sentence take effect or to a substituted sentence.92 In some jurisdictions it is mandatory for the courts 
to restore the sentence held in suspense unless the circumstances are exceptional.93  
3.3.2 Suspended sentences are a popular sentencing measure in this State. In Magistrates Courts in 
the financial year 2003-2004, 60 per cent of prison sentences were wholly suspended and 12 per cent 
were partly suspended. Of all penalties they comprised 10 per cent and two per cent respectively of the 
principal sentence imposed on offenders. Sentences of imprisonment imposed by the Supreme Court 
in financial years 2002-2004 were suspended in about 50 per cent of cases: 34 per cent were wholly 
suspended and 15 per cent partly. In total it would appear that more than half of all prison sentences 
are wholly suspended in this State.94 Tasmania ranks second in its use of wholly suspended sentences 
in the higher courts in Australia, between South Australia (at 48 per cent) and Victoria (at 24 per 
cent).95 While there is no statutory limit on the length of a term of imprisonment that may be 
suspended, in practice it is unusual for a sentence exceeding 24 months to be wholly suspended. Some 
data on suspended sentences appears in Tables 9 and 10.96  
                                                
88  Department of Police and Public Safety, submission, 2. 
89  Warwick Dunstan, submission. 
90  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 7(b). 
91  In some jurisdictions there are restrictions on the length of sentences that can be suspended, see Lorana Bartels ‘The use 
of suspended sentences in Australia: Unsheathing the Sword of Damocles’ (2007) 31 Criminal Law Journal 113, 132. 
92  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 27. 
93  E.g. Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 31(5A).  
94  Data supplied by Lorana Bartels, Ph D student, Faculty of Law. 
95  Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, Suspended Sentences: Final Report, Part 1 (2006) ch 2. 
96  Data supplied by Lorana Bartels, from chapter 4 of her thesis, Tables 4-4 and 4-6: Lorana Bartels, Sword or Feather? The 
Use and Utility of Suspended Sentences in Tasmania (PhD thesis, University of Tasmania, 2008). 
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Table 9: Proportion of sentences suspended by length – Supreme Court 
Sentence length 
(months) 
Unsuspended 
(n=372) 
Party suspended (n=105) 
Wholly suspended 
(n=246) 
0>3 (n=40) 35% 0% 65% 
3>6 (n=167) 38% 6% 56% 
6>9 (n=132) 45% 11% 45% 
9>12 (n=77) 48% 14% 38% 
12>18 (n=123) 46% 29% 24% 
18>24 (n=59) 64% 25% 10% 
24>36 (n=49) 65% 29% 6%* 
36+ (n=76) 93% 7% 0% 
TOTAL (n=723) 51% 15% 34% 
* This figure relates to all sentences of 24>36 months, but the three wholly suspended sentences imposed were in fact of 
exactly 24 months.  
Table 10: Proportion of sentences suspended by length – Magistrates Court 
Sentence length 
(months) 
Unsuspended 
(n=443) 
Partly suspended (n=200) 
Wholly suspended 
(n=1032) 
0>1 (n=86) 40% 0% 60% 
1>2 (n=393) 21% 2% 77% 
2>3 (n=327) 22% 5% 73% 
3>4 (n=348) 28% 8% 64% 
4>6 (n=243) 34% 16% 50% 
6>8 (n=135) 29% 25% 46% 
8>12 (n=86) 31% 43% 26% 
12+ (n=99) 51% 38% 11% 
TOTAL (n=1717) 28% 12% 60% 
3.3.3 Tables 9 and 10 show that in both the Supreme Court and Magistrates Courts, short 
sentences were most likely to be wholly suspended and that (sentences of less than one month in 
Magistrates Courts aside) the proportion of wholly suspended sentences decreased inversely with 
sentence length. The mean length of wholly suspended sentences was six months in the Supreme 
Court and 80 days in Magistrates Courts.97 
3.3.4 In Tasmania it is permissible to combine suspended sentences with other sentencing options 
such as community service orders, fines, probation orders, rehabilitation program order and driving 
disqualification orders.98 This kind of suspended sentence is sometimes referred to as a ‘conditional 
suspended sentence’. In the Supreme Court in the period 2002-2004, 68 per cent of wholly suspended 
sentences and 60 per cent of partly suspended sentences were combined with some other order, most 
often with compensation orders but also commonly community service orders or probation. An 
additional 11 per cent of partly and wholly suspended sentences made supervision by a probation 
order a condition of the order, and nine per cent of wholly suspended sentences were combined with a 
                                                
97  Ibid, 4.3.2. 
98  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 8(1).  
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fine.99 In a total of 23 per cent of suspended sentences, the offender was subject to supervision. In 
Magistrates Courts, fines and wholly suspended sentences were a common combination (33 per cent 
of cases) and probation was combined with partly suspended sentences in 21 per cent of cases and 16 
per cent of wholly suspended sentences.100 
Criticisms of suspended sentences 
3.3.5 Suspended sentences are a controversial order and it has been suggested that they are a major 
source of public dissatisfaction with sentencing. At least six discrete criticisms of suspended sentences 
have been raised. 
The disjuncture between the legal view and the public view of suspended sentences 
3.3.6 Suspended sentences are viewed very differently by the legal system and by the general 
public. From the legal point of view they are the penultimate penalty. In the list of sentencing options 
in the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), they follow a sentence of imprisonment. Moreover, they are a 
‘substitutional sentence’. In other words, before a suspended sentence can be passed the court must be 
satisfied that a sentence of imprisonment and not some lesser sentence is appropriate. Additionally, the 
length of the sentence should be determined before any consideration is given to the decision to 
suspend it. From a legal point of view, a wholly suspended sentence remains a sentence of 
imprisonment. However, the public perception of a suspended sentence is entirely different. When a 
suspended sentence is imposed, the offender ‘walks free’. The consequences of a suspended sentence 
appear less than a community service order, a fine or a probation order. Far from being the 
penultimate sanction, in the public view, it ranks as less severe than probation or a small fine.101 Media 
reports of offenders being granted suspended sentences reflect and reinforce this view by describing 
offenders who receive suspended sentences as having ‘walked free’,102 being ‘thrashed with a legal 
feather’103 or by characterising this option as a ‘no-fine, no jail sentence’.104  
Illogicality in the reasoning process justifying suspended sentences  
3.3.7 The process of reasoning required in reaching the decision that a suspended sentence should 
be imposed has also attracted criticism. The factors which the court is required to take into account in 
deciding to suspend a sentence of imprisonment – such as previous good character, steady 
employment and the likelihood of rehabilitation if not sent to prison – are the same factors which the 
court is required to take into account in deciding whether a sentence of imprisonment is warranted at 
all.105 It is said that giving double effect to mitigating factors means that white collar and middle class 
offenders tend to benefit disproportionately.106  
                                                
99  Bartels (2008), above n 96, 4.3.4, 4.3.5.  
100  Data is not available on the extent to which probation is made a condition of a suspended sentence. 
101  Leslie Sebba and Gad Nathan, ‘Further Explorations in the Scaling of Penalties’(1984) 24 British Journal of Criminology 
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103  Richard Ackland, referring to the suspended sentence imposed on John Laws for soliciting information from a juror in 
1999: see Kate Warner, ‘Sentencing Review 1999’ (2000) 24 Criminal Law Journal 355, 362. 
104  ‘Crown Refuses Leave to Appeal on Laws’, Sun Herald (Sydney), 10 September 1999. 
105  Kate Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania, (2002) [9.215]; Arie Freiberg, Pathways to Justice (2002) 120. 
106  Ashworth (2000), above n 3, 294; Mirko Bagaric, ‘Suspended Sentences and Preventive Sentences: Illusory Evils and 
Disproportionate Punishments’ (1999) 22 University of New South Wales Law Journal 535; Warner (2000) above n 103. 
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Ineffectiveness 
3.3.8 Critics have questioned the effectiveness of suspended sentences on the grounds that there is 
no evidence that the suspended sentence has a deterrent or reformative effect and avoiding 
unnecessary prison sentences could be achieved by other means.107 However, more recent English 
evidence contradicts the first assertion, with two studies reporting that offenders given suspended 
sentences had the lowest reconvictions rates of offenders in the sample.108 Bartels has followed-up 
offenders sentenced in the Supreme Court of Tasmania over a two-year period between July 2002 and 
June 2004 in order to investigate the reconviction rate of offenders given suspended sentences in 
comparison with other dispositions. There is no other published research in Australia examining 
reconviction rates for suspended sentences. Her sample included all non-custodial sentences and all 
custodial sentences of up to and including two years allowing a two-year period at risk for the follow-
up. She found that exactly half of all offenders in her sample were reconvicted within two years. 
Wholly suspended sentences had the lowest reconviction rate at 42 per cent compared with 52 per cent 
of offenders with a non-custodial order and 62 per cent of offenders with an unsuspended sentence. 
These differences were highly significant in a statistical sense. Moreover, those reconvicted on a 
wholly suspended sentence were the group of offenders most likely to be reconvicted of a minor 
offence only and the differences in reconviction rates remained significant even for offenders whose 
index offence was serious, rather than moderate or minor. Both violent and property offenders 
performed better on wholly suspended sentences than other dispositions. For first offenders, 
unsuspended and partly suspended sentences were less likely to result in reconviction than wholly 
suspended sentences or non-custodial sentences but offenders with a minor record on a wholly 
suspended or partly suspended sentence performed better than offenders on unsuspended sentences or 
non-custodial sentences. Young offenders (those aged between 18-24) performed much better on 
wholly suspended (53 per cent reconvicted) and partly suspended sentences (55 per cent) than on 
unsuspended sentences (86 per cent) or non-custodial orders (72 per cent). As Bartels claims, these 
findings demonstrate that suspended sentences are ‘not only a cost-effective sentencing disposition but 
one whose rate of reconviction suggests that they do in fact work’.109 However, it is acknowledged that 
the relationship between re-offending and disposal is complex and it is difficult to attribute differences 
in re-offending rates to a particular disposition rather than selection factors.110 
Net-widening and sentence inflation 
3.3.9 Contradicting the claim that wholly suspended sentences divert offenders from prison, it is 
argued that suspended sentences have had no real impact on the imprisonment rate because of the 
susceptibility of the suspended sentence to net-widening and sentence inflation. In other words, courts 
will impose suspended sentences in some cases when custody was not justified (net-widening or 
penalty escalation) or longer sentences when suspending (sentence inflation). When suspended 
sentences are breached and prison sentences activated, a lagged increase in the prison population 
results counteracting any immediate diversionary impact wholly suspended sentences have on the 
imprisonment rate. This was the experience in Britain in the early days of suspended sentences.111 In 
New South Wales, a study looking at the effect on the prison population and the use of non-custodial 
sentences following the re-introduction of suspended sentences found clear evidence of net-
widening.112 In Victoria, Tait’s early study of suspended sentences claimed that there was evidence of 
sentence inflation of suspended sentences in magistrates’ courts with more very short unsuspended 
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prison sentences than wholly suspended sentences and more wholly suspended sentences of than 
unsuspended sentences. However, there was an immediate reduction in the use of imprisonment but no 
lagged increase in the prison population.113 More recent data on sentence lengths has led the 
Sentencing Advisory Council to suggest that the higher percentage of suspended sentences under 12 
months compared with the percentage of immediate prison sentences of that length may be some 
evidence of net-widening. However, it is acknowledged that rather then showing net-widening, these 
trends could suggest courts are quite properly suspending short prison sentences in recognition of the 
negative effects of such sentences on offenders.114  
3.3.10 Bartels has sought to ascertain if there is evidence of suspended sentences leading to 
sentencing inflation or net-widening in Tasmania by analysing the distribution of the length of prison 
sentences. Because there is neither a gap in the use of wholly suspended sentences under six months 
relative to the use of unsuspended sentences of that length, nor an increase in the use of them for 
sentences of more than six months, Tait’s ‘gap and bulge test’115 suggests that neither the Supreme 
Court nor Magistrates Courts are inflating the length of wholly suspended prison sentences. It could be 
argued that heavy use of short wholly suspended sentences suggests net-widening (namely that they 
are being used instead of non-custodial sentences) rather than as a substitute for an immediate prison 
sentence. However, it could equally be argued that courts are quite properly suspending a greater 
number of shorter sentences in recognition of the negative effects of such sentences on offenders.116 
Suspended sentences and proportionality  
3.3.11 The Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council argues that suspended sentences violate the 
principle that punishment should be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the culpability and 
degree of responsibility of an offender. Having decided that a sentence of imprisonment of a particular 
length is required, the decision that it should be suspended on the basis of the individual circumstances 
of the offender raises concerns about the proportionality of the sentence, particularly when contrasted 
with offenders who are required to serve an immediate term of imprisonment.117 In the Council’s view 
this argument supports the contention that suspended sentences should be abolished, or if they are to 
be retained in the sentencing hierarchy above non-custodial orders, additional conditions should attach 
to the orders. 
Breach proceedings and the empty threat of imprisonment  
3.3.12 The Issues Paper noted that there were real concerns in Tasmania that breach proceedings 
are neglected.118 In the consultations with Community Corrections, the failure of the police and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions to initiate proceedings for breach was raised.119 Moreover, it was 
stated that the Director of Public Prosecutions was reluctant to initiate proceedings for breach of 
conditions relating to supervision as distinct from the commission of an offence. In her study of 
suspended sentences, Bartels has explored the issue of breach proceedings.120 Following-up her sample 
                                                
113  David Tait, ‘The Invisible Sanction: Suspended Sentences in Victoria 1985-1991’ (1995) 28 Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Criminology 143, 153. 
114  Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council (2006), above n 95, 34-36. 
115  Ibid. Tait suggests that if the length of the sentence is irrelevant to the decision to suspend (and vice versa) there should 
be an even distribution in the percentage of suspended sentences amongst different sentence lengths (though it would be 
natural for more short sentences to be suspended than long sentences). So, for example, there should not be 10 per cent of 
one month sentences suspended, 50 per cent of three month sentences suspended, and 20 per cent of five month sentences 
suspended – this would be a clear ‘gap’ at the one-month level and ‘bulge’ at the three-month level suggesting that 
sentences are being increased because they are being suspended.  
116  Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council (2006), above n 95, 36.  
117  Ibid, 29-30.  
118  Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, Sentencing, Issues Paper No 2 (2002) 71. 
119  Consultations with Community Corrections, Hobart, (September 2002); Consultations with Community Corrections, 
Devonport (26 September 2002).  
120  Bartels (2008), above n 96. 
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of all wholly and partly suspended sentences imposed in the Supreme Court in a two-year period, she 
found that 41 per cent of suspended sentences (126 sentences) were breached by the offender 
committing an imprisonable offence during the operational period of their sentence.121 However, 
breach action was only taken in respect of seven offenders, two on a partly suspended and five on a 
wholly suspended sentence. This represented six per cent of breached partly suspended sentences and 
five per cent of breached wholly suspended sentences. Of the seven cases where breach action was 
taken, the sentence was activated in full in three cases, in part in one case, and the operational period 
was extended or the original term resuspended in the remaining three cases. These results are startling. 
Whilst failure to initiate breach proceedings is not an inherent flaw of the suspended sentence, such a 
failure merely fuels the public perception that such sentences are an ineffectual slap on the wrist and 
contributes to a lack of confidence in sentencing. Moreover, it erodes the argument that the deterrent 
threat of an immediate prison sentence in the event of breach justifies the claim that a suspended 
sentence is the penultimate sanction in the sentencing hierarchy.  
Suspended sentences in other jurisdictions 
3.3.13 Criticism of suspended sentences has led to their abolition in New Zealand.122 In Victoria, 
the Sentencing Advisory Council has recommended phasing out suspended sentences by December 
2009. In the Council’s view it is an inherently flawed and intrinsically ambiguous order. It is argued 
that with a credible and flexible range of intermediate sentencing orders it is not necessary to retain 
it.123 In contrast, the recommendation of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission124 was 
adopted and suspended sentences were reintroduced in New South Wales in 2000.125 In the UK the 
suspended sentence has been recently replaced with a revamped suspended sentence which gives 
judges and magistrates the power to suspend a sentence of imprisonment of between 28 and 51 weeks 
for up to two years provided a minimum of at least one of a range of quite onerous conditions is 
attached – these conditions include compulsory unpaid work, activity or program requirements, drug 
testing requirements and treatment, supervision, curfew requirements, exclusion requirements, 
residence requirements with or without electronic monitoring and attendance centre requirements.126 In 
the event of breach, the court must order the custodial term to take effect, either in whole or in part, 
unless it concludes it would be unjust to do so.127 A recent report found that supervision was the most 
common condition attached to the orders (44 per cent), followed by program requirements (24 per 
cent) and unpaid work (17 per cent).128 
Reforming suspended sentences: the options 
3.3.14 The Issues Paper asked whether changes were needed in Tasmania to make the suspended 
sentence a more logical, credible and effective sentencing option. Many of the submissions were 
critical of the suspended sentence on the grounds it is seen by offenders and the public at large as a 
soft option.129 In one submission a member of the public was incredulous that a suspended sentence 
could be regarded as the penultimate penalty and she refused to accept the proposition that the need to 
                                                
121  A suspended sentence is breached by breaching a condition of suspension or by committing an imprisonable offence: 
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 27. 
122  Sentencing Act 2002 (NZ). 
123  Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council (2006), above n 95, 51. 
124  New South Wales Law Reform Commission (1996), above n 38. 
125  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). 
126  See Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) ss 189-192.  
127  Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK), sch 12 para 8(2). 
128  National Offender Management Service, Offender Management Caseload Statistics: Quarterly Brief July to September 
2005, The Home Office (2006).  
129  Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Law Society, submission; Community Corrections Hobart, submission; Tasmanian 
Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, submission: as a means of overcoming the attitude that suspended sentence 
means ‘walking free’ it was suggested that a system of restorative justice be used in conjunction with suspended 
sentences.  
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keep the imprisonment rate down justified such a measure.130 The following options for change have 
been considered to address the criticisms of the suspended sentences. 
Abolition 
3.3.15 This is the recommendation of the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council on the basis that 
the inherent flaws in the order cannot be overcome by tinkering with it. In the submissions in response 
to our Issues Paper, Tasmania Police recommended abolition. This was conditional on the availability 
of options such as home detention and intensive correctional orders.131 However, most submissions 
favoured retention. The then Chief Justice, for example, submitted that ‘they serve a useful 
purpose’.132 The Director of Public Prosecutions described it as a useful sentencing option but 
suggested that it be required to be combined with another sentencing option (see below). Bartels’ 
interviews with six judges and ten magistrates about suspended sentences found no support for the 
abolition of suspended sentences. In response to a question about possible legislative changes, 
sentencers were keen ‘to retain the status quo’ and three respondents referred to the undesirability of 
abolishing them.133 
Restricting the availability of suspended sentences 
3.3.16 Rather than abolishing suspended sentences, some jurisdictions have restricted the use of 
suspended sentences in some way. In England between 1991 and 2003, the use of suspended sentences 
was limited by providing that suspended sentences could only be ordered if they were ‘justified by the 
exceptional circumstances of the case’.134 As an interim measure during the phasing out of suspended 
sentences in Victoria, the Sentencing Council has recommended that restrictions be placed on the 
availability of suspended sentences for a range of serious violent offences, including murder, 
manslaughter, rape, sexual penetration of a child and intentionally causing serious injury.135 In the 
Council’s view, creating a presumption against fully suspending a sentence in such cases would 
address the community concern about the use of suspended sentences in cases where the level of harm 
caused to the victim is high. In such cases a suspended sentence may be seen as failing to meet the 
purposes of denunciation, deterrence and just punishment.  
3.3.17 An alternative means of limiting the use of suspended sentences would be to place a limit on 
the term that could be suspended. There is no limit in Tasmania (nor in South Australia and the ACT) 
on the length of sentence that can be suspended. However, in New South Wales, the maximum term of 
imprisonment that can be held in suspense is two years, in Victoria it is three years (two years in the 
Magistrates Court) and in Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory, a five year limit 
applies. It could be argued that placing a limit on the length of suspension would prevent the use of 
suspended sentences in the most controversial cases.  
Providing guidance as to the use of suspended sentences  
3.3.18 In some jurisdictions the legislation specifically provides that a suspended sentence may 
only be imposed if an unsuspended sentence would be appropriate in all of the circumstances.136 In her 
interviews with judges and magistrates, Bartels asked whether such a provision would be an 
appropriate addition to the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas). All judges and most magistrates rejected the 
suggestion on the grounds that it was already clear in the case law and was therefore unnecessary. 
However, one magistrate stated that such a provision would change the law in Tasmania as both the 
Sentencing Act and the Supreme Court state that a suspended sentence is a ‘free floating option’ and 
                                                
130  Dianne Jackson, submission.  
131  Tasmania Police, submission, 2. 
132  The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, submission, 2-3. 
133  Bartels (2008), above n 96, 3.4.9.  
134  Criminal Justice Act 1991 (UK) s 5. 
135  Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council (2006), above 95, 71-72. 
136  Victoria, Western Australian and the Northern Territory: see Bartels (2007), above n 91, 117. 
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that it is no longer necessary to come to the preliminary decision that a sentence of imprisonment is 
deserved.137 Only two magistrates supported such an amendment. They considered that it would be a 
useful educational tool for the public and it would help emphasise the point for judicial officers.138  
Increasing the punitive and rehabilitative elements  
3.3.19 A number of submissions favoured giving suspended sentences more bite by imposing 
additional conditions. The Director of Public Prosecutions favoured a statutory requirement that a 
suspended sentence only be given in combination with some other sentencing option such as a 
probation order, fine or community service. The Department of Justice was also attracted to this idea 
and referred with approval to the then proposed English suspended sentence ‘custody minus’ which 
requires the imposition of supervision or some other positive requirement.139 It was contended that the 
inclusion of a supervision requirement would counter the ‘walking-free’ perception of the order and 
improve its effectiveness by allowing the supervising officer to address the offender’s behavioural 
issues. It was also suggested that white-collar offenders should be required to pay for their attendance 
at any programs to which they were directed. John Heathcote (a probation officer) suggested that some 
involvement with community corrections should be a requirement of all orders. He too was attracted to 
the English approach.140 On behalf of the Tasmanian Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, 
Maureen Holloway recommended that in order to avoid the virtual let-off perception of suspended 
sentences, restorative components be added – for example, that the sentence be suspended on 
condition damage is restored or the victim compensated in some way.141 
3.3.20 In Bartels’ interviews, judges and almost all magistrates were very supportive of the use of 
combination orders to add punitive and rehabilitative components to the sentence.142 The suspended 
sentence and fine combination, however, was thought to be generally of little utility because of most 
offenders’ inability to pay. Magistrates were particularly supportive of combining suspended sentences 
with probation. One of the judges suggested the efficacy of suspended sentences would be enhanced 
by more structured obligations such as attendance at a specific program a condition of suspension 
coupled with a report-back system.143 One magistrate spoke of the need for a greater range of 
community based programs to support people on suspended sentences.144 However, whilst one judge 
stated a combination order is ‘nearly always appropriate’ and ‘should always be looked at,’ judicial 
officers had little difficulty in identifying cases where a combination order was not appropriate and 
there was some concern with overloading probation case loads. 
Reforming breach proceedings 
3.3.21 In addition to urging that breach proceedings not be neglected, it has been suggested that 
breach proceedings be subject to a limitation period and that activation be automatic in cases of 
breach. In his submission to the Institute, the then Chief Justice referred to the problems caused by 
delay in initiating breach proceedings. He stated: 
In some cases breach proceedings are initiated long after the breach is proved by 
conviction. It goes against the grain to activate a sentence if the breach has already been 
punished and the prisoner released after a subsequent sentence. Some limitation period for 
the institution of such proceedings after discovery of the breach is worth examining. There 
is also an inbuilt reluctance (not logically warranted) to activate a sentence for the first 
                                                
137  Bartels (2008), above n 96, 3.4.2. 
138  Ibid. 
139  Department of Justice and Industrial Relations, submission, 13; note that the terminology ‘custody minus’ was abandoned 
when the Halliday Report was implemented; see para 3.3.13 above. 
140  John Heathcote, submission, 2. 
141  Tasmanian Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, submission, 2. 
142  Bartels (2008), above n 96, 3.4.3. 
143  Ibid, 3.4.3 quoting Judge 1. 
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crime when the second crime which constitutes the breach has already been adequately 
punished.145 
3.3.22 In her interviews with judges and magistrates, Bartels found a strong desire to see more 
proactive action by the prosecuting authorities and better management of breaches.146 She found there 
was little knowledge about the process of monitoring and dealing with breached sentences and their 
comments suggested that judicial officers generally infer that offenders who are not brought back for 
breach have complied with their order, although, that this could be optimistic was conceded by some. 
On the basis of her breach study (see above para 3.3.12) Bartels argued that judicial officers are 
currently sentencing on a flawed basis. She also found some judicial officers were ambivalent about 
receiving breach information because of its potential to destroy their confidence in suspended 
sentences. 
3.3.23 In some jurisdictions, courts have the power to initiate action in relation to breach of its own 
motion.147 Bartels asked judicial officers whether such a power would be beneficial. No judges 
supported this proposal generally on the grounds that it was inappropriate for a judicial officer to adopt 
a prosecutorial or investigative role. One judge said he could see no reason for such a change as the 
Director of Public Prosecutions seemed to work quite effectively. Magistrates on the other hand were 
divided on this issue with at least two supporting the proposal on the grounds of efficiency and poor 
performance of the police in prosecuting breaches. 
3.3.24 Breach provisions in most jurisdictions create a presumption in favour of the activation of 
the original sentence. In South Australia and New South Wales, for example, if the offender breaches 
a condition of the sentence, the court must activate the original sentence of imprisonment unless the 
court is satisfied that the breach was trivial or there are good reasons for excusing the offender’s 
failure to comply.148 In Victoria the discretion is even more constrained. The court must order the 
offender to serve all or part of the original prison term unless it is of the view that ‘it would be unjust 
to do so in view of any exceptional circumstances.’149  
3.3.25 It could be argued that failing to activate the original sentence on breach erodes the 
effectiveness of the order as a deterrent and brings the legal system into disrepute.150 In response to the 
Issues Paper, the Department of Justice recommended that consideration be given to breach 
automatically leading to the sentence being served.151 However, the then Chief Justice’s submission 
favours retaining the discretion on breach to enable the court ‘not to fully activate them and even to 
discharge or extend them’.152 In her interviews with judges and magistrates, Bartels found that 
respondents were almost unanimous in their view that a broad and unfettered discretion in relation to 
the consequences of breach should be retained. Only two respondents thought otherwise with one 
magistrate suggesting that legislating for the circumstances in which activation would not be 
appropriate could improve the image of the suspended sentence in the public view. Two magistrates 
were of the impression that the case law either created a presumption that the sentence should be 
activated, or stated a principle that this generally should be the case.153 
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147  Crimes (Sentencing and Procedure Act 1999 (NSW) s 98(1); Sentencing Act (NT) s 43(4A), (4B). 
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The Institute’s views 
Abolition?  
3.3.26 Despite the flaws of the suspended sentence, it has the advantage of deterring the offender 
with the threat of imprisonment whilst avoiding the costs and adverse impact of actual imprisonment. 
To abolish it would remove a valuable tool, one which enables courts to mark the seriousness of the 
offence by imposing a sentence of imprisonment while showing mercy in the particular case by 
suspending it. There is also the fear that removing it will have a significant impact on the 
imprisonment rate – a very real fear in this jurisdiction where more than half of the sentences of 
imprisonment imposed are wholly suspended. In New Zealand, the increase in custodial sentences 
from 2002 to 2003 was explained in part by the abolition of suspended sentences.154 The Institute 
concedes that there are problems with suspended sentences – including their confusing nature and poor 
public perception. However, it is of the view that they remain a very useful sentencing option and that 
in a jurisdiction with no other sanctions in the sentencing hierarchy between a prison sentence and a 
community service order it is premature to contemplate abolition. If the range of custodial and 
intermediate non-custodial options were to be extended and accepted by the courts, then abolition 
could be reconsidered.  
Restricting the availability of suspended sentences  
3.3.27 The Institute has considered whether the poor public perception of suspended sentences 
could be improved by legislative limits on the length of suspended sentences. However, an analysis of 
sentence length for suspended sentences in Tasmania suggests that sentences in excess of two years 
are possibly never wholly suspended. From 2001 to July 2007, no wholly suspended Supreme Court 
sentences of this length were found.155 In the case of partly suspended sentences, the period held in 
suspension very rarely exceeds two years.156 These figures suggest that it is unnecessary to restrict the 
length of suspended sentences in Tasmania.  
3.3.28 A second way of restricting the availability of suspended sentences for more serious types of 
offending would be to impose offence-based restrictions, limiting the availability of wholly suspended 
sentences for serious offences to exceptional circumstances. The Victorian Sentencing Advisory 
Council has recommended that this restriction should apply to murder, manslaughter, rape, sexual 
penetration of a child and intentionally causing serious injury. In Tasmania, from 2001 to 2006 there 
was just one wholly suspended sentence for manslaughter,157 one for attempted murder,158 three for 
rape159 and one for intentionally causing harm.160 
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155  Bartels found no wholly suspended sentences of this length in Magistrates Courts in 2003-2004, the longest wholly 
suspended sentence was 21 months. 
156  From 2001 to July 2007 just two sentences were found where this was the case – in both 30 months was suspended. They 
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followed by rape of two elderly women; he was sentenced to five years imprisonment with two years six months 
suspended; Parkinson (Evans J 16 July 2001) was a disability pensioner with schizophrenia who set fire to his unit; his 
back-dated sentence of three years was suspended and coupled with a continuing care order. In Magistrates’ Courts 15 
months was the longest period suspended in 2003-2004.  
157  Horner (Underwood J, 17 March 2003) where D panicked and shook his choking eight-week-old baby causing her death. 
158  This was a mercy killing case: Pryor (Hill AJ, 19 December 2006) see also Godfrey (Underwood CJ, 26 May 2004) a 
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2006): 6 months wholly suspended for rape on the basis if continuation of sexual intercourse committed by an 
intellectually impaired 18 year-old upon a 19 year old who was also intellectually impaired; Sharma (Crawford J 24 
March 2003): intoxicated man put penis of sleeping neighbour in his mouth, six months wholly suspended. 
160  DeKroon (Evans J, 14 May 2004): a wholly suspended sentence of 18 months imprisonment was imposed on a plea of 
guilty to aggravated burglary, assault and committing an unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm. The offender, a 50 
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3.3.29 The Institute recognises that the use of wholly suspended sentences for very serious crimes 
can give rise to public concern and undermine confidence in the criminal justice system. However, 
there is no evidence that wholly suspended sentences are being used inappropriately for serious crimes 
in Tasmania. In cases of manslaughter, rape and intentionally causing bodily harm, the Supreme Court 
is only wholly suspending prison sentences in exceptional cases. In the case of maintaining a sexual 
relationship with a child, because of the wide range of seriousness that such an offence covers, 
restrictions on the use of wholly suspended sentences would constitute an unnecessary fetter on the 
exercise of judicial discretion.  
3.3.30 The Institute’s conclusion that there is no need to restrict the use of suspended sentences in 
the case of serious crimes still leaves open the question whether wholly suspended sentences are being 
over-used in other cases. This raises the issue of whether there is any evidence of bottom-end net-
widening. The Institute has found no conclusive evidence of this. Nor is there any evidence of 
sentence inflation. In summary, the Institute is not convinced that suspended sentences are being over-
used in Tasmania in a way that requires restrictions on their use. Bartels argues that wholly suspended 
sentences are over-used for first offenders.161 The Institute does not recommend that this be addressed 
by legislative provision. The recommended formulation of the principle of restraint in the use of 
custody could assist to encourage restraint in the use of imprisonment for all offenders including first 
offenders by reminding judicial officers that a sentence of imprisonment should only be imposed if the 
offence was so serious that a non-custodial sentence cannot be justified.  
Providing guidance as to the use of suspended sentences  
3.3.31 As discussed above (see para 3.3.18) Bartels’ study reveals that some magistrates are 
confused about the way in which a suspended sentence is supposed to operate.162 They do not start 
with the proposition that the seriousness of the offence demands a prison sentence and one magistrate 
believes the law no longer requires this. Nor was there agreement on the issue of whether it was 
impermissible to increase the length of a sentence if it was suspended. If judicial officers are confused 
then it is not surprising that the public have little understanding of how the suspended sentence is 
supposed to operate. Although all judges and most magistrates rejected the need for legislative 
guidance, uncertainty about the current law and the impact of Dinsdale v The Queen163 demonstrates 
there is a good case for giving some legislative guidance as to when it is appropriate to impose a 
suspended sentence. It is therefore recommended that guidance be given about the imposition of 
suspended sentences in a way that does not interfere with judicial discretion but that makes it clear that 
two distinct steps are involved. In Dinsdale Kirby J said: 
The starting point … is the need to recognise that two distinct steps are involved. The first 
is the primary determination that a sentence of imprisonment and not some lesser sentence 
is called for. The second is the determination that such term of imprisonment should be 
suspended for a period set by the court. The two steps should not be elided. Unless the first 
is taken, the second does not arise.164 
3.3.32 The Institute recommends that a new section, s 23A, be inserted into Division 4 of Part 3 of 
the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) to give recognition to this principle. It should provide that: 
A court must not impose and suspend a term of imprisonment (wholly or partly) unless, 
having regard to the provisions of this Act (and in particular s 13A), it has first determined 
that it would be appropriate in the circumstances that the offender be imprisoned for the 
term of imprisonment imposed. 
                                                                                                                                                   
year-old man with no relevant prior convictions, went to his daughter’s house in a justified state of anxiety and concern 
over the welfare of his grandchildren. He sprayed capsicum spray on his daughter’s partner and when she tried to remove 
the car keys from his car, he stabbed her in the arm with a knife. His relationship with his daughter was probably 
destroyed and he was devastated by the outcome of the episode. 
161  Bartels, above n 96, 4.3.6.2. 
162  Bartels (2008), above n 96, 3.4.2.  
163  (2000) 202 CLR 321. 
164  (2000) 202 CLR 321, 346. 
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3.3.33 This accords with Kirby J’s statement in Dinsdale165 and the generally accepted 
interpretation of the decision. The Institute favours this formulation over that in the Sentencing Act 
1991 (Vic) s 27(3) that provides: 
A court must not impose a suspended sentence of imprisonment unless the sentence of 
imprisonment, if unsuspended, would be appropriate in the circumstances having regard to 
the provisions of this Act. 
Increasing the punitive and rehabilitative elements  
3.3.34 One of the most compelling criticisms of the suspended sentence is its confusing nature. It is 
difficult for the public to accept that it is indeed the penultimate sanction. Where a wholly suspended 
sentence includes at least one condition that requires some positive action on behalf of the offender it 
becomes a more demanding sentence and makes the place of suspended sentences in the sentencing 
hierarchy more plausible. If a condition of community service were to be attached, the order would 
have more punitive bite. If supervision or participation in an offender treatment program were to be 
required, arguably this would make the order more onerous and assist rehabilitation. Bartels’ study 
compared the reconviction rates of wholly suspended sentences combined with additional sentencing 
orders with suspended sentences simpliciter (this does include orders with a condition of supervision). 
She found that those with a suspended order simpliciter had a lower reconviction rate (38 per cent) 
than those who received a suspended sentence and a community service order (50 per cent) and those 
who received a wholly suspended sentence and a probation order (61 per cent). In comparison, only 33 
per cent of offenders with a wholly suspended sentence and a compensation order were reconvicted. 
Moreover, the re-offending of the supervised offenders was more serious. Bartels states: 
It is unclear however whether this poor outcome [for probation in particular] is because 
increased scrutiny picked up instances of offending which might otherwise have gone 
undetected… or because the sentencing judge imposed the probation order on an offender 
who was in any event less likely to be able to comply with a suspended sentence, or for 
some other reason.166 
3.3.35 The poor reconviction rate for probation was confirmed when suspended sentences with a 
condition of supervision were also examined. This revealed that unsupervised wholly suspended 
sentences had a reconviction rate of 38 per cent, which was statistically significantly better than the 54 
per cent of wholly suspended sentences with a probation order and the 58 per cent of wholly 
suspended sentences with a supervision condition.167 The Institute accepts that being monitored by a 
probation officer could well lead to more instances of offending being picked up. But whatever the 
interpretation, it should be noted that supervised suspended sentenced offenders performed better than 
offenders who received unsuspended prison sentences (62 per cent reconvicted).  
3.3.36 The idea of adding supervision, program or community service requirements to bolster the 
credibility of the suspended sentence as a serious penalty is an attractive one. However, the Institute 
does not recommend that courts be required to impose additional conditions. However, it does 
recommend that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 24 be amended to make explicit the kinds of 
conditions that can be attached to a wholly or partly suspended sentence. The list should include 
supervision, community service, attendance at an offender treatment program or a restorative 
requirement. At the same time the Institute is aware that there are problems with overloading offenders 
with requirements and orders. In particular, if an additional order, say a probation order, is made rather 
than making supervision a condition of suspension, the offender will be exposed to triple jeopardy. If 
the offender commits an offence within the operational period he/she is liable to be punished for the 
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offence that constitutes the breach of the suspended sentence, for the breach of the suspended sentence 
and breach of the probation order. The Institute is of the view that it is preferable to make additional 
punitive, rehabilitation or restorative requirements conditions of suspension. This will require 
amendment to the Sentencing Act to allow a wider range of conditions to be attached to a suspended 
sentence than is currently the case.168  
3.3.37 The recommended new s 24 should be modelled on the following: 
(1) An order of a court suspending the whole or part of a sentence of imprisonment is 
subject to the condition that the offender must not commit another offence punishable by 
imprisonment during the specified period.169 
(2) Such an order may be made subject to such additional conditions as the court considers 
necessary and expedient including the following conditions: 
• that the offender be subject to the supervision of a probation officer; 
• that the offender be required to perform community service; 
• that the offender be required to undertake a rehabilitation program; 
• that the offender undergo specified medical or psychiatric treatment; 
• a restorative requirement. 
3.3.38 This recommendation also requires an amendment to s 8(1) of the Act to omit the power of 
courts to combine wholly suspended sentences with probations orders, community service orders and 
rehabilitation program orders.170  
3.3.39 The Institute has considered whether a pre-sentence report should be made a prerequisite to a 
wholly or partly suspended sentence to ensure that the offender’s needs are addressed by appropriate 
conditions. However, it considered that this would impose an unnecessary burden on Community 
Corrections. In some cases, there is no need for special conditions. Instead, it is recommended that 
new provision (s 24A) be inserted into the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), providing that where there is 
reason to think that an offender may benefit from ‘additional conditions’ the court should order a pre-
sentence report addressing these issues. 
Reforming breach proceedings 
3.3.40 Quite clearly a situation in which only five per cent of breached orders result in proceedings 
is unacceptable. It makes a farce of the suspended sentence – the sword of Damocles is barely a butter 
knife.171 The underlying rationale of the suspended sentence is the clear deterrent threat involved if the 
offender re-offends. If there is little chance of breach action in the event of re-offending the deterrent 
threat is severely compromised. In Julian Roberts’ words, ‘[a]n indulgent response to breaches of 
conditions will encourage more breaches and undermine still further the deterrent power of the 
sanctions.’172 The fact that the certainty of being caught has a stronger deterrent effect than the severity 
of the punishment173 underlies the importance of ensuring that breach proceedings are not lax. Another 
problem with the failure to bring breach cases back to court is that judges and magistrates get no feed-
back on their sentences and little opportunity to develop a feel for the type of offender who typically 
                                                
168  While the power to impose ‘such conditions as the court considers necessary or expedient’ is broad, it is unlikely that 
courts would countenance community service as a condition or even admission to a drug treatment program: see Wighton 
v Taws [2004] TASSC 21 and Bartels (2007), above n 91, 124-128 for discussion of this issue. 
169  This merely makes explicit the current position: see s 27(1). 
170  A drug treatment order under the Sentencing Act 1997 s 7(ab) cannot be combined with a suspended sentence (see s 
27B(c)). 
171  This metaphor was used in R v Brady [1998] ABCA 7, [46], see Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, above n 95, 9, 
note 24 for an explanation of the context. 
172  Julian Roberts, The Virtual Prison: Community Custody and the Evolution of Imprisonment (2004). 
173  A von Hirsch et al, Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: An Analysis of Recent Research (1999) 5-6. 
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succeeds and the type who does not. Breach proceedings can provide and opportunity for sentencers to 
develop the experience to better target this measure.  
3.3.41 It seems that efforts have been made by the Director of Public Prosecutions and Tasmania 
Police to ensure that proceedings for breach are initiated in all cases and in a timely manner. This is to 
be commended. However, there are a number of obstacles to achieving improvements in actioning 
breaches and a review should be undertaken to explore whether the administrative changes put in 
place have produced improvements. The Institute also recommends that this review investigate 
breaches of all conditions of the sentence and not merely the requirement not to commit an 
imprisonable offence. Commenting on her findings in relation to breach action, Bartels suggests closer 
liaison between the Director of Public Prosecutions, Police Prosecutions, Department of Justice, 
Community Corrections, Supreme and Magistrates Courts is necessary to develop protocols for 
dealing with breaches. Any discussion, she suggests, should consider the use of computer software to 
automatically notify apparent breaches.174 The Institute agrees with these suggestions and adopts them. 
3.3.42 The Institute has considered the thorny issue of whether it would be appropriate for a judge 
or magistrate to deal with a breach of their own motion rather than waiting for an application to the 
court that sentenced the offender in accordance with s 27 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas). It was 
noted above (see para 3.3.23) that Bartels found judges were universally opposed to this idea and only 
a minority of magistrates supported it. However, they were unaware of the dire position in relation to 
breach proceedings. It is arguable that in the interests of efficiency and to help address the problem of 
breach proceedings, that courts should be permitted to deal with a breach of their own motion at the 
same time that an offender is being sentenced for a conviction of an imprisonable offence which 
constitutes a breach of a suspended sentence. In addition to certainty and severity, celerity is the third 
aspect of punishment that deters. Allowing a court to deal with a breach of its own motion would 
address this element of deterrence. However, if there is judicial opposition to acting on breach without 
an application from the prosecution or a probation officer on the grounds that it usurps the role of the 
prosecutor, there would be little point in legislating for it. The power of the judge or magistrate to deal 
with the breach would be ignored. To avoid this objection, it is recommended that the prosecution be 
given the power to make an oral application at the time of sentence of the breaching offence for the 
breach to be dealt with simultaneously or following an adjournment. The prosecution would be 
required to verify the details of the suspended sentence so that the judicial officer’s position is not 
compromised.  
3.3.43 The Institute is of the view that there is merit in tightening the consequences of breach by 
enacting a presumption in favour of activation of the sentence on proof of breach. A suspended 
sentence implies a sentence imposed but not executed conditional on the offender not re-offending. As 
the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council has pointed out, the less certain are the consequences, the 
less its potential capacity for special deterrence.175 The Institute acknowledges that while the certainty 
of detection is more important than the severity of the punishment for breach, it is nevertheless 
important that there is a need to clearly communicate to offenders and to the community that breaches 
will be dealt with seriously if the order is to have integrity and not be regarded as a let-off with no 
serious consequences. To help address the public perception of the suspended sentence as a let-off, the 
Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 27(4) be amended to provide that the court 
must order that the sentence held in abeyance takes effect, either in whole or in part, unless it 
concludes it would be unjust to do so.176 The Institute has also considered whether the words ‘in view 
of any exceptional circumstances which have arisen since the order suspending the sentence was 
made’ should be added in accordance with the provision in Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 31(5A). The 
formulation in South Australia and New South Wales is that the original sentence must be activated 
‘unless the court is satisfied that the breach was trivial or there are good reasons for excusing the 
offender’s failure to comply’. The Institute prefers the ‘unjust to do so’ formulation as an appropriate 
                                                
174  Bartels (2008), above n 96, 7.7. 
175  Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council (2006) above n 95, 104. 
176  This is similar to provisions in Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory. 
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compromise between flexibility and certainty. As discussed above (in para 3.3.25) some magistrates 
were confused as to the legal position in relation to response to breach. Creating a legislative 
presumption in favour of activation of the sentence would have the added benefit of clarifying this 
confusion. 
3.3.44 The Institute does not recommend reducing the range of options a court has in the event of a 
breach finding.  
Recommendations 
9. Notwithstanding criticisms of the suspended sentence, the Institute is of the view that the suspended 
sentence is a useful sentencing option that should be retained (see para 3.3.26). 
10. The Institute found no evidence that suspended sentences are overused or used inappropriately. 
Therefore it does not recommend that length-based or offence-based restrictions be imposed on the 
power to order suspended sentences (3.3.27 – 3.3.30). 
11. The Institute recommends that to remove confusion about the nature of the suspended sentence, 
legislative guidance be given in the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) about the imposition of suspended 
sentences that does not interfere with judicial discretion (3.3.31- 3.3.32). The proposed s 23A is as 
follows: 
A court must not impose and suspend a term of imprisonment (wholly or partly) unless, having regard 
to the provisions of this Act (and in particular s 13A), it has first determined that it would be 
appropriate in the circumstances that the offender be imprisoned for the term of imprisonment 
imposed.  
12. To give suspended sentences some punitive bite, the Institute recommends that instead of 
permitting combined orders, the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 24 be amended so that it lists a range of 
additional conditions that may be attached to a suspended sentence (3.3.36). The new provision should 
be modelled on the following: 
(1) An order of a court suspending the whole or part of a sentence of imprisonment is subject to the 
condition that the offender must not commit another offence punishable by imprisonment during the 
specified period.177 
(2) Such an order may be made subject to such additional conditions as the court considers necessary 
and expedient including the following conditions: 
• that the offender be subject to the supervision of a probation officer 
• that the offender be required to perform community service 
• that the offender be required to undertake a rehabilitation program 
• that the offender undergo specified medical or psychiatric treatment 
• a restorative requirement. 
13. The Institute recommends that to avoid the offender being punished more than once for breaching 
the same sentence that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 8(1) be amended so that a suspended sentence 
cannot be combined with a community service order, a probation order or a rehabilitation program 
order (see 3.3.38). 
                                                
177  This merely makes explicit the current position: see s 27(1). 
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14. To ensure that the needs of the offender are addressed and to enhance the opportunities that a 
suspended sentence presents to address those needs, it is recommended that where there is reason to 
think that an offender may benefit from any ‘additional conditions’, the court should require a pre-
sentence report addressing the issue of ‘additional conditions’ that should be included in the order. 
This recommendation would require an amendment to s 24 (see 3.3.39). 
15. The Institute recommends that a review be conducted to see if improvements introduced to address 
the neglect in instituting breach proceedings have been successful. (3.3.41) 
16. If breach proceedings still appear to be lax, the Institute recommends discussions between the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Police Prosecutions, Department of Justice, Community Corrections, 
Supreme and Magistrates Courts to develop protocols for dealing with breaches and the introduction 
of computer software to automatically notify apparent breaches. (3.3.41) 
17. The Institute recommends that s 27 of the Sentencing Act be amended to empower the prosecution 
to make an oral application to have a breach of a suspended sentence dealt with when a court is 
sentencing an offender for an offence the conviction for which constitutes a breach of the condition of 
a suspended sentence that an offender not commit an imprisonable offence. (3.3.42) 
18. To promote the deterrent value of the sanction and to enhance the integrity of the sanction in the 
eyes of the community, the Institute recommends that in dealing with breach cases there be a statutory 
presumption in favour of activation. (3.3.43) 
3.4 Home detention 
3.4.1 A home detention order confines offenders to a specified residence during specified times for 
the duration of the sentence under strict supervision and subject to conditions. The conditions can vary 
from conditions that place an offender under curfew at home for certain hours to conditions requiring 
confinement at home at all times except for a very limited number of court-authorised absences. It 
takes at least two forms:178 
• ‘front-end’, where an offender is specifically sentenced to home detention as an alternative to a 
sentence of imprisonment; 
• ‘back-end’, where home detention follows a period of full-time imprisonment. 
3.4.2 Both forms of home detention involve supervision and surveillance by probation officers but 
back-end home detention is not a sentencing option, rather parole board or corrective services 
personnel have the authority to made the order. For this reason this section of the report will only 
consider ‘front-end’ home detention. In many jurisdictions the home detainee wears an electronic 
bracelet, which cannot be removed without detection. The bracelet interacts with a small monitoring 
unit attached to the telephone at the offender’s residence. Supervising officers can also use mobile 
units that interact with the bracelet to monitor attendance at approved locations. More recent 
developments include global positioning systems (GPS) which permit the monitoring of offenders 
beyond the confines of their homes.  
3.4.3 Internationally, there is a range of terms to describe sanctions that require the offender to 
remain in the precincts of a specified residence.179 Such sanctions can be implemented using a number 
                                                
178  It can also be an alternative to remand or a condition of supervised bail for unsentenced offenders. Such a program has 
operated in South Australia since 1987. 
179  These include community custody, community control (in Florida), a conditional sentence of imprisonment (in Canada), 
home confinement, home arrest and home detention: Roberts (2004), above n 172, 50. Roberts uses the term ‘community 
custody’ to embrace this group of measures and he includes the revamped English suspended sentence within this term, 
presumably because it allows curfew and electronic monitoring requirements (at 4-5, 85).  
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of different statutory frameworks.180 Home detention is the terminology favoured in Australian and 
New Zealand. In New South Wales home detention is a sentencing option for offenders sentenced to 
no more than 18 months imprisonment.181 Offenders placed on a home detention order (HDO) are 
subject to surveillance by means of electronic monitoring as well as visits from probation officers. 
There is a lengthy list of offences for which an HDO cannot be imposed and also prior offence history 
exclusions. The program commenced in 1997 and operates in Sydney, Newcastle and Illawarra 
regions only. In South Australia, home detention operates state-wide but front-end home detention has 
a very narrow scope, applying only to prisoners whose health, disability or frailty makes service of the 
prison term unduly harsh. Home detention orders were piloted in Victoria for a period of three years 
from 2004-2006 for offenders sentenced in Melbourne to no more than 12 months imprisonment.182 
The program has been extended indefinitely. Prior history exclusions include violence, sex offences, 
firearms offences, stalking, commercial drug trafficking and breach of family violence intervention 
orders. In the Northern Territory home detention operates as a form of conditional suspended sentence. 
Offenders sentenced to an imprisonment term of five years or less that the court has suspended in 
whole or in part are eligible and there are no current offence or prior offence exclusions in the 
legislation.183 In New Zealand, rather than having the power to order home detention, the courts’ role 
is limited to granting permission to apply for an order to the Parole Board. Application for leave is 
made from prison so offenders granted leave to serve their sentence at home will have spent some time 
in prison. Home detention is not available for sentences of imprisonment longer than two years but 
there are no current offence or prior history exclusions.184 
3.4.4 Home detention is not available in Tasmania. In 1999 the Magistracy recommended to the 
‘Wing Committee’ that home detention be introduced in Tasmania and ‘without seeking to be 
exhaustive’ suggested that offenders particularly suitable for such an option would be repeat drink 
drivers, disqualified drivers and young repeat offenders involved in acts of dishonesty with some 
prospects of rehabilitation remaining. The Wing Committee recommended that a Home Detention 
Scheme be introduced (both as a front-end and back-end option) and that electronic surveillance be 
used to monitor participants.185 The 2000-2001 Justice Department Annual Report flagged a pilot 
program, scheduled to be implemented and evaluated in the fourth quarter of the 2001-2002 year.186 
However, plans for the pilot were abandoned before it began when a viability study indicated it was 
too costly per offender and a new Attorney-General had other priorities.  
Advantages of home detention 
3.4.5 The Wing Committee summarised the strengths of home detention as follows: 
• offenders are not exposed to the negative influences of a prison environment; 
• employment can be maintained; 
• family and community ties can be maintained; 
• it provides flexibility for employment, study, medical treatment, etc;  
• the financial position of the offender and their family can be maintained; 
                                                
180  It may be a curfew condition of another sanction monitored by electronic surveillance, or it may be a sanction in its own 
right. 
181  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 7. 
182  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 18ZR-18ZT.  
183  Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 40, 44, 45. 
184  Sentencing Act 2002 (NZ) s 97; see also Roberts (2004), above n 172, 75 for a description of the New Zealand model. 
The differences between the various Australian models are usefully described in Monica Henderson, Benchmarking Study 
of Home Detention Programs in Australia and New Zealand, Report to the National Corrections Advisory Group (2006) 
74.  
185  Wing Committee Report (1999), above n 83, 140. 
186  Department of Justice and Industrial Relations Tasmania, Annual Report 2000-2001 (2001) 77. 
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• it provides a semi-controlled environment where persons released from prison and their families 
can work towards establishing normal lives with assistance and encouragement, rather than 
being left to flounder after release from prison; 
• there are distinct cost advantages to the State which is relieved of the obligation to maintain the 
offender.187 
3.4.6 In more general terms, Julian Roberts has argued that home detention has the advantage of 
being able to satisfy multiple penal objectives including punitive, restorative and rehabilitative 
elements.188 He also argues that detention in a private residence may well encourage society to see a 
greater role for the community in the administration of legal punishments.189 
Disadvantages 
3.4.7 The literature on home detention raises a number of problems with it: 
• net-widening/penalty escalation: the object of front-end home detention – to divert people from 
the prison system and provide a more humane option – is likely to be subverted by home 
detention being used in place of non-custodial options; 
• it is likely to operate in a discriminatory fashion because without a permanent residence or a 
residence appropriately equipped for electronic monitoring an offender is unlikely to be 
assessed as suitable for a home detention order; 
• differences in the quality of offenders’ housing may mean that home detention is a harsher 
punishment for some offenders than others; 
• there is the potential for home detention to have a very negative impact on the offender’s family 
particularly for victims of domestic violence but also because of the stresses of living with an 
offender subject to home detention and pressure on the family/co-residents to supervise the 
offender;190 
• electronic monitoring is a degrading form of punishment and violates human rights.191 
3.4.8 Various suggestions have been made to address some of these disadvantages. It has been 
recommended that the scheme be monitored to ensure it is diverting offenders from imprisonment.192 
To avoid the scheme operating in a discriminatory fashion by excluding poor offenders, the New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission recommended that, in addition to a legislative requirement that 
reasonable efforts be made to find accommodation for homeless offenders, consideration be given to 
allocating resources to equip offender’s homes so as to make them suitable for detention.193 The 
potential for domestic violence and the negative effect of home detention on an offender’s family have 
been addressed in some jurisdictions by removing domestic violence offenders from eligibility for 
home detention orders,194 making the household residents’ consent a condition of the order and 
withdrawal of consent by a co-resident grounds for revocation.195  
                                                
187  Ibid, 139. 
188  Roberts (2004), above n 172. 
189  Ibid, 184. 
190  See Andrew von Hirsch, ‘The Ethics of Community Based Sanctions’ (1990) 36 Crime and Delinquency 162. 
191  See Ashworth (2005), above n 3, 93. 
192  New South Wales Law Reform Commission (1996), above n 38, 146. 
193  Ibid, 153. 
194  As in New South Wales and Victoria. 
195  Ibid. 
Tasmania Law Reform Institute   Sentencing 
124 
Responses to the Issues Paper 
3.4.9 Many of the responses to the Issues Paper addressed the topic of home detention and most 
supported the introduction of front-end home detention.196 Reasons for supporting the introduction of 
this measure included the avoidance of the disruption to family life,197 cost saving by reducing the 
costs of imprisonment198 and avoiding making an adverse personality worse.199 The then Chief Justice 
was a little more guarded in his support, suggesting that home detention should be explored further.200 
Craig Mackie argued that changes to probation and community service were a priority and necessary 
before home detention was introduced.201 The Justice Department was opposed to introducing ‘front-
end’ home detention ‘straight-up’, preferring instead to trial it as back-end option with offenders 
known to the system.202 The principal concern was net-widening – the potential to ‘capture offenders 
who might otherwise have not been given a custodial sentence’.203 A victims of crime service worker 
raised concerns in relation to the safety of family members of home detainees.204  
3.4.10 Few submissions contained a discussion of views as to details of a home detention option. 
However, Tasmania Police recommended that it be an alternative to imprisonment, and that it be 
subject to strict eligibility criteria and of limited duration similar to the New South Wales model. One 
respondent recommended that the discriminatory nature of the sanction be addressed by finding 
suitable accommodation for the homeless and putting offenders who live in mansions in group homes 
in the community.205 The Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania submitted that home detention not be an 
alternative to prison, that it be limited to 18 months and that orders be subject to family consent. 
The Institute’s views 
3.4.11 Notwithstanding the dangers of net-widening, the Institute is attracted to the concept of 
home detention. It notes that its introduction in Canada has been a success and has led to a decline in 
prison sentences with only a small net-widening effect. In the first three years of its introduction, a 13 
per cent reduction in prison admissions was directly attributable to the new sanction.206 Moreover, the 
proportion of offenders completing without breach is high.207 Similarly high completion rates have 
been reported in Australia and New Zealand.208 It appears that such a measure can reduce reliance on 
imprisonment with considerable cost benefits, and at the same time address many of the purposes of 
sentencing. Appropriately constructed it can punish and deter as effectively as prison, and yet also 
contribute to rehabilitative and restorative goals.209  
• While not as severe as institutional imprisonment it has ‘penal bite’. Research indicates that 
offenders see home detention as very restrictive and in that sense punitive.210 This is well 
                                                
196  Submissions in favour included Tasmania Catholic Justice and Peace Commission; Tasmania Police; Criminal Law 
Subcommittee of the Law Society; Warwick Dunstan. 
197  Maureen Holloway, on behalf of the Tasmanian Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, submission. 
198  The Commissioner of Police, Mr Richard McCreadie, submission. 
199  Anonymous victim of crime, submission. 
200  The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, submission, 3. 
201  Submission, 3. 
202  Department of Justice and Industrial Relations, submission, 13. 
203  Ibid. 
204  Liz Tanton-Buchanan, The Victims of Crime Service, submission.  
205  Anonymous victim of crime, submission. 
206  Julian Roberts, ‘Reducing the use of Incarceration: Recent International Experiences’ (2005) 86 Reform 15, 17. 
207  Andrew Ashworth, ‘Foreword’ in Roberts (2004), above n 172.  
208  Henderson (2006), above n 184, 74. 
209  Roberts (2004), above n 172, 52. 
210  Ibid, 114. 
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illustrated by detainees in the New South Wales program, where most respondents in an exit 
survey were ‘shocked at how tough the scheme actually was.’211  
• In theory home detention can offer the same degree of specific deterrence as institutional 
custody. Research shows that severity of punishment has only limited impact on the likelihood 
of re-offending and that when background factors are controlled for, the recidivism rate for 
released prisoners is no better than less severe sanctions. Evaluations of electronic monitoring 
have suggested that electronically monitored offenders ‘generally do no better or no worse than 
similar offenders sentenced to more restrictive sanctions’,212 nor significantly better or worse 
‘compared with those being manually supervised.’213 On the basis of 12 control-group studies, 
Aos et al found that electronic monitoring does not reduce recidivism, nor does it increase it.214  
• Home detention has the advantage of achieving rehabilitative and restorative goals. Roberts 
argues it is clearly a more effective way of promoting rehabilitation than custody and through 
conditions imposed it can encourage offenders to engineer changes in their lives and can permit 
the kind of initiatives associated with restorative justice.  
• The Institute accepts that home detention cannot achieve the same incapacitative effects as 
institutional imprisonment and so offenders who pose a significant risk to the public should be 
excluded from eligibility.  
Statutory framework  
3.4.12 The Institute has considered the statutory framework that should be recommended for this 
sanction. The first issue is whether home detention should be seen as a standard or core condition of a 
suspended sentence or whether it should be a separate custodial sanction. In Canada, England and the 
Northern Territory it is a condition of a suspended sentence but in New South Wales and Victoria it is 
an independent sanction. While there are advantages in giving the suspended sentence more punitive 
bite by making home detention or curfew requirements a standard condition of suspension, the 
Institute is of the view that this would inevitably result in net-widening in Tasmania, a jurisdiction 
where the suspended sentence is so widely accepted by judicial officers. In the Institute’s view, it 
should be a seen as a separate custodial sentence that is more severe than a wholly suspended 
sentence. To avoid net-widening, the sanction should be constructed as a form of custody with the 
court being first required to impose a term of custody before making a home detention order. The 
Institute recommends that this pre-requisite be located in a statutory framework that contains the 
principle of restraint in the use of custody.  
Labelling the sanction  
3.4.13 The name of the sanction should reflect its nature as a form of custody and promote public 
acceptance of it as such. Moreover, it is not desirable to restrict orders to residence in the offender’s 
home, and there are cases where alternative accommodation may be more appropriate, for the 
homeless, wealthy and mentally ill215 for example, and for domestic violence offenders. While these 
considerations suggest a name like community custody might be preferable, home detention or home 
detention order is the terminology that is better understood in Australia.  
                                                
211  Kyleigh Heggie, Review of the NSW Home Detention Scheme, Department of Corrective Services (NSW) Research 
Publication No 41 (1999) 79. 
212  Roberts (2004), above n 172, citing Rogers and Jolin (1989). 
213  Mackenzie (2002), above n 55, 344. 
214  Aos, Miller and Drake (2006), above n 58, 3, 6. 
215  In R v Knoblauch [2000] 2 SCR 780, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a community custody order which required 
the offender to be detained in a secure psychiatric facility.  
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A multi-dimensional sanction 
3.4.14 Julian Roberts, a respected sentencing scholar and international advocate of community 
custody, has argued that in ‘order for community custody to realize its potential, the sanction must 
consist of more than simply a restriction on an offender’s liberty.’216 The Institute agrees. Home or 
residential confinement alone will achieve little more than punishment. Offenders should be 
encouraged to pursue treatment if necessary, to compensate the victim where possible and to take steps 
to make restoration to the community where appropriate. The Institute therefore recommends that 
home/residential confinement should be the core condition of the order but it should be 
multidimensional with additional conditions that reflect the additional needs of the offender or the 
restorative aims of the order. 
The impact of the order on co-residents  
3.4.15 One of the disadvantages of home detention is the stress and pressure it places on the 
offender’s family. The Issues Paper asked that submissions address the issue of how the offender’s 
family should be protected. One submission recommended that an HDO be subject to the consent of 
the offender’s family.217 To protect the offender’s family the Institute recommends that before making 
an HDO, the court should obtain an assessment report which addresses the suitability of the offender 
for such a disposition, the impact of the order on third parties and the environment in which the 
offender will be confined. The consent of co-residents should be a prerequisite as it is in New South 
Wales and Victoria and this should be able to be withdrawn at any time. However, if co-residents do 
not consent or consent is withdrawn, the sentence should be served in a half-way house or other 
suitable accommodation. The Institute was concerned that to state in the report that one or more 
residents did not consent to the order may put them in a particularly difficult position vis a vis the 
offender. However, on balance, it was decided to recommend that consent in writing should be a 
prerequisite for the offender to reside at his or her home or normal residence. If the writer of the 
assessment report has concerns for the safety of the residents then it would be possible to merely state 
that the offender was not a suitable person to serve the sentence by way of home detention and that it 
was not appropriate that the sentence be served by way of home detention, or alternatively that it was 
preferable in the circumstances that alternative accommodation be found for the offender.  
Discretion as to length  
3.4.16 The issue of whether courts should have the discretion to make an HDO longer than the term 
of custody it replaces has been considered by the Institute. In Canada the Supreme Court has 
determined that this is permissible for the reason that community custody cannot match the penal 
value of institutional custody.218 However, elsewhere, including in New South Wales, the length of the 
custodial term must be determined without regard to the possibility that a home detention order may 
be made. In other words, the length of a home detention order is tied to the length of the sentence of 
imprisonment which is determined without regard to the manner in which it is to be served.219 The 
advantage of the Canadian approach is that it ensures that the principles of parity and proportionality 
are not violated. If two comparable offenders are sentenced, one to community custody for six months 
and one to imprisonment for six months, they are usually going to be serving sentences of varying 
severity in violation of the principle of parity.220 The principle of proportionality may be infringed if 
the appropriate sentence is one of six months imprisonment and this is replaced by six months 
community custody.221 The public may also be more supportive of a sanction which replaces prison if 
the replacement is longer than the term of imprisonment that would have been imposed. The 
disadvantage of giving courts a discretion to increase the length of an HDO is that it conflicts with the 
accepted method of reasoning for wholly suspended sentences and could not be accepted without also 
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allowing courts to increase the length of wholly suspended sentences. The Institute also notes that 
while home detention cannot match the punitive value of institutional custody, the home detainee does 
not have access to remission or parole so in effect will generally spend longer in detention. The 
Institute recommends that this made be clear in the legislation. 
Limiting the length of the order 
3.4.17 The Issues Paper asked whether HDOs should be limited to 18 months in length. This is the 
maximum length in New South Wales. Tasmania Police directly addressed this issue submitting that 
HDOs should be of limited duration, as in New South Wales. The Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania 
disagreed submitting instead that there should be a wide judicial discretion in respect of length. In 
Victoria the maximum is 12 months, it is five years in the Northern Territory and in South Australia 
there is no sentence length restriction. In New Zealand the court can only give leave to apply for 
HDOs to offenders sentenced to two years or less. In England and Wales the limit adopted for the 
suspended sentence is 12 months and in Canada a sentence of imprisonment that can be ordered to be 
served in the community (a conditional sentence of imprisonment) must be less than two years. 
Sentence length restrictions are open to the criticism that they unnecessarily restrict judicial discretion 
and that there may be exceptional cases where it is appropriate to impose home detention for a longer 
period than 18 months. However, there are two good reasons in favour of sentence length restrictions. 
First, setting no ceiling or a ceiling as long as two years allows HDOs to be imposed in very serious 
cases which can attract media and public criticism and undermine the acceptability of community 
custody in the eyes of the public. A lower limit, say of 12 months, would avoid such controversy and 
have little impact on increasing admissions to prison compared with a higher upper limit of no limit at 
all.222 Secondly, long HDOs place considerable hardships and pressures on the families of offenders. 
These pressures may be tolerable for months but may be an intolerable burden for longer periods.223 
Moreover, Roberts argues that research suggests that the likelihood of continued compliance is 
inversely related to the length of time the offender is required to observe conditions.224 The Institute 
accepts the strength of the arguments against and in favour of length restrictions. However, it is of the 
view that the arguments in favour can be adequately addressed by requiring judicial officers to 
conduct periodic reviews of offenders sentenced to an HDO in excess of 12 months with power to 
vary the conditions of the order.225 It therefore recommends that no limits be placed on the length of 
the order but that judges and magistrates be required to review orders in excess of six months. 
Offence-based exclusion criteria  
3.4.18 As discussed in para 3.4.3, jurisdictions differ in the offences that are statutorily excluded 
from home detention orders. In general the Institute does not favour excluding specific offences from 
HDOs. If the court is prevented from imposing HDOs for offences such as manslaughter, sexual 
assault or violent offences but is permitted to impose a less severe sanction for such offences, 
anomalies are created unless similar changes are also made to the ambit of less severe sanctions. 
Excluding specific offences prejudges the relative seriousness of the crimes excluded. Moreover, as 
Roberts has pointed out, such schedules can be subject to political interference with Parliament adding 
crimes to the schedule in a knee-jerk response to appease the public.226 However, there are principled 
reasons for some exclusions. Offences that pose a significant risk to society should be excluded, and 
offenders convicted of a domestic violence offence should not be returned home to serve the sentence 
although they could be required to serve it in a community-based residence with appropriate 
conditions to protect the victim. It has been argued that it is appropriate to exclude offenders convicted 
of drug dealing, manufacture or cultivating drugs in cases where the offender has used his or her home 
                                                
222  Roberts (2004), above n 172, 162-163. 
223  Ibid, 163. 
224  Ibid. 
225  Ibid, 164. 
226  Ibid, 165.  
Tasmania Law Reform Institute   Sentencing 
128 
for the commission of the offence.227 However, the Institute does not recommend including such an 
exclusion. The matter should be left to the discretion of the judge.  
Homeless and wealthy offenders  
3.4.19 The Issues Paper invited submission on ways homeless offenders or those with unsuitable 
accommodation could be included in the scheme. Two submissions suggested that disadvantaged 
offenders should be required to serve HDOs in group homes or ‘suitable accommodation’228 while it 
was suggested that ‘rich offenders who usually live in mansions, should also be placed in suitable 
group homes’.229 Roberts’ observation that ‘[a]llowing a rich defendant to purge his sentence in luxury 
would scandalise pubic opinion’ is borne out by the public response to the decision to allow Paris 
Hilton to serve her 42 week prison sentence at her luxury home with an ankle monitor.230 The Institute 
is of the view that it is as inequitable to deny the sanction to wealthy offenders as it is to deny it to the 
homeless. The homeless should be required to serve home detention in a half-way house. In the case 
of the affluent, on the face of it, being required to stay in a ‘mansion’ or a beautifully appointed house 
may not seem much of a punishment. However, it is the confinement and lack of freedom that is the 
punishment. The wealthy are accustomed to travel and a choice of activities, entertainments and 
destinations denied to the less well-off. Being confined to their home could severely constrain the 
freedom they are accustomed to. 
Provision of adequate resources for supervision and assistance  
3.4.20 Community custody should not be introduced unless corrective services are given additional 
resources to devote more time to surveillance and support of offenders. Fundamental to acceptance of 
the sanction by police, judicial officers and the public will be the perception that ‘home detainees will 
be subject to strict surveillance under a system that cannot be circumvented’.231 Provision should also 
be made for home detention programs to be available to ensure adequate support and supervision.232 
Recommendations 
19. The Institute recommends that ‘front-end’ home detention be introduced as a sentencing option 
and that it be called ‘home detention’. (3.4.11, 3.4.13) 
20. That it should not be a condition of a suspended sentence but a custodial sentence located in the 
sentencing hierarchy between an immediate sentence of imprisonment and a wholly suspended 
sentence of imprisonment. (3.4.12) 
21. That home/residential confinement be a core condition of the order but courts should have the 
discretion to impose additional orders to reflect the needs of the offender or the restorative aims of the 
sentence. (3.4.14) 
22. That a home detention assessment report be a prerequisite of a home detention order. (3.4.15) 
23. That a court must not make a home detention order unless the offender consents and signs an 
undertaking to comply with their obligations under the order. (3.4.15) 
24. That consent of co-residents be a prerequisite of the order and consent should be able to be 
withdrawn at any time. (3.4.15) 
25. That offenders sentenced to home detention not be eligible for remissions or parole. (3.4.16) 
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26. That there be no limits on the length of the order but that judicial officers be required to review 
orders in excess of six months. (3.4.17) 
27. That there should be no offence-based exclusion criteria, however, an offender who poses a 
significant risk in terms of committing a further violent offence should not be eligible for a community 
custody order. (3.4.18) 
28. That the courts should have a discretion to order home detention be served in a place other than the 
offender’s home in appropriate cases (e.g. in cases of domestic violence offences and homeless 
offenders). (3.4.15, 3.4.19) 
29. That additional resources be allocated to Community Corrections for preparation of assessment 
reports, supervision of home detainees and provision of home detention programs. (3.4.20) 
3.5 Periodic detention  
3.5.1 Periodic detention involves imprisoning offenders for limited periods but allowing them to 
spend the remainder of their time at home, at work or otherwise in the community. It is a sentencing 
option in New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory but not in Tasmania. In New South 
Wales there are eleven detention centres at eight locations233 and in the ACT there is one.  
3.5.2 In New South Wales, where an offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not more 
than three years, the sentencing court may order that a sentence of imprisonment be served by way of 
periodic detention.234 This generally requires the offender to remain in custody for two consecutive 
days of each week for the duration of the sentence. An offender serving periodic detention may also be 
required by the Commissioner of Corrective Services to carry out community work and attend training 
or counselling.235 Certain offenders are ineligible for periodic detention including those convicted of 
prescribed sexual offences.236 The periodic detention scheme in New South Wales operates in two 
stages. During Stage 1 detainees are required to remain in custody in a detention centre for the 
detention period. After serving one third or three months (whichever is the greater), periodic detainees, 
who have attended regularly and been of good behaviour, are eligible for Stage II. Stage II is a non-
residential component of periodic detention which allows the detainee to sleep at home at night and 
attend at the designated work site on two consecutive days from 8am to 4pm. One of the advantages of 
Stage II is that it provides an incentive for regular attendance and good behaviour in Stage 1.  
3.5.3 The New South Wales Law Reform Commission recommended abolition of Stage II 
detention because it was inconsistent with truth in sentencing and because of the negative effect on 
public perception of periodic detention as an effective sentencing option. It was anticipated that 
abandoning Stage II would encourage greater use of periodic detention because it would be seen as 
having a stronger punitive element.237 The Commission’s recommendation has not been adopted. The 
use of periodic detention has been declining in New South Wales, with numbers of detainees dropping 
from 1,424 in 1996 to 1,045 in 2001238 and 724 in 2006.239 The scheme is under review and it seems 
likely that it will be phased out. In contrast, in the ACT, periodic detention accommodation is being 
expanded. The ACT scheme differs from the NSW scheme in that there is no staged approach to 
detention.240  
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3.5.4 In the United Kingdom, periodic detention – under the label intermittent custody – was 
introduced on a pilot basis in 2004241 and national roll-out is still on the agenda. The Sentencing 
Guidelines Council has advised that public safety should be the paramount consideration and so 
‘intermittent custody’ should not be ‘used for sex offenders or those convicted of serious offences of 
either violence or robbery’ but may be suitable for those who are ‘full-time carers; employed; or in 
education’.242 
Advantages 
3.5.5 The advantages of periodic detention are said to include the following: 
• it registers disapproval of the offender’s criminal activities without all the negative effects of 
full-time imprisonment; 
• it enables the offender to maintain contact with family, friends and employment and to 
contribute to the community through community work; 
• it keeps the offender away from hotels and the possibility of excessive drinking thereby 
decreasing the risk of re-offending; 
• it is much cheaper than full-time imprisonment;243 
• it is compatible with principles of restorative justice by returning a benefit to the community in 
the form of work on community projects but at the same time it has an element of punishment; 
• it is perceived by detainees to be a fairer sanction than full-time imprisonment,244 and this is a 
factor associated with better crime outcomes. 
Disadvantages 
3.5.6 The disadvantages of periodic detention are said to include the following: 
• as with home detention there is the possibility of net-widening; 
• it will require an increase in detention facilities, and in a small state like Tasmania with a 
dispersed population this will be at a significant capital cost; 
• it is difficult to run because of the burden of processing prisoners’ frequent entry and exit from 
custody; 
• a possible reluctance to use this sentencing option because judges are ambivalent about the 
equivalence between a sentence of full-time imprisonment and a sentence of periodic 
detention;245 
• problems with compliance rates.246 
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3.5.7 As discussed in the Issues Paper, the Tasmanian Legislative Council’s Select Committee (the 
‘Wing Committee’) investigated periodic detention and visited detention centres in New South Wales 
and the Australian Capital Territory. They were satisfied that it has considerable merit and 
recommended its adoption in Tasmania.247 This recommendation was supported by the submission 
from the Tasmanian Magistracy. The Committee recommended the establishment of Periodic 
Detention Centres accessible to the three regions of Tasmania either in prisons or other suitable 
facilities. The Committee envisaged a two-stage scheme, similar to that operating in New South 
Wales. It was argued this would give courts the opportunity to include offenders living in remote areas 
in the scheme.  
Response to the Issues Paper 
3.5.8 Responses to the Issues Paper were divided on the issue of whether periodic detention should 
be introduced in Tasmania. The then Chief Justice opposed it on the grounds that it ‘would be an 
administrative nightmare’ and could not be satisfactorily enforced and ‘disciplinary action as the result 
of inevitable breaches would clog up the court system’.248 Consultations with community corrections 
officers in Hobart emphasised the large cost of providing special facilities and productive programs 
and activities for detainees. Craig Mackie submitted that increased resources for existing community 
sentences were a greater priority than new initiatives such as periodic detention. However, supporters 
of periodic detention were more numerous than detractors with the Legal Aid Commission of 
Tasmania, the Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Law Reform Commission, the Tasmanian Justice 
and Peace Commission and other individuals recommending the introduction of periodic detention.249 
In Bartels’ interviews with judges and magistrates, two judges responded to a general question about 
sentencing reform of suspended sentences with a comment supporting the inclusion of periodic 
detention as a sentencing option.250 The Justice Department’s response did not oppose the notion of 
introducing periodic detention but noted the need for funds for developing appropriate physical 
infrastructure in each of the three regions of the State and the need for some form of rehabilitative or 
reparative component to be devised for the non-detention period of orders.251 Advocates were divided 
on whether periodic detention should be a substitutional sanction or not. The Wing Committee 
envisaged it as an option ‘without limitation, notwithstanding the risk of net widening’252 but the Legal 
Aid Commission recommended that it be a substitutional sanction, in other words that the judicial 
officer’s decision sequence be that it is first decided that a term of imprisonment be imposed before 
the decision is made to order that it be served by way of periodic detention.  
The Institute’s views 
3.5.9 There is a real advantage in seeking to avoid some of the negative impacts of imprisonment 
such as disruption or employment, family life and education. Periodic detention avoids placing family 
members in the invidious position of gaolers. However, the costs associated with housing offenders for 
short periods are large and given expenditure of ‘around $90M’ on the new prison at Risdon253 it is 
unlikely that the government would put more money into custodial infrastructure for some time. 
Moreover, the Institute is of the view that the most pressing need is for resources for programs rather 
than bricks and mortar. It therefore does not recommend that periodic detention be introduced as a 
sentencing option until funding is available. 
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Recommendation 
30. The Institute does not recommend that periodic detention be introduced as a sentencing option at 
this time (for the reasons outlined in para 3.5.9). 
3.6 Intensive correction orders 
3.6.1 The intensive correction order (ICO) is an intermediate sentencing sanction which is 
available in Victoria and Queensland. It has an international counterpart in the US in Intensive 
Supervised Probation, a program which was designed to provide increased supervision and restraint on 
offenders in comparison with regular probation. However, rather than enhanced probation, intensive 
correction orders in Victoria (and Queensland) are an enhanced community service and probation 
order combined and have been described as ‘a community service order with teeth’. In some ways 
they are closer to one form of the new English generic community sentence which has a core 
supervision requirement and one or more of 12 possible requirements of which unpaid community 
work is one.254  
3.6.2 The intensive correction order was introduced in Victoria in the early 1990s with the aim of 
diverting offenders from short terms of imprisonment.255 Where a court has obtained a pre-sentence 
report on the offender and has imposed a sentence of imprisonment that does not exceed 12 months it 
may order that it be served by way of intensive correction in the community.256 Core conditions which 
must be agreed to by the offender include not to commit another imprisonable offence; to report to or 
receive visits from a community corrections officer at least twice a week; and to attend at a specified 
community corrections centre for at least 12 hours per week to perform community work for at least 
eight hours and to spend any balance in counselling, treatment or education. Other special conditions 
may be added by the judicial officer in relation to attendance at prescribed programs. In the event of 
breach, there is a presumption of imprisonment, unless there are exceptional circumstances.  
Advantages 
3.6.3 The advantages of the intensive correction order are similar to home detention and periodic 
detention: 
• it permits the courts to impose a custodial sentence which lends weight to the penalty, 
emphasising its seriousness and has symbolic value for victims; 
• it enables the offender to maintain contact with family, friends and employment; 
• by providing for frequent contact with a community corrections officer and the opportunities for 
treatment, counselling and education, it can address the causes of the offending behaviour; 
• it avoids the contaminatory effects of imprisonment; 
• it is cheaper than full-time imprisonment; 
• it is compatible with principles of restorative justice by returning a benefit to the community in 
the form of work on community projects but at the same time it has an element of punishment. 
Disadvantages and problems 
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3.6.4 While there is a risk that any sanction that is intended to be diversionary can be used 
inappropriately with ‘net-widening’ effects, Freiberg suggests that one of the reasons the ICO has not 
been particularly successful in Victoria is the reverse: the substitutional nature of the sanction (in other 
words, its link with a sentence of imprisonment) has meant that some sentencers may be reluctant to 
impose it in cases where they believed that the offender required a high degree of supervision but 
where the offence itself may have not warranted imprisonment.257 Other problems with it include: 
• the program conditions have not been made available; 
• insufficient resources have been devoted to the sanction causing sentencers to lose confidence in 
it; 
• high breach rates because of insufficient resources and lack of flexibility resulting in a loss of 
confidence in the order; 
• the order may be too short for effective rehabilitation;  
• the breach conditions are too severe and inflexible. 
3.6.5 Freiberg made a number of recommendations to address these problems, including that the 
nexus with imprisonment be severed by making the ICO a sentencing option in its own right but one 
which should only be imposed where a court is considering sentencing an offender to a term of 
imprisonment.258 However, none of his recommendations have been followed and the take-up rate of 
this sentencing option does not appear to have increased.259 
 Responses to the Issues Paper 
3.6.6 The Issues Paper asked whether the intensive corrections order should be introduced in 
Tasmania and, if so, whether it should be a sentence in its own right or a substitutional sanction for 
imprisonment. There was some support for its introduction.260 The Legal Aid Commission of 
Tasmania and Tasmania Police suggested that the intensive corrections order should be introduced as a 
sentencing option in its own right rather than a substitutional sanction. The submission from Tasmania 
Police recommended that the main emphasis of the order should be on restorative justice and 
rehabilitation but a discretion to attach additional surveillance requirements such as home detention or 
curfew conditions was also suggested. A submission from a probation officer favoured introducing 
intensive correction orders but it is clear from the submission that he had in mind intensive supervised 
probation rather than the a community service order with bite.261 The Justice Department commented 
that further research was necessary to determine the best model for intensive correction orders and 
noted that more intensive supervision would require increased funding.262 
The Institute’s views 
3.6.7 The submissions and consultations suggest that the concept of an intensive correction order 
is a confusing one which does not convey whether it is in essence an enhanced probation order or an 
enhanced community service order. International evidence suggests that intensive supervised 
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probation which involves increased supervision and surveillance is not effective in reducing 
recidivism. Based on her review of evaluation studies, Mackenzie concluded: 
there is no evidence that recidivism is reduced by increasing surveillance and other 
restraints over offenders on ISP [intensive supervised probation]. In fact, the increased 
surveillance may be associated with increases in technical violations.263 
3.6.8 This is supported by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy review. Based on 23 
studies, Aos et al report that intensive supervision with an emphasis on surveillance had no impact on 
crime outcomes compared to treatment as usual.264 However, both of these reviews agree that the 
evidence suggests that if offenders are offered increased treatment in addition to increased surveillance 
and control, crime outcomes are improved – sometimes significantly so.265 These findings are not 
relevant to the Victorian model of an intensive corrections order. However, the evidence suggests that 
it is perhaps worth exploring the idea of a generic community sentence, or a community sentence that 
offers considerable flexibility to sentencers. Nonetheless, it should avoid the twin problems of 
threatening the relationship between the gravity of the offence and the severity of the penalty and the 
imposition of too many conditions. The Institute does not support introducing an order which is in 
effect an additional custodial order and is of the opinion that the home detention order/community 
custody order is a more appropriate option than the intensive correction order. This raises the question 
whether it would be a more attractive option if the nexus with imprisonment was broken so that the 
ICO became a sentencing alternative in its own right and not a means of serving a sentence of 
imprisonment. The Institute is of the view that having an order which combines the punitive, 
reparative and rehabilitative aspects of an enhanced community service order could be achieved in 
other ways. 
Recommendation 
31. For the reasons outlined in paras 3.6.7 – 3.6.8, the Institute does not recommend the introduction 
of the intensive correction order in Tasmania, either as a means of serving a sentence of imprisonment 
or as a sentencing option in its own right. 
3.7 Community service orders 
3.7.1 Community service orders (CSOs) require an offender to perform unpaid work or other 
activity in the community under the direction of a probation officer or supervisor. In the sentencing 
hierarchy they sit below a suspended sentence. When first introduced, community service orders 
(work orders) were an alternative to imprisonment but they are now a sentencing option in their own 
right. The authorising legislation is the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 7(c). The offender may be 
required to work on any day of the week and in conformity with trends elsewhere, community service 
includes attendance at educational or other programs. The Community Service Order Scheme co-
ordinates work, work sites and supervision for persons subject to CSOs. It provides assistance to a 
broad range of community organisations and individual pensioners. In recent years, the trend has been 
away from individual assistance and more towards working with organisations that are able to provide 
supervision, tools and equipment.266 It is not known what proportion of the projects assigned or hours 
completed consist of personal development or education activities. An early study of community 
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service orders in Tasmania found only 3.3 per cent of projects fell outside the work category.267 The 
2002 audit gave examples of personal development and education courses but gave no indication of 
the extent to which such programs were used.268 Breach of a community service order is an offence for 
which the offender may be fined or imprisoned. In addition or alternatively, the court may confirm the 
order, increase the number of hours or cancel the order and re-sentence the offender for the original 
offence.269 
3.7.2 Community service orders have many advantages over imprisonment not the least of which 
is cost. The cost of corrective services supervision in Tasmania in 2005-2006 was $8.97 per day 
compared with a cost of $222 per day for keeping a person in custody.270 The extent to which 
community service orders have been used to replace imprisonment is not entirely clear. An obvious 
advantage of community service is that it has a restorative element: it provides an opportunity for 
offenders to give something back to the community. It is a sanction that has a punitive element (by 
constraining the offender’s time and freedom), a rehabilitative element (by providing possibilities of 
education and work experience) and a restorative element. It appears to be a useful and credible 
sentencing option in the sentencing hierarchy for medium range offences. 
3.7.3 In 1999 the Wing Committee reported that there had been a steady upward trend in the use of 
CSOs since 1980 and that there was a significant increase in 1996/1997 with 1,091 orders made.271 
However, since then their use has declined with 826 orders made in 2005-06272 and 840 in 2006-07.273 
In the Magistrates Court community service orders comprise about 4 per cent of orders made.274 In the 
Supreme Court they are imposed in about 5 per cent of sentences (as the most serious outcome).275  
3.7.4 Section 7(i) of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) allows community service orders to be 
combined with other orders and combinations with suspended sentences and/or probation orders are 
not uncommon. From 2001 to 2006 in the Supreme Court 16 per cent of those who received 
community service orders also received probation orders.276 In the Magistrates Court 20 per cent of 
community service orders are combined with probation orders.277 There are clearly advantages in 
combining community service with a wholly suspended sentence in some cases so that the suspended 
sentence is given a punitive bite. Similarly, combining probation with community service allows 
rehabilitation to be emphasised as well as punishment and reparation. However, if this combination is 
over-used it may stretch the resources of community corrections by the supervisory requirements of 
combined orders. It may also result in a disproportionate outcome and set-up offenders to fail by 
overloading the sentence with requirements.  
3.7.5 Some jurisdictions, such as Victoria and Western Australia, have a different model for 
community-based orders. Rather than separate categories of order for community service and 
probation they have an order (called a community-based order) with multiple elements capable of 
being tailored to the needs of different types of offenders.278 While this has the advantage of flexibility, 
                                                
267  Terese Henning, ‘Hidden Factors in the Assessment of Offenders for Community Service Orders in Tasmania’ (1997) 8 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 287, 304: data from this study were taken from 1992-1993.  
268  Tasmanian Audit Office, Managing Community Service Orders, Special Report No 44 (2002), 22.  
269  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 36. 
270  Tasmanian Department of Justice (2007), above n 11, 45 (community supervision, there is no differentiation between 
probation, parole and community service costs), 42 (prison). 
271  Wing Committee Report (1999), above n 83, 143; Tasmanian Audit Office (2002), above n 268, 10. 
272  Tasmanian Department of Justice, Annual Report 2005-2006 (2006) 58. 
273  Tasmanian Department of Justice (2007), above n 11, 47. 
274  Data supplied by Lorana Bartels, PhD student, University of Tasmania. She found that in her lower court sample for 
2003-2004 community service orders comprised 3.7 per cent of orders made. 
275  Based on Supreme Court sentencing data for 2001-2006. 
276  Supreme Court Sentencing data 2001-2006. Bartels (2007), above n 91, found 14.2 per cent of wholly and partly 
suspended sentences were combined with a community service order.  
277  From Bartels’ 2003-2004 sample.  
278  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 36-48, Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) ss 61-67.
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there are problems with a lack of clarity regarding the aims of the order.279 England and Wales also 
have a generic community sentence that gives sentencers a menu of options which can be combined to 
form a single sentence. The basic requirement is supervision and the ‘menu’ of optional requirements 
includes compulsory unpaid work; curfew or exclusion orders; electronic monitoring and participation 
in restorative justice programs.280 Other jurisdictions such as New South Wales have retained the 
community service order as a discrete order. 
Responses to the Issues Paper 
3.7.6 Responses to the Issues Paper were generally supportive of community service orders as a 
credible sentencing option. The Chief Justice, for example, stated, ‘I think that by and large, these 
have been very successful. Curiously, many of those subject to them are far from reluctant to carry 
them out satisfactorily because they are doing something worthwhile.’281 However, a number of 
problems were identified and a lack of resources was a recurring theme. Craig Mackie had no issues 
with the legislative framework but submitted that there were a raft of problems associated with CSOs 
because of a lack of resources allocated to them resulting in too few officers administering them, lack 
of availability of programs in some areas and delays in assessing suitability of offenders for orders. He 
was also critical of the quality of the work programs available stating, ‘[p]rograms that could really 
benefit the community and the offender are frustratingly rare’. He also complained that offenders 
receive little or no rehabilitative assistance from CSOs.282 A probation officer also referred to the lack 
of diversity in the availability of programs and commented on a lack of selectivity in orders made by 
courts and community corrections.283 Community Corrections Officers in Hobart recommended a 
person be employed with the role of seeking out new projects and providing organisations with 
support and advice in relation to supervision. It was suggested that high profile projects result in an 
increase in orders.284 A respondent from a Community Legal Centre suggested insufficient use was 
made of community service orders, adverting to their potential to result in community benefit.285 
Tasmania Police favoured changing the legislative framework so that community service orders would 
have a menu of options in addition to unpaid work including supervision and participation in 
restorative justice programs. The Hobart Community Legal Centre submitted that community service 
orders should also have a rehabilitation component with more resources allocated to enable referral to 
different rehabilitation programs.286 
3.7.7 The Justice Department response referred to the difficulty in sourcing placements for 
community service orders and predicted problems if there were to be an increase in the number of 
orders made.  
Rewards  
3.7.8 The Issues Paper raised the question of whether a form of reward should be built into the 
community service order. In New Zealand, s 67 of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides that if a probation 
officer is satisfied that the offender has a good record of compliance with a sentence of community 
work, the probation officer may, as the sentence nears its end, remit up to 10 per cent from the 
aggregate number of hours of community work imposed by the court. Tasmania Police supported such 
a system287 as did Community Corrections in Hobart and Launceston.288 The Legal Aid Commission of 
                                                
279  Freiberg (2002), above n 245, 166. 
280  See Ashworth (2005), above n 3, 312-321 for an explanation. 
281  The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, submission, 3. 
282  Submission from Craig Mackie, solicitor. Consultation in October 2007 revealed that his views are unchanged. 
283  J Heathcote, probation officer, submission. 
284  Consultation with Community Corrections Hobart, 14 September 2002. 
285  Mr Bob Hamilton, Manager, Launceston Community Service, submission. 
286  Hobart Community Legal Centre, submission from Jane Hutchison and Olivia Montgomery. 
287  Tasmania Police, submission. 
288  Consultations 30 September 2002 (Launceston), 14 September 2002 (Hobart). 
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Tasmania thought rewards should be limited to a certificate or statement outlining competencies 
attained by the person.  
Breach 
3.7.9 A number of submissions addressed the issue of breach. Tasmania Police recommended that 
the breach offence should be abolished provided appropriate mechanisms exist for monitoring 
performance. Community Corrections Launceston suggested that the first failure to appear should 
result in a warning and that there should be an administrative increase in number of hours for a third 
failure. 
Community service orders and fines 
3.7.10 A number of submissions were in favour of making community service orders a broader 
option that was available for offences which were not punishable by a term of imprisonment.289 It was 
also noted that there was inconsistency among magistrates as to whether a community service order 
was available instead of a mandatory minimum fine for an offence such as drink driving.290 An 
examination of Bartels’ data set for the Magistrates Court in 2003-2004 revealed that only six of the 
twelve magistrates had imposed a community service order in lieu of a mandatory fine or 
imprisonment in this period for drink driving suggesting magistrates do not have a consistent view 
about the availability of a community service order where the penalty provision prescribes a 
mandatory minimum fine or imprisonment.  
The Institute’s views 
3.7.11 The Institute is of the view that community service orders appear to be a credible, logical and 
effective sentencing option. The latest Justice Department’s annual report suggests they are ‘imposed 
by the courts to encourage offenders to achieve responsible behaviour including: performing useful 
tasks that provide reparation to the community; improve social attitudes and skills and improve 
interaction between offenders and the public.’291 The Institute would add that they are also punitive 
and so a community service order can condemn and censure the crime by inflicting a deserved 
response as well seeking reparation and desistance from crime. An indication of effectiveness can be 
assessed by completion rates and reconviction rates. Justice Department annual reports show that 
completion rates were consistently high from 2002-2006 although the completion rate has dropped in 
the last financial year from 90 per cent in 2005-2006 to 81 per cent in 2006-2007.292 The Tasmanian 
rate compares favourably with other jurisdictions.293 An audit of community service orders was 
conducted in 2002 in Tasmania.294 It reported that cases of non-attendance were promptly reported to 
the Community Corrections Services. Together with good completion rates this supports the general 
view of respondents that community service orders are a credible sentencing option.  
                                                
289  Submissions of the Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, Tasmania Police, Bob Hamilton, Community Corrections 
Hobart. 
290  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, submission; Magistrate Dixon (personal communication, October 2007). 
291  Tasmanian Department of Justice (2007), above n 11, 46. 
292  Ibid, table 9.11., 47. 
293  The Justice Department’s submission reported that the Tasmanian rate of 90.3 per cent in 2000-2001 compared with 66.6 
per cent for Australia as a whole. In New South Wales, for example, the annual average successful completion rate was 
76.5 per cent in 2003-2004: I Potas, S Eyland and J Munro (2005) ‘Successful Completion Rates for Supervised 
Sentencing Options’ Sentencing Trends and Issues, Number 33 (Judicial Commission of New South Wales), 5.  
294  Tasmanian Audit Office (2002), above n 268. However, it was found that the procedures for handling warnings and 
breach were not uniform around the State. A number of other problems with management of orders were highlighted in 
the 2002 audit. These included that the way in which educational and personal development programs were credited was 
not uniform around the State, some orders being made without assessment input from CCS and a question-mark over the 
time taken to complete CSOs in some cases. 
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3.7.12 The lack of availability of reconviction data by order type was highlighted in the Auditor’s 
report in 2002. This has still not been remedied. However, some data is available from Bartels’ study 
for community service orders imposed in the Supreme Court. CSOs in the Supreme Court account for 
about 10 per cent of community service orders imposed annually. Bartels’ study found that 52 per cent 
of offenders who received a non-custodial sentence were reconvicted. Those on community service 
alone performed better than probation alone or community service order and probation, probably due 
to selection effects. The reconviction rate for wholly suspended sentences combined with community 
service orders was 50 per cent, whereas the rate for all wholly suspended sentences was 42 per cent 
and for unsuspended sentences it was 62 per cent. A recent UK Home Office study showed that taking 
into account age, gender, offence type and criminal history, in the 2004 cohort community punishment 
order disposals (community service orders) and community punishment rehabilitation orders 
(community services orders and probation combined) were associated with lower rates of re-offending 
than imprisonment whereas drug testing and treatment orders and probation orders were associated 
with higher rates than imprisonment. However, the authors caution against reading too much into these 
findings because of the failure of the study to control for other characteristics related to re-
offending.295 In other words, while these finding are interesting, they cannot be relied upon to assert 
that community service orders (community punishment orders) work better than custodial or other 
disposals. There is some evidence that the quality of the community service experience for offenders 
may be associated with reductions in recidivism.296 McIvor’s research on community service in 
Scotland found that reconviction rates were lower among offenders who believed community service 
to be worthwhile, with more positive experiences being associated by high levels of contact with the 
beneficiaries, opportunities to acquire new skills and work that is seen as having some intrinsic value 
for the recipients.297 
A generic community order?  
3.7.13 The Institute has considered whether to recommend adopting a generic community sentence 
with a menu of options including compulsory unpaid work, supervision by a probation officer, 
attendance at programs etc. Courts in Tasmania appear to appreciate the flexibility of being able to 
combine community service orders with other sentencing options such as probation orders. One 
disadvantage of doing so is that if an offender breaches this sentence they are likely to be in breach of 
both orders. While having a generic community sentence would avoid this and could also encourage 
judges and magistrates to tailor the sentence to the individual offender’s needs in a constructive way, 
the Institute is of the view that a generic community sentence lacks clarity regarding the aims of the 
order. Rather than a generic community sentencing order the Institute favours a community service 
order with core requirements of unpaid work, attendance at educational or other programs and the 
option of additional conditions such as supervision. The Institute also recommends that attendance at a 
rehabilitation program for domestic violence offenders be made a possible condition. To assist in the 
task of selecting appropriate conditions, the Institute recommends that judicial officers be assisted in 
the task of selecting appropriate conditions by a community service assessment which includes an 
offender’s needs for supervision and programs, suitability for work and availability of the program. 
A broader sentencing option?  
3.7.14 The Institute sees merit in the argument that a community service order should be available 
instead of a minimum fine. The present situation in which there is confusion about whether a 
magistrate has the power to substitute community service for a minimum fine or imprisonment is 
clearly undesirable and the Institute recommends that this should be clarified by a legislative provision 
which makes it clear that this is permissible. This raises the question whether the requirement that a 
community service order can only be imposed for offences which are punishable by imprisonment 
                                                
295  Cunliffe and Shepherd (2007), above n 54, 12-13. 
296  Gill McIvor, ‘Reparative and Restorative Approaches’ in Anthony Bottoms, Sue Rex and Gwen Robinson (eds), 
Alternatives to Prison: Options for an Insecure Society (2004) 176. 
297  Ibid. 
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should be altered so that in cases of an impecunious offender a community service order can be 
ordered in the first instance. While there may be some force in the argument that for such offenders a 
community service order may be a less severe sanction than a fine, the Institute is of the view that such 
a provision would subvert the position of community service orders in the sentencing hierarchy and 
could lead to net-widening. If an offender lacks the means to pay a fine of a level appropriate to the 
severity of the offence, the amount of the fine should be reduced to a level that the offender can pay 
and this should be explained in the sentencing remarks. Alternatively, a conditional unsupervised 
release order under s 7(f) of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) should be imposed in lieu of a fine. This 
position may appear to sit rather uncomfortably with the last recommendation that in the case of an 
impecunious offender, the court may substitute a community service order for a minimum fine or 
imprisonment. However, in such a case, neither a fine less than the minimum nor a conditional 
supervised release order is available as a means of avoiding an unaffordable fine. And in any event the 
offence is imprisonable, so allowing the courts to substitute community service for a minimum fine 
does not subvert the position of a community service order as more severe than a fine. Finally, if there 
is an inconsistency it can be blamed on the need to avoid the injustice of mandatory penalties. 
3.7.15 The Institute also recommends that the New Zealand practice of remitting up to 10 per cent 
of the aggregate of the total of community service hours be further explored by the Justice 
Department. It should also be noted that rather more controversially, a recent amendment that came 
into effect in October 2007 provides that a penalty of up to 10 per cent may be imposed on an offender 
for poor performance.298  
A diversity of projects and programs 
3.7.16 While the Audit in 2002 did not find evidence of difficulties in finding suitable work projects 
or a lack of project supervisors,299 the experience of at least some lawyers is that in some areas work is 
not available for offenders.300 Two submissions stated that there is lack of diversity in the types of 
programs available.301 The submission of the Justice Department adverted to difficulties in sourcing 
placements. Henning’s study of community service orders in 1992-1993 found no evidence that 
offenders living in rural areas were disadvantaged in the assessment process for CSOs by a lack of 
available work,302 however, she did find that work is less likely to be available for women offenders, 
offenders with health problems and offenders with dependants. This was of concern because she also 
found that where community service work is not available there was an increased likelihood that the 
offender will receive a custodial sentence.303 It is not known whether the community service order 
scheme continues to operate in a discriminatory fashion. The Institute recommends that the Justice 
Department conduct a review of community service order projects to ensure that there is a diverse 
range of projects available in the different regions of Tasmania. Community service orders are a 
valuable sentencing option and their potential needs to be fully exploited. It may well be that more 
resources need to be put into the community service order scheme to address these issues. In 
reviewing community service orders, account should be taken of the Community Punishment 
Pathfinders Project in the UK which is testing a range of approaches to community punishment 
including skills accreditation, quality placements (based on McIvor’s research), pro-social modelling, 
use of combination orders and involvement of the voluntary sector.304  
                                                
298  Sentencing Act 2002 (NZ) s 66D. 
299  Tasmanian Audit Office (2002), above n 268, 35-36, 42-44. 
300  Submission of Craig Mackie, and personal communication, October 2007. 
301  Submissions of Craig Mackie and John Heathcote, Probation Officer. 
302  Henning (1997), above n 267, 302. 
303  Ibid, 313. 
304  Preliminary results suggested projects focussed on skills accreditation and pro-social modelling were promising: Sue Rex 
et al, What’s Promising in Community Service: Implementation of Seven Pathfinder Projects, Home Office Findings No 
231 (2004). 
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Recommendations 
32. The Institute does not recommend that a generic community sentence should replace community 
service orders and probation orders, (3.7.13) however, it does recommend that s 28 of the Sentencing 
Act 1997 (Tas) be amended so that supervision or attendance at a ‘rehabilitation program’ for domestic 
violence offenders is made available as an optional condition of a community service order. (3.7.13) 
33. The Institute recommends that s 8(2)(a) and (b) (which allow a CSO to be combined with a 
probation order or a rehabilitation order) be omitted. (3.7.13). This conforms with the Institute’s view 
that sanction stacking is undesirable, but there should be flexibility in relation to conditions of 
sentencing orders (see above para 3.3.36). 
34. The Institute recommends that community service order assessments assess an offender’s need for 
supervision and programs, suitability for work and availability of programs. (3.7.13) 
35. The Institute recommends that the Part 6 (Fines) of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) be amended to 
include the power to impose a community service order where the penalty prescribed is a mandatory 
minimum fine or imprisonment. (3.7.14) 
36. The Institute does not recommend that the power to impose a community service order be 
broadened so it is available for offences that are not punishable by imprisonment. If an offender 
cannot pay a fine, the judicial officer should impose a conditional release order. (3.7.14) 
37. The Institute also recommends that the New Zealand practice of remitting up to 10 per cent of the 
aggregate of the total of community service hours be further explored by the Justice Department. 
(3.7.15) 
38. The Institute recommends that the Justice Department conduct a review of the community service 
order scheme305 to ensure the availability of adequate resources to provide projects in country areas, a 
diversity of projects so that women and others with dependants, those with health problems and 
disabilities have suitable work and that promising findings from projects such as the UK’s Pathfinder 
project can be implemented in this state. (3.7.16) 
3.8 Probation orders 
3.8.1 A probation order is a sentence which requires an offender to be under the supervision of a 
probation officer and to obey the reasonable directions of that officer. It is a sentencing option that has 
been available to the courts in Tasmania since 1934. In the sentencing hierarchy a probation order is 
less severe than a community service order but more serious than a fine.306 There are a number of core 
conditions which are automatically included in a probation order. They include that during the period 
of probation the offender must not commit any offence punishable by imprisonment; during the period 
of probation the offender must report as required to the supervising officer and must notify the officer 
of a change of address or employment.307 Probation orders may be tailored to the needs of a particular 
offender by the inclusion of special conditions. Examples of such conditions are conditions which 
require the offender to undergo treatment for alcohol or drug dependence; submit to medical or 
psychiatric treatment or a requirement to attend educational, health or personal programs.308 The 
period of probation must not exceed three years. The purpose of supervision is  
                                                
305  The Institute understands that such a review is now underway. 
306  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 7(d).  
307  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 37(1). 
308  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 37(2).  
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to minimise the risk of offending and its effect on the community by encouraging offenders 
to achieve responsible behaviour through the administration and enforcement of orders and 
conditions imposed by the courts… The focus is on offending behaviour, and referral to 
programs aimed at improving social attitudes and personal circumstances…309 
3.8.2 A probation order will be breached if an offender fails without reasonable excuse to comply 
with a condition of the order or if he or she assaults or uses abusive language to a probation officer. 
Breach is a separate offence for which the offender may be fined or imprisoned. Additionally, the 
court may confirm or extend the order, vary a condition or cancel the order and re-sentence the 
offender for the original offence.310 
3.8.3 Probation orders (as the most serious sanction imposed) represent only about one per cent of 
sanctions.311 However, they may be used in combination with more serious sanctions such as 
community service orders and suspended sentences. In the Supreme Court almost 90 per cent of 
probation orders are combined with some other penalty, usually a community service order or a 
wholly suspended sentence.312 In the Magistrates Court more than 50 per cent or probation orders are 
combined with a more serious penalty, usually community service or a wholly suspended sentence.313 
The Wing Committee noted that in Tasmania, in common with other Australian jurisdictions, the use 
of probation orders is declining. This was explained as being in part due to an increase in the use of 
community service orders.314 The table below shows the number of probation orders imposed since 
1998-1999 as well as the numbers completed and revoked or breached. 
Table 11: Probation order made and completed, 1998-99 to 2006-07 
 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 
Number of orders 
imposed 618 589 495 569 384 528 571 653 688 
Number of orders 
completed 598 558 482 548 371 508 506 528 676 
Percentage of orders 
completed 86 94 97 96 97 96 97 96 97 
Number 
revoked/cancelled 20 31 13 21 13 20 14 12 19 
Source: Department of Justice Annual Reports 
3.8.4 Table 11 shows the number of probation orders declined from 1998-1999 to 2002-2003 with 
a low of 384 orders made in 2002-2003. Thereafter the numbers have increased, with numbers in the 
last two years exceeding the number in 1998-1999. However, the number of orders is still 
considerably below the high point in 1995-1996 when close to 800 orders were made. It is important 
to note that in the majority of cases probation orders are now combined with a more severe sanction 
such as a wholly suspended sentence or a community service order.  
Responses to the Issues Paper 
3.8.5 The Institute received a number of useful submissions in relation to probation orders. The 
Issues paper asked the following questions: 
• Are probation orders being used appropriately by the courts? 
                                                
309  Tasmanian Department of Justice, Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003) 61; the most recent report contains a shorter version 
referring only to the minimising the risk of reoffending and its effect on the community. 
310  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 42. 
311  In the Supreme Court from 2001-2006 they accounted for just .8 per cent of orders (Institute’s data collected from 
Supreme Court Sentencing database) in the Magistrates Court in 2003-2004 they accounted for 1.02 per cent.  
312  Based on sentencing data for 2001-2006.  
313  Based on Bartels’ data for 2003-2004.  
314  Wing Committee Report (1999), above n 83, 120. 
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• Is it an appropriate, logical, credible and effective sentencing option? 
• Are conditions used appropriately? 
• Is there a need to restructure orders in any way? 
• Is there a need for a specialised order for offenders convicted of drug and drug-related offences? 
• Are completion rates satisfactory? 
• Are breach procedures satisfactory? 
• Are the resources available to support probation orders adequate? 
3.8.6 The decline in the use of probation orders was addressed by a number of respondents. The 
Justice Department hypothesised that custodial sentences have been substituted for both probation and 
community service orders. The decline in use was explained by one probation officer as a consequence 
of a failure to prosecute breaches: 
The pity of the matter is that over the years some probation officers did not prosecute 
breaches of conditions because they ignored the reality of what is written on the probation 
order and focussed only on the rehabilitation side of the probation. I think this is one reason 
for the lessening use of probation by magistrates – a loss of faith in its administration by 
community corrections. Breaching has been paid more attention in recent years but a 
reputation is hard to regain once lost.315 
3.8.7 In his view, probation does have a punitive element in the requirement to be of good 
behaviour but this is lost if breaches are not prosecuted. Another explanation suggested for declining 
use was: 
the custom that has grown of linking it with other sentences such as community service 
orders and suspended sentences, which I think diminishes the impact of a probation order. 
In my opinion probation would be better used as a stand alone penalty. 
3.8.8 Community Corrections officers in Launceston considered that probation was not used 
enough as a stand-alone sanction because it was not regarded by judges and magistrates as sufficiently 
harsh. Echoing the views of the probation officer quoted above, the suggested explanation for the 
perception that it was not harsh enough was probation officers’ focus on assistance to the offender at 
the expense of probation’s punitive element.316 Another view was that the use of a risk assessment tool 
meant that probation orders were only recommended for high/medium risk offenders. It was suggested 
that the sentencing hierarchy needs to be rethought because a community service order is not 
necessarily more serious than probation which is recommended for more serious risks.317 As one 
probation officer commented, an offender can sometimes get a CSO over and done with very quickly, 
whereas probation is dragged out for a long time and can be a greater infringement on liberty.318 
3.8.9 A number of respondents saw no need for a restructuring of orders.319 However, Tasmania 
Police favoured a generic community sentencing order with a menu of options.320 
                                                
315  J Heathcote, submission, 1. 
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317  Ibid. 
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3.8.10 A recurring theme in the submissions in relation to probation was the lack of resources to 
provide suitable programs for offenders on probation. Community corrections officers in the north-
west of the State described the allocated resources for such programs as ‘miserable’ and officers in 
Hobart also emphasised the need for more resources for programs and referral options.321 A lack of 
resources was also mentioned in submissions by Legal Aid Tasmania and by Craig Mackie. The latter 
said: 
Frequently probation orders have specific conditions attached to target populations such as 
drug and alcohol issues, gambling, mental health, financial budgeting, anger management 
etc. Because of a lack of resourcing, this is frequently not followed up. 
3.8.11 He also referred to the failure of community corrections to act on breaches, stating that 
prosecution was so rare as to be almost unknown. He submitted that as a priority probation and 
community service should be adequately funded and no new sentencing options introduced until this 
happened. 
3.8.12 On the issue of drug and alcohol treatment, Tasmania Police favoured specialised orders 
rather than utilising conditions of a probation order. This issue has been overtaken by new 
developments funded by the Commonwealth Government and will be considered separately below. 
The Institute’s views 
3.8.13 The Institute has rejected the idea of a generic community sentencing order in favour of 
preserving the distinct identity of different community sentencing options including probation orders. 
However, it has recommended that supervision by a probation officer be an optional condition of 
wholly suspended sentences, community service orders and a core condition of home detention. As a 
distinct sentencing option in its own right, the probation order has waned in popularity and the 
Institute sees a real need to revitalise it as a credible stand-alone sentencing option. There is a 
perception, at least, that there are insufficient resources to provide the kinds of assistance an offender 
requires to address their ‘criminogenic needs’ and to support rehabilitation and that breach action is 
rarely taken with offenders able to abuse this sentencing order.322 The Institute is aware that recurrent 
funding for community corrections in the 2007-2008 budget has increased by $650,000 and this will 
enable additional staff to be employed and new programs offered.323 However, offender to staff ratios 
will remain high and despite the increase in the number of probation orders made in the last four years, 
in the Institute’s view, the probation order appears to have lost its impact as a plausible stand-alone 
alternative to imprisonment.  
3.8.14 The Justice Department’s information on breach action shows breach action resulting in 
revocation is rare (see Table 11 above). In 2005-2006 just 12 orders were revoked or cancelled. This 
represents less than two per cent of orders made in that year. In comparison, a study of supervised 
bonds in New South Wales has shown a revocation rate of 11 per cent.324 Breach rates cannot be taken 
as a measure of success, particularly for sanctions such as probation where levels of intensity and 
strictness of supervision are low. On the contrary, breach rates in the order of two per cent suggest that 
breaches may not be appropriately followed-up. In the absence of a thorough breach study is it not 
known whether this is the case. There are a number of alternative explanations. It could be that it is a 
better strategy to take breach action only as a last resort with probation officers working with 
offenders to motivate them to reduce their risk of re-offending and complete their orders successfully. 
Or it could be that community corrections initiate breach proceedings appropriately but in many cases 
the order is simply confirmed and there is no additional penalty. Feed-back from community 
corrections suggested that community corrections is clear about its responsibilities to take breach 
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action. However, magistrates vary in their response to breach proceedings.325 Anecdotally, it was said 
that some magistrates appear to be of the view that it is inappropriate to impose a more severe penalty 
than they did in the first place despite the fact they have a power to fine or imprison for breach and in 
addition to resentencing the offender.326 Others give quite significant penalties in breach cases. The 
Institute recommends that if probation orders are to be perceived as an effective sentencing option, 
orders must be rigorously monitored, action must be taken in respect of breach when appropriate and a 
consistent approach adopted to breach by the courts. Lax enforcement for whatever reason undermines 
the credibility of orders. The Institute recommends that the Justice Department conduct a breach study 
to investigate the incidence of breach of orders and the outcomes of breach proceedings. To ensure the 
response to breaches of orders is consistent, fair and firm, it is recommended that guidelines be created 
for probation officers and judges and magistrates. 
How effective is probation as a sentencing option? 
3.8.15 While reconvictions studies have their drawbacks, such studies may shed more light on the 
effectiveness of probation than revocation. A recent English study has shown that community 
rehabilitation orders (in effect renamed probation orders) are associated with higher rates of re-
offending than prison.327 However, the author’s caveat must be emphasised – not all factors that 
influence re-offending were controlled for.328 Weatherburn has recently conducted a study of the 
effectiveness of supervision in New South Wales by comparing offenders placed upon supervised 
bonds with offenders placed on bonds without supervision in terms of the proportion re-offending and 
time to first offence.329 ‘Propensity Score Matching’ was used to control for differences in the two 
groups. He found offenders who were supervised were no less likely to re-offend and took no longer to 
re-offend than offenders who are unsupervised. A possible explanation which is currently being 
explored is that the level of supervision and/or treatment support actually provided to supervised 
offenders is inadequate.330  
3.8.16 One of the problems of a focus on crude reconviction rates is that they may obscure possible 
interaction effects, in other words, the fact that probation supervision may be effective for a particular 
type of offender but not for all offenders. Moreover, combining all forms of supervision together in 
one group may obscure differences in outcome for different degrees of supervision or surveillance and 
different programs that offenders may be referred to in the course of supervision. As noted above (see 
para 3.8.15) overseas research suggests that supervision involving increased surveillance and 
monitoring has no effect on the risk of re-offending.331 However, when offenders receive treatment in 
addition to the increased surveillance and control, intensive supervised probation does have an impact. 
In their review of the research evidence, Aos et al found that while intensive supervision surveillance 
oriented programs had no impact on crime outcomes, when combined with treatment oriented 
programs, intensive supervision reduced crime outcomes on average by 16.7 per cent.332 Moreover, a 
number of offending behaviour programs for offenders on probation have been found to be effective 
including cognitive behavioural therapies,333 sex offender treatment using cognitive behavioural 
treatment methods,334 and employment training and job assistance in the community.335 Relying upon 
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systematic research reviews, commentators have listed the characteristics of successful programs336 
and the types of skills which are effective in individual supervision and case management.337 While the 
international evidence suggests there is reason to be optimistic about the possibilities of constructive 
interventions in the lives of offenders, the English experience suggests that some caution is needed. In 
the enthusiasm to embrace the ‘What Works’ movement, programs were rolled out on a large scale 
before they were properly evaluated and there were problems with staffing and with targeting the 
programs appropriately to offenders’ needs.338  
3.8.17 The Institute is aware that since 2002, Community Corrections have offered a cognitive 
behavioural program for offenders serving community-based sentences which is called ‘Offending is 
Not the Only Choice’.339 The program targets moderate to high-risk offenders. It aims to provide 
offenders with skills to consider the impact of their offending on themselves and others and to think 
and behave in ways that are generally accepted in the community.340 This program will be rolled out 
state-wide. Community Correction also offers a family violence intervention program, which is 
delivered to offenders who receive a rehabilitation program order for a family violence offence (see 
para 3.11.2) and a program called ‘Substance Abuse is Not the Only Choice’ which is delivered as part 
of the Court Mandated Diversion Project (see para 3.11.3). Community Corrections have plans to offer 
a program targeting adult offenders convicted of more than one drink driving offence within a five-
year period. It is an educational and therapeutic program that addresses issues such as the 
consequences of drink driving, the effects of alcohol on driving, managing drinking situations, 
alternative behaviours and relapse prevention. 
3.8.18 Based on systematic research reviews, there is now a wealth of literature available on the 
effectiveness of a wide range of rehabilitative programs and effective case management and 
practitioner skills in supervision. If probation is to regain its reputation as a credible sentencing option, 
judges and magistrates need to have confidence that it can be effective. The Institute recommends that 
a thorough review be undertaken to determine a range of evidence-based programs that can be made 
available for offenders to address both their criminogenic needs and utilise their strengths.341 These 
programs should be carefully rolled-out, evaluated and well publicised in an effort to revive probation 
as an independent sentencing measure. In addition to a focus on programs, there should be a focus on 
the broader concept of human services in probation supervision.342 It is likely that Community 
Corrections are well aware of evidence-based options which could be usefully offered. It is less clear 
whether they are adequately funded to deliver them. 
3.8.19 International research reveals another possibility for improving the confidence of judicial 
officers in the probation. Evaluations of drug courts and other problem solving courts have shown the 
potential of greater positive involvement by sentencers in the encouragement and maintenance of 
change. Under the banner or therapeutic jurisprudence, drug courts have pioneered the concept of the 
judicial officer as an agent of rehabilitation by the provision of ongoing supervision by the court. 
While this has resource and cost implications it has considerable potential to both enhance the 
perception of probation orders and to improve outcomes for offenders. The Institute recommends that 
this be explored for particular categories of offenders. It is aware that in Hobart, the Magistrates Court 
runs a mental health list each month and, inspired by the tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence, bail 
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conditions are used to assist offenders to meet their treatment requirements. However, where longer-
term treatment is required, sentencing options are more appropriate than bail conditions. 
3.8.20 The Institute has given some thought to whether the place of probation in the sentencing 
hierarchy should be altered as suggested in some submissions. This would have the advantage of 
underlining the seriousness of the order. It is generally accepted that community service is a more 
severe sanction than probation. Three reasons support this: first, a community service order can only 
be imposed if the offence is punishable by imprisonment; secondly, in the list of orders in s 7 of the 
Sentencing Act it appears below imprisonment and thirdly, it is a more obviously punitive order than 
probation. The Institute recognises that in some cases a probation order of 18 months is likely to be 
more onerous than a community service order of 14 hours. However, it does not see the need to re-
order the list of sanctions in the Act to indicate that probation is a more severe sanction than 
community service. Whilst in general a community service order is regarded as a more severe penalty 
than probation and probation as more severe than a fine, in some cases a heavy fine may be more 
severe than either community service or probation and in some cases probation will be more onerous 
than community service.  
3.8.21 Another way to resuscitate the probation order would be to rename it as a community 
rehabilitation order, as was done in the UK by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. However, such a change 
would be merely window dressing and is not supported by the Institute.  
Recommendations 
39. The Institute does not recommend a generic community sentencing order for the reasons outlined 
in para 3.8.13. (and see 3.7.13) 
40. The Institute does not recommend altering the place of probation orders in the hierarchy of 
sanctions to indicate that it is a more serious sanction than a community service order for the reasons 
given in para 3.8.20. 
41. In the Institute’s view there are two basic problems with probation orders that need to be 
addressed. First, there is a need to restore confidence in probation orders as an independent sentencing 
option (as evidenced by the fact that 90 per cent of probation orders in the Supreme Court and more 
than 50 per cent of orders in the Magistrates Court are combined with a more serious penalty) and 
secondly, there is the lack of resources devoted to community corrections. To help restore the 
reputation of probation orders as a credible independent sentencing option, the Institute recommends: 
•  that the Justice Department conduct a breach study of probation orders to inform guidance for 
probation and judicial officers in relation to breach proceedings. 
• that a review be conducted to determine a range of evidence-based programs for introduction in 
Tasmania to enhance the potential of probation to reduce recidivism and encourage desistance 
and that resources be made available to offer these programs to appropriately targeted offenders. 
• that such programs be supported by proper assessment, motivation, case-management and 
reinforcement of learning to follow-up and support program effects. 
• that the possibility of ongoing supervision by the court be considered for certain categories of 
offenders on probation orders. 
3.9 Fines 
3.9.1 The fine is the most frequently used penalty. It is used predominantly in relation to summary 
offences, but it is also available as a sanction against those convicted of indictable offences. In the 
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sentencing hierarchy a fine is less severe than a probation order. In the Magistrates Court they account 
for 69 per cent of penalties imposed, far exceeding wholly suspended sentences (the next most 
common sanction).343 In the Supreme Court between 2001-2006 fines accounted for 3.6 per cent of 
penalties imposed.  
3.9.2 In 1987 a new system of specifying fines in penalty provisions was introduced. Rather than 
specifying the fine in dollar terms, fines were changed to penalty units and the value of a penalty unit 
was stated in s 4 of the Penalty Units and Other Penalties Act 1987 (Tas). The advantage was said to 
be that the eroding effect of inflation on fine penalty provisions could be dealt with by a single 
amendment. This was not merely a revenue producing argument. The effects of inflation on fines may 
not only reduce their deterrent efficacy but could also discourage the use of fines if the maxima were 
perceived to be too low. The worth of a penalty unit remained as it was in 1987 at $100 until October 
2007 when it was increased to $120 and an indexation formula was inserted into the Act to take effect 
from 1 July 2008.344 
3.9.3 As a sentencing option the fine has many advantages: it produces revenue; it is flexible in the 
sense that it can be easily adjusted to gravity, culpability and means; it is straightforwardly punitive 
and it is said to be effective as it seems to be followed by fewer reconvictions than other penalties.345 
The Issues Paper ascertained that there are three problems with the fine that need to be addressed. 
First, there is no power in Tasmania to impose a fine without recording a conviction; secondly, the 
issue of fine enforcement; and thirdly, the problem of the unequal impact of fines. 
Fine without conviction 
3.9.4 A fine cannot be imposed unless a conviction is recorded.346 This is by no means the position 
in all jurisdictions. In Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and South Australia courts have the 
power to fine with or without recording a conviction.347 The Wing Committee recommended that 
courts be empowered to impose a fine without recording a conviction, noting that this issue had been 
raised by a number of magistrates. It was argued that in some cases a fine may well be appropriate but 
recording a conviction may be undesirable because of its impact on the employment prospects of an 
offender.  
Responses to the Issues Paper 
3.9.5 Only five submissions addressed the issue of the power to fine without recording conviction. 
Three submissions supported the proposition that courts should be empowered to fine an offender 
without recording a conviction348 and two opposed the idea. One respondent regarded ‘no conviction 
recorded’ as a farce as the police record the finding of guilt anyway.349 The Legal Aid Commission of 
Tasmania opposed giving the courts a discretion to convict or not on the grounds that a person who 
accepts an infringement notice has a conviction recorded.  
The Institute’s view 
3.9.6 The absence of a discretion to fine without a conviction seems to be an ongoing concern of 
magistrates. A number of them mentioned it in Bartels’ interviews with them in relation to suspended 
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348  Tasmania Police, submission, 4; Craig Mackie, submission; WD Dunstan, submission. 
349  John Heathcote, probation officer, submission. 
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sentences.350 The Institute considers courts should have a discretion to fine without recording a 
conviction. It seems quite anomalous that courts can make a probation order without recording a 
conviction but have no such power in relation to fines. It is acknowledged, as one respondent to the 
Issues Paper pointed out, that if no conviction is recorded, the police will still record that the person 
has been found guilty of an offence. But in legal terms the offender will not have a criminal 
conviction, and in job or licence applications will not be required to disclose the offence as a 
conviction. While a person who accepts an infringement notice does usually incur a conviction, the 
conviction is for an offence which is generally viewed as not ‘truly criminal’ and is unlikely to impact 
on personal integrity, character or job prospects. The Institute does not regard an automatic conviction 
for acceptance of an infringement notice as sufficient reason to deny the courts a discretion to decline 
to convict when imposing a fine. 
Fine default 
3.9.7 A common difficulty with fines is enforcement. Up to 50 per cent of court fines are unpaid in 
Tasmania.351 As at 31 March 2007, $32.1M was due and payable to the Consolidated Revenue Fund 
from unpaid court fines and $1.4M from infringement notices.352 Approximately 3000 fine defaulters 
are brought back to court each year.353 Clearly fine enforcement is an expensive and resource-intensive 
process. Moreover, failure to pay fines can undermine the credibility of the criminal justice system. If 
offenders are able to avoid payment they may be less deterred and come to believe they can commit 
further offences with impunity. Courts may also lose faith in fines if it comes to be known that fines 
are very often unmet. 
3.9.8 Prior to 28 April 2008, if an offender failed to pay a fine ordered by the court, a warrant of 
apprehension issued to bring the offender before the court. The same happened if an infringement 
notice was unpaid, the matter had gone to court and the court ordered fine remained unpaid. A 
magistrate, faced with an offender brought to court for non-payment of a fine, had four alternatives: a 
community service order; a direction that civil proceedings be taken, a warrant of commitment for a 
term of imprisonment or a suspended committal order.354 For an offender who was committed to 
prison for fine default, the amount in respect of which the warrant was issued was reduced by $100 for 
each day served in prison.355 The number of fine defaulters has fluctuated in recent years from 192 in 
1997-1998 to 445 in 2000-2001356 and down to 57 in the ‘12 months to 2007’.357 Both the level of 
outstanding fines and the numbers imprisoned for fine default is unsatisfactory.  
3.9.9 Fine enforcement was an issue that was addressed in a number of submissions to the 
Institute. However, it is an issue that the government has in hand and the Monetary Penalties 
Enforcement Project has been on the agenda since at least 2002.358 In 2005 the Monetary Penalties 
Enforcement Act 2005 (Tas) was passed and was assented to on 9 December 2005. It commenced on 
28 April 2008. The scheme of the Act is that when a fine is imposed by the court or an infringement 
notice issued, a new statutory officer, the Director, Monetary Penalties Enforcement Service (MPES) 
will, on the application of an offender, have the power to vary the payment period, order payment by 
instalments or convert the fine to a monetary penalty community service order (MPCSO).359 If a 
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person is in extreme hardship and is unable to undertake a MPCSO, the Director has the power to 
deem the fine uncollectible.360 Failure to pay a fine or infringement notice will result in the Director 
issuing an enforcement order which gives the defaulting offender the option of paying the fine in full, 
entering into an agreement to pay by instalments or applying to convert the amount to a MPCSO.361 If 
the offender fails to exercise any of these options the Director will have a range of sanctions to enforce 
payment without further recourse to the courts including suspension of the offender’s driver licence, 
vehicle registration or prescribed licence (for example a firearms licence);362 civil enforcement 
including a garnishee-type order, redirection of money from an offender’s bank account, seizure and 
sale of the offender’s possessions or registration of a charge on a title to land.363 The Director also has 
the power to apply to a court for the offender to be imprisoned pursuant to a commitment order.364  
Driving sanctions for fine default 
3.9.10 Licence sanctions for fine default have an instinctive appeal and many jurisdictions have 
introduced them to improve fine recovery.365 Advantages include administrative ease, relative 
cheapness and provision of an acceptable alternative to imprisonment for fine default.366 It has been 
argued that they are an effective means of encouraging payment of fines.367 However, the New South 
Wales and Western Australian experience reveals real problems with this method of fine enforcement. 
In its Interim Report, the New South Wales Sentencing Council identified the issue of driver licence 
sanctions for fine default as a matter of ‘grave concern’.368 A survey of magistrates, public 
consultations and submissions to the Council warned that these sanctions interfere with employment, 
particularly in rural areas where driving may be necessary to keep a job. The consequence is 
secondary offending – people are being convicted for driving offences attributable to licence sanctions 
imposed for fine and penalty default, in many instances where the fine for an offence is unrelated to 
the purpose of ensuring road safety. Concern was also expressed to the Council that licence suspension 
for fine default confused the ‘Road Safety’ message. Licence sanctions for non-driving related 
offences ‘effectively makes people rethink their commitment and adherence to the road rules. The 
system actually subverts the road safety message’.369  
3.9.11 A study in Western Australia has shown that licence sanctions for fine default results in a 
significant increase in the total rate of licence disqualification.370 Between 1995 and 2003, the rate of 
licence disqualification increased in that State by 60 per cent, due largely to increases in fine 
suspensions. Ferrante found fine suspension comprised 84 per cent of all disqualifications, and 45 per 
cent of licence disqualifications were for reasons unrelated to road traffic law enforcement. This 
highlights the issue of secondary offending. Various studies have estimated the proportion of 
disqualified drivers who drive illegally ranges from 25 per cent to 75 per cent.371 Ferrante found that 
licence disqualification for non-payment of fines was seen as an “unfair act committed against those 
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who could least afford the consequences of such action’.372 Such a perception by drivers is not 
conducive to compliance. The consequence of non-compliance if they are caught will be further 
sanctions – in some cases, imprisonment.373 The issue of secondary offending has been explored by the 
New South Wales Sentencing Council. It was speculated that the significant increase in the prevalence 
of offences of driving while disqualified and driving while suspended in the decade between 1992-
2002 was attributable to the use of licence sanctions for fine default.374 This was confirmed by Road 
and Traffic Authority New South Wales data which showed secondary offending has indeed increased. 
Of the almost 108,000 licences suspended for fine or penalty default in the 12 months to 30 June 2005, 
approximately 2.5 per cent (over 2,750 people) were subsequently convicted for driving while 
suspended and of these over 10 per cent went on to be convicted of driving while disqualified.375 
While it is not known how many were imprisoned for those offences, the evidence of secondary 
offending is clear. 
Responses to the Issues Paper  
3.9.12 The Issues Paper asked the question should cancellation of driver licences and vehicle 
registration be introduced as alternative sanctions for fine default. Responses were divided. 
Community Corrections in Hobart and Devonport were strongly opposed to the idea. In his 
submission, John Heathcote, a probation officer, rejected the suggestion on the grounds that it would 
impose too heavily on the poor. On the other hand, a number of submissions were supportive of using 
licence disqualification and cancellation of vehicle registration as a sanction for fine default.376 
The Institute’s view 
3.9.13 New South Wales and Western Australia have used licence and registration cancellation as a 
sanction for fine default for non-traffic offences for over a decade. The Institute shares the concerns of 
the New South Wales Sentencing Council about the use of these sanctions. It is inevitable that their 
introduction will promote the use of unregistered vehicles and increase the incidence of driving while 
disqualified. There is a real danger that fine defaulters may end up in prison not for fine default as 
such, but as a consequence of continuing to drive after licence suspension for fine default. If 
implemented, it is likely that licence suspension will disguise the true rate of imprisonment for what is 
really fine default. Queensland did follow the lead of other states in invoking these sanctions for fine 
default because of similar concerns. This measure has the potential to cause real hardship to certain 
groups of people, such as the young, the disadvantaged and people from rural areas where access to 
public transport is limited. The Institute therefore recommends that the provisions in the Monetary 
Penalties Enforcement Act 2005 (Tas) that allow the Director of MPES to impose the sanctions of 
suspension of driver licences and car registration for fine default be repealed.  
The problem of unequal impact: day fines or unit fines 
3.9.14 In imposing a fine, a court must determine the level of fine that reflects the seriousness of the 
offence and then make an appropriate adjustment downwards if the offender is unable to pay. There is 
no power in Tasmania to increase a fine on the grounds of the affluence of the offender. In the case of 
a mandatory minimum fine there is no discretion to reduce the amount of the fine below the minimum. 
The new Monetary Penalties Enforcement Scheme seeks to address the problems of offenders who are 
unable to pay fines by allowing offenders to seek additional time to pay, to apply to convert the fine to 
a MPCSO or even to apply for exemption from payment in cases of extreme hardship. However, the 
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fact remains that the fine disadvantages those who lack financial resources. Inability to pay may result 
in an offender incurring a community service order which is generally regarded as a harsher sanction 
than a fine. If a fine is the appropriate penalty but the offender lacks the means to pay it, the proper 
course is to move down the penalty scale and impose a conditional discharge order rather than up the 
scale and impose a community service order. This does not always happen and cannot happen in the 
case of a mandatory minimum fine. Since a fine cannot be increased in the case of an offender with 
substantial financial resources, the fine has unequal impact on the affluent and the less so.  
3.9.15 From time to time the European idea of ‘day fines’ or ‘unit fines’ has been suggested as a 
means of addressing the principles of equality before the law and equal impact. They are common in 
Western Europe and are used in some parts of the US. Day fines require that the amount of the fine be 
calculated as a proportion of the daily income of the offender. So instead of merely allowing means to 
reduce the amount of a fine, the fine will increase in proportion to the financial means of the offender. 
Day fines have been considered and rejected in Tasmania377 and have not yet found favour in any 
Australian jurisdiction although some reports have approved the concept, at least in theory.378 There 
are strong arguments in favour of day or unit fines in terms of greater justice in fining. Day fines mean 
that, in the case of drink driving offences for example, fines will have a more equal impact on 
offenders. It can also be argued that setting fairer fine levels should lead to the greater use of fines and 
less difficulty in enforcing them.379 In the United Kingdom unit fines were introduced in 1991 and then 
abandoned in 1993. It has been argued that the problems which led to the failure of unit fines were 
avoidable and they are still on the agenda in the UK with the Carter Review in 2003 recommending 
their re-introduction.380  
3.9.16 Another way of dealing with the issue of equal impact is to allow financial circumstances to 
increase as well as reduce the amount of the fine. This is now the position in the UK.381 It seems this 
has not been nearly as effective in dealing with the fairness problem as unit fines, with average fines 
increasing for the unemployed and decreasing for the employed following the abandonment of unit 
fines.382 
Responses to the Issues Paper 
3.9.17 A number of respondents supported the idea of introducing day fines in Tasmania.383 
Tasmania Police submitted: 
The capacity to increase a financial penalty according to the means of the offender will 
assist in ensuring that the same amount of ‘pain’ is felt by the wealthy as it is by the poor. 
… The proposed model involves establishing a monetary penalty determined at the level to 
be imposed on an unemployed family in rental accommodation and scaled up according to 
the economic status of the individual. The multiplying factor could be the value of the 
principal residence rather than income as the taxable income of the wealthy is often a poor 
guide to their means and few, despite their low formal income, are prepared to live in 
substandard accommodation. 
3.9.18 Don Wing MLC did not explicitly support the introduction of day fines but he expressed 
support for the idea of allowing financial circumstances to increase as well as reduce the amount of a 
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fine. The Chief Justice was particularly critical of the unfairness of ‘draconian’ mandatory minimum 
fines. 
The Institute’s view 
3.9.19 The Institute is attracted to the day or unit fine concept. It has the potential to achieve more 
and fairer fining as is demonstrated by the UK experience which saw an increase in the use of fines, 
the unemployed fined less and the employed more. Increasing the use of fines has the advantage of 
relieving pressure on community penalties. Imposing community orders rather than fines has the effect 
of taking offenders more quickly up-tariff with flow-on effects on the imprisonment rate. However, 
the Institute appreciates that there are difficulties in obtaining accurate information about an offender’s 
financial situation and the task of calculating the amount of a fine would be burdensome. This need 
not necessarily be done by the judicial officer who could determine the number of units and leave the 
value of the unit to be assessed administratively by the Director of MPES. Establishing a day fine 
scheme would be a complex task and could not be undertaken until the MPES is operational. As a 
long-term strategy the Institute recommends that the government set up a project to investigate how a 
day fine scheme could be introduced in Tasmania. The government has estimated that the new MPES 
will remove 40,000 minor criminal matters from the courts per annum,384 so cost savings could be used 
in making fining fairer. While reducing the number of fine defaulters imprisoned has been a 
consideration in implementing the MPES, the dominant purpose has been efficiency and cost 
benefits.385 Fairness should now be addressed. A problem underlying fine enforcement is the intrinsic 
unfairness of our fining system. ‘Until this is remedied, no amount of tinkering with enforcement and 
alternative sanctions for default will address the issue properly’.386 
3.9.20 In the meantime, the Institute recommends enactment of the English approach that requires 
courts to consider the offender’s financial circumstances whether this has the effect of increasing or 
reducing the amount of the fine. As in the UK, the courts should also be empowered to make a 
financial circumstances order, requiring the offender to provide the court with such financial details as 
it requests.387 
Recommendations 
42. The Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 7(e) be amended to empower 
courts to fine an offender without recording a conviction. (3.9.6) 
43. The Institute recommends that Monetary Penalties Enforcement Act 2005 (Tas) be amended to 
omit the power of the Director of the Monetary Penalties Enforcement System to order suspension of 
an offender’s driver’s licence or vehicle registration for failure to comply with an enforcement order 
issued for fine default. (3.9.13) 
44. The Institute recommends that the government establish a feasibility study to investigate how a 
day fine scheme could be introduced into Tasmania. (3.9.19) 
45. Pending the introduction of unit fines, the Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 
(Tas), Part 6 be amended to insert a new provision: 
(a) requiring a court to inquire into an offender’s financial circumstances before fixing the amount 
of a fine; 
(b) providing the amount of the fine should reflect the seriousness of the offence; 
                                                
384  Parliament of Tasmania (2005), above n 352. 
385  The total cost of MPES is estimated to be $6.6M: Parliament of Tasmania, Estimates Committee A, 20 June 2007. 
386  Kate Warner, ‘Sentencing Review 2006-2007’ (2007) 31 Criminal Law Journal 359 at 365.  
387  See Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) ss 162, 164. 
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(c) that in fixing the fine a court should take into account the offender’s financial circumstances; 
(d) empowering the court to make a financial circumstances order, requiring the offender to provide 
the court with such financial details as it requests. (3.9.20) 
3.10 Conditional release order (s 7(f) orders) 
3.10.1 Orders for the conditional release of offenders have their origins in the common law bond. In 
Tasmania the common law bond has been abolished by the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 101. Instead, 
courts may, with or without recording a conviction, adjourn proceedings for a period not exceeding 60 
months and, on the offender giving an undertaking with conditions attached, order the release of the 
offender.388 Core conditions include the requirement to be of ‘good behaviour’ and to appear before 
the court if called on to do so during the period of the adjournment. In the sentencing hierarchy a 
conditional release order is less serious than a fine. If the offender observes the conditions of the 
undertaking, then, at the expiry of the adjournment period or upon the further hearing of the adjourned 
proceedings, the offender will be discharged or the charge will be dismissed, depending on whether a 
conviction has or has not been recorded.389 Non-compliance with the conditions of the undertaking 
may expose the offender to being re-sentenced for the original offence as well as to being fined for the 
breach.390 However, breach of the conditions of the order is not made an offence.391 The imposition of 
conditions is not intended to provide the court with a supervisory function in relation to the offender. 
Rather it aims to encourage the offender’s good behaviour by placing him or her on notice that he or 
she may be required to reappear before the court at any time during the period of the order. However, 
additional conditions may relate to participation in education or rehabilitation programs.  
3.10.2 This sentencing measure is used for about nine per cent of offences in the Magistrates 
Court392 and, as one would expect, less often in the Supreme Court. From 2001-2006 conditional 
release orders accounted for 1.9 per cent of sentencing outcomes. No data was available on 
enforcement and breach of adjourned undertakings. 
Response to the Issues Paper 
3.10.3 Only three submissions addressed conditional release orders. Both the Chief Justice and 
Tasmania Police submitted that breach of this order should not be an offence and in consultations with 
Community Corrections Launceston it was suggested that conditional release orders should be used 
more, particularly instead of some fines. 
The Institute’s view 
3.10.4 The Institute agrees that breach of a conditional release order should not constitute an 
offence. This accords with the current position. However, it is unsatisfactory that there is no data on 
outcomes of these orders so the extent to which orders are breached or followed-up is unknown. If 
conditional release orders are never followed-up and breaches never dealt with, it is pointless having 
such orders. Offenders may as well be dealt with by an absolute discharge or by recording a conviction 
only. Like the wholly suspended sentence of imprisonment, a conditional release order is a ‘sword of 
Damocles’ type of order. If the threat is an empty one this is likely to undermine confidence in the 
order as a credible sentencing option and lead to a reduction in its use. A conditional release order is a 
                                                
388  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 7(f). 
389  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) ss 60-61. 
390  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) ss 60(4), 62(4)(c). 
391  Compare s 36 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) (breach of a CSO is an offence) and s 42 of the Sentencing Act 1997 
(Tas) (breach of a probation order is an offence). 
392  Bartels’ data for 2003-2004, above n 274. 
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useful sentencing option and is particularly useful in lieu of a fine when an offender lacks financial 
resources. In terms of its effectiveness there is some English evidence that they are an effective form 
of sentencing, attracting better than predicted reconviction rates.393 To ensure that conditional release 
orders are a credible sentencing option, the Institute recommends that the Justice Department follow-
up orders and report on breach rates annually. It also recommends that a reconviction study be done to 
ascertain the extent to which offenders have been of ‘good behaviour’ and the outcomes of these 
orders.  
Recommendations 
46. The Institute recommends: 
• that the Justice Department follow-up conditional release orders and report on breach rates 
annually; 
• that a reconviction study be done to ascertain the outcomes of conditional release orders. 
(3.10.4) 
3.11 Rehabilitation program orders and drug treatment 
orders 
3.11.1 Rehabilitation program orders for domestic violence offenders were not considered in the 
Institute’s Sentencing Issues Paper and drug treatment orders were not considered in any detail. The 
Institute makes no recommendations in relation to rehabilitation program orders but they are briefly 
discussed for the sake of completeness and to put the discussion of the other sentencing options in 
context.  
Rehabilitation program orders  
3.11.2 Rehabilitation program orders may be made by a court in respect of an offender convicted of 
a family violence offence.394 A ‘family violence offence’ is ‘any offence the commission of which 
constitutes family violence’.395 A rehabilitation program order requires an offender to participate in a 
structured treatment program designed to reduce the likelihood of re-offending.396 The program 
offered by Community Corrections is the Family Violence Offender Intervention Program (FVOIP). It 
is a cognitive behavioural group-based intervention that targets the prime criminogenic need of 
violence propensity while addressing a range of other criminogenic needs such as substance and 
alcohol abuse. Community Corrections undertakes a family violence offender’s suitability to 
undertake the FVOIP and their risk of re-offending. Contravention of a rehabilitation program order is 
an offence.397 These orders became available from 30 March 2005 as part of the Safe at Home 
program. No such orders have been made in the Supreme Court and the most recent Justice 
Department Annual Report does not record the number made in the Magistrates Court. 
                                                
393  Ashworth (2005), above n 3, 297 quoting the Halliday Report. 
394  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 7(ea).  
395  The definition in the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 4 refers to the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) which in s 3 defines a 
family violence offence. Family violence is defined in s 7. 
396  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 4.  
397  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 54A.  
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Drug treatment orders 
3.11.3 In the Issues Paper, one of the discussion points asked whether there was a need for a 
specialised order for offenders convicted of drug and drug-related offences. Few responses addressed 
this issue. The Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania submitted that it was not the lack of orders for 
offenders with drug issues that was the problem, it was the lack of programs for such offenders 
including residential programs.398 Craig Mackie stated that frequently probation orders have specific 
conditions attached to target problems such as drug an alcohol issues but because of a lack of 
resourcing this is frequently not followed up. He asked, ‘[w]hat possible use is a supervision order 
with a condition for alcohol and drug counselling and treatment for a person, when there are no 
facilities available to facilitate it?’399 He supported creating special drug treatment orders, but noted 
this would be worthless without a funding commitment. The Chief Justice thought it sufficient to 
attach a condition to a probation order for drug treatment but noted he was unaware how effective 
such conditions were. An audit conducted for the purposes of the Institute’s Drug Court Project 
demonstrated that available drug treatment services were inadequate to service a drug court.400  
3.11.4 A specialist drug court was suggested by the Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania.401 In 2005 
the Institute accepted a reference on the feasibility of a drug court pilot and embarked on the project 
with funding from the Law Foundation of Tasmania. However, when it became clear that the 
government had opted for a court mandated diversion project rather than a drug court, the results of 
the work were published as a research paper to help inform the development of the court mandated 
diversion model. An audit of drug treatment programs in the State was conducted for the Research 
Paper and concluded that existing programs were inadequate to service a drug court. Most services in 
Tasmania focus on brief interventions whereas offenders who receive a drug court order usually 
require a year or more of treatment. 
3.11.5 In mid 2007 the pilot program for drug offenders called Court Mandated Diversion (CMD) 
for drug offenders was introduced. The program is funded under the Commonwealth’s Illicit Drug 
Diversion Initiative (IDDI) and will operate on a State-wide basis until June 2008. There are three 
levels or tiers in the program. The first level is a bail diversion program which operates post plea and 
allows diversion to drug treatment for up to 12 weeks as a condition of bail. Court review is possible 
through additional mentions. At the second level, drug treatment can be made available in several 
ways. This includes as a condition of a suspended sentence or a probation order, or offenders on 
community service orders can be referred to drug treatment using the standard condition to attend 
‘other programs as directed by a probation officer’.402 For second level drug treatment orders there is 
no continuing court involvement. Neither the first or second level has a legislative base.  
3.11.6 The drug treatment order at the third level is supported by amendments to the Sentencing Act 
that are modelled on a provision in the Victorian Sentencing Act 1991. Section 7(ab) provides that if a 
court is constituted by a magistrate, it may record a conviction and make a drug treatment order. Such 
an order cannot be made unless the court would have sentenced the offender to a term of 
imprisonment were it not making the drug treatment order and it would not have suspended the 
sentence either in whole or in part.403 A drug treatment order cannot be made in respect of a sexual 
offence or an offence involving the infliction of more than minor bodily harm.404 A drug treatment 
order has a custodial part and a treatment and supervision part. The custodial part is the sentence of 
imprisonment that the court would have imposed if it had not made the drug treatment order. The 
offender is not required to serve the custodial part unless it is subsequently activated.405 The treatment 
                                                
398  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, submission, 4 and 9.  
399  Craig Mackie, submission, 3. 
400  Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, The Establishment of a Drug Court Pilot in Tasmania, Research Paper No 2 (2006). 
401  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, submission, 4. 
402  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 28(g). 
403  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 27B(1)(c). 
404  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 27B(1)(a).  
405  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 27F.  
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and supervision part of the order consists of core and program conditions.406 Core conditions include 
the requirement not to commit another imprisonable offence, to attend the court whenever it directs 
and to undergo treatment for illicit drug use as directed.407 Program conditions, at least one of which 
must be attached, includes such things as a requirement to submit to drug testing.408  
3.11.7 The Attorney-General was at pains to point out in his second reading speech that the 
amendments to the Sentencing Act introducing the power to make drug treatment orders do not create 
a drug court. However, it does incorporate many of the features of drug courts that operate in other 
jurisdictions.409 A key similarity between drug treatment orders and a drug court is the provision for 
ongoing supervision of orders by the court and the capacity to impose a series of ongoing rewards and 
escalating sanctions depending on offender progress.410 The explanatory notes to the Bill indicate that 
it is envisaged that initially offenders will be required to return to court weekly and that frequency will 
be progressively reduced as a reward during court reviews of progress. The CMD program has 
required a significant improvement in the availability of drug treatment services. It is a matter of some 
concern that funding for the program is in some doubt after June 2008 and at this stage no drug 
treatment orders can be made after 31 May.411 Of equal concern is the issue of ongoing funding for 
treatment that supports suspended sentences, probation orders and community service orders. Having 
increased the capacity of non-government organisations to deliver drug treatment services and having 
expended over $400,000 to develop programs and build up the capacity of treatment providers to 
deliver such services, it would be wasteful to fail to renew service contracts on the grounds that 
Commonwealth funding for a start-up pilot was no longer available irrespective of the outcome of the 
evaluation of CMD. The Institute recommends that if the evaluation of CMD proves promising, each 
of the three levels of the program should continue and drug treatment orders should also be made 
available to offenders convicted in the Supreme Court by referral to the Magistrates Court when 
appropriate. Absence of recourse to CMD can place a judge in a predicament when an offender has 
commenced treatment pursuant to an order in the Magistrates Court and then faces the Supreme Court 
in respect of concurrent offending.412 
Recommendations 
47. The Institute recommends that if the evaluation of the Court Mandated Diversion of Drug 
Offenders program proves promising: 
• each of the three levels of the program should continue; and 
• the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) should be amended to enable offenders convicted in the Supreme 
Court to be made subject to drug treatment orders. (3.11.7) 
3.12  Breach of non-custodial orders 
3.12.1 Breach of a community service order, breach of probation, and breach of a rehabilitation 
program order constitute an offence. The breach offence is not used for breach of a suspended 
sentence, a drug treatment order or for a conditional release order. It appears that the purpose of the 
breach offence is procedural rather than punitive. It provides a mechanism to allow the person to be 
brought back to the court in a speedy and effective manner and for time limits to be imposed within 
                                                
406  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 27E(3).  
407  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 27G.  
408  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 27H(1)(a).  
409  Parliament of Tasmania, House of Assembly, The Attorney-General, Sentencing Amendment Bill 2007 (No 31), Second 
Reading, 4 July 2007. 
410  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) ss 27K - 27M. 
411  Parliament of Tasmania (2007), above n 410. 
412  See for example Tasmania v Hingston, COPS, Blow J, 17 September 2007. 
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which action can be taken for breach. However, creating a breach offence has been criticised because 
it creates a triple jeopardy situation for offenders. They can be brought back to be dealt with for the 
original offence; they can be fined up to 10 penalty units or imprisoned for up to three months for the 
offence created by the breach of the order; and they can be dealt with for the offence which breached 
the order. For this reason Freiberg’s Victorian Sentencing Review, recommended that breach of 
conditional orders should no longer be a criminal offence and that mechanisms be put in place to 
ensure that offenders can be expeditiously and effectively brought back before the courts without 
imposing unnecessary, time-consuming and complex procedures.413  
Responses to the Issues Paper 
3.12.2 The Issues Paper asked whether breach offences should be abolished. Few submissions 
addressed this issue. The Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania was opposed to abolishing the breach 
offences on the grounds there should be some consequences of failure to comply with a court order. 
Craig Mackie expressed a similar view. Tasmania Police were in favour of abolishing breach offences 
for the triple jeopardy reasons outlined in the Issues Paper with the proviso that appropriate 
mechanisms are in place to bring offenders back to court if there is a failure to comply with the order. 
The Institute’s views 
3.12.3 The Institute is of the view that procedures in relation to breach of sentencing orders need to 
be radically overhauled. In relation to suspended sentences the failure to follow-up breaches of 
suspended sentences and probation orders has been highlighted. Bartels’ examination of breach of 
suspended sentences found that action was only taken in five per cent of breaches of wholly suspended 
sentences. It seems likely that breaches of probation orders are rarely prosecuted and that action is 
rarely taken in respect of breaches of conditional discharge orders. From 2001 to 2007 it appears that 
there were just two cases in the Supreme Court that involved breach of a CSO and one case for breach 
of probation.414 The Institute recommends that expeditious procedures be put in place to enable 
offenders to be brought back to court when necessary to ensure that sentencing orders are credible. It 
also recommends that for the triple jeopardy reasons outlined above, the offences of breach of 
community service, probation and rehabilitation orders be abolished and replaced with legislative 
provisions similar to those for breach of a suspended sentence (s 27) and breach of a conditional 
release order (s 62). Abolishing the breach offence does not mean that a breach of the order has no 
consequences. As is clear from the situation in Tasmania, the legislative breach machinery has little 
impact on the efficiency of follow-up. The administrative mechanisms are key and the Institute 
recommends that these be reviewed. 
Recommendations 
48. The Institute recommends that:  
• the offences of breach of a community service order, breach of a probation order and breach of a 
rehabilitation program order be abolished and replaced with breach provisions similar to those 
in s 27 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas); 
• the procedures for follow-up and actioning breaches of community orders be radically 
overhauled.(3.12.3) 
                                                
413  Ibid, 118-119. 
414  There may have been more but they do not appear in the Supreme Court’s sentencing database. 
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Part 4 
Role of Victims 
(a)  Consider whether the interests of victims are adequately dealt with in the sentencing 
process and to what extent the objective of section 3(h) [that of recognising the interests 
of victims] has been met. 
(b)  In particular consider the efficacy of compensation orders and the victims’ levy. 
4.1 Victims in the criminal justice system 
Introduction 
4.1.1 The role of victims in the criminal justice system has traditionally been a very limited one. A 
victim is not a party to criminal proceedings and is at most a witness. However, in recent decades 
attempts have been made to accommodate the interests of victims in the criminal justice system. The 
impetus for this trend came first from the victims’ movement and more recently from the restorative 
justice movement. The victims’ movement has focussed on welfare services and procedural rights for 
victims. In sentencing terms this includes the right to make submissions to sentencing and parole 
authorities and to receive compensation. Proponents of restorative justice generally seek more 
fundamental change and advocate a new approach to crime. Restorative justice has been described as 
‘a process whereby parties with a stake in a specific offence collectively resolve how to deal with the 
aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future’.1 Others have argued that this definition is 
too narrow and have defined restorative justice as ‘every action that is primarily oriented towards 
doing justice by restoring the harm that has been done to the victim.’2 The focus of restorative justice 
is not solely on victims. Equally important is both the reintegration of the offender into the community 
and accountability – enabling offenders to assume active responsibility for their actions. Some 
‘restorativists’ prefer to see restorative justice as a form of diversion from the criminal justice system 
whilst others, such as Braithwaite and Pettit,3 see it as a fully-fledged alternative to traditional 
retributive and rehabilitative approaches to crime. At a practical level, attempts have been made to 
accommodate restorative concepts such as conferencing, mediation and compensation within the 
conventional criminal justice system. Section 3(h) of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) provides that a 
purpose of the Act is to recognise the interests of victims. In his second reading speech the then 
Attorney General, Ray Groom MHA, claimed that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) promoted a focus on 
restorative justice and that the government was concerned to do all it could to protect the interests of 
victims. This part explores the extent to which the Act and the sentencing process recognises the 
interests of victims. The interests of victims are also considered in Part 5 (in the context of victim 
impact statements to the Parole Board) and Part 7 (in the context of explicitly including restoration as 
a sentencing goal in the Sentencing Act 1997). 
                                                
1  Tony Marshall, Restorative Justice: An Overview, The Home Office (1999).  
2  Lode Walgrave, ‘Extending the Victim Perspective Towards a Systematic Restorative Alternative’ in Adam Crawford 
and Jo Goodey (eds), Integrating a Victim Perspective Within Criminal Justice (2000) 253. 
3  John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (1990). 
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4.2 Victim Impact Statements 
4.2.1 The effect of the crime on the victim is relevant to the exercise of sentencing discretion.4 The 
prosecution may inform the court of the impact of the crime or the court may be provided with a 
victim impact statement informing the court of the harm, loss or injury suffered by a victim as a result 
of the crime. Tasmania, in common with all states and territories except Queensland, has legislative 
provisions and statutory rules governing the use of victim impact statements.5 Victim impact 
statements (VIS) are also used in other common law countries.6 Section 81A of the Sentencing Act 
1997 (Tas) provides that if a court finds a person guilty of an indictable offence, a victim of that 
offence may furnish to the court a written statement that ‘gives particulars of any injury, loss or 
damage suffered by the victim as a direct consequence of the offence’ and ‘describes the effects on the 
victim of the commission of the offence.’ A victim includes a member of the immediate family of a 
deceased victim of the offence.7 As with any pre-sentence information, the court must ensure that the 
offender has knowledge of it and the opportunity to challenge it.8 If the court considers it appropriate, 
another person may furnish a VIS on the victim’s behalf.9 If the victim so requests the court must 
allow the victim, the person who has supplied the statement or a nominated person, to read the VIS to 
the court.10 There is provision for victims to amend or withdraw the statement at any time before it is 
read to or by the Court.11 A judge or magistrate has the power to direct a victim not to read any part of 
a VIS considered to be irrelevant.12  
4.2.2 The legislation envisages that a victim may prepare their own VIS or have someone do it on 
their behalf. The rules state that they may be either printed or handwritten.13 Assistance in preparing a 
VIS is provided by the Victims of Crime Service, Victims Support Services and occasionally by 
sexual support services in Hobart, Launceston and on the north-west coast. Victims Support Services 
is a section of the Department of Justice. The Victims of Crime Service is a government funded 
service that, in addition to assistance with the preparation of victim impact statements, provides 
support for people attending court, counselling and referrals.14 It has offices in Burnie, Devonport, 
Launceston and Hobart. Most reports are prepared with Victims Support Services who assist in the 
preparation of approximately 100 reports per year. In the Supreme Court VIS are commonly provided 
in cases of sexual offences, armed robbery and assaults. In the Magistrates Court they are occasionally 
provided in cases of assault and sexual offences. Although theoretically available for property 
offences, in practice they are only provided in cases of offences against the person.  
4.2.3 VIS have been used in Australia for about a decade. They still have their critics who point to 
the following problems:  
… they can raise a victim’s expectations about sentence, which may not be fulfilled; expose 
offenders to unfounded allegations by victims; lead sentencers to give disproportionate 
weight to the impact of the crime on the victim to the detriment of other relevant 
considerations; and skew an otherwise objective and dispassionate process by the 
introduction of emotional and possibly vengeful content.15 
                                                
4  This is subject to a number of technical sentencing rules: Kate Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (2nd ed, 2002) 80-82, 87. 
5  See Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Same Crime, Same Time, Report No 103 (2006) 14.8 note 10. 
6  Victims Rights Act 2002 (NZ) ss 17-27; Criminal Code, RS 1985, c C-46, s 722. In the UK, Victim Personal Statements 
are governed by a Practice Direction by the Lord Chief Justice: Practice Direction (Victim Personal Statements) [2001] 
Cr App R (S) 482. 
7  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) 81A. 
8  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 81A(7); Criminal Rules 2006 (Tas) r 4; Justices Rules 2003 (Tas) r 54B. 
9  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 81A(2A). 
10  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 81A(4).  
11  Criminal Rules 2006 (Tas) r 8, 9; Justices Rules 2003 (Tas) r 54F, 54H.  
12  Criminal Rules 2006 (Tas) r 10; Justices Rules 2003 (Tas) r 54G.  
13  Criminal Rules 2006 (Tas) r 11; Justices Rules 2003 (Tas) r 54I(c). 
14  Lifeline is the current provider. 
15  ALRC (2006), above n 5, 14.10 (footnotes omitted). 
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4.2.4 Another objection to VIS is that they may lead to inconsistent sentences depending on 
whether a VIS is supplied or not and in instances where the victim asserts greater psychological harm 
than a more robust victim might.16 Administrative concerns have focused on the likelihood that 
consideration of VIS during the sentencing process will overburden the justice system, prove costly 
and cause delays.17 
4.2.5 Two aspects are particularly controversial. First, their use in the case of family members of 
homicide victims has been questioned because of concerns that consideration of such evidence could 
threaten the objectivity of the sentencing process and result in penalties reflecting the comparative 
worthiness of the deceased relative to other dead victims.18 In New South Wales the Supreme Court 
has taken the view that, notwithstanding a statutory provision requiring courts to accept a VIS from 
the relatives of homicide victims, it is not a relevant factor to be taken into account in deciding 
penalty.19 In contrast, in South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia courts are required by 
legislation to take account of a VIS submitted by a family member in the determination of penalty.20 
Courts in these states have differed as to how much weight should be given to this evidence.21  
4.2.6 Secondly, whether a victim should be permitted to express an opinion about the sentence has 
been questioned. The Western Australian legislation expressly prohibits this,22 but in the Northern 
Territory it is allowed.23 Neither s 81A of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) nor the Justices Rules 2003 
(Tas) refer to the issue. Strictly speaking, s 81A relates to facts about the impact and effects of the 
offence and not to opinions as to the appropriate sentence. While courts in Tasmania have sometimes 
been prepared to give victims’ wishes some weight, they are not determinative. The courts see their 
function as being to determine the wider interests of the community.24 The Victims Support Service’s 
guidance on VIS in its printed brochure and website states that a victim should not include an opinion 
on the sentence that the court should give in a VIS.25 
Responses to the Issues Paper 
4.2.7 The Issues Paper asked if there were any issues arising out of the legal recognition of victim 
impact statements that needed to be addressed. Responses were generally supportive of the use of VIS, 
seeing it as a valuable opportunity for victims to express their feelings about the crime.26 A number of 
submissions focussed on concerns about the deficiencies in the legislation which have since been 
addressed. In particular, the failure to provide for a VIS to be supplied without it being read out in 
court and the inability of a victim to amend a VIS have been addressed in the Sentencing Act 1997 
(Tas) the Justices Rules 2003 (Tas) and the Criminal Rules 2006 (Tas).27 It was also suggested that 
there should be a systematic way of preparing a VIS28 or a template to ensure consistency in format 
                                                
16  Ibid, 14.11. 
17  Tracey Booth, ‘Restoring Victims Voices: Victim Impact Statements in the Sentencing Process’ (2005) 86 Reform 59, 60.  
18  Ibid; Tracey Booth, ‘Homicide, Family Victims and Sentencing: Continuing the Debate about Victim Impact Statements’ 
(2004) 15(3) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 253.  
19  Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76; R v Bollen [1998] NSWSC 67.  
20  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10; Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 24. 
21  Booth (2004) above n 18, 254. 
22  Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 25(2). 
23  Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 106B(5A). 
24  See F (1998) 8 Tas R 88, 97-98 (Slicer J); McGhee Serial No 69/1994, 4 (Green CJ), 9 (Zeeman J). 
25  Victims Support Services, Victim Impact Statements (2007) < http://www.justice.tas.gov.au/victims/vis> at 20 November 
2007; Victims Support Services, Having Your Say Through A Victim Impact Statement in Tasmania (2007) 
<http://www.justice.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/27232/Vic_Impact_bro_v3.pdf> at 20 November 2007. 
26  For example, see submissions of Kay Fisher; Jocelyn Freedman, Victims of Crime Service Hobart; Liz Tanton-
Buchanan, The Victims of Crime Service, Launceston; Tasmania Police. 
27  For the power of a victim to amend VIS see: Justices Rules 2003(Tas) r 54F; Criminal Rules 2006 (Tas) r 8; for the 
option to read the statement in court see Justices Rules 2003 (Tas) r 54D; Criminal Rules 2006 (Tas) r 6.  
28  Liz Tanton-Buchanan, The Victims of Crime Service, Launceston, submission. 
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and content.29 The Rules allow the Chief Justice and the Chief Magistrate to approve a form for a VIS 
that may be used.30 While this has not been done, the Victims Support Services brochure has a form 
that can be used to prepare a VIS.31  
4.2.8 In response to the Issues Paper, the then Chief Justice submitted that the unproclaimed s 81A 
was too broad and would lead to delays in the sentencing process as potential victims are sought out 
and consulted. He argued that a more limited definition of victim should be adopted, one that did not 
included all crimes including burglary and stealing and all victims including banks, mortgagees and 
insurance companies.32 Kay Fisher submitted that those assisting with the preparation of a VIS should 
make it clear to the victim that their statement will have little impact on the sentence imposed. 
Tasmania Police supported a more active role for victims. It was suggested that victims be given the 
opportunity to confront the offender either in a facilitated conference or by giving oral evidence about 
the impact of the crime. It was also suggested that a victim should have the opportunity to question the 
offender as part of the sentencing process. Tasmania Police suggested that,  
For some victims, these options would give them closure and reduce the fear of an 
unknown offender. At the same time, the process would confront the offender with a more 
personalised appreciation of the impact of their wrongdoing.33 
The Institute’s views 
4.2.9 The Institute is of the view that a VIS is a valuable tool in the sentencing process. It assists 
the court in assessing the effects of the crime on the victim. Providing victims with a voice in criminal 
proceedings and an opportunity to communicate to the court and the offender the ways in which the 
crime has impacted on them can be a therapeutic experience. Many of the problems and concerns in 
relation to VIS have either been addressed by the introduction of appropriate safeguards or answered 
by research. The then Chief Justice’s concerns about delays and the broad definition of victim do not 
seem to have proved to have been realised. VIS do not appear to delay proceedings and are rarely, if 
ever, submitted in the case of burglary or other property offences. The Institute does not support 
Tasmania Police’s suggestion for a more active role for victims at the sentencing stage (see above para 
4.2.8). The fact a victim can read out a VIS and the possibility of victim offender mediation provides 
sufficient opportunity for the victim to “confront the offender”. The suggestion that the victim be 
given the opportunity to question the offender as part of the sentencing process is, in the Institute’s 
view inappropriate. An offender cannot be compelled to take the stand in a trial and should not be 
compelled do so in a sentencing hearing. To require this would conflict with a defendant’s right to 
silence.  
The value of VIS to victims 
4.2.10 The issue of whether submitting a VIS is a positive experience for victims has been explored 
in a number of research studies. No research has been conducted in Tasmania but studies elsewhere 
are instructive. A South Australian study found less than half of victims who provided VIS material 
stated they felt relieved or satisfied after providing the information. For the other half, providing VIS 
information made no difference and six per cent considered the experience made them feel worse. 
There was no evidence that VIS had an impact on sentencing outcomes.34 Ashworth refers to English 
research which shows that most victims did not know the use to which their statement had been put 
                                                
29  Tasmania Police, submission, 5. 
30  Justices Rules 2003(Tas) r 54 I(e) (Chief Magistrate); Criminal Rules 2006 (Tas) r 11(d) (Chief Justice).  
31  Most forms are returned to the Victims Support Services where the form is printed and supplied to the prosecution and 
defence counsel. 
32  The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, submission, 4. 
33  Tasmania Police, submission, 6. 
34  Edna Erez, Leigh Roeger and Michael O’Connell, ‘Victim Impact Statements in South Australia’ (Paper presented at the 
International Victimology: 8th International Symposium, Canberra, 21 August 1994). 
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and few believed it had much effect on the charge or sentence although this had been the hope of 
many. He concludes that if some victims do feel better for the experience, there is the danger of raising 
expectations that can be disappointed.35 Tracy Booth agrees that research studies in various 
jurisdictions including Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom reveal that VIS 
have no significant effects on sentencing outcomes;36 and that victims, who think of their VIS in 
instrumental terms, are disappointed when their VIS do not impact on sentence. However, she argues 
that victims submit a VIS for a variety of reasons and not necessarily primarily for the purpose of 
influencing the penalty imposed.  
4.2.11 The impact of VIS on sentencing outcomes in Tasmania is unknown. Nor has any research 
been conducted on victims’ expectations of, or satisfaction with, VIS. In Tasmania, it seems, victim 
counsellors are careful to inform victims that while the court will take their statement into account in 
assessing the impact of the crime on them, this will not necessarily affect the sentencing outcome. The 
international evidence suggests that there is a danger that those who do furnish a statement with the 
primary aim of influencing the penalty may be disappointed. It is therefore important, as Kay Fisher 
submitted, that it be made clear to victims that the VIS is only one factor that a court will consider 
when determining the sentence and that it may not necessarily change the sentence. As Booth argues, 
the focus should be on the expressive and communicative function of a VIS. Advice to victims should 
make it clear that the purpose of VIS is to give victims a voice, to enable them to communicate both 
with the court and the offender and to express their feelings about the effects of the crime on them. 
Sentencing remarks may create a second opportunity to exploit the expressive and communicative role 
of VIS. Booth states: 
By acknowledgement of VIS and reference to the victim’s words in the course of judgment, 
courts are able to communicate a message that is overtly responsive to the legitimate 
interests of victims and reflects our community’s changing sensibilities in this context. The 
court communicates both a message of sympathy and clear recognition that these victims 
have been wronged. Recent research indicates that judges are taking the opportunity to refer 
to the victim in their sentencing remarks and that such developments are appreciated by 
victims.37 
4.2.12 The Institute recognises that providing a VIS and the court’s use of it in sentencing 
comments to acknowledge the effects of the crime on the victim can have a positive impact on the 
victim.38 The Court’s use of a VIS can be both therapeutic and empowering for a victim. To ensure 
that victims do not see the primary purpose of VIS as affecting the sentencing outcome, and to avoid 
disappointing victims, the Institute recommends that the advice given by the prosecution, by the 
Victims Assistance Unit, Victims Services and Sexual Assault Services continue to make this point 
and that it be included in the Victims Assistance Unit’s brochure. 
Secondary victims 
4.2.13 The Institute acknowledges that the issue of the use of VIS from family victims in homicide 
cases is in theory problematic. The Institute agrees that it is offensive to fundamental concepts of 
equality and justice to impose a harsher sentence upon an offender because of the relative value of the 
life lost.39 However, it does not recommend that family victims be excluded from the definition of a 
                                                
35  Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (4th ed 2005), 355. A more recent evaluation of the Scottish pilot 
VIS scheme provides more positive findings with 61 per cent reporting that making a VIS made them feel better (38 per 
cent felt worse) and 86 per cent stating the decision to make a VIS had been the correct one: James Chalmers, Peter Duff 
and Fiona Leverick, ‘Victim Impact Statements: Can Work, Do Work (For those who bother to make them)’ [2007] 
Criminal Law Review 360, 378. 
36  Booth (2005), above n 17, 61. As Chalmers, Duff and Leverick (2007), above n 35, 363 (n 24) point out, this is hardly 
surprising, isolating the impact of VIS is always going to be difficult given the multitude of factors that are taken into 
account in imposing sentence. 
37  Booth (2005), above n 17, 61. 
38  Occasionally too this can assist the victim in accepting a verdict that is disappointing – see for example Crawford J’s 
sentencing comments in Tasmania v Pelikan, 18 September 2007. 
39  Inkson (1996) 6 Tas R 1, 30 (Zeeman J). 
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victim for the purpose of VIS. Provided such victims are not led to believe that their statements will 
lead to different outcomes, for example a heavier penalty on the offender because the victim was so 
well loved and their death impacted so heavily on dependents and family, there is no difficulty. The 
focus should be on the communicative and symbolic function of a VIS as a means of allowing the 
criminal justice system to engage with the emotional issues stemming from victimisation. 
4.2.14 While the Institute has concluded that VIS is a valuable sentencing tool, its use remains 
controversial. In the UK critics still argue that it a sweetener to increase victims’ satisfaction with the 
criminal justice system, to con victims into thinking their interests are being looked after.40 And in 
Australia some judges are sceptical of their utility.41 The Institute recommends that research be 
conducted in this jurisdiction to examine the effectiveness of VIS as tool for the courts and for victims. 
Such research could provide important pointers to ways in which VIS could be improved.  
Victims’ wishes 
4.2.15 The Institute is aware that the issue of whether a court should have regard to a victim’s’ 
wishes in relation to sentence is controversial.42 However, in the context of VIS this is not a difficulty. 
Section 81A of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) does not authorise victims to include their views as to 
sentence in a VIS, and it is discouraged.43 If a victim does include this in a statement it is deleted by 
the Victims’ Assistance Unit before it is given to the parties and the court. In some rare cases a 
victim’s wishes in relation to penalty may be conveyed to the court by defence counsel in the course of 
a plea in mitigation and the court will deal with it as the law provides. Generally, a victim’s wishes are 
given little if any weight. Considerations of fairness and consistency support this.44 
Recommendations 
49. The Institute supports the use of victim impact statements. They are a valuable tool in the 
sentencing process which assist the court in assessing the effects of the crime on the victim, and 
provide the victim with a voice in the sentencing process. The courts’ use of VIS can be therapeutic 
and empowering for victims. To ensure that provision of a VIS provides a positive experience for 
victims, the Institute recommends that the advice given by the Victims Assistance Unit and other 
victim services assisting with VIS continue to ensure the focus is on the symbolic and communicative 
function of VIS rather than its impact on the sentencing outcome. It recommends that this be explained 
in the Victims Support Service’s brochure. (4.2.9 – 4.2.12) 
50. The Institute recommends retaining the right of the family victims in homicide cases to make a 
VIS. However, as in the previous recommendation, it recommends that advice to victims should make 
it clear that this is but one factor the court will consider in imposing sentence and that it cannot lead to 
the court putting a greater value on one life rather than another. (4.2.13) 
51. The Institute recommends that research be conducted in this jurisdiction to examine the value of 
VIS to the courts and victims. (4.2.14)  
                                                
40  See Andrew Sanders, Rod Morgan and Ed Cape, ‘Victim Impact Statements: Don’t Work, Can’t Work’ [2001] Criminal 
Law Review 447. For a critique of this article see Chalmers, Duff and Leverick (2007), above n 35. 
41  ALRC, (2006), above n 5, 14.13. 
42  See Warner (2002), above n 4, 87. 
43  See above, para 4.2.6 referring to the Victims Support Services’ brochure.  
44  See Warner (2002), above n 4, 87.  
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4.3 Victim mediation 
4.3.1 Section 84(1) of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) provides that before a court passes sentence 
on an offender it may, if the offender agrees, order a mediation report and adjourn the proceedings to 
enable the report to be prepared. A court may also receive such a report without having requested 
one.45 A mediation report is a written or oral report by a mediator about any mediation or attempted 
mediation between the offender and a victim.46 It is to report on ‘the attitude of the offender to 
mediation, to the victim and to the effect on the victim of the offence; and any agreement between the 
victim and the offender as to actions to be taken by the offender by way of reparation.’47 The 
procedures as to disclosure and challenge are the same as for probation officers’ pre-sentence reports.48 
4.3.2 Despite the existence of these provisions it does not seem that mediation reports or victim 
offender mediation is used in Tasmania at the pre-sentence stage of criminal proceedings. Victim 
offender mediation is a restorative justice measure that has been used in a number of jurisdictions in 
Australia over the last ten years or so. It has been carried out on an ad hoc basis by the Justice 
Department for a number of years, usually using external mediation services. Responsibility for co-
ordination of this service now rests with the Victims Support Services. The program receives referrals 
in relation to prisoners rather than pre-sentence referrals. Before mediation occurs a formal process is 
undertaken to determine if the case is suitable for mediation using criteria which include the consent of 
the offender and the victim to the process, the reasonableness of the expectations of the parties and the 
safety of all involved.49  
4.3.3 In the juvenile justice area, a similar restorative measure, the community conference or 
‘family group conference’ has proved extremely popular. Most jurisdictions, including Tasmania, have 
now legislated for community conferences.50 These conferences are primarily an alternative to court 
proceedings but they may also be ordered by a magistrate prior to sentencing a youth.51 At the adult 
court level there has been less enthusiasm for restorative justice measures like conferencing or 
mediation, however, New South Wales has been running a promising pilot community conferencing 
program targeting young adults in two local courts since September 2005.52 
 Responses to the Issues Paper 
4.3.4 The Issues Paper sought to discover an answer to why there had been so few referrals for 
mediation reports and to explore whether there were resources and expertise to allow use to be made 
of victim offender mediation. The Justice Department mentioned a lack of resources as did Kay 
Fisher, a counsellor who had participated in some victim offender sessions.53 The latter advocated 
greater use of victim offender mediation and emphasised the value of confronting the offender with 
the victim’s reactions to the crime. A worker with the Victims of Crime Service in Launceston 
estimated that only two-five per cent of victims would accept mediation because of both the stress 
involved with a mediation session and fear of the offender.54 The Legal Aid Commission submitted 
                                                
45  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 84(3). 
46  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 85. 
47  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 85. 
48  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 87-88. 
49  See, Victims Support Services, Victim/Offender Mediation (2007) <http://www.justice.tas.gov.au/victims/mediation> at 
19 November 2007. 
50  See, Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas) ss 13-20. 
51  Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas) s 37. 
52  See, Julie People and Lily Trimboli, An Evaluation of the NSW Conferencing for Young Adults Program, NSW Bureau of 
Crime Statistics and Research (2007). 
53  Department of Justice and Industrial Relations, submission, 17; Kay Fisher, submission, 2. 
54  Liz Tanton-Buchanan, Victims of Crime Service, Launceston Community Centre, Launceston. 
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that community conferencing for adult offenders may be more appropriate than victim offender 
mediation. 
The Institute’s view 
4.3.5 Victim offender mediation may well be a useful in a minority of cases. However, it has not 
had any acceptance as a pre-sentence measure. As a restorative measure it appears to have been 
overtaken by community conferencing which has a stronger restorative focus from the point of view of 
the offender and victim, and has the added advantage of incorporating the community. The Institute is 
attracted to the idea of exploring the use of community conferences for young adults. Using the 
experience gained in youth justice in Tasmania and with insights from the New South Wales pilot, it 
recommends running a pilot community conference program for young adults.  
Recommendation 
52. The Institute recommends a pilot community conferencing program for young adults modelled on 
both the New South Wales pilot and on Tasmania’s youth justice experience with conferencing. 
(4.3.5) 
4.4 Compensation orders 
4.4.1 One of the restorative justice measures the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) introduced was 
mandatory compensation orders for some offences. The Attorney General noted in his second reading 
speech that compensation orders in criminal proceedings are often given low priority with claims for 
damages being adjourned indefinitely. The purpose of the new compensation order provisions was to 
give them greater priority. The Act requires that courts make compensation orders in all cases of 
burglary, stealing, robbery, arson and injury to property where there is evidence of loss, destruction or 
damage as a result of such an offence, irrespective of whether there is an application by the victim or 
the prosecutor.55 In the case of other offences they are discretionary.56 Additionally, s 43 gives 
compensation orders priority over fines where the offender has insufficient means for both orders to be 
made and s 68(9) frees the courts of the rules of evidence when assessing compensation in an attempt 
to make it easier and faster for courts to make an order. Whether the financial circumstances of the 
offender are relevant to the amount of an order is unclear. Where orders are compulsory, means would 
appear to be irrelevant.57 A compensation order is an ancillary order. In other words it is an order in 
addition to sentence rather than a sentencing option in its own right. Compensation orders are 
enforceable in the same way as a civil judgment of the court making the order.58 Alternatively, fine 
recovery procedures can be used because ‘fine’ is defined in s 4 of the Act to include compensation 
orders. In practice, compensation orders are only enforced in the same way as fines if they are 
imposed by the Magistrates Court. The recently proclaimed Monetary Penalties Enforcement Act 2005 
only applies to compensation orders made by the Magistrates Court by virtue of s 3, which defines a 
fine to include a compensation order made by the Magistrates Court. 
4.4.2 An early study of the use of compensation orders under the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) 
suggested that these provisions have failed to fulfil the promise of compensating victims of property 
crime.59 Despite provisions requiring the courts to make orders in respect of convictions for some 
                                                
55  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 68(1)(a). 
56  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 68(1)(b). 
57  Warner (2002), above n 4, 141-142. 
58  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 69. 
59  Kate Warner and Jenny Gawlik, ‘Mandatory Compensation Orders for Crime Victims and the Rhetoric of Restorative 
Justice’ (2003) 36(1) The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 60.  
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offences where there is evidence of loss, it appeared orders were not made in the majority of those 
cases, and of those made, very few were paid. In the year after the Act came into force compensation 
orders were made in 42 per cent of burglary, stealing and unlawfully injuring property cases in the 
Supreme Court, but in only eight per cent of burglary and/or stealing cases and 25 per cent of injury to 
property cases in Magistrates Court in the south of the State. Matters were adjourned indefinitely in 
the Supreme Court in 24 per cent of cases and no order was made in 14 per cent of cases. In the 
remaining cases loss was recovered or there was no loss. If the matter was adjourned, in both courts it 
was the responsibility of the victim to have the matter relisted. It was found that enforcement 
procedures differed between the Supreme Court and Magistrates Court. In the Supreme Court the 
Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) sends the offender a letter instructing him or her to pay the 
compensation order directly to the victim or through the victim’s solicitor. As there was no follow-up 
and payment was not overseen by the Supreme Court, it was not known how often compensation 
orders were paid. For compensation orders made by Magistrates Court, recovery was pursued by the 
Fines Enforcement Unit. The study found very few compensation orders were paid. In the first year of 
mandatory orders only four per cent of burglary and or stealing compensation orders were fully paid 
and only 20 per cent of injury to property orders.  
4.4.3 The study concluded that compulsory compensation orders have failed victims and are far 
from being a measure that has helped restore confidence in the criminal justice system, the false 
promise of compensation is probably even counterproductive. The Issues Paper suggested that 
mandatory compensation orders have failed to achieve reparation for victims for a number of reasons 
including a lack of resources devoted to enforcement, the futility of making orders in many cases 
when there is little prospect of the order being paid, the ambiguous status of compensation orders 
under the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) and perhaps a cultural reluctance to embrace their use. There is 
no recent data on the use of mandatory compensation orders or their enforcement. However, the 
Institute examined their use in the Supreme Court in 2006 for the purposes of this Report and found 
that outcomes were similar to those reported in Warner and Gawlik’s study: orders were made in 36 
per cent of cases, adjourned sine die in 20 per cent of cases and no order was made in 17 per cent of 
cases. 
Table 10 Compensation Orders Made in the Supreme Court for Burglary, Stealing and Unlawfully 
Injuring Property 
Outcome Number Percentage of Total 
 1/8/98-31/7/99 1/1/06-31/12/06 1/8/98-31/7/99 1/1/06-31/12/06 
Compensation order made 96 31 42% 36% 
Order or assessment adjourned sine die 55 19 24% 22% 
Loss recovered (so no order) 35 9 15% 10% 
No Loss (so no order) 9 13 4% 15% 
Loss but no order 16 14 7% 16% 
No order or explanation 17 1 7% 1% 
Total 228 87 100% 100% 
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Responses to the Issues Paper 
Mandatory or discretionary?  
4.4.4 The Issues Paper sought responses to a number of questions, the first related to whether or 
not a compensation order should remain mandatory for property loss in cases of burglary, stealing, 
robbery, arson and injuring property.60 Most respondents who addressed this issue were of the view 
that orders should not be mandatory. Jocelyn Freedman of the Victims of Crime Service submitted: 
The introduction of victim compensation orders, whilst looking promising for victims and 
restorative justice, has been a huge let down for expectant victims of crime. Unless there is 
a distinct possibility of the victim actually receiving all or part of the ordered payment then 
it is doing more harm than good to order the offender to pay. Since the Act, the VOC 
Service has spent many hours providing information and support to victims who thought 
they would be automatically re-imbursed when the order was made.61 
4.4.5 Tasmania Police and the Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania suggested that that they should 
not be compulsory but that, as in the UK, courts should be required to consider them where there has 
been loss, injury or damage and that where an order is not made, reasons should be given for not doing 
so.62 Tasmania Police stated: 
Victims are entitled to an explanation as to why a compensation order was not considered 
appropriate in their case, and requiring courts to provide reasons for not imposing orders 
may actually encourage the use of orders in appropriate cases.63 
4.4.6 While not specifically saying he opposed the mandatory nature of compensation orders for 
property loss, the Director of Public Prosecutions said: 
one might reasonably resist devoting resources to assessments of the quantum of 
compensation orders when the means of the offender and the mechanisms for enforcement 
are such that to do so appears to be an entirely pointless exercise.64 
4.4.7 Only one respondent submitted that compensation orders should remain compulsory.65 The 
then Chief Justice ‘disputed the fact that few such orders are made, at least in the Supreme Court’ as 
the Issues Paper claimed, but he did not specifically address the issue of whether they should be 
discretionary or compulsory.66 
Issues relating to the making of compensation orders 
4.4.8 Currently, a compensation order is an ancillary order. In other words, an order which does 
not have a punitive purpose but is made in addition to a sentencing order in s 7 of the Sentencing Act 
1997 (Tas). The Issues Paper asked whether a compensation order should be a sentencing option in its 
own right. In South Australia, the ACT, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, a compensation order 
is a sentencing option in its own right.67 The United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice 
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power68 states that governments should consider making restitution 
a sentencing option.69 Only two respondents addressed the question whether compensation orders 
                                                
60  In addition to the submissions mentioned below, Don Wing MLC, President of the Legislative Council and Kay Fisher 
supported making mandatory orders discretionary. 
61  Submission, 2. 
62  Tasmania Police, submission, 6; Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, submission, 10. 
63  Tasmania Police, submission, 6. 
64  Submission, 2. 
65  Warwick Dunstan, submission, 1. 
66  The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, submission, 4. 
67  Criminal Law (Sentencing Act) 1988 (SA); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 19, 20; Sentencing Act 2002 (NZ) s 
12. 
68  For the legal status of this Charter in Tasmania see para 4.6.2. 
69  United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, GA Res 40/34 , 
GAOR, 40th sess, 96th Plen mtg, [9], UN Doc A/Res/40/34 (1985).  
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should be made a sentencing option in their own right – the then Chief Justice who opposed the 
suggestion and the Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania which supported it.  
4.4.9 The Issues Paper also asked whether means should be relevant to the making of a 
compensation order. As the Issues Paper explained, it is unclear whether means are relevant in 
assessing the amount of compensation under s 68 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas). There are 
arguments pointing in both directions.70 Only two respondents addressed this issue and both submitted 
that means should be relevant to the amount of compensation ordered.71 
4.4.10 The Issues Paper addressed the relevance of a compensation order to sentencing orders other 
than fines. Section 43 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) gives a compensation order priority over a fine 
if the offender has insufficient means to pay both. However, its relationship with other penalties is 
unclear. As an ancillary order it could be argued that it should not displace punishment and its 
relevance should be limited to providing evidence of remorse. Conversely, it could be argued that in 
the absence of a fetter on the legislative discretion to take a compensation order into account, the 
courts should be free to do so. None of the submissions addressed this issue. 
4.4.11 The Issues Paper also asked whether additional resources should be given to both police and 
prosecutors to deal with claims. The Director of Public Prosecutions, Tasmania Police and the Legal 
Aid Commission of Tasmania recommended this. The then Chief Justice suggested that more attention 
should be given to their prompt assessment. The DPP disputed the suggestion in the Issues Paper that 
courts and prosecutors had not done all they could to make compensation orders more successful 
because of ambivalence towards compensation orders and a cultural resistance to dealing with matters 
outside their traditional role. He said: 
Legislation concerning Victim Impact Statements and Compensation Orders perhaps 
looked good to legislators when enacted. (Indeed, who would speak against such 
measures?) However, no funding was provided to enable these to be adequately attended to. 
This is not, as the [Issues] Paper wrongly suggests, a matter of ‘cultural resistance’...72 
4.4.12 Tasmania Police submitted: 
If required, additional resources should be made available to police/prosecutors to deal with 
claims. Victims should not have to pursue the order themselves. 
Enforcement of orders 
4.4.13 The Issues Paper asked: 
• Should compensation orders be enforced in the same way as fines? 
• What measures could improve enforcement of compensation orders? 
4.4.14 The then Chief Justice submitted that more attention should be given to prompt 
enforcement.73 Tasmania Police asserted that courts should oversee the payment of compensation 
orders and they should be enforced in the same manner as fines.74 The Legal Aid Commission of 
Tasmania also considered they should be enforced like fines.75 Michael Hodgman submitted that: 
                                                
70  Warner (2002), above n 4, 141-142. 
71  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, submission, 11; Jocelyn Freedman, submission, 2. 
72  Director of Public Prosecutions, submission, 2. 
73  The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, submission, 4. 
74  Tasmania Police, submission, 6. 
75  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, submission, 11. 
Part 4: Role of Victims 
169 
… the present poor level of enforcement of compensation orders needs serious attention 
and we would support any appropriate changes to improve the present system.76 
4.4.15 The DPP suggested that the means of the offender and ineffective mechanisms for 
enforcement appear to make devoting effort to assessments pointless.77 
The Institute’s views 
Mandatory or discretionary? 
4.4.16 The purpose of the new compensation order provisions in the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) was 
to give compensation orders greater priority.78 The Institute endorses this sentiment and agrees with 
the submission of the former Chief Justice that compensation orders are ‘a convenient way of giving 
summary judgment if sufficient evidence is available of value’.79 However, examination of the 
practical operation of compulsory compensation orders in the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) suggests ‘that 
they are mere tokenism, exploitation of a popular cause, and yet another political placebo for crime 
victims’.80 It also shows that it is unwise to just deposit a restorative measure into a system which is 
predominantly about punishment and expect it to work. Moreover, provisions for mandatory 
compensation orders are unrealistic and present false hope for victims. As Jocelyn Freedman 
submitted, ‘they can do more harm than good’ by increasing victims’ disillusionment and 
disappointment with the criminal justice system.81 However, the Institute recommends that rather than 
just making a compensation order discretionary, the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) should require that in 
every case where it appears to the court that another person has suffered injury, loss, destruction or 
damage as a result of the offence, the court must consider whether a compensation order should be 
made and if one is not made, the court has a duty to give reasons for not doing so. This follows the 
English position.82 The Institute considers a more realistic approach is to require courts to consider 
making an order rather than require them to do so. This should prove to be a more effective means of 
reinforcing recognition of the harm caused to victims by criminal offences than mandatory orders. It 
could be argued that there is no need to require reasons for not making an order because if orders are 
discretionary and one is applied for there is a common law requirement to give reasons if no order is 
made. The counter-argument to this is that if courts are to be required to consider making a 
compensation order as part of the penalty, which is the next recommendation of the Institute, the 
making of a compensation order is not dependent on an application for one. It follows that requiring 
reasons for no order, in a case of injury, loss destruction or damage as a result of the offence, will 
increase the focus on victims and so further the objective in s 3(h) of the Sentencing Act 1997 of 
recognising their interests. 
A sentencing option in its own right? 
4.4.17 The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has recently considered this issue and 
recommended against making reparation (the federal legislation’s term for compensation) a sentencing 
option. In the Commission’s view a reparation order is compensatory rather than punitive and so 
should not be a sentencing option in its own right. Both the Law Reform Committee of the Parliament 
of Victoria83 and the New South Wales Law Reform Commission84 have recommended that 
                                                
76  Hon Michael Hodgman, Shadow Attorney-General, submission, 4. 
77  Director of Public Prosecutions, submission, 2. 
78  Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 13 August 1997, (the Honourable Ray Groom, Attorney 
General). 
79  The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, submission, 4. 
80  Warner and Gawlik (2003), above n 59, 73. 
81  Jocelyn Freedman, submission. 
82  Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (UK) ss 130 -134. 
83  Law Reform Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Restitution for Victims of Crime: Final Report (1994) xviii.  
84  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 79 (1996) [13.2.]. 
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compensation orders should retain their ancillary status. The Institute sees some force in these 
arguments but considers there are advantages in making a compensation order an independent order 
which could be either the central feature of the sentence or more in the nature of an ancillary order in 
addition to the punishment contained in the principal order (imprisonment or a fine). It would be the 
central feature when the only order such as when it takes priority over a fine or when it accompanies 
an adjourned undertaking order made by the court under s 7(g) of the Sentencing Act 1997. If the 
criminal justice system is to be responsive to victims then orders should not necessarily be purely 
punitive but reparative and restorative as well. Moreover, it is realistic to acknowledge that a 
compensation order can be punitive. While it is more in the nature of a civil order, it does have 
punitive elements. Not only does it require the offender to pay money to the victim, if the offender 
fails to do so, payment can be enforced in the same manner as a fine. The ALRC argued that ‘it is not 
appropriate that an entirely different enforcement regime should apply for victims of crime seeking 
reparation through the criminal justice system when compared with an applicant seeking reparation 
through civil litigation’.85 The counter-argument is that in many jurisdictions including Tasmania, 
compensation orders already have the criminal characteristic of being enforceable in the same manner 
as fines.  
4.4.18 The Institute therefore recommends that compensation orders should no longer be merely 
ancillary orders but included in the list of sentencing orders in s 7 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas). It 
would automatically follow that the making of a compensation order would be relevant to the 
sentencing discretion, but this would not deflect the court from imposing a custodial sentence or a 
community service order if that is what the offence justifies. In other words, it would not infringe the 
principle of equality before the law by permitting wealthy offenders to escape a prison sentence. The 
Institute has considered whether at the same time the court should retain its discretion to make a 
compensation order as an ancillary order which is not part of the sentence. In an appropriate case the 
court would refuse to make an order as part of the sentence stating that the matter is better dealt with 
as an ancillary matter which would be adjourned for compensation to be assessed. However, having 
two kinds of compensation order could well lead to confusion and for this reason the Institute has 
rejected this. The best interests of victims would be better served by embedding the notion of a 
compensation order as a sole or principal aspect of a sentence.  
The relevance of means 
4.4.19 As noted above, the legal position in relation to the relevance of an offender’s means is 
unclear under s 68 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas). In keeping with the notion of a compensation 
order as a sentencing option in its own right and not simply a civil remedy provided by criminal 
courts, the Institute recommends that means be relevant to the amount of a compensation order. The 
ALRC has noted that there is a tension between the desire to recognise the civil rights of victims of 
crime in the sentencing process and the desire to avoid making futile orders or imposing crushing 
financial burdens on offenders, a tension the ALRC did not believe to be best resolved by taking 
means into account. In the view of the ALRC: 
A central purpose of the power to make reparation orders is to ensure that victims of crime 
receive adequate compensation for the loss they have suffered as a result of an offence. The 
purpose is not effectively achieved if the financial circumstances of an offender are taken 
into account so as to reduce the quantum of the compensation to be paid to a victim. It is 
not desirable that victims of crime are awarded less compensation than civil litigants 
because of the financial circumstances of the offender.86 
4.4.20 The ALRC’s argument has validity if the compensation order is viewed as an ancillary order 
providing a civil remedy. But it loses its force if a compensation order is viewed as a sentencing 
option. The victim’s civil remedies remain, with the Sentencing Act 1997 s 68(8) providing that the 
right to bring civil proceedings is unaffected. The point that it is unfair to victims to reduce the amount 
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of compensation on the basis of the offender’s means can also be countered by the point made by 
Ashworth that in reality very few victims sue their offenders; therefore, in practice, the compensation 
order does transfer from the offender to the victim money which the offender would not otherwise 
have to have paid and which the victim would not have otherwise received.87 
More resources? 
4.4.21 Based on the study of compensation orders, the Issues Paper suggested that neither courts 
nor prosecutors had done all they could to make compensation orders more successful. Greater efforts 
could be made to adduce evidence of loss at the sentencing stage as part of the normal information 
supplied to the court. In cases where there is insufficient evidence of loss and the imposition of a 
compensation order would not be a futile exercise because of the offender’s inability to pay, the courts 
could adjourn the matter to a definite date with a request that the prosecutor supply details of the 
loss.88 The Institute’s recommendation to abolish mandatory orders would allow greater selectivity in 
imposing orders and may encourage greater efforts to pursue orders in cases where it is not a pointless 
exercise. Nevertheless, adequate resources need to be provided to prosecutors to enable this to be 
done. The Institute recommends a review of the administrative procedures and resources associated 
with the making of compensation orders to enable them to be ‘adequately attended to’.89 
Simple cases only? 
4.4.22 The Issues Paper did not address the issue of whether compensation orders should be 
available in simple cases only. However, the issue of orders in cases of personal injuries was raised by 
the Director of Public Prosecutions. He expressed disagreement with a Supreme Court decision which 
ruled that orders only be made in the simplest cases, a decision that he said ‘seems to practically rule 
out personal injuries’.90 A related issue is whether an order could be made in respect of pain and 
suffering and the psychiatric consequences of the offence in addition to outgoings such as medical 
expenses arising from an injury. The words in s 68 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) ‘injury, loss, 
destruction or damage as a result of the offence’ would appear to be wide enough to cover pain and 
suffering and other kinds of non-economic loss. However, in R v Monks,91 which appears to be the 
decision referred to by the DPP, Evans J refused an application made by the victim for a compensation 
order for a psychiatric condition alleged to have resulted from sexual abuse committed between 11 and 
19 years earlier when the victim was between five and 13 years of age. Evans J said: 
The general purpose of the legislation is to provide a summary and inexpensive method of 
compensating a victim for personal injuries or property damage. In appropriate cases, the 
legislation provides a convenient means for a victim to avoid instituting separate civil 
proceedings to recover damages. The legislation is not intended to cater for claims 
involving complicated or extensive inquiry or investigation…92 
4.4.23 The application was dismissed on grounds which included the fact that the claim for 
compensation was particularly complicated and difficult and the available evidence was insufficient to 
provide any foundation upon which the court could assess the claim.  
4.4.24 The Institute agrees that it is appropriate that compensation orders should be limited to clear 
and simple cases and that it is a proper exercise of discretion to refuse to make an order where a 
complicated or extensive enquiry is necessary to ascertain the injury or loss, causation or the amount 
of the loss.93 However, ‘the clear case principle’ does not mean that orders cannot be made in cases of 
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personal injury. If the material presented to the court (see Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 68(6)) 
sufficiently demonstrates the pain and suffering experienced by the victim, including distress and 
anxiety, then the order should include an amount for this as well as including expenses reasonably 
incurred for counselling and medical expenses. While some jurisdictions make this explicit in the 
legislation,94 the Institute does not see the need to do so.  
Combination orders and compensation as a condition of a sentencing option 
4.4.25 In Part 3 the Institute considered combination orders and argued that sanction stacking can 
have undesirable consequences. It therefore recommended that, rather than combining suspended 
sentences, community service and probation orders, community service or supervision be made a 
condition of the primary order. However, the same objections do not apply to combining suspended 
sentences, community service orders or probation with a fine if this is appropriate. Nor is there a 
problem with combining a compensation order with other sentencing orders such as a suspended 
sentence, a community service order or a probation order to add a reparative element to a primarily 
punitive, denunciatory or rehabilitative sentence. A compensation order could also be combined with a 
conditional release order. The question arises whether a compensation order could in some cases be 
made a condition of a sentencing order. For example, would it encourage the offender to pay 
compensation if it were made a condition of a suspended sentence or a conditional release order and at 
the same time add some punitive bite to the order? The ALRC has recently recommended that federal 
sentencing legislation should prohibit a court from making payment of compensation a condition of a 
conditional release order or a wholly or partially suspended sentence.95 It argued it was incongruous to 
enforce reparation orders that are attached as conditions of some sentencing orders through breach 
procedures in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) when other reparation orders are ancillary to the sentencing 
process and are enforced as civil debts: 
The ALRC does not consider it desirable to use the criminal justice system to enforce 
payment of a reparation order by placing offenders at risk of being sentenced for failure to 
make reparation. To require a federal offender to comply with a reparation order as a 
condition of his or her sentence is to create an undesirable and confusing amalgam of 
criminal and civil procedures, which should be avoided.96 
4.4.26 The Institute has recommended that a compensation order be an independent sentencing 
order that is enforceable in the same way as a fine. It therefore differs in nature from the federal 
reparation order. To make it a condition of another order is another means of strengthening the 
reparative element of sentencing orders in accordance with a recognised need to acknowledge that the 
criminal justice system no longer ignores victims. For this reason the Institute is of the view that 
compensation can be a possible condition of a suspended sentence, a community service order or a 
probation order (see para 3.3.34). 
Enforcement of orders 
4.4.27 As noted above, (para 4.4.2), the mechanisms for enforcement differ depending on which 
court imposes the compensation order. In the case of Supreme Court orders, which could be – but are 
not – enforced in the same manner as fines, the proportion that are paid is unknown. It is left to the 
victim to follow-up payment. Warner and Gawlik’s study of mandatory compensation orders made in 
the two years after the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) was proclaimed found that fine enforcement 
procedures were used to enforce orders made in the Magistrates Court. However, no more than 21 per 
cent of orders were fully paid in cases of damage to property and eight per cent in cases of burglary 
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and stealing.97 Whether the situation remains the same is unknown but could be investigated by the 
Justice Department as recovery of compensation orders is recorded by the court. The Institute agrees 
with Tasmania Police and the Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania that compensation orders should be 
enforced in the same manner as fines. There appears to be no logical reason to differentiate between 
Supreme Court orders and Magistrates Court orders. If compensation orders become a sentencing 
option rather than an ancillary order and means are relevant to the amount of the order, pursuing 
recovery in the same manner as a fine is perfectly logical. 
4.4.28 Although payment of compensation orders imposed in the Magistrates Court is pursued by 
the Fines Enforcement Unit, the indications are that the recovery rate is poor. This may be improved 
by abolishing mandatory orders and making means relevant so that futile orders and those that impose 
a crushing burden on the offender are avoided. The new Monetary Penalties Enforcement Service 
(MPES) aims to increase the collection rate of monetary penalties and this could impact on the 
payment of compensation orders. The Institute recommends that the way in which the Director of the 
MPES will exercise administrative powers in relation to compensation orders be reviewed to ensure 
that orders are dealt with in a way that gives the victim the best opportunity of recovering the amount 
of the order. 
Recommendations 
53. The Institute is of the view that the interests of victims would be better served by making some 
fundamental changes to compensation orders including making a compensation order a sentencing 
option in its own right.  
54. The Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 68(1) be amended omitting the 
requirement that compensation orders must be made for injury loss, destruction or damage if the 
offence is burglary, stealing, robbery, arson or injury to property. Instead courts should be required to 
consider making a compensation order in cases where injury, loss, destruction or damage has been 
caused by the offence and where such an order is not made, give reasons for not doing so. This 
requirement should be inserted in s 8A of the Act. (4.4.16) 
55. The Institute recommends that the option of making a compensation order should be included in 
the list of sentencing orders in s 7 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) rather than as an ancillary order in 
Part 9. The provision should state [a court may] ‘with or without recording a conviction make a 
compensation order for injury, loss, destruction or damage suffered by a person as a result of the 
offence’. (The provisions relating to compensation orders in Part 9 will have to be relocated). (4.4.17) 
56. The Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) be amended to provide that in 
determining the amount of a compensation order the court may take into account, as far as practicable, 
the financial circumstances of the offender and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose.98 
(4.4.18 - 4.4.19)  
57. The Institute recommends a review of the administrative procedures and resources associated with 
the making of compensation orders to enable them to be ‘adequately attended to’.99 (4.4.20) 
58. The Institute recommends that courts be empowered to make a compensation order in addition to 
imprisonment, community service order or a fine (this will require amendments to s 8 of the Act). It 
also recommends that courts be given the discretion to make compensation a condition of a suspended 
sentence, a home detention order, a community service order or a probation order. (4.4.16) 
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59. The Institute recommends that payment of compensation orders be enforced in the same manner as 
fines. It therefore recommends that: 
• This be clarified in (the relocated) s 69 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) (enforcement as a 
judgment debt) by adding a provision that enforcing the fine in this way does not preclude 
action being taken under s 47 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) for fine default; 
• That the definition of ‘fine’ in s 3 of the Monetary Penalties Enforcement Act 2005 (Tas) be 
amended to include ‘or the Supreme Court’ after the words ‘Magistrates Court’. (4.4.1)  
4.5 Compensation levies 
4.5.1 In Tasmania, as in other jurisdictions, convicted offenders are required to pay compensation 
levies which are used to help fund awards made under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. 
This is a scheme under which persons who suffers personal injuries as a result of criminal conduct 
may obtain some compensation. A person convicted or found guilty of a ‘serious offence’ must pay a 
compensation levy.100 A ‘serious offence’ includes crimes under the Code, drug offences, some 
offences under the Police Offences Act 1935 including assault, injury to property and motor vehicle 
stealing, dangerous and negligent driving and all drink driving offences. The levy is $50 for 
convictions in the Supreme Court and $20 for convictions in the Magistrates Court and it is payable in 
respect of each conviction. If the total amount of compensation levies exceeds the ‘combined limit’ 
(currently $500) the court has a discretion to reduce the amount to the combined limit in circumstances 
of financial hardship. Compensation levies are enforced in the same manner as fines. In some 
jurisdictions prisoners are required to satisfy levies out of prison earnings, however in Tasmania 
orders are made payable on release from prison.101 
4.5.2 At the time levies were introduced they were controversial. It was argued for example that it 
was unfair for the cost of criminal injuries compensation to be borne by delinquent drivers, most of 
whom bear no responsibility for criminal injuries. It has also been argued that the levies increase the 
burden borne by poorer offenders and may compound problems of imprisonment of offenders for fine 
default.102 Sumner countered that the reality is that most offenders do not have the means to make 
restitution, and given that the state must fill the gap, it is more equitable for offenders as a class to 
make a contribution to victims as a class than for the cost to fall on the whole community.103  
4.5.3 The Institute was asked to explore the efficacy of compensation levies. As their purpose is to 
help fund criminal injury compensation awards this would require data on the amount recovered from 
levies which goes towards criminal injuries compensation, the amount that is ordered but not 
recovered and the costs of recovery. Some $200,000 is recovered from compensation levies per annum 
but it is not known the amount ordered but not recovered. Nor are the costs of recovering the amount 
paid known. This data was not available from the Fines Enforcement Unit. It is likely that levies, like 
fines, are frequently unpaid.  
Responses to the Issues Paper 
4.5.4 The Issues Paper specifically sought responses to two questions relating to compensation 
levies: 
• Are compensation levies producing hardship for offenders?  
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• Are they an economic means of helping to compensate victims? 
4.5.5 The Institute received little assistance on these matters. The Legal Aid Commission of 
Tasmania expressed the view that they do cause hardship to offenders. Tasmania Police supported the 
retention of the levies as a means of assisting funding awards under the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme. However, the then Chief Justice made some pertinent criticisms of 
compensation levies. He asserted: 
There is a lack of logic in the Act’s approach. It always seems absurd when passing 
sentence on a murderer to order the payment of a $50 levy, when the next case may be a 
multi-count indictment for attempting to pass valueless cheques and require the imposition 
of a $50 levy on each of 20 counts. 
The discretion in the Court to cap the levy at $500 is not sufficiently flexible. There should 
be a range of the amount of the levy, with a wide discretion in the Court to impose a levy 
commensurate with the gravity of the offence and/or the degree of harm caused. The means 
of the offender should likewise be a factor. Perhaps a range of $50 to $1000 with an 
unfettered discretion would be most appropriate.104 
The Institute’s views 
4.5.6 The Institute agrees that levies are a useful means of funding criminal injuries compensation. 
Funding for the scheme comes from Consolidated Revenue and it is reasonable that funding from 
offender levies reduce the burden on the innocent law abiding citizen. However, as the then Chief 
Justice pointed out, the Institute also agrees that it is illogical to order a murderer to pay a levy of $50 
but a fraudster to pay $50 for each offence. The Institute also agrees with his suggestion that a cap of 
$500 may not be sufficiently flexible. However, it is less convinced that the amount of the levy should 
be within a defined range with an unfettered discretion to be exercised having regard to the gravity of 
the offence, degree of harm caused and the means of the offender. The levy is not about compensation 
or punishment but in effect a revenue raising device which should be easily calculated. There should 
be no attempt to adjust it according to means, harm caused or offence severity. Instead flat rates for a 
sentence irrespective of the number offences should be prescribed with scales based on the most 
serious conviction. This could be set at $200 for crimes against the person, $100 for indictable 
property offences and summary offences against the person, and $50 for other summary offences. 
While it is noted above that it is likely that many offenders do not pay compensation levies, some do 
and this provides a useful source of funds for criminal injuries. The Institute recommends that 
increasing the amount could assist in meeting the State’s obligations under this scheme and that the 
recommended scales are more logical and fair than the current levies. South Australia has recently 
doubled its compensation levies to increase the revenue for criminal injuries compensation. It also 
imposes a levy of $20 for expiated offences, which are administrative penalties applying to 
infringement notices. These amounts are quarantined and must be paid into the criminal injuries 
compensation fund. The Institute also recommends that a levy be imposed on infringement notices as 
well as on court-imposed sentences as is done in South Australia. 
4.5.7 The Institute has considered the issue of time for payment. Section 7 of the Victims of Crime 
Compensation Act 1994 (Tas) provides that payment of the levy is to be ordered to be paid forthwith, 
within a specified period or by instalments and that the order may be made so as to apply from the date 
of conviction or, if the offender has been sentenced to a term immediate imprisonment, from the date 
of release. Payment of a levy so long after the offence seems absurd in the case of a crime like murder 
when an offender may not be released for more than 20 years. It is recommended that there be a 
standard period for payment, namely 14 days from conviction or release from custody, with a 
discretion to the judicial officer to otherwise order.  
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4.5.8 The Institute is aware that victims sometimes misconstrue compensation levies and see the 
levy as in some way representing compensation for injury or damage suffered. It therefore 
recommends that the nature of the levy be explained in the Victims Support Services brochure for 
victims. 
Recommendations 
60. To increase the amount that compensation levies contribute to the criminal injuries compensation 
fund that the Victims of Crime Compensation Act 1994 (Tas) be amended to adopt a scale which 
increases the amount payable and better reflects the seriousness of the offence. (4.5.6) 
61. That a levy be imposed on infringement notices as well as on court imposed sentences as is done in 
South Australia. (4.5.6) 
62. That the time for payment for levies be a standard 14 days from conviction or release from prison 
with a discretion for the court to otherwise order. (4.5.7) 
63. That the nature of the compensation levy be explained in the Victims Support Services brochure 
for victims to counter any misperception that the levy represents compensation for their injury or loss. 
(4.5.8) 
4.6 The Victims’ Register 
4.6.1 The United Nations’ Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power was adopted by the General Assembly in 1985.105 It provides that victims should be 
informed of the ‘scope, timing and progress of the disposition of their cases, especially where serious 
crimes are involved and where they have requested such information’.106 The Charter has been adopted 
by some Australian states but has not formally been adopted by the Tasmanian Parliament. However, 
an attempt was made to enact a Charter of Victims Rights which included the rights of victims to be 
advised on request of the outcome of all criminal proceedings in relation to the crime and be fully 
appraised of any sentence imposed and its implications. It also included the right to be notified on 
request of the offender’s release from custody in cases where the offender has been imprisoned and the 
crime involved sexual assault or other personal violence.  
4.6.2 Despite the absence of a statutory obligation to keep victims informed about the progress of 
a case, sentencing outcomes and release dates, Victims Support Services do provide such information. 
Victims Support Services (as the Victims Assistance Unit) commenced operation on 1 July 2001, and 
its first priority was the establishment of a Victims’ Register to enable victims to be advised of the 
offenders’ location, length of sentence, security classification and release dates. The plan was for the 
Register to be implemented in discrete stages with stage one including information on offenders 
currently held within the prison system. Where the Parole Board is considering the parole of an 
offender, and when it has decided to release an offender, amendments to the Corrections Act 1997 
(Tas) now provide a mechanism for informing the victim of this and of the right to provide a statement 
(see discussion below in Part 5 at 5.5.1). In early 2002, considerable controversy surrounded the 
imminent release from custody to parole of an offender convicted of manslaughter and rape. The 
mother of the victim had not been notified of this and was considerably distressed by the news. 
Presumably she was not notified because she had not requested notification nor been notified that she 
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had the opportunity to request notification. There have been other incidents of victims first learning of 
the release of an offender by seeing them in public.  
4.6.3 In the responses to the Issues Paper, Tasmania Police predicted that initial problems 
experienced with the Victims’ Register may be resolved when its existence becomes more widely 
known. It endorsed the existence of the Register and stressed the importance of ensuring the 
notification procedures are effective.107 Michael Hodgman, MHA, submitted that the Victims 
Assistance Unit (now Victims Support Services) should be more adequately resourced108 and Don 
Wing, MLC, submitted that victims should be kept adequately informed about the process and 
outcome of proceedings and of the intention to release a prisoner in cases where a victim would suffer 
trauma by unexpectedly meeting in the community a recently released prisoner.109 
4.6.4 The Victims Register is now well established. It is an automated database that enables 
registered victims to be provided information about: 
• the sentence imposed by the court; 
• the location of the offender at the time of registration, and any subsequent transfers; 
• the offender’s security classification at the time of registration, and any classification changes; 
• the offender’s release eligibility dates; 
• the result of any leave applications; 
• any parole applications by the offender; 
• outcomes of parole hearings; 
• if the offender escapes from custody; 
• if the offender dies in custody. 
4.6.5 The Director of Public Prosecutions informs Victims Support Services of the names of 
victims of crime and the victims are then contacted. In cases of murder, rape and serious assaults 
Victim Support Services seek out victims. Police prosecutors notify Victims Support Services in cases 
in which victims express a wish to be included on the Register. Links to information about the Victims 
Register and registration forms are available through the Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania and the 
Justice Department’s Victims Support Services website.110 In addition, Victims Support Services 
advertise the existence of the Register annually. Currently there are 469 victims entered on the 
Register. This is the highest per capita take up rate in Australia.111 The Institute commends the creation 
of the Register and the take-up rate achieved by Victims Support Services. It notes that the ability of 
the service to inform victims of such matters as the date of release of an offender depends on victims 
informing Victims Support Services of any change of address. 
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Part 5 
Parole 
(a) Consider and comment upon the legislative requirement that judges and magistrates 
state the non-parole period. 
(b) Consider the length of the minimum non-parole period. 
(c) Consider and comment upon the legislative requirement that the Parole Board take into 
account a Victim Impact Statement (VIS) provided to it and not make a decision until a 
victim whose name has been entered on the Victims’ Register has been given an 
opportunity to make a VIS. 
(d) Consider and comment upon the legislative requirement that the Parole Board publish 
its decisions. 
5.1 Parole background 
Background to the terms of reference 
5.1.1 In April 2002, following controversy surrounding the Parole Board’s decision to release 
Gerald Wayne Hyland, a taxi driver serving a sentence for the manslaughter and rape of a young 
woman passenger, the Attorney-General wrote to the Law Reform Institute foreshadowing 
amendments to parole legislation to require the courts to specify the non-parole period when passing 
sentence, and to require the Parole Board to publish its decisions and to take into account any Victim 
Impact Statements before making a decision as to parole release. The letter invited the Law Reform 
Institute to extend the sentencing reference to include consideration of these changes and any other 
recommendations in relation to parole. The Institute accepted the extension of the terms of reference in 
the above terms. 
What is parole? 
5.1.2 Parole is a system of early, supervised release. Three purposes of parole are commonly 
mentioned. First, and primarily, it is designed to protect the community by reducing the risk of re-
offending. It can achieve this in a number of ways: by prompting prisoners to participate in 
rehabilitation programs; by managing reintegration into society through supervision and conditions 
which, if breached, can result in return to prison; and by identifying and differently managing high risk 
offenders. Secondly, it provides an incentive for prisoners to behave better in prison. The importance 
of the incentive for better inmate behaviour was enhanced in this State by the drastic curtailment of 
remissions from one-third of an offender’s sentence to a maximum of three months in 1993. A third 
purpose is that parole saves money by freeing up prison places through the early release of prisoners. 
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Models of parole 
5.1.3 There are different models of parole. Release on parole may be automatic after a non-parole 
period (the minimum term of imprisonment) has been served or release may be a discretionary matter 
determined by an administrative body such as a parole board. The non-parole period may be fixed by 
statute or by the court. If fixed by the court there may be a statutory minimum non-parole period. This 
minimum period may vary depending on the type of offence. The model adopted in Tasmania when 
parole was introduced in 1975 was for the statute to state the non-parole term and for parole release 
decisions to be made by the Parole Board. In other words, parole release in Tasmania is not automatic 
– it is a matter for the Parole Board.1 At first, the courts had no role in relation to parole. Amendments 
in 1987 gave the courts the power to extend the statutory non-parole period and to order that a prisoner 
not be released on parole with respect to a sentence. This was the model incorporated into the 
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) and the Corrections Act 1997 (Tas). By virtue of amendments to the 
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) in 2002, a failure by the court to specify a non-parole period makes an 
offender ineligible for parole.2 
5.1.4 For prisoners other than those sentenced to life imprisonment and offenders declared to be 
dangerous criminals, s 68(1) of the Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) specifies a statutory non-parole period 
of one-half of the sentence. An offender cannot be released on parole before the completion of one 
half of the sentence or six months whichever is the greater, unless in the opinion of the Board, there 
are exceptional circumstances.3 By virtue of s 17(2) of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), a longer period 
may be ordered by the sentencing court or it may order that the offender is not eligible for parole. 
Section 17(3A) now provides that where a court does not make an order under s 17(2) specifying the 
non-parole period, the offender is not eligible for parole in respect of that sentence.4 Judicial officers 
are now required by s 17(7) to give reasons if they make an order under s 17(2), that is, if they order 
that an offender is not eligible for parole or not eligible before the expiry of such period as is specified. 
Failure to state the non-parole period is by reason of s 17(3A), in effect, a denial of the possibility of 
parole but, if no order is made under s 17(2) and in effect parole is denied, the Act does not require 
reasons to be given. This suggests that the intention of s 17(7) was to require a judge to give reasons 
for setting a non-parole period rather than for declining to do so.5  
5.1.5 Parole for federal offenders is rather different. The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 19AB(1) 
requires a court, which sentences an offender to a sentence longer than three years imprisonment, to 
set a non-parole period unless it decides that it is inappropriate to do so. Parole is granted 
automatically for sentences less than 10 years if a non-parole period has been set.6 If the sentence is 
for 10 years or longer and a non-parole period has been set, release is determined by the Attorney-
General.7 This power to determine release has been delegated to senior officers of the Attorney-
General’s Department and it is assisted by advice from a Parole Panel.  
Reforming parole  
5.1.6 Parole has an important role in the criminal justice system but it is a controversial one. In the 
1980s, the anti-parole movement was particularly strong and in some jurisdictions parole, or at least 
discretionary parole, was abolished. Criticisms focussed on the difficulty of predicting post release 
                                                
1  In some jurisdictions, parole is automatic. For example in New South Wales parole release is automatic for prisoners 
serving less than three years and in South Australia it is automatic where an offender is sentenced to less than five years: 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 50; Correctional Services Act 1982 (SA) s 66. 
2  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 17 (3A). 
3  Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) s 70. 
4  Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 17(3A), (6). The amendments were effective from 1 October 2002. 
5  See Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 29 May 2002, 34-96 (Dr Peter Patmore, Attorney General). 
6  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 19AL(1). While s 19AL(1)(b) would seem to give the Attorney a discretion as to release date, it 
would seem parole is granted automatically: Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time, Sentencing 
Federal Offenders, Report No 103 (2006) 23.56.  
7  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 19AL(2). 
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behaviour, the lack of evidence of any beneficial effects of supervision and the charade of fixing a 
sentence, which is subverted by early release. In a number of jurisdictions this last criticism was 
addressed by requiring courts to set or state the minimum period that the prisoner was required to 
serve before being eligible for release. In other jurisdictions the first criticism was addressed by 
abolishing discretionary parole. However, whilst recognising its imperfections, Australian reviews 
have tended to favour retention of parole on the ground that it does serve useful functions. Most 
recently the Australian Law Reform Commission has recommended that automatic parole be abolished 
for federal offenders and replaced with discretionary parole.8 In New Zealand the Law Commission 
reviewed parole and has recommended retaining discretionary parole release with some changes to its 
structure and to eligibility.9  
5.1.7 The economic benefits of parole are clear. It reduces the prison population and the costs of 
supervision are less than the costs of incarceration. It can be argued it offers offenders an incentive to 
rehabilitate. Even if participation in prison programs is not entirely genuine but is motivated by a 
desire to impress the parole board, prisoners may gain something from it. Whether it works in terms of 
reducing reconviction rates has sometimes been doubted. The New Zealand Law Commission’s 
review of the evidence concludes that there is ‘some, albeit slender and equivocal evidence that parole 
may have a beneficial effect upon recidivism’.10 It referred to Stephen Shute’s review of the UK 
evidence spanning several decades,11 which revealed a clear trend that parolees are, on average, less 
likely to be reconvicted than non-parolees, at least in the short term. The reason for this is less clear. It 
could be due to selection effects or the benefits of supervision. Shute concludes: 
After thirty-five years of research, can it now be said with confidence that parole either 
does or does not have a beneficial effect on recidivism? Sadly, at least as far as England 
and Wales are concerned, the answer is no.12 
5.1.8 From reviews of the North American research, the New Zealand Law Commission draws a 
similar conclusion:  
In Joan Petersilia’s discussion of comparable Canadian and American literature, the 
positive correlation between parole and lower (or later) recidivism is clear; the reasons 
again remain largely a matter for speculation.13 
5.1.9 A more recent large US study of 38,624 prisoners released from 15 states examining the 
effect on re-arrest rates of parole supervision found discretionary parolees were less likely to be 
arrested but mandatory parolees fared no better than prisoners released without supervision and in 
some cases fared worse.14 It was suggested that differences could well be due to the factors other than 
supervision, but not that supervision has no effect on recidivism. Rather it was suggested that certain 
prisoners benefit more from supervision following screening by a parole board than others. A New 
Zealand study by Mark Brown cited by the Law Commission compared inmates released on parole 
with inmates released automatically to supervision and found parole appeared to postpone 
reconviction and re-imprisonment but did not terminate it.15 
                                                
8  ALRC, above n 6, 586-589. 
9  New Zealand Law Commission, Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform, Report 94 (2006). 
10  Ibid, 54. 
11  Ibid; Stephen Shute, ‘Does Parole Work? The Empirical Evidence from England and Wales’ (2004) 2 Ohio State Journal 
of Criminal Law 315. 
12  Ibid, 321. 
13  New Zealand Law Commission (2006), above n 9, 55. 
14  Amy Solomon, Vera Kachnowski and Avi Bhati, Does Parole Work? Analysing the Impact of Postprison Supervision on 
Rearrest Outcomes (2005). 
15  Ibid, 56. 
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Responses to the Issues Paper 
5.1.10 The Issues Paper did not canvass the possibility of abolishing parole but asked for 
suggestions for change in relation to its legislative framework. A number of respondents expressed 
support for discretionary parole.16 The former Chief Justice, Justice Cox, said ‘[f]ew would argue that 
parole is not a worthwhile system’.17 Justice Underwood, as he was then, said, ‘I believe that early 
release on parole is a useful tool and should be retained. It helps maintain discipline in the prison and 
it helps integrate prisoners back into society’.18 
The Institute’s view 
5.1.11 The Institute agrees with the New Zealand Law Commission that although it cannot 
confidently be claimed that parole prevents recidivism, we should not be hasty about abolishing a 
system when the evidence is marginally positive.19 It is appropriate that public protection and risk 
factors play a part in determining whether an offender can be released before the end of a sentence and 
it is realistic to make such a decision at a time closer to release rather than at the time of sentence. The 
Institute considers a model which provides for a statutory minimum non-parole period with a judicial 
discretion to increase the non-parole period or refuse parole is appropriate. Rather than automatic 
release, it supports a model that allows for parole release decisions to be made by a parole board. 
Discretionary parole provides an incentive to address offending behaviour by participating in 
rehabilitation programs, it assists with managing offenders in custody be providing an incentive for 
good behaviour and encourages offenders to develop post-release plans. The Tasmanian model 
provides an appropriate balance between judicial input into the parole eligibility date based on the 
gravity of the offence and culpability of the offender and the offender’s antecedents,20 and 
discretionary release by a Board which offers the flexibility of identifying and differentially managing 
high risk offenders at the time of release.21 
Recommendation 
64. The Institute supports the current parole model in which parliament sets the minimum non-parole 
period, the court determines the parole eligibility date and the Parole Board determines the date of 
release for parole eligible offenders. (5.1.11) 
5.2 Stating the non-parole period as part of the sentence 
5.2.1 Prior to the 2002 amendments it was quite rare for courts either to make an order that the 
offender not be eligible for parole or to extend the statutory non-parole period. The accepted view was 
that the prima facie position is that a person is eligible for parole at the end of half of the sentence. As 
Green CJ stated: 
In my view the scheme of the Parole Act justifies the conclusion that prima facie a person 
who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment is eligible for parole at the expiration of 
the period fixed by the Act and that the power to limit his eligibility for parole conferred by 
                                                
16  The Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Law Society, submission, 5; Kay Fisher, then Parole Board Member, submission, 
2; Michael Hodgman, Shadow Attorney-General, submission, 5. Many others made submissions in relation to parole 
which implied support for its preservation. 
17  The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, submission, 5. 
18  The Honourable Justice Underwood, submission, 2.  
19  New Zealand Law Commission, above n 9, 56. 
20  As required by the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 17(4). 
21  The Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) s 72(4) requires the Board to take into account a number of factors, the first two are the 
likelihood of re-offending and the protection of the public. 
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s 12B should only be exercised when the judge imposing sentence is affirmatively satisfied 
that there exists sufficient reason why the accused should be deprived of his right to have 
the Parole Board consider his release on parole. I do not understand counsel for the 
applicant or the respondent to be arguing to the contrary of the substance of those 
propositions. 
The provisions of s 12B(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Parole Act 1975 do not on their face limit 
the factors to which a judge may have regard when he is exercising the discretion conferred 
by that section but in my view nothing in the Act would suggest that Parliament was 
intending that a judge should take into account considerations which are not relevant to 
what are generally accepted as the principles and purposes of sentencing. In my view 
therefore in exercising his discretion under s 12B a judge should have regard to the factors 
specified in s 12B(1)(a), (b) and (c) read in the light of the established principles and 
objectives of sentencing.22 
5.2.2 Section 12B(1) of the Parole Act 1975 (Tas) was in substance re-enacted in s 17 of the 
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) and the approach that prima facie a person should be eligible for parole at 
the half way point of the sentence continued. 
The impact of the requirement to state the non-parole period  
5.2.3 It is clear that the primary purpose of requiring the judge to state a non-parole period was to 
address the criticism that parole makes the court’s announced sentence a charade. Because of the 
impact of parole release on sentence length, the time served by a prisoner may bear little relationship 
to the sentence imposed by the court. A consequent lack of transparency about what a sentence 
actually means tends to undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system. ‘Truth in 
sentencing’ requires courts to state what a sentence really means. In his second reading speech, the 
then Attorney-General asserted: 
With these amendments, it will be the sentencing court which determines in an open, public 
and accountable way, the actual time a person must spend in prison prior to being eligible 
for parole. The situation will contrast with the process currently followed where it is left to 
the Parole Board to decide, in many cases where years have elapsed since the crime was 
committed. This will ensure that there will be no doubt in the public’s mind about the 
actual time that must be spent in prison before a prisoner may be considered for release on 
parole.23 
5.2.4 Requiring courts to articulate the parole component of a sentence satisfies the demand for 
truth in sentencing. It is a worthwhile reform which addresses the desirable criterion that sentencing be 
a transparent process. The Attorney-General’s second reading speech does not clearly indicate if the 
amendments to s 17 were intended to do more than to make the sentencing process transparent in order 
to increase community faith in the system.24 His words could be interpreted as indicating a greater role 
for offence seriousness and culpability in determining parole release as these matters are likely to be 
more vivid at the time of sentence than the time of eligibility for release. Prompting courts to consider 
the non-parole period in each case suggests that a greater role for the courts was envisaged in 
determining parole eligibility. Furthermore, the fact that the default position of a failure to specify a 
non-parole period changed from release after the half way point to no parole eligibility suggests that 
the prima facie position was no longer eligibility at the expiration of the minimum statutory period. 
However, the Attorney-General acknowledged that it was unclear whether the amendments would lead 
                                                
22  Gill Serial No 34/1990 1-2, 7-8 (Crawford J); Adams Serial No 41/1998 (Crawford J). 
23  Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 29 May 2002, 34-96 (Dr Peter Patmore, Attorney General), 
where he said where the court does exercise its power to state a non-parole period it must give reasons. 
24  Ibid. 
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to a change in practice when he said, ‘[t]he interesting point that we do not know at the moment is 
how judges will respond with their non-parole periods.’25  
5.2.5 The post-amendment approach to the non-parole periods was adverted to in Balmer v The 
Queen where the Court of Criminal Appeal made it clear that the prima facie position that a person is 
eligible for parole after six months or half of the sentence no longer applies: 
The question is not, as counsel for the appellant’s submission suggests, was there anything 
in the material before the learned sentencing judge that required deviation from an order 
making the appellant eligible to apply for parole after the service of one-half of the 
sentence? The question is, on the material before the learned sentencing judge, was it 
appropriate to order that the appellant be eligible to apply for parole, and if so, should he be 
eligible to do so. 26 
5.2.6 Rohan Foon’s study of the impact of the 2002 parole amendments on judges’ sentencing 
practice confirms that judges responded by extending the non parole period beyond the minimum 
period much more often than they had done prior to the amendments.27 
Table 11: Non-parole periods for offenders sentenced to over 9 months imprisonment 
pre- amendment period 
1/10/00 to 30/9/02 
post amendment period 1 
1/10/02 to 30/09/04 
post amendment period 2 
1/10/04 to 30/09/06 
 
No  % No % No % 
min non-parole 
period 185 89 86 37 61 30 
extended non-
parole period 19 9 100 43 96 47 
no parole 
eligibility 4 2 48 21 49 24 
Total 208 100 234 100 206 100 
5.2.7 Table 11 shows that before the 2002 amendments 89 per cent of sentenced offenders were 
eligible parole release after the minimum statutory non-parole period. This had reduced to 37 per cent 
in the two year period after the amendment and to 30 per cent in the next two year period. In other 
words, prior to the amendments only nine per cent of offenders had their statutory non-parole period 
extended by the sentencing judge whereas since the amendments it has been more usual to extend the 
non-parole period than not to. It also shows that it was rare for an offender to be denied a parole 
eligibility date before the 2002 amendments. Now it is much more common with 21 per cent and 24 
per cent of sentences over nine months in the two periods after the amendment having no parole 
eligibility date.  
5.2.8 Foon also found that the average operative sentence (the period of a sentence that is not 
suspended) remained almost the same for the two periods (see Fig 23),28 but the average non-parole 
period increased (see Fig 24). He found average non-parole periods as a percentage of the operative 
sentence increased for all crime types after the amendments. These findings were confirmed by 
analysis of data for the next two years. 
                                                
25  Ibid, in Committee. 
26  [2006] TASSC 97, [22] (Evans and Tennant J); See also Duggan v The Queen [2007] TASSC 23, [79] (Tennant J). 
27  Rohan Foon, Truth in Sentencing and the Sentencing Amendment Act 2002 (Tas): Its Impact and Effect on the 
Determination of Non-Parole Periods in Tasmania (Supervised Research Elective, University of Tasmania, 2004). The 
data have been updated for this report.  
28  Excluding homicide where the base rate is low and so the average fluctuates. 
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Fig 23: Average operative sentence for sentences of 9 months and more  
 
5.2.9 Increases in the average non-parole period as a percentage of operative sentences were found 
to be particularly evident in the case of lower range sentences (see Fig 24). As Foon suggested, this 
demonstrates that courts are more inclined to deny parole in cases where the benefits of parole are 
restricted by the shortness of the parole period. The amendments have had less effect in cases of 
lengthy sentences where judges were more likely to turn their minds to setting a non-parole period in 
order to give effect to the gravity of the offence.29 
Fig 24: Average non-parole periods by sentence length 
 
5.2.10 Foon found that in the period before the amendments, judges were consistent in setting non-
parole periods. Average non-parole periods ranged from 54 per cent to 57 per cent of the operative 
sentence and the minimum non-parole period was set in 85 to 97 per cent of cases. Sentencing data 
since the amendments have been analysed to see if the trend to extend non-parole periods has been 
consistent between the judges. 
Table 12: Non-parole period as a percentage of operative sentence by judge, 2002-2006 
                                                
29  Ibid. 
Average non-parole period per sentence 
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5.2.11 This table demonstrates considerable differences between the judges with Judge 7 imposing 
the minimum period in just 10 per cent of cases compared with Judge 1 who imposed the minimum in 
55 per cent of cases. Some judges did not ever deny parole in this period (Judges 2 and 6) but Judge 4 
denied parole in 34 per cent of cases and Judge 7 did so in 28 per cent of cases. 
5.2.12 To sum up, as well as addressing the issue of truth in sentencing by requiring a sentence to 
say what it means, it is clear that the 2002 amendments requiring a judge to state the non-parole period 
if an offender was eligible for parole release have had an impact on the prima facie position of parole 
eligibility after serving the minimum statutory non-parole period. The presumption in favour of a non-
parole period of half the sentence has gone and non-parole periods have increased as a percentage of 
the operative sentence. Whether this has had an impact on time served is unknown, but in theory at 
least, it could have led to increases. 
Responses to the Issues Paper 
5.2.13 The Issues Paper supported the requirement for judges to state any parole eligibility date in 
court on the grounds that stating only the nominal sentence in open court does nothing to inform the 
victim, the offender and the general public about what the sentence means in practice. However, it 
questioned whether it was appropriate to reverse the prima facie presumption that a person should be 
eligible for parole after serving half of the sentence or six months – whichever is the longer. 
5.2.14 Few respondents addressed the 2002 amendments. However, Underwood J (as he then was) 
commented: 
So far as I am aware, the position with respect to non-parole periods prior to the very recent 
changes to the Sentencing Act 1997 s 17, worked perfectly well. I understand that the 
legislative change was the result of widespread and ill-informed public opinion concerning 
the release on parole of a prisoner who as convicted of manslaughter, not murder of a 
young woman.30 
5.2.15 The Honourable Don Wing MLC was concerned that the amendments could result in the 
situation of a judge forgetting to specify a non-parole period even though he or she had no intention of 
requiring the offender to serve the full term of the sentence. He favoured the pre-amendment position 
of eligibility at the half way point if the judge made no order.31 The then Chief Justice, Justice Cox, 
had a similar concern and did not consider the 2002 amendments appropriately addressed the situation 
of courts giving adequate consideration to the possibility of extending a non-parole period, noting that 
a judge’s failure to make an order and a failure to advert to that fact, would be likely to result in 
appellate review. His solution to a repetition of the Hyland situation32 was to introduce a sliding scale 
of parole eligibility based on length of sentence.33 Tasmania Police agreed with the requirement for a 
judge to state the non-parole period of a sentence but was of the view that if the judge made no special 
order the period should be 75 per cent of the sentence rather than no eligibility.34 
                                                
30  The Honourable Justice Underwood, submission, 2.  
31  Don Wing, President of the Legislative Council, submission, 2. 
32  Hyland was a taxi driver convicted of rape and manslaughter of his passenger. He unsuccessfully appealed a sentence of 
16 years (Hyland Serial No A82/1996). No non-parole period was specified by the trial judge and his release on parole 
attracted much media attention: see above para 5.1.1. In his submission, the Chief Justice said he suspected insufficient 
consideration was given to the possibility of extending the parole period: The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, 
submission, 5. 
33  The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, submission, 5. 
34  Tasmania Police, submission, 10. 
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The Institute’s view 
5.2.16 The Institute supports the requirement for a judge or magistrate to stipulate the non-parole 
period at the time of sentence on the grounds that a failure to do so confuses the public and the victim 
about what the sentence means in practice and attracts criticism which can be avoided by a more 
transparent approach. On the face of it, an inadvertent failure to address the issue of a parole eligibility 
date could lead to difficulties. However, the Institute has no evidence that this has proved to be a 
problem.35 In any event, Crown counsel could draw a judge’s attention to the matter or the matter 
could be corrected by an application to correct the sentence under s 94 of the Sentencing Act 1997.  
5.2.17 It is now accepted that the amendments to s 17 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) have altered 
the prima facie position that a person is eligible to apply for parole after the minimum statutory period 
unless there is reason to deprive the offender of this right. The Institute has no particular difficulty 
with this in theory. However, there are a number of concerns with s 17. First, it has led to disparity 
between the judges in its application. It does not necessarily follow that it has led to inconsistent 
outcomes between offenders because release is determined by the Board in all cases except those 
where no non-parole period is set. The Institute is concerned that transparency has come at the cost of 
inconsistency between judges in the way in which they approach fixing the non-parole period. A 
possible solution is to re-instate the prima facie right of a prisoner to apply for parole after half the 
sentence has been served by inserting in s 17 a provision to the effect that the court shall state a period 
that is one-half of the period of the sentence unless it is satisfied that the circumstances it is required to 
consider in s 17(4) require an extension of that period or a no non-parole period to be set.  
5.2.18 Secondly, s 17 is rather clumsily drafted and this is highlighted when the requirement of 
reasons in 17(7) is considered. It seems incongruous to require reasons when a judge orders that an 
offender is not eligible for parole but not to require reasons when parole is denied because no non-
parole period is set. It would appear from the Attorney-General’s second reading speech that the 
intention could have been to require reasons when offenders were given a non-parole period. 
Examination of all 2006 prison sentences of more than nine months revealed that reasons for setting a 
parole period or refusing parole were usually stated clearly. In other cases, no clear reasons were given 
but they could possibly be inferred from sentencing remarks. And there were cases where parole was 
not mentioned although these were usually operative sentences of fewer than 15 months. That there is 
some confusion in relation to the need to give reasons is not surprising.36 While there is no statutory 
obligation to give reasons for refusing to fix a parole period where parole is not mentioned, the 
Institute is of the view that reasons should be given where sentences exceed 12 months. The Board 
does not consider it necessary to require reasons for denying parole for shorter sentences. In the case 
of a sentence of nine months, for example, an offender would be normally be released unconditionally 
after six months because of remissions, so it is only for sentences in excess of nine months that parole 
is relevant in practice. It is barely relevant for sentences of up to 12 months because although an 
offender with a 12 month sentence may be released after six months on parole, they will be released 
conditionally and the supervision period is likely to extend beyond their earliest unconditional release 
date.37 It is therefore recommended that s 17(7) be amended so that it requires reasons to be given for 
specifying a non-parole period and for denying parole for all sentences of imprisonment in excess of 
12 months. The Institute also questions the need for there to be two ways of denying parole, namely 
stating that the offender is not eligible for parole and by not commenting on parole. A more 
transparent approach is for the judge to be required to make an order under s 17(2) if the offender is 
                                                
35  A search of our Supreme Court sentencing database revealed that there were 20 cases of sentences in excess of nine 
months in which parole was not mentioned but most of these were sentences of 12 months or less with just six longer 
sentences where parole was not mentioned and therefore the offender was ineligible.  
36  In Wisniewski v The Queen [2007] TASSC 25 an appeal against sentence was allowed on the grounds that stating a non-
parole period of three years in the sentence of four years made the sentencing manifestly excessive. Justice Slicer at [38] 
also stated that the failure of the sentencing judge to provide reasons provided a basis for upholding the appeal.  
37  See Corrections Act 1997 s 75 which allows the parole period to extend beyond the full term of the sentence. 
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not to be eligible for parole. The Institute therefore recommends that s 17(2) be amended to provide 
that a court must make an order under para (a) or (b).  
Recommendations 
65. In the light of the inconsistencies that have emerged between judges in sentencing practices 
relating to the extension of non-parole periods and the denial of parole eligibility, the Institute 
recommends that s 17 be amended to include a requirement that the court state a period that is equal to 
the statutory non-parole period unless it is satisfied having regard to the circumstances that it is 
required to consider in s 17(4) that an extension of that period is necessary or parole should be denied. 
(5.2.17) 
66. It is recommended that s 17(7) be amended so that when a sentence of more than 12 months 
imprisonment is imposed and an order is made under s 17(2)(a) that an offender is not eligible for 
parole or an order is made under s 17(2)(b) setting a non-parole period, reasons for such an order are 
given. (5.2.18) 
67. It is recommended that a court be required to state that an offender is not eligible for parole when 
parole eligibility is denied by requiring a court to make an order under s 17(2)(a) or (b). (5.2.18)  
5.3 What should the minimum non-parole period be? 
Non-parole periods elsewhere in Australia 
5.3.1 When parole was first introduced in Tasmania by the Parole Act 1975, the statutory non-
parole period was one-third of the sentence or six months, whichever was the greater. This was later 
extended to one-half of the sentence. Just as models of parole vary between jurisdictions, so do 
minimum non-parole periods. In some jurisdictions there are variable minimum non-parole periods 
depending on sentence length. For example in Western Australia, the minimum non-parole period is 
one half of the sentence for sentences up to four years, and for sentences in excess of four years a 
prisoner is eligible for parole when two years of the prison term remains to be served.38 In a number of 
jurisdictions the variability of the minimum non-parole period depends on the type of the offence. In 
Queensland, prisoners serving a term of imprisonment for a ‘serious violent offence’ are not eligible 
for release on parole until the prisoner has served 80 per cent of the term of imprisonment but other 
prisoners are eligible after half of the term of imprisonment.39 In South Australia a ‘serious offence 
against the person’ attracts a minimum non-parole period of four fifths of the sentence unless there are 
special circumstances.40 In the case of other offences the court has a discretion to fix a non-parole 
period of any length.41 In the Northern Territory, courts are required to specify a minimum non-parole 
period for offenders sentenced for 12 months or longer of not less than 50 per cent of the sentence but 
for certain sexual offences and offences against persons under 16 years of age the minimum period is 
70 per cent.42 In New South Wales, the balance of the term required to be served must not exceed one 
third of the non-parole period, ‘unless the court decides there are special circumstances for it being 
more’.43 Release is automatic for sentences of three years or less.44 New South Wales has also 
                                                
38  Sentencing Act 1993 (WA) s 93; Sentencing Administration Act 2003 (WA) Part 3 s 22 (sentences less than 12 months). 
39  Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) ss 182(2), 184(2).  
40  Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 32(5)(ba). 
41  Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 32 (There isn’t a section saying there is any general minimum non-parole 
period – this section states that the court must set one and makes note of a couple of limits to it (like for murder and 
serious offenders). 
42  Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) ss 53-55A.  
43  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ss 44 and 46.  
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introduced legislative standard non-parole periods which are fixed by statute for some offences to 
further structure and guide judicial discretion.45 Victoria has a different model. There is no statutory 
minimum proportion of the sentence that must be served and the relationship between the sentence and 
the non-parole period is governed by case law. This does not specify a ratio between the head sentence 
and the non-parole period. Two thirds of the head sentence is common but does not provide a fixed 
standard.46 A glance at sentencing data for Victoria suggests that non-parole periods tend to be 
upwards of one-half of the sentence, averaging around 60 per cent.47 
International examples 
5.3.2 In the United Kingdom, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 introduced radical changes to early 
release. The work of the Parole Board is now limited to dealing with offenders serving 
‘dangerousness’ sentences (sexual and violent offenders who have been assessed as dangerous) where 
release is determined by assessments of risk.48 All other prisoners serving determinate sentences of 12 
months or longer are automatically released after serving half of the sentence on licence. Courts have 
the power to recommend licence conditions but the precise terms of the licence are set by the Home 
Office on the advice of the Prison Governor and from the National Offender Management Service.49 
Under New Zealand’s Parole Act 2002 most offenders serving sentences of two years or more were 
eligible for parole after serving one-third of their term. The only exceptions were offenders convicted 
of murder with aggravated circumstances and dangerous offenders subjected to an indeterminate 
sentence.50 However, the New Zealand Law Commission recommended increasing the proportion of 
time served before being eligible for parole.51 This has been implemented and for long term sentences 
the statutory non-parole period is now 12 months or two thirds of the sentence whichever is the longer 
and for short term sentences it is two thirds.52 
5.3.3 In Canada, for offenders sentenced to sentences of two years or more the statutory non-
parole period is one-third of the sentence, although a judge may increase the non-parole period from 
one-third to one-half for offenders convicted of sexual offences, offences of violence and drug 
offences.53 Offenders sentenced to less that two years imprisonment are subject to the jurisdiction of 
the province. In Ontario, for example, an offender sentenced to less than two years may be released 
after one-third of the sentence.54  
Should the statutory non-parole period be extended in Tasmania? 
5.3.4 Before the government’s 2002 amendments to the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) were debated, 
the Opposition introduced a private members Bill to increase the non-parole period to two-thirds of the 
sentence. This was opposed by the Government and defeated, as was an amendment to the 
government’s Sentencing Amendment Bill. However, it remained Liberal Party policy for the July 
2002 election but appears now to have been abandoned. At the time, the Opposition supported the 
                                                                                                                                                   
44  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 50. 
45  Considered below at para 5.3.12 
46  Demarco [1999] VSCA 69. 
47 Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, Sentencing Snapshots (2007) 
<http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/Sentencing+Council/Home/Sentencing+Statistics/Sentencin
g+Snapshots/> at 7 December 2007.  
48  Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (4th ed 2005), 282.  
49  Ibid. 
50 Geoff Hall, The Sentencing Act 2002 – New Bottle, Same Wine? (2002) Law Talk < http://www.nz-
lawsoc.org.nz/lawtalk/583hall.htm> at 5 December 2007. 
51  Law Commission, Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform, Report 94 (2006) 11. 
52  Sentencing Amendment Act 2007 (NZ).  
53  Corrections and Conditional Release Act, RSC 1992 c20, s 120. 
54  Ontario Parole and Earned Release Board, Parole Eligibility (2004) 
<http://www.operb.gov.on.ca/english/parole_elig.html> at 7 December 2007. 
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increase of the non-parole period on the grounds that this was what the community wanted as 
evidenced by the ‘very strong community concern about soft treatment of criminals and then their 
release when they have only served half of their sentence.’55 In contrast, the Greens strongly opposed 
any extension of the non-parole period and vigorously defended the parole system.56  
5.3.5 In the Issues Paper it was pointed out that arguments in favour of extending the non-parole 
period – the need to address community concern that sentencing is too soft and that serving only half 
of the sentence will undermine deterrence and be inadequate denunciation – can be answered by the 
discussion in Part 2. In other words, the available evidence suggests that increasing the severity of 
sentences will not alter the widespread view that sentences are too lenient, and that increasing sentence 
length is not an effective strategy to reduce crime. The issue of public concern with lenient sentences 
is discussed further in Part 7. 
Responses to the Issues Paper 
5.3.6 A number of responses to the Issues Paper supported increasing the statutory non-parole 
period. Increasing it to 75 per cent of the sentence was supported by three respondents.57 The Police 
Association of Tasmania (PAT) submitted: 
With regard to parole, PAT has a policy whereby it believes the sentence of the court 
should substantially prevail with the scope for early release limited to 25% of the sentence, 
including time for remission. Our view is based on the desire for punishment to reflect the 
seriousness of the crime and the fact this is best assessed at the time by the court.58 
5.3.7 On behalf of the Liberal Party, Michael Hodgman argued in support of extending the non-
parole period, although it should be noted that the Liberal Party has since abandoned this policy.59 
5.3.8 The Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania supported increasing the non-parole period to two 
thirds of the sentence.60 Kay Fisher supported the current 50 per cent non-parole period as the general 
rule but suggested that it be increased to 75 per cent for sentences of more than four years on the 
grounds ‘it would perhaps be more palatable from a victim perspective’ and ‘as a Parole Board 
member it is challenging to grant such a long period of parole for such a serious crime’.61 The then 
Chief Justice suggested a sliding scale: 
If Parliament wishes to take the initiative in preventing a repetition of the Hyland situation, 
some consideration could be given to a sliding scale or parole eligibility, eg a minimum of 
50 per cent for sentences not exceeding 5 years, up to 75 per cent minimum for those of or 
exceeding 20 years. In that way the element of ‘nature and circumstances of the offence’ 
could be more readily factored into the sentencing process.62 
                                                
55  Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 22 May 2002, 50-111 (Mr Hodgman, Shadow Attorney-
General). 
56  Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 29 May 2002, 34-96 (Ms Pegg Putt). 
57  Submissions of Warwick Dunstan, the Police Association of Tasmania and Michael Hodgman (MHA, Shadow Attorney-
General). 
58  Police Association of Tasmania, submission, 5. 
59  The Hon Michael Hodgman, personal communication, December 2007. 
60  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, submission, 13. 
61  Kay Fisher, member of the Parole Board, submission, 2. 
62  The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, submission, 5. 
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5.3.9 However, a number of other submissions, including that of Justice Underwood, as he then 
was, supported parole without suggesting an increase in the statutory non-parole period.63 The 
Honourable Don Wing MLC, expressly supported retaining the 50 per cent non-parole period.64 
The Institute’s views 
5.3.10 The Institute acknowledges that there is some support for increasing the statutory non-parole 
period from 50 per cent of the sentence and that a number of other jurisdictions have done so or have 
introduced variable proportions depending on offence type or sentence length. The grounds for doing 
so are that to allow a prisoner to be released after just half the sentence has been served makes a 
mockery of the sentence pronounced in court, undermines denunciation and deterrence and reinforces 
the public perception that the system is too lenient towards criminals. In the Institute’s view the anger 
and frustration of victims and others who believe that sentences do not mean what they say is 
addressed by the judge pronouncing both the head sentence and the non-parole period when a sentence 
is imposed thereby making it clear that the offender will be eligible for release on parole after serving 
the non-parole period. It still could be argued that a statutory non-parole period of 50 per cent of the 
sentence gives insufficient recognition to the nature and gravity of the offence in determining the time 
in prison an offender must serve. However, such a position fails to acknowledge that prisoners 
released on parole are not released unconditionally. They remain under a prison sentence65 and if 
parole is revoked they are normally required to serve the remainder of the sentence which was 
unserved at the time of release with no credit for ‘clean street time’.66 This is not always the case in 
jurisdictions that have a longer statutory minimum non-parole period.  
5.3.11 The Institute’s view is that requiring a judge to address the non-parole period in every case 
(because a failure to do so will deny the offender eligibility for parole release) sufficiently addresses 
concerns that a statutory non-parole period of one half of the sentence fails to recognise the gravity of 
offence. If the judge is of the view that the nature and circumstances of the offence warrant increasing 
the non-parole period, this can be done. The Institute considers a judge’s discretion should not be 
constrained by increasing a minimum period which in any event is an arbitrary proportion of the 
sentence. Extensions of the non-parole period for long sentences or for certain kinds of offences are 
objectionable for the same reason, namely justice is better served by leaving the matter to the 
discretion of the judge. There will be cases where offenders who are sentenced to long sentences, even 
offenders who are convicted of violent offences can be appropriately released into the community at 
the half way point. They will still be ‘under sentence’,67 subject to constraints on their freedom and 
supervision and parole conditions may assist in their rehabilitation and reintegration back into the 
community.  
5.3.12 The Institute notes that some jurisdictions, such as Victoria, have managed perfectly well 
without any minimum statutory non-parole period at all. It also notes that generally, where statutory 
non-parole periods have been increased, this has not been done with the aim of increasing the length of 
prison sentences. The primary aim has been to promote truth in sentencing by ensuring that prisoners 
spend a greater proportion of the pronounced sentence in prison. This has meant that adjustments have 
to be made to sentences imposed to decrease their length. In New Zealand, where the Law 
Commission has recommended increasing the statutory non-parole period from one-third to two-
thirds, it was also recommended that sentences be reduced by around 25 per cent and that this be 
achieved by sentencing guidelines drafted by a Sentencing Council. Clearly, increasing the statutory 
non-parole period is a complex matter. For reasons outlined in Part 2, increasing the sentence length of 
                                                
63  The Honourable Justice Underwood, submission, 2; the Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Law Society expressed 
support for parole and stating the non-parole period at sentence but made no mention of a need to increase the non-parole 
period.  
64  Mr Don Wing, MLC, President, Legislative Council, submission, 2. 
65  Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) s 78(1). 
66  Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) ss 76, 79(5). 
67  Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) s 79(5)(a).  
Part 5: Parole 
191 
prison sentences is not supported by the Institute. Increasing the statutory non-parole period should not 
be done without adjusting sentences downwards. In any event, the Institute does not see any need to 
increase the statutory non-parole period. Nor does the Institute favour the introduction of the New 
South Wales initiative of standard non-parole periods (see 5.3.1), an issue considered further in Part 6.  
Recommendation 
68. The Institute does not recommend increasing the statutory non-parole period in the Corrections 
Act 1997 (Tas) s 68(1) and the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 17(3) beyond half of the period of the 
operative sentence.68 (5.3.10 – 5.3.12) 
5.4 Victim statements 
5.4.1 Amendments to the Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) s 72, provide a mechanism for informing 
victims of an offence that the release of the offender is to be considered by the Board and that they 
may provide a written statement to the Board. Victims whose names appear on the Victims Register 
managed by the Victims Support Services (see para 4.6.2) are invited to provide a victim statement. 
Section 72(4)(ka) requires any victim statement provided to the Board to be considered along with the 
other listed matters (the likelihood of the prisoner re-offending, the protection of the public, the 
rehabilitation of the prisoner, the likelihood of the prisoner complying with the conditions, the 
circumstances and gravity of the offence or offences etc).  
5.4.2 A victim statement is defined as a,  
written statement that – 
(i) gives particulars of any injury, loss or damage suffered by the victim as a direct 
result of the offence; and 
(ii) describes the effects on the victim of the commission of the offence.69 
5.4.3 This definition is almost identical to the description of a victim impact statement (VIS) in the 
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 81A(2A) referring to the statements which may be provided by victims to 
the court prior to sentence under the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), s 81A.  
5.4.4 The Issues Paper suggested that the provision of a VIS to the Parole Board in the terms of s 
72B is inappropriate and incompatible with the basis of parole decisions and the purposes of parole. 
Parole is not a re-sentencing exercise. It is not up to the Board to determine if the prisoner has been 
punished adequately for the offence. The quantum of punishment is a matter for the courts. The 
function of the Parole Board is to determine if it is in the public interest to release the offender on 
parole. This is a matter of determining the risk of re-offending and of deciding whether parole will 
assist in preventing the offender from committing further offences. The nature and seriousness of the 
offence are relevant to this and it follows that it is appropriate for the Board to consider the sentencing 
remarks and other information in relation to the offence. Victim impact should only be relevant in so 
far as offence seriousness bears on the risk of re-offending. However, a victim’s statement may be 
relevant to the Board to inform it of the victim’s feelings about the release of the offender. It may be 
that the victim has real fears in relation to the offender’s release. It is possible that the victim has been 
harassed by the prisoner or received threats. These and other matters related to the risk of re-offending 
are relevant matters for the Board in deciding upon release and the conditions of release. Victims can 
also be advised about whom to contact in the event of problems arising in relation to the offender. In 
                                                
68  Operative sentence is the term used in the Corrections Act 1997 (see definition in s 3) – it means the period of 
imprisonment that is not suspended. 
69  Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) s 72(2B). 
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other words, what is most relevant to the Board is any material that relates to the risk of re-offending 
and how the offender should be managed on release.  
5.4.5 The Issues Paper suggested that the provisions relating to providing victim statements to the 
Parole Board are misleading. It argued that it is appropriate that victims convey their feelings about 
parole release to the Board and it is appropriate that measures be adopted to alleviate victim concerns. 
But it is not appropriate that victims be given the impression that they can prevent parole release 
because they believe the offender has not been punished enough. The Institute proposed that the 
Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) s 72(2B)(b) and s 72(4) should be amended to reflect the kind of 
information about protection of victims that would be useful to both the Board and victims. 
Responses to the Issues Paper 
5.4.6 The Issues Paper sought responses to the Institute’s preliminary view of the need to amend 
the Corrections Act 1997(Tas) s 72(2)(b) as to the content of victim statements to avoid suggesting to 
victims that parole is a re-sentencing exercise. Few respondents addressed this issue but support was 
expressed for victim statements by some respondents and no problem was seen with the statements 
focusing on victim impact even in cases when no VIS had been supplied to the sentencing court.70  
The Institute’s views 
5.4.7 The concern of the Institute that providing victim statements to the Board that focus on 
victim impact cause victims to believe that parole is a re-sentencing exercise that allows the Board to 
deny parole on the basis of past or ongoing impact of the offence on the victim does not seem to have 
created problems in practice. This may in part be due to the advice given to victims about the use the 
Board makes of victim statements. The last published annual report of the Parole Board states: 
As stated in previous reports ‘the Board does not lose sight of the impact of the crime in the 
community and personal level’[sic], but recognises also that the views of victims are but 
only one of the factors the Board must have regard to.  
The Board considers it would be wrong and contrary to the requirements of the Act to 
refuse parole because of the objection of a victim or relative, such objections are relevant in 
the overall decision making process and are certainly relevant to the sort of conditions that 
would be imposed on any parole order that might be made. For instance the Board almost 
always imposes limits on the freedom of movement of parolees in order to eliminate or at 
least reduce the risk of the prisoner coming into contact with a victim of his criminal 
behaviour.71 
5.4.8 Published reasons for decision also provide the opportunity for the Board to explain the role 
of victim statements. For example in giving reasons for granting parole in a recent application in 
which family members of the deceased victim strongly opposed the application, the Board concluded 
its reasons for doing so in the following way: 
The Board has carefully considered the Applicant’s application for parole and the material 
provided to it. The Board has carefully weighed the statements provided by the deceased’s 
family members and their objection to her being granted parole, however, the wishes of the 
deceased’s family members are only one factor that the Board takes into account. On 
                                                
70  Submissions of Tasmania Police, Warwick Dunstan. Kay Fisher, Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania. 
71  Parole Board of Tasmania, Annual Report of the Parole Board of Tasmania for the Year Ended 30th June 2005 ( 2005) 4-
5. 
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balance the Board is of the view that the Applicant meets the statutory criteria to be granted 
parole and it is appropriate that the Applicant be afforded the privilege of parole.72  
5.4.9 The Institute acknowledges that both what the victim is told by Victim Support Services or 
the Victims of Crime Service and what the Parole Board says in its reasons are likely to mean much 
more to victims than the terms of s 72(2B) of the Corrections Act 1997 (Tas). It also acknowledges the 
importance of symbolic reasons for providing information about victim impact as well as instrumental 
reasons (as discussed above at para 4.2.11). Nevertheless, it recommends that s 72(2B)(b) be amended 
to better reflect the role of the statement in a Board’s deliberations by adding an additional sub-
paragraph referring to the ‘matters relevant to the risk of the offender re-offending and the sorts of 
conditions which should be imposed on any parole order in relation to contact with the prisoner.’  
Recommendation 
69. The Institute recommends that the Corrections Act 1997(Tas) s 72(2B)(b) be amended to better 
reflect the role of the victim statement in a Board’s deliberations by adding an additional sub-
paragraph referring to the ‘matters relevant to the risk of the offender re-offending and the sorts of 
conditions which should be imposed on any parole order in relation to contact with the prisoner.’ 
(5.4.7- 5.4.9) 
5.5 Publishing Parole Board decisions and open hearings 
Publishing reasons 
5.5.1 The Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) requires the Board to give notice of parole orders and 
reasons for its decisions in various circumstances. If it makes an order that an offender be released on 
parole, s 72(7)(a) requires that it give notice of this to the prisoner and s 72(7)(b) provides that it must 
publish its reasons for the order and give a copy to any victim who has made a statement under s 
72(2(b). The Board is also authorised (by s 72(7A)) to delete any material that relates to the privacy of 
the prisoner or of any other person if the Board is of the opinion that it is in the interests of the 
prisoner or any other person to do so. If it defers a decision it must let the prisoner know in writing and 
when it refuses parole it must also give reasons to the prisoner.73 If it is in the interests of the prisoner, 
any other person or the public to withhold any or all reasons from the prisoner the Board may withhold 
those reasons.74 Notifying a registered victim who has provided the Board with a statement under s 
72(2C) of release date was to avoid families of deceased victims being confronted with the released 
offender before they had any knowledge of their release.75 The protocols and procedures for this 
appear to be working well.  
5.5.2 Section 72(7)(b) clearly requires the Board to publish its reasons for granting parole. This 
does not appear to have been done in all cases. It appears that the Board grants parole in between 50 
and 100 hundred cases each year76 but until 2006 at least, published decisions in less than 20 cases. 
The reason for this is unclear. Possibly exactly what was meant by publishing reasons was unclear. In 
the Issues Paper the Institute commended the introduction of a requirement to publish reasons on the 
grounds that this improves transparency and accountability of the criminal justice system. Many 
                                                
72 Parole Board Decision of Anne Maree Kibbey (2007) 
<http://www.justice.tas.gov.au/paroleboard/decisions_2007/kibbey,_anne_maree> at 7 December 2007. 
73  Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) s 77(8). 
74  Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) s 77(9).  
75  Instances of this were referred to in the debate on the 2002 amendments: Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Assembly, 29 May 2002, 34-96 (Mr Michael Hodgman, Shadow Attorney-General). 
76  Parole Board of Tasmania, above n 72, 9. 
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responses to the Issues Paper commended this initiative.77 One respondent dissented from this view. 
The Honourable Don Wing, MLC, President of the Legislative Council referred to extensive publicity 
given to the release on parole of a prisoner who had been sentenced for a crime of dishonesty. He 
continued: 
This meant that he was required to be reintegrated into the community amidst a blaze of 
publicity. This caused renewed distress to him and even, more importantly, his wife and 
children who were still attending school. In view of this experience and having reflected on 
the matter as a result of this, I do not consider this to be in the interests of the community 
and certainly not in the interests of the family of the former prisoner. It must be difficult 
enough for prisoners to make the transition back into society without having their crime and 
prison circumstances glaringly featured in the media at the time of their release.78 
5.5.3 The Institute respects this view and acknowledges that publishing decisions can adversely 
impact on offenders and their families. However, parolees are still technically serving a prison 
sentence. Early release on parole remains controversial in the public view. Accordingly, in the 
interests of transparency and improving confidence in decision-making, the Institute’s view is that 
decisions should be published.  
Open hearings? 
5.5.4 Another way of ensuring accountability and transparency of Parole Board decisions would 
be to make Parole Board hearings open to the public. This is the situation in New South Wales. 
Hearings are not open to the public in any other state or territory. The Issues Paper sought responses in 
relation to this matter. Responses were divided. Those who supported making Parole Board hearings 
open to the public79 generally did so citing reasons of transparency and improving confidence in 
decision-making. Opponents of public hearings included the Mr Justice Cox, the then Chief Justice, 
the Honourable Don Wing MLC, and Kay Fisher, who was then a member of the Parole Board. Kay 
Fisher was concerned that opening the hearings to the public would increase legal formalities, prolong 
hearings and unduly restrict the matters that could be considered by the Board.80 Don Wing’s reasons 
for opposition to public hearing echoed his concerns with publishing reasons. He said: 
I am opposed to parole hearings being open to the public because this would revive all the 
negative aspects of a crime and a prisoner’s imprisonment at a time when it is important for 
prisoners to be successfully reintegrated into society in their own interests, in the interests 
of their family, especially children, and in the interest of the community.81 
5.5.5 The Institute is of the view that opening parole board procedures is not justified. It agrees 
that this would increase formalities, prolong hearings and would not assist in the resettlement of 
offenders. The interests of transparency and improving public confidence in parole would be better 
served by publishing reasons for granting parole.  
5.5.6 A number of submissions also referred to a lack of resources provided to the Board and 
consequential administrative difficulties. The Justice Department conducted a review of the 
administration of Parole Board processes in late 2007. No doubt these matters will be addressed in that 
review. 
                                                
77  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, submission, 14; Submissions of Dr Bryan Walpole; Dianne Jackson; The 
Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, 5; Tasmania Police; Community Corrections Hobart, consultation, 14 September 
2002.  
78  Submission, 2. 
79  Tasmania Police, submission 10; Dianne Jackson, submission, 2; Dr Bryan Walpole, submission, 1.  
80  Kay Fisher, submission, 3. 
81  Don Wing MLC, President of the Legislative Council, submission, 2. 
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Recommendations 
70. The Institute recommends that Parole Board decisions should be published on the Parole Board’s 
website. (5.5.3) 
71. It does not recommend that Parole Board hearings should be open to the public for the reasons 
given in para 5.5.5. 
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Part 6 
Sexual Offenders 
Consider whether the protection of society requires legislative change to the Sentencing Act 
1997 (Tas) and the Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas) in relation to sentencing sexual offenders. 
6.1 Introduction 
Background to the terms of reference 
6.1.1 At the request of the Attorney-General, in December 2006 the terms of reference of the 
sentencing project were amended to include consideration of whether the protection of society requires 
legislative change to Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) and the Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas) in relation to 
sentencing sexual offenders. This was precipitated by a public outcry following a sentence imposed 
upon a youth who pleaded guilty to the rape and associated assaults of two elderly women in the 
course of separate burglaries on the North West Coast.1 The youth was 15 years old when he 
committed the first rape and 16 at the time of the second rape. He was sentenced to five years 
imprisonment with half of that sentence suspended on conditions that included a probation order and 
assessment and treatment for alcohol and drug dependency. The sentencing judge indicated that a 
mature offender would be likely to receive a sentence of eight years imprisonment for these crimes. 
The case was widely reported in the three daily Tasmanian newspapers and the media coverage 
continued throughout 2007.2 Comments invariably condemned the sentences as inadequate and called 
upon the legal system to get tough on offenders.3 It was also suggested that youth should not be a 
mitigating factor in cases of rape.4 
6.1.2 Two further cases of rape attracted media criticisms for leniency in early 2007. A sentence of 
two years imprisonment imposed on a man who pleaded guilty to the rape of his pregnant ex-partner5 
was appealed by the Director of Public Prosecutions on the ground that the sentence was manifestly 
inadequate. In his submission to the Court of Criminal Appeal the Director stated that ‘sentences for 
single rape counts were on the slide over the past 15 years’. He argued ‘the rape deserved a greater 
sentence given that the victim was pregnant, made a prisoner in her own home, had suffered 
psychologically, her daughter was nearby and the attack was violent and degrading’.6 The Court of 
Criminal Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted a sentence of three years on the grounds that the 
sentence of two years was manifestly inadequate. Crawford J commented: 
                                                
1  Tasmania v ALR, Crawford J, 21 November 2006. He also pleaded guilty to additional counts of burglary and stealing 
and so the sentence was imposed in respect of five counts of aggravated burglary, five of stealing, two of rape, one of 
aggravated sexual assault and two of aggravated assault. 
2  An online search revealed 26 articles, editorial comment and letters to the editor published in the Advocate, the Examiner 
and the Mercury discussing the case until the end of December 2007.  
3  Those critical of the sentence included David Foster, Brant Webb, and politicians Brett Whiteley and Norma Jamieson. 
4  This was suggested by a rape victim commenting on the inadequacy of ALR’s sentence: ‘Rape victim seeks longer 
sentences’ The Advocate (Burnie), 2 December 2006. 
5  Tasmania v KLP, Tennent J, 22 February 2007. 
6  Chris Pippos, ‘Rape Terms “Too Light” Prosecutor Questions Courts’ Softer Stance’, The Advocate (Burnie), 23 May 
2007. 
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Undoubtedly, the sentence of two years imprisonment was a low one for the crime of rape. 
In most cases the sentence should be much more severe. It is commonly, as it was here, a 
crime of violence, domination and degradation and it usually causes great psychological 
trauma to the victim. It requires a substantial sentence of imprisonment in most cases. 
Leniency may be extended in exceptional circumstance, but there were none in this case.7 
6.1.3 On 2 March 2007, Andrew Denis Dare was sentenced on a plea of guilty to five years 
imprisonment with a minimum of three years for prolonged sexual attack on a woman committed after 
he had broken into her home.8 He was also placed on the sex offender register for a period of 10 years. 
Again, the sentence was attacked in the newspapers because it was too lenient9 Throughout 2007 the 
Advocate conducted a campaign for tougher sentences of sex offenders, asserting that the region and 
the newspaper were growing progressively angrier over a string of light sentences for rape offenders. 
In addition to the cases above, all of which occurred on the North West Coast, a number of other cases 
attracted criticism including a sentence of two years imposed on a priest for maintaining a relationship 
with one of his students10 and a sentence of four years and six months imposed on a Devonport man 
for maintaining a relationship with a young person.11 In support of the need for harsher sentencing for 
sexual offenders, the Advocate published an article claiming that ‘Tasmania is soft on crime’ on the 
basis of Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) figures showing ‘about half the people being convicted 
in the Tasmanian Supreme Court do not serve jail time afterwards’.12  
6.1.4 In March 2007 the Examiner published the results of an Internet poll that showed that 86 per 
cent of respondents answered yes to the question ‘do you believe courts are too lenient when 
sentencing convicted criminals?’13 This was repeated in December 2007 with 88 per cent of 
respondents stating that they believed courts to be too lenient.14 There was also media coverage of a 
meeting between the Police Association and the Attorney-General with the Police Association 
reported as saying that ‘it now expects “outcomes” on apparent lenient court sentencing, following its 
meeting with Attorney-General Steve Kons, who it seems was receptive to its calls for urgent law 
reforms’.15 From the report of the meeting it would appear that the primary concern of the Police 
Association was with lenient rape sentences rather than leniency generally. In June 2007 at the request 
of the Attorney-General, the Chief Justice hosted sentencing forums in Burnie and Devonport to which 
people who had written letters to the Advocate, community leaders and journalists were invited. 
Participants at each forum were invited to consider what sentence they would hand down to a sex 
offender and a burglar and thief.16 The Chief Justice would have sentenced the burglar more harshly 
than some of the participants but the suggested sentences for the sex offender were not reported. 
The Institute’s approach to the terms of reference 
6.1.5 It is clear that the Attorney-General was prompted to refer the issue of the sentencing of 
sexual offenders to the Institute by the media criticism which followed the sentence imposed on the 
youth for rape of the two elderly women on the North-West coast. Pressure on the then Attorney-
General, Steve Kons, from some quarters to introduce harsher penalties for sexual offenders continued 
throughout 2007. He is to be commended for not bowing to this pressure and for referring the matter 
                                                
7  DPP v P [2007] TASSC 51, [16] (Crawford J); Slicer and Evans JJ agreed with Crawford J’s reasons. 
8  Tasmania v ADD, Tennent J, 2 March 2007. The sentence was imposed for nine offences including robbery and 
aggravated sexual assault – in addition to raping her he had sexually assaulted her and tied her up. 
9  Luke Sayer, ‘Five years for rape, Sentence angers Police, Victims’, The Mercury (Hobart), 3 March 2007, 3; Angus 
Livingstone, ‘Rapist Could be Out in Three Years’ The Advocate, 3 March 2007, 6-7.  
10  Chris Pippos, ‘Marist Priest Gets Just One Year. Ferguson Sentence Shock’ The Advocate (Burnie), 16 May 2007. 
11  Amber Wilson, ‘No Justice for Girl: Family Sex Offender Sentence Four and a Half Years in Jail’ The Advocate (Burnie), 
18 October 2007. 
12  Sean Ford, ‘We’re Soft on Crime’ The Advocate (Burnie), 24 April 2007, 1. 
13  ‘Internet Poll’ The Examiner (Launceston), March 2006, 2. 
14  ‘Internet Poll’ The Examiner (Launceston), 15 December 2007, 2. 
15  Chris Pippos, ‘Police Positive after Talks on Sentencing’ The Advocate (Burnie), 13 April 2007. 
16  Sean Ford, ‘Minimum Terms not the Answer’, The Advocate (Burnie), 6 June 2007. 
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to the Tasmanian Law Reform Institute for an informed and considered response and then patiently 
waiting for this Report.  
6.1.6 The Institute has approached the issue referred to it by the Attorney-General in four steps: 
First, by attempting to address the general question of whether current sentencing practices for rape 
and sexual offences in Tasmania are appropriate; secondly, by asking whether the protection of society 
justifies special measures for sex offenders; thirdly, by reviewing sentencing legislation in other 
jurisdictions which aims to both protect society against sex offenders and to improve public 
confidence in the criminal justice system’s response to sex offending; and finally, the Institute outlines 
an approach to address the criticism from some quarters that sentences for sex offenders are too 
lenient. 
6.2 Are current sentencing practices for rape and sexual 
offences appropriate? 
6.2.1 In Part 1 of this Report the sentencing patterns from 1978 to 2006 for the most common 
crimes were discussed. Whilst sentences for rape are invariably custodial,17 it was shown that the 
median sentence for one and two counts has decreased over this time. As explained in Part 1, it could 
be argued that the differences from the earlier period (1978-1989) when the median sentence for one 
count of rape was four years does not necessarily mean that sentencing for rape has become more 
lenient. Changes in the definition of rape in 1987 mean that rape now covers a wider range of 
penetrative sexual assaults than was the case in the earlier period. However, the trend has continued to 
go downwards in the last five years particularly for single count sentences and global sentences for 
two counts.18 The median sentence for one count of rape is now close to two years (25.5 months) and 
is three years six months for two counts. This does suggest that sentencing for rape has become more 
lenient. However, as Table 2 in Appendix A shows, sentences for other sexual offences such as sexual 
intercourse with a young person and maintaining a sexual relationship with a young person have 
tended to increase rather than reduce in severity.  
Table 13: Rape Custodial Sentences (Single-count) 1978-2006 
Year No. Min. Med. Max. % Cust. 
1978-1989 27 18 48 84 100 
1990-2000 27 6 36 96 100 
2001-2006* 14 6 25.5 60 100 
* The numbers in this table do not match those in Table 2, Appendix A because this table includes data for the whole of 
2006. 
Table 14: Rape Custodial Sentences (Multiple counts) 1978-2006 
Year/Counts No. Min. Med. Max. 
1978-1989 
2 counts 17 30 60 96 
3-4 counts 10 30 48 72 
5 & more counts 8 48 72 240 
1990-2000 
2 counts 21 9 45 120 
3-4 counts 18 27 60 84 
5 & more counts 23 36 84 144 
                                                
17  No non-custodial sentences for rape were imposed in the period 1978 to 2006. 
18  The counting rules for global sentences in this data included sentences for multiple counts that include at least one count 
of rape. So two counts could be one of rape and one of indecent assault or two of rape.  
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2001-2006* 
2 counts 10 30 42 84 
3-4 counts 3 42 60 66 
5 & more counts 9 48 72 120 
* The numbers in this table do not match those in Table 2 , Appendix A because this table includes data for the whole of 
2006. 
6.2.2 Examining sentencing data for rape for the last five years may not give a true picture of 
sentencing patterns for rape for multiple counts because the numbers are small. For this reason it is 
more appropriate to look also at patterns based on the last 10 years (1997-2006). 
Table 15: Rape Custodial Sentences (Single Count) 1997-2006 
Year No. Min. Med. Max. 
1997-2006 20 6 30 60 
Table 16: Rape Custodial Sentences (Global) 1997-2006 
Counts No. Min. Med. Max. 
2 19 24 48 84 
3 & 4 14 27 57 90 
5 & < 15 36 72 120 
6.2.3 In the light of the context of the Attorney-General’s request to the Institute to examine 
possible legislative changes in relation to the sentencing of sexual offenders, it is interesting to 
examine the three controversial sentences for rape in late 2006 and early 2007 against the background 
of sentencing practices in Tasmania. As Table 17 shows, global sentences for five or more offences 
which include rape as the most serious crime range from 36 months (three years) to 120 months (10 
years) with a median of six years. Both ALR’s and Dare’s five-year sentences are clearly within this 
range, although they are below the median sentence. ALR’s crimes were particularly serious as there 
were two victims, both elderly. Half of his sentence was suspended. On the face of it, this may appear 
to be a lenient sentence. However, two factors should be noted. First, no non-parole period was set so 
this meant that in terms of parole eligibility, the sentence was equivalent to an immediate sentence of 
five years imprisonment with a the minimum non-parole period of half of the sentence. Secondly, the 
offender was aged 15 and 16 at the time of the offences and the judge made it clear that had he been an 
adult, he would have been sentenced to a sentence of eight years imprisonment. Special considerations 
apply in relation to sentencing youthful offenders, even when the crime is as serious as rape. 
Sentencing guidance from the Court of Criminal Appeal suggests that it was appropriate for the 
sentencing judge to impose a much shorter sentence on ALR because of his youth and that partial 
suspension of it was also appropriate. In George v The Queen19 the Court of Criminal Appeal 
explained how courts should approach sentencing youthful offenders for rape. Cox J said, ‘[v]ery 
different considerations determine the appropriate range for offenders in the age group of the 
defendant.’ The Court made it clear that rehabilitation is of primary importance in such a case, general 
deterrence is of less importance, denunciation more muted and just deserts considerations are satisfied 
by a less severe sentence.  
6.2.4 In a letter to the victim’s relatives, the Director of Public Prosecutions nominated the 
offenders’ youth and the fact that no non-parole period was set (making the sentence equivalent to a 
five year sentence with the minimum non-parole period) as reasons why he had chosen not to appeal. 
The Institute’s view is that ALR’s sentence was within range and that it is appropriate for different 
considerations to apply in the case of juvenile offenders.  
                                                
19  [1986] Tas R 49, 64 (Cox J), see also Cosgrove J and Nettlefold J; remarks approved by Crawford, Zeeman and Slicer JJ 
in Stonehouse Serial No A90/1993, 3. 
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6.2.5 Assuming that the sentences Dare’s case and the Court of Criminal Appeal’s three-year 
sentence in KJP are within the range of sentences set by the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal 
Appeal, the question whether the current sentencing range of sentences is appropriate remains. This 
question is not susceptible to an easy answer. Public opinion appears to suggest that sentences for rape 
and sexual offences are too lenient. A national survey in the mid 1990s indicated that respondents 
considered sentencing for rape to be too lenient compared to other crimes.20 And polls and surveys 
since consistently report that the public think sentences are too lenient. However, there are many 
problems with media polls and surveys, not the least being that, in this context, it is unlikely that 
respondents have a clear enough idea of the reality of sentencing practices to be in a position to give 
informed judgment on the question. The issue of gauging informed public opinion or public judgment 
rather than the top-of-the-head responses to media polls and representative surveys will discussed in 
more detail in Part 7. It is sufficient to say here that polls such as the Examiner’s of March and 
December 2007 do not assist in answering the question of whether sentencing practices for rape and 
sexual offences in Tasmania are appropriate or too lenient. In the context of simulated sentencing 
exercises or surveys using vignettes, the public’s view tends to be close to that of the judge. In 
Lovegrove’s recent sentencing study, for example, the groups that were given the sex offence vignette 
suggested a median sentence that was less than the judge’s sentence.21 In contrast, preliminary findings 
from the University of Tasmania jury sentencing study shows that while jurors’ sentences were more 
lenient than the judges’ sentences overall, for sex offences they were more severe. 
6.2.6 One way of attempting to assess the appropriateness of current sentencing ranges for rape 
and sexual offences in Tasmania could be to compare sentencing practices across jurisdictions. 
However, there are problems with interjurisdictional comparisons. First, the definition of sexual 
offences varies between jurisdictions. Rape in Tasmania has a narrower definition than rape in 
Victoria, and in New South Wales ‘rape’ is covered by three crimes – aggravated sexual assault, 
aggravated sexual assault in company and sexual assault. Secondly, sentencing practices differ and the 
Tasmanian practice of imposing global or general sentences for multiple counts is unknown in many 
other jurisdictions. Thirdly, provisions for early release differ. Such things as automatic parole or back 
end home detention may mean that the there are differences in the proportion of the full term of the 
sentence that is actually served. And finally, there is difficulty in obtaining comparable data. 
Nevertheless, a cross-jurisdictional comparison which includes another serious crime could shed some 
light on the issue. Robbery22 was chosen as the comparator crime and the measures of sentencing 
severity selected were the maximum penalties and the proportion of offenders sentenced to full-time 
imprisonment (including partly-suspended sentences). A comparator crime is useful because it enables 
a comparison of sentencing differentials between different crimes as well as a raw comparison of 
penalty severity. In other words it indicates an offence’s position on the penalty scale relative to other 
offences. 
Table 17 Range of statutory maximum penalties for sexual assault23 
Jurisdiction Statutory maximum 
Tasmania 21 years 
New South Wales  14 years – Natural Life 
Victoria 25 years 
Queensland Life 
South Australia Life 
Western Australia 14 years – 20 years 
New Zealand 20 years 
                                                
20  Jenny Bargen and Elaine Fishwick (1995) Sexual Assault Law Reform: A National Perspective, Canberra, Office of the 
Status of Women, 108-109. 
21  Austin Lovegrove, ‘Public Opinion, Sentencing and Lenience: An Empirical Study Involving Judges Consulting the 
Community’ [2007] Criminal Law Review 769. 
22  Robbery is stealing from a person accompanied by violence or threats of violence. 
23  Source: Judicial Commission of New South Wales (2007) Full-time imprisonment in New South Wales and Other 
Jurisdictions: A National And International Comparison, Monograph 29, 15 with the addition of Tasmania and with the 
US deleted. 
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England Life 
6.2.7 The maximum penalty for an offence is an indication of how seriously the offence is viewed 
by Parliament and increases in the maximum penalty have been interpreted by the courts as evidence 
of Parliament’s intention that the offence should attract a heavier penalty than in the past.24 In cross-
jurisdictional comparisons, maximum penalties have been used as a measure of sentencing severity. 
However, in Tasmania with all indictable offences except murder and treason attracting a maximum 
penalty of 21 years, the Code gives no indication of the relative seriousness of indictable offences.  
Table 18: Range of statutory maximum penalties for robbery25 
Jurisdiction Statutory maximum 
Tasmania 21 years 
New South Wales  14 years – 25 years 
Victoria 15 years - 25 years 
Queensland 14 years - Life 
South Australia 15 years - Life 
Western Australia 14 years – Life 
New Zealand 10 years – 14 years 
England Life 
Fig 25: Proportion of offenders sentenced to immediate imprisonment for rape 
 
6.2.8 In Tasmania 90 per cent of offenders sentenced for rape received a sentence of immediate 
imprisonment. In comparison with other Australian jurisdictions this is a smaller proportion than in 
New South Wales and Queensland but significantly higher than Victoria, and Western Australia. In 
England where the definition of rape is the same as in Tasmania, the proportion of offenders sentenced 
to immediate imprisonment for rape is 97 per cent.  
                                                
24  Baumer v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 51, 56. 
25  Source: Judicial Commission of New South Wales (2007) Full-time imprisonment in New South Wales and other 
jurisdictions: A national and international comparison, Monograph 29, 15 with the addition of Tasmania. 
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Fig 26: Proportion of offenders sentenced to immediate imprisonment for robbery  
 
6.2.9 In Tasmania, 75 per cent of offenders sentenced for robbery received a sentence of 
immediate imprisonment. The Tasmanian imprisonment rate is comparable to Queensland, South 
Australia and Western Australia, higher than Victoria but lower than New South Wales. 
Table 19: Average sentences for rape  
Jurisdiction Average 
Tasmania 50.6 months 
New South Wales 75.4 months 
Queensland 80.8 months 
Victoria 79.9 months  
England 83.4 months 
Data sources: See Appendix B. 
Table 20: Average sentences for robbery Higher Courts (all) 
Jurisdiction Average 
Tasmania 21.8 months 
New South Wales 48.3 months 
Queensland 47.7 months 
Victoria 49.8 months  
England 45 months 
Data sources: See Appendix B. 
6.2.10  In comparing average sentences for rape and robbery it is necessary to look also at the 
percentage of custodial sentences. Jurisdictions which send a smaller proportion of offenders to prison 
would be expected to have more serious offenders in the custodial category. Therefore it could not be 
said that if the average prison sentence is longer that the sentences are more severe in that jurisdiction. 
With this in mind, the fact that average sentences for rape are less in Tasmania than in New South 
Wales and Queensland (jurisdictions with a higher proportion of sentences of immediate imprisonment 
for this crime), suggests that sentences for rape are more lenient in Tasmania than in these states. 
However, the fact that the average sentence for rape is longer in Victoria than Tasmania has to be 
offset against the lower imprisonment rate.  
6.2.11  As explained in para 6.2.6, relativities with other crimes is another way of comparing 
sentencing. A comparison of the average sentences for rape and robbery show that Tasmania sentences 
rape the most severely in comparison with robbery in the jurisdictions displayed in Tables 20 and 21 
with an average sentence for rape that is more than double the average robbery sentence. In New 
South Wales, for example, average rape sentences are considerably less than double robbery 
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sentences. To put this in another way, the average robbery sentence in Tasmania is only 43 per cent of 
the average rape sentence whereas in New South Wales it is 64 per cent of the average rape sentence.  
The Institute’s view 
6.2.12 Trying to determine if current sentencing practices for rape and sexual offences in Tasmania 
are appropriate is difficult. Relying on public outcry or media criticism of isolated cases is an 
unreliable guide of informed public opinion. Examining the sentencing ranges for a particular offence 
is an advance on this but there are problems in deciding what is an appropriate range of sentences for 
any particular offence. Deciding an appropriate sentencing range for rape in particular is difficult 
because doing so requires an intuitive judgment about what rape is worth and what rape is worth in 
comparison with other crimes. In theory, comparisons with average sentences imposed in other 
jurisdictions could assist but this can be misleading because of the many differences between 
jurisdictions in custodial sentences, release practices and counting rules for sentencing statistics. 
Moreover, on some measures the sentence may be more severe and on others less severe. The Institute 
is unable to answer the question whether current sentencing practices for rape and sexual offences are 
too lenient. Examining the median sentence for one and two counts of rape suggests that sentences 
have become more lenient. The Institute suggests that what is an appropriate sentencing level for rape 
and other sexual offences is an issue that needs further consideration. This could be done in a number 
of ways. It could be made a focus of investigation in the University of Tasmania’s jury sentencing 
study which is exploring the use of jurors as a means of ascertaining informed public opinion (see para 
7.1.27 below for more detail about this study) As outlined above (see para 6.2.5), early results from 
this study indicate that while the majority of jurors who participated in the study suggested a sentence 
that was lower than judge’s sentence, in the case of sex offenders they were significantly more likely 
to impose a sentence that was more severe than the judge’s sentence.26 This should be supplemented 
by further research by way of either a deliberative poll or focus groups similar to those used by 
Lovegrove. Consideration could be given to including a range of participants in focus groups, such as 
victim representatives, lawyers, and other experts with an interest in the issue. Another Australian 
study will soon present opportunities to obtain informed public opinion about sentencing in Tasmania. 
This sentencing project, which is funded by the Australian Research Council, proposes to use both 
representative surveys with sentencing vignettes and focus groups to elicit public opinion about 
sentencing issues.27 In Part 7 it is suggested that efforts be made to include Tasmania in the later stages 
of the study. The issue of how the government should respond if further research does show that 
informed public judgment suggests sentences for sex offences are too lenient will be discussed in the 
final section of this Part. 
6.2.13 As indicated in the discussion of the case of ALR above (see paras 6.2.3-6.2.4) the Institute 
rejects the suggestion that that youth should cease to be a mitigating factor.28 All Australian 
jurisdictions have accepted that special considerations apply in the sentencing of youthful offenders, 
even in cases as serious as rape.29 The special approach to the sentencing of children is based upon 
public interest as well as mercy. As Murray J explained in R v T (a Child):  
Relevantly to the issues raised in this appeal, I turn now to the position of the child 
offender, who has always been regarded by the criminal law as being in the special position 
that the paramount consideration in sentencing, or otherwise disposing of the case of a 
convicted child, will be to find the solution best calculated to aid the rehabilitation of the 
child, not only in mercy, having regard to the offender’s youth, but also for the pragmatic 
                                                
26  Kate Warner, Julia Davis, M Walter and Rebecca Bradfield, ‘Talking to Juries About Punishment: Investigating a New 
Way to Gauge Public Opinion and Inform the Public’ (Paper presented at the 2008 Supreme and Federal Courts 
Conference, Sydney, 19 January 2008). 
27  Geraldine Mackenzie, David Indermaur, Roderic Broadhurst, Kate Warner, Lynne Roberts and Nigel Stobbs, ‘Sentencing 
and Public Confidence: Public Perceptions and the Role of the Public in Sentencing Practice and Policy’, ARC Discovery 
Grant No 2008-210. 
28  This was suggested by a rape victim commenting on the inadequacy of ALR’s sentence: ‘Rape victim seeks longer 
sentences’ The Advocate (Burnie), 2 December 2006.  
29  See Laws of Australia, 12.2 paras [70] – [79]. 
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reason that to so treat a young offender is regarded as being most likely in the long term to 
aid the protection of the community by preventing recidivism.30 
6.2.14 The Institute also supports the existing arrangements for determining where sentences of 
imprisonment are served. In the case of ALR, one of the complaints of the victims’ families was that 
ALR had served his sentence at Ashley and not ‘hard time’ at Risdon.31 Traditionally, selecting the 
place of detention for an offender is an executive function. When the Supreme Court is sentencing a 
juvenile offender it has the power to impose a detention order instead of a sentence of imprisonment.32 
If a sentence of imprisonment is imposed, where it is served is a matter for the Director of Corrective 
Services.33 In practice, offenders under the age of 18 sentenced to imprisonment are transferred to the 
Ashley Youth Detention Centre. The Institute supports this approach. It is appropriate that youthful 
offenders be detained with other youth rather than with adult offenders. 
Recommendations 
72. The Institute recommends that the issue of whether current sentencing practices for sexual 
offences are appropriate should be further investigated by using a range of methods including specially 
designed focus groups and deliberative polls to build upon current research studies that are 
investigating this issue. (6.2.12) 
73. The Institute recommends retaining the common law principles in relation to the sentencing of 
juvenile offenders and does not recommend altering the current position which allows the Director of 
Corrective Services to transfer juvenile offenders to Ashley Detention Centre. (6.2.13 – 6.2.14) 
6.3 Does the protection of society justify special 
measures for sex offenders? 
6.3.1 Because the sentencing of sexual offences seems to give rise to particular public concern, the 
issue of whether this category of offending should attract a special legislative response will be 
considered. First, however, the existing special measures for sex offenders in Tasmania will be 
described. 
Existing special measures for sex offenders in Tasmania 
6.3.2 Currently there are two special sentencing measures that apply to sex offenders in Tasmania, 
namely sex offender registration orders and dangerous offender declarations. 
Sex offender registration orders 
6.3.3 In December 2005, Tasmania became the sixth Australian jurisdiction to enact offender-
reporting legislation with the passing of the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2005 
(Tas). The legislation commenced on 1 March 2006. The preamble to the Act states that its purpose is 
to reduce the likelihood of reoffending and to facilitate the investigation of any future offences a 
registered offender may commit. The genesis of national Australian offender reporting legislation 
seems to have been a meeting of the Australian Police Ministers’ Council in 2003. The Australian 
National Child Offender Register (ANCOR) was launched in September 2004 and it was envisaged 
                                                
30  (1993) 67 A Crim R 272, 279. 
31  Sean Ford, ‘Rapist freed before review Elderly victims’ families want tougher laws’ The Advocate (Burnie), 20 
December 2007, 3. 
32  Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas) s 107. 
33  Corrections Act 1977 (Tas) s 38. 
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that all states and territories would pass legislation in line with a common model to require people 
convicted of sexual or other serious offences against children to register with police and provide 
details such as club memberships and travel plans. The Community Protection (Offender Reporting) 
Act 2005 (Tas) fulfils Tasmania’s commitment to ANCOR. It provided for the creation of a 
Community Protection Offender Register containing specified personal details of particular offenders. 
The Act follows the approach in Victoria and Western Australia by targeting sex offenders in general 
rather than child sex offenders only. 
6.3.4 There are a number of mechanisms for including sex offenders on the register. The primary 
mechanism is an order of a court at sentence. Section 6 of the Community Protection (Offender 
Reporting) Act 2005 (Tas) requires a court which is sentencing an offender for a reportable offence to 
make an order directing that the name of the offender be placed on the Community Protection 
Offender Register, ‘unless the court is satisfied that the person does not pose a risk of committing a 
reportable offence in the future’. Reportable offences are listed in three Classes/Schedules and include 
a range of offences from possessing child exploitation material to aggravated sexual assault and rape. 
The order requires the offender to comply with the reporting obligations under the Act for a period of 
time that is at the discretion of the court, with maxima from eight years to life depending on the class 
of the reportable offence. The reporting obligations require the offender to report to the registrar 
within seven days of the order being made and to provide the required personal details. A court may 
also make an order directing registration and compliance with reporting obligations in respect of an 
offender who is sentenced for a non-reportable offence if the court is satisfied that the person poses a 
risk of committing a reportable offence in the future.  
6.3.5 An offender who is subject to reporting obligations must provide the Registrar with a list of 
personal details, including address, names of children with whom he or she has regular unsupervised 
contact, name and place of employment, including voluntary work and practical training, club or 
organisation membership or affiliation if children participate, and vehicle registration details.34 Any 
changes in personal details must be notified within seven days, interstate travel must be notified at 
least seven days before departure and annual reports must be made to the Registrar by each reportable 
offender. Failure to comply with reporting obligations is an offence punishable by a fine or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months.35 
Dangerous offender declarations 
6.3.6 The principle of proportionality is a central principle of sentencing. It requires that 
punishment should be proportionate to the offence committed taking into account harm and 
culpability. In the words of the Court of Criminal Appeal:36 
The fundamental principle of proportionality does not permit the increase of a sentence of 
imprisonment beyond what is proportional to the crime merely for the purpose of extending 
the protection of society from the recidivism of the offender. 
6.3.7 In Tasmania, a dangerous offender declaration under the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 19 is a 
statutory exception to the principle of proportionality. Such offenders receive an indeterminate 
sentence if it is warranted for the protection of the public. In other words, in addition to receiving a 
fixed term of imprisonment, an offender declared a dangerous criminal cannot be released from 
custody until the declaration is discharged. To be declared a violent offender, the offender must have 
been convicted of a crime ‘involving violence or an element of violence’ and have at least one 
previous conviction for a crime involving an element of violence. Applications for a declaration are 
generally made at the sentencing hearing following a plea or finding of guilty. However, a judge 
before whom an offender was convicted can entertain such an application at any time during the 
                                                
34  Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2005 (Tas), s 17. 
35  Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2005 (Tas), s 33. 
36  Read (1994) 3 Tas R 387, 395. 
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offender’s sentence.37 The Court of Criminal Appeal has decided that both rape and indecent assault 
intrinsically involve violence for the purposes of s 19 and it is not necessary to examine the details or 
circumstances of the crime to determine this.38 The Court has also made it clear,39 following the 
observations of the High Court in Chester v Queen,40 that the power to direct preventive detention 
should be confined to very exceptional cases where the exercise of the power is demonstrably 
necessary to protect society from physical harm. 
6.3.8 In summary, sexual offenders who are declared dangerous because they are a continuing 
danger to the community are held in custody until the court is satisfied that they no longer constitute a 
danger. Similar provisions empowering courts to sentence a violent or sexual offender to an indefinite 
term of imprisonment apply in most Australian jurisdictions.41 In recent years, in addition to 
indeterminate sentences, various preventive detention measures have been introduced in some 
jurisdictions to address public concern about the danger posed by released sex offenders. These will be 
considered below. However, in the Institute’s view, a very persuasive argument for creating further 
exceptions to the principle of proportionality is needed. If sentencing policy is to be evidence-based, 
the question of whether sex offenders pose a greater risk of recidivism than other offenders justifying 
such differential treatment must be addressed. 
What do recidivism studies tell us about sex offenders? 
6.3.9 Targeting sex offenders for special measures is frequently justified on the basis of the high 
rates of recidivism of this group of offenders and of child sex offenders in particular.42 However, 
international research suggests sex offenders recidivate less than drug, property and burglary offenders 
and their recidivism relates more to general and violent offences than to sexual offences. Moreover, 
child molesters do not recidivate more than other sex offenders. While any study of recidivism of 
sexual offenders is likely to represent an undercount of offending behaviour because sexual offending 
has very low rates of reporting to the police, research based on self-reports as well as official reports 
consistently shows that sex offenders have lower rates of recidivism than other kinds of offenders.43 It 
is not clear why rates of sexual recidivism are low – it could relate to non-detection, to lack of 
opportunity or to rehabilitation. However, reviewers are generally agreed that the studies give a 
reasonable, although conservative estimate of sexual recidivism of apprehended offenders relative to 
other types of offenders.44 It is also a consistent finding that different types of sex offenders recidivate 
at different rates. For example, an often cited meta-analysis of 61 recidivism studies covering six 
countries revealed that just over 13 per cent of sexual offenders were known to have recidivated 
sexually, with an average of 19 per cent for rapists and 13 per cent for child molesters.45 Gelb has 
reviewed the handful of recidivism studies conducted in Australia and concluded that the results are 
                                                
37  Director of Public Prosecutions v Phillips [2006] TASSC 81. 
38  Evans (1999) 8 Tas R 325. 
39  Read (1994) 3 Tas R 387, 395. 
40  (1988) 165 CLR 611, 619; see also McGarry v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 121. 
41  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 18A (serious offences including murder, rape and sexual offences against children); 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 163 (violent offender); Criminal Law Amendment Act 1945 (Qld) s 23 (sex 
offender); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 23 (sex offender); Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 65 (violent 
offenders); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 98. For a convenient summary of these provisions see Bernadette McSherry, 
Patrick Keyzer and Arie Freiberg, Preventive Detention for ‘Dangerous’ Offenders in Australia: A Critical Analysis and 
Proposals for Policy Development, Report to the Criminology Research Council, December 2006, 18-22. 
42  See for example a discussion of the debate on the introduction of the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic) 
discussed in Kate Warner, ‘Sentencing Review 2004-2005’ (2005) 29(6) Criminal Law Journal 355. 
43  Karen Gelb, Recidivism of Sex Offenders, Research Paper, Sentencing Advisory Council, 2007, 21. 
44  Denise Lievore, Recidivism of Sexual Assault Offenders: Rates, Risk Factors and Treatment Efficacy, Australian Institute 
of Criminology, 2004, 37; D J West, ‘The Sex Crime Situation: Deterioration More Apparent Than Real’ (2000) 8 
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 399; Gelb (2007), ibid, 21. 
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consistent with the international research literature.46 This is supported by Lievore’s review of 
Australian and international studies.47  
6.3.10 The research evidence suggests that special provisions targeting sex offenders cannot be 
justified on the grounds that sex offenders are more likely to re-offend than other categories of 
offenders. There is no evidence that this is so. However, sex offending has serious if not devastating 
consequences for victims and its incidence and impact needs to be addressed. But because sex 
offending, particularly sex offending involving children is such an emotive subject, special care needs 
to be taken that such offenders are not seen as forfeiting their rights to be protected by fundamental 
principles of law and human rights. Law-makers have a particular responsibility in this area because of 
the popular support for harsh measures for such offenders and the unpopular and possibly electorally 
damaging consequences of a principled stance on the issue.  
6.4 Sentencing Options for Sex Offenders 
6.4.1 In this section the Institute canvasses a number of sentencing options for sex offenders that 
have been introduced in other jurisdictions. It includes a discussion of post-sentence options such as 
post-sentence preventive detention and supervision which are perhaps strictly-speaking neither a 
sentencing option, nor punitive in intent, nor necessarily criminal in nature. However, they are relevant 
to the terms of reference. 
Mandatory minimum penalties 
6.4.2 Mandatory minimum penalties, such as three strikes laws are one way legislatures have 
responded to public criticisms that sentences are too lenient and judges are out of touch with public 
attitudes to crime. For the last decades of the twentieth century, mandatory sentencing laws were the 
most popular new sentencing initiative in the United States with mandatory penalties applying to 
aggravated rape, drug offences, offences involving firearms and repeat offenders. Other countries soon 
followed, including the United Kingdom and Canada.48 In Australia, the Northern Territory and 
Western Australia enacted controversial mandatory penalties in the 1990s. The Northern Territory 
mandatory sentencing legislation for adult and juvenile property offenders was repealed by the 
incoming Labor Government in 2001, but the mandatory penalties for adults convicted of violent and 
sex offences remain.49 Section 78BB of the Sentencing Act (NT) provides that where a court finds an 
offender guilty of a wide range of sexual offences the court must record a conviction and must order 
that the offender serve an actual term of imprisonment or a term of imprisonment that is partly 
suspended. No minimum period of imprisonment is prescribed. In South Australia a 20 year 
mandatory minimum period for murder has been prescribed.50 
6.4.3 Politicians frequently promise mandatory penalties if elected to government. In Queensland 
in 2006 the Opposition Leader introduced into Parliament the Offenders (Serious Sexual Offences 
Minimum Imprisonment and Rehabilitation) Bill. The Bill imposed minimum terms for those 
convicted of serious sex offences and also sought to ensure that offenders could not be released from 
prison until they had completed a rehabilitation program. The government opposed the Bill and it was 
defeated.51 In the debate in Tasmania in 2007, calls for a legislative response to the perceived leniency 
of rape sentencing apparently included the suggestion of mandatory minimum penalties. And most 
                                                
46  Gelb (2007), above n 43, 22. 
47  Lievore (2004), above n 44. 
48  Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, (4th ed, 2005) 206-209; Julian Roberts, Public Opinion and 
Mandatory Sentencing, A Review of International Findings (2003) 30 Criminal Justice & Behaviour 483, 485. 
49  Sentencing Act (NT) ss 78BA, 78BB. 
50  Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 32(5)(ab). 
51  Queensland Parliament, 30 March 2006 and 9 August 2006. 
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recently the Weekend Australian has reported that Crime Victim Support Association spokesman Noel 
McNamara called for standard minimum sentences of 50 per cent of the maximum sentence for sex 
offenders in Victoria.52 
Criticisms of mandatory minimum penalties 
6.4.4 While advocates of mandatory sentences argue that such schemes reduce unduly lenient 
sentences and create consistency by reducing discretion, there is a range of criticisms of mandatory 
penalties. First, it is argued they lead to injustice because of their inflexibility. There will inevitably be 
penalties in individual cases that most agree are too severe.53 Secondly, evaluations of mandatory 
sentencing regimes show that judges and prosecutors devise ways to circumvent their application. In 
other words, mandatory penalties redistribute discretion so that the (less visible) decisions by the 
police and prosecuting authorities become increasingly important. Thirdly, critics such as Tonry argue 
that there is little basis for believing they have any deterrent effect on rates of serious crime but they 
do increase public expenditure by increasing trial rates and case processing times. As the ALRC has 
pointed out, many commentators have argued that mandatory sentences contravene a number of 
international human rights standards including the principle of proportionality and the requirement that 
sentences should be reviewable by a higher court. In their application to juvenile offenders mandatory 
sentences are particularly controversial and contravene the requirement that detention of young people 
should be a last resort and only ever for the shortest time appropriate.54 
The Institute’s views 
6.4.5 The Institute is of the view that mandatory minimum penalties for rape or sexual offences are 
inappropriate. They displace discretion, distort the judicial role, lead to injustice in individual cases 
and there is no evidence they are an effective deterrent. The Institute is aware that elected officials 
want to reassure the public generally that their concerns have been listened to and acted upon. There is 
a need to respond to public views about sentencing for sex offenders, but first, informed public 
opinion or public judgment on these issues needs to be ascertained. If informed public opinion 
suggests sentences are too lenient for sex offences, mandatory minimum penalties would be one 
means of increasing the sentencing severity. But it is the wrong response. In Tasmania, in the years 
2001 to 2006, there have been only five sentences imposed for rape which have not involved an 
immediate term of imprisonment. Factors such as the youth of the offender, intellectual impairment 
and other extenuating circumstances were relied upon by the sentencing judge to justify not imposing 
an immediate sentence of imprisonment in each case. To deny judges the flexibility to impose a 
wholly suspended sentence in such cases would be likely to lead to grave injustice.55 
Recommendation 
74. The Institute opposes the use of mandatory minimum penalties for sex offenders. (6.4.5) 
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Mandatory minimum non-parole periods 
6.4.6 Mandatory minimum non-parole periods were introduced in New South Wales in 200256 
initially applying to some 21 serious offences committed after 1 February 2003 including murder, a 
range of sexual offences, acts involving injury to the police, car jacking, some drug offences and 
unauthorised possession of firearms. ‘Standard non-parole period’ is defined as the ‘non-parole period 
for an offence in the middle range of objective seriousness’.57 The court is to set the standard non-
parole period as the non-parole period for the offence unless for any of the reasons referred to in s 21A 
of the Act the period should be longer or shorter.58 The purpose of the standard non-parole period 
legislation was said to be promoting consistency and transparency in sentencing by identifying a 
reference point in addition to the maximum penalty to guide sentencing discretion and promote public 
understanding of the sentencing process.59  
6.4.7 In his second reading speech, the Attorney-General said that the standard non-parole periods 
had been set taking into account the seriousness of the offence, the maximum penalty and current 
sentencing trends for the offence as shown by sentencing statistics compiled by the Judicial 
Commission of New South Wales.60 However, one of the main objections to the scheme was that it 
amounted to a significant increase in sentencing tariffs and that the periods were selected without 
consultation and on unarticulated criteria.61 Compared with the average non-parole periods imposed 
prior to the scheme, the standard minima ranged from a 25 per cent increase in the case of murder to a 
more than 300 per cent increase in the case of aggravated sexual assault. The leading decision on 
standard non-parole periods is R v Way62 in which the Court of Criminal Appeal indicated that 
standard non-parole periods were intended for a middle-range case where the offender was convicted 
after trial, and guidance was given on what is ‘in the middle range of objective seriousness’. 
The Institute’s view 
6.4.8 Standard non-parole periods for sexual offences could be one way of addressing the 
perception of lenient sentencing for sex offences and the apparent decline in sentencing severity for 
one and two counts of rape. It could also be argued that it would improve transparency and public 
confidence in the criminal justice system by giving some legislative indication of what the sentence 
may be in a jurisdiction where there is in effect no guidance from the maximum penalty. However, 
this is not an approach the Institute recommends. While research shows that public knowledge of 
sentencing practices is woeful and that the public consistently underestimate the severity of sentencing 
practices, there is no reason to believe that specifying standard non-parole periods in legislation will 
have any impact on improving public understanding of, and public confidence in, sentencing practices. 
Secondly, while standard non-parole periods are not strictly mandatory penalties, if they are a starting 
point with room to move upwards or downwards, they nevertheless restrict judicial discretion and can 
lead to injustice in individual cases. Thirdly, even if only used for sexual offences, there will be 
problems in determining what should be the standard non-parole period for rape, aggravated sexual 
assault, indecent assault, maintaining a sexual relationship with a young person etc. Should it be based 
on current sentencing practices and, if not, how should it be determined? There are also difficulties in 
relation to sentences for multiple offences. In Tasmania multiple offences are usually dealt with by 
means of a global sentence and it is not clear how this could be accommodated in a standard non-
parole period table. Finally, the offence of maintaining a sexual relationship can cover such a wide 
range of offending, from three instances of indecent assault to multiple counts of rape, that a standard 
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non-parole period for such an offence would require so many departures from the standard that it 
would be meaningless and no more helpful than current sentencing statistics.  
Recommendation 
75. The Institute does not recommend the introduction of standard non-parole periods for sex offences. 
(6.4.8) 
Longer than proportionate sentence provisions and indefinite sentences for sex offenders 
Longer than proportionate sentences 
6.4.9 In Victoria, if a person is a serious sexual offender or a serious violent offender, the court 
must give priority to the protection of the community and may impose a sentence that is longer than 
that which is proportionate to the gravity of the offence.63 A serious sexual offender is a person who 
has been convicted of either two or more sexual offences, for which he or she has been sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment, or one sexual offence and one violent offence arising out of the one course of 
conduct for which he or she has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment.64 A serious violent 
offender is a person who has committed one serious violent offence such as murder, intentionally 
causing serious injury, causing a very serious disease or threats to kill, for which he or she has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment.65  
6.4.10 South Australia has a serious repeat offender scheme which allows a sentence to be 
disproportionate to the gravity of the offence if a person is declared to be a serious repeat offender.66 
The trigger condition is the conviction of three serious offences committed on at least three separate 
occasions or, in the case of child sex offences, two convictions on separate occasions. As well as 
relieving the court of the need to ensure the sentence is proportionate to the offence, a declaration 
means that any non-parole period must be at least four fifths of the length of the sentence. 
Indefinite sentences for sex offenders 
6.4.11 Queensland and South Australia have special provisions for the indefinite detention of sex 
offenders. The Queensland provisions allow a convicted sex offender to be detained indefinitely where 
there is evidence from two medical practitioners, one of whom must be a psychiatrist, that the offender 
is incapable of exercising proper control over his or her sexual instincts and that this incapacity can be 
cured by continued treatment.67 The South Australian provisions are similar but were extended in 2005 
to offenders unwilling to control their sexual instincts.68 Both schemes allow for applications to be 
made at the time of sentence and during the sentence, although the option of doing so during the 
sentence has not yet been exercised.69 
                                                
63  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 6D.  
64  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 6B(2) 
65  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 6B(1). 
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The Institute’s views 
6.4.12 The Institute does not support either enacting provisions to allow courts to impose longer 
than proportionate sentences for sex offenders or the introduction of indeterminate sentences 
specifically for sex offenders. Tasmania already has dangerous offender provisions which allow courts 
to impose a disproportionate sentence to protect the public which is indeterminate. Whether this 
should be modified in any way will be considered after provisions for post-sentence supervision and 
detention orders are discussed. 
Post-sentence preventive detention and supervision 
6.4.13 Concern with how to manage the small number of high risk offenders whose term in prison 
is about to end has led some Australian states to introduce legislation to enable offenders to be 
supervised in the community or held in further detention after their sentence has ended. 
Post sentence detention orders 
6.4.14 Post-sentence detention involves detention of offenders after they have served their full 
sentence. Queensland was the first jurisdiction in Australia to introduce such a scheme and New South 
Wales and Western Australia have followed. These schemes aim to protect the community and to 
provide continuing control and treatment of the offender.70 Queensland’s Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual 
Offenders) Act 2003 was introduced in response to public concern about the release of a prisoner, 
Denis Ferguson, in January 2003 after he had completed a 14-year sentence for kidnapping and 
sexually abusing three children.71 It was reported that Ferguson had refused to take part in 
rehabilitation programs and had boasted how he would have sex with children once he was released. 
The Act empowered the Attorney-General to apply to the Supreme Court for an order for the 
continued detention of a prisoner serving a period of imprisonment for a ‘serious sexual offence’. This 
is defined as an offence of a sexual nature that either involves violence or is against children. Under 
the Act the application for a continuing detention order must be made during the last six months of the 
prisoner’s period of imprisonment.72 The court can then order that the prisoner undergo a risk 
assessment order, which authorises two psychiatrists to examine the prisoner and prepare a report on 
the level of risk posed by the prisoner in the event that he is released.73 At a subsequent hearing the 
court then assesses the prisoner’s risk of re-offending and may impose either a continuing detention 
order or a supervision order.74 The court must be satisfied ‘by acceptable, cogent evidence … to a high 
degree of probability’ that the prisoner would pose a serious danger to the community if the orders 
were not made. Continuing detention orders are to be reviewed at least every 12 months by the 
Supreme Court.75 
6.4.15 In 2006 Western Australia and New South Wales enacted similar legislation, namely, the 
Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA) and the Crime (Serious Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW). 
There are some differences between the three schemes. For example, under the Queensland and 
Western Australian schemes continued detention orders are indefinite but in New South Wales a 
continuing detention order expires at the end of a specified period, or if not specified, at the end of five 
years. This does not prevent an application for subsequent orders being made. Secondly, the 
proceedings in the Queensland and New South Wales schemes are civil in nature.76 In contrast, the 
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Western Australian Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 s 40 makes it clear the proceedings are 
criminal in nature. Whether the proceedings are civil or criminal changes the way in which 
proceedings are conducted, for example the way in which evidence is gathered and led.77 
6.4.16 The Queensland legislation was challenged before the High Court in Fardon v The Attorney-
General (Qld)78 on the basis that it conferred a power on the Supreme Court of Queensland which was 
incompatible with its integrity as a court. The challenge failed and a majority of the Court held that the 
legislation was constitutionally valid on the basis that its primary purpose was not punishment but 
community protection. 
Post sentence supervision orders 
6.4.17 Rather than allowing extension of detention, these orders extend the period of supervision in 
the community beyond the expiry of the sentence. In recent years, five Australian states have 
introduced schemes which enable post-sentence supervision of sex offenders in the community. In 
Queensland, Western Australia and New South Wales the orders complement continued detention 
orders – if the court decides that the offender is a serious danger to the community then the court must 
decide whether adequate protection would be provided by an extended supervision order or that a 
detention order is necessary.  
6.4.18 Victoria’s Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic) with its regime for the extended 
supervision of high-risk child-sex offenders beyond the terms of their sentence commenced on 26 May 
2005. It seems the immediate catalyst for this legislation was a series of newspaper articles and media 
hype about the possible release from prison of a prisoner designated ‘Mr Baldy’,79 whose sentence of 
14 years for the rape and indecent assault of two boys aged nine and six was nearing its end.80 The first 
of these offences had been committed within a month of his release from a prison after serving a term 
for multiple child sex offences.  
6.4.19 Unlike the Queensland, Western Australian and New South Wales schemes, the Victorian 
Act is limited to extending supervision in the community. The scheme applies to offenders who have 
been sentenced to imprisonment for a wide range of sexual offences against children. It allows the 
Secretary of the Department of Justice to apply to the court which sentenced the offender for an 
‘extended supervision order’. The application must be made while the sentence is being served. It 
must be supported by at least one assessment report from a psychologist, psychiatrist or other 
prescribed health service provider who has conducted an assessment of the likelihood of reoffending.81 
The court is empowered to make an order if satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender 
is likely to commit a relevant offence after his or her sentence is completed if an order is not made.82 
The orders apply for an initial period of up to 15 years and can be renewed for additional periods of up 
to 15 years.83 Core conditions of the order are: that the offender not commit another relevant offence, 
requirements as to attendance for supervision and treatment as directed, the need for consent to move 
residence, and to notify any change in employment.84 Supervision is provided by the Adult Parole 
Board which may also give directions as to place of residence, impose curfews and impose other 
restrictions on employment, movement and activities.85 Any concern that the scheme may result in 
shorter sentences because of the existence of post release supervision orders is addressed by an 
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amendment to the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), which provides that the fact that an offender is or may 
be under the monitoring program after release is not to be taken into account at the time of 
sentencing.86 As at July 2006, nine extended supervision orders had been granted by the Courts. Only a 
minority contested the application for an order in court.87 
Criticisms of preventive detention and supervision 
6.4.20 There are a range of criticisms of post release preventive detention and supervision orders. 
The objection that they target sex offenders on the erroneous assumption that they have a higher risk 
of re-offending than other types of offenders can be countered by arguing that these schemes target 
selected high risk sex offenders only. But there are other objections including that they infringe a 
number of human rights and fundamental legal principles. Problems with unreliability of risk 
assessment are also raised. The following paragraphs give an overview of these criticisms. 
The principle of proportionality  
6.4.21 It is a ‘basic principle of sentencing law that a sentence … imposed by a court must not 
exceed that which can be justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime 
considered in the light of its objective circumstances.’88 This does not mean that protection of the 
public is irrelevant in determining a sentence but, as a majority of the High Court explained in Veen v 
The Queen (No 2),89 there is a difference between merely inflating a sentence for the purposes 
preventive detention which is impermissible, and exercising the sentencing discretion having regard to 
the protection of society among other factors, which is permissible. A sentence of indeterminate length 
such as a life sentence may be justified on the basis it is proportionate to the seriousness of the 
offence. But if the seriousness of the offence and the culpability of the offender do not justify such a 
sentence, the principle of proportionality forbids such a sentence being imposed because it is 
necessary to protect the public. Post-sentence preventive detention and supervision orders are based on 
what the offender might do in the future and not on what the offender has done in the past and 
therefore can offend against the principle of proportionality.90 
The principle of finality in sentencing 
6.4.22 This principle provides that an offender should be released at the end of his or her sentence 
without the sentence being subsequently extended (other than by an appeal). This could perhaps be 
viewed as a version of the aspect of the rule of law principle that there should be no punishment 
without law, which requires that once a sentence has been served, offenders are entitled to their 
freedom. An offender subject to an indeterminate term (such as life imprisonment of a dangerous 
offender declaration) knows at the outset that the term is indeterminate and may at least know the pre-
parole period or when an application can be made to review the term. In contrast, post-sentence 
preventive schemes lead to uncertainty as to how long an offender must remain in prison after the 
sentence has expired. 
Double punishment 
6.4.23 An objection to post sentence preventive detention regimes is that they offend the double 
punishment limb of the double jeopardy rule. Article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights provides that ‘no-one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for 
which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal 
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procedure of each country’. Both legislation and common law provide that the double jeopardy rule 
applies to punishment as well as the determination of guilt.91 The double punishment rule generally 
applies to prevent an offender being punished twice for overlapping elements of two or more 
offences.92 This is also relevant in the context of post sentence preventive detention. Having been 
sentenced once, for an order to be made extending detention or providing for supervision beyond the 
end of the sentence could be said to amount to double punishment for the same conduct.  
Problems of prediction 
6.4.24 Preventive detention schemes rely on assessments of risk, the fallibility of which is well 
documented in the criminological literature.93 Risk assessments may be either clinical assessments of 
risk based on the judgment of experienced diagnosticians or actuarial assessments based on selected 
characteristics of the offender. Clinical assessments have long been shown to over predict risk with 
large numbers of false positives.94 Successful predictions rates of only one third are common. Whilst it 
appears that actuarial methods of prediction are superior to clinical methods,95 this method still has 
serious problems. As McSherry, Keyzer and Freiberg explain: 
A difficulty of actuarial methods alone is that they are based on determining whether an 
individual offender has the same characteristics or risk factors as a ‘typical’ kind of 
offender. Risk assessments can classify an individual within a group – as ‘high risk’, 
‘medium risk’ or ‘low risk’ – but they cannot say where in this group a given person lies 
and therefore cannot identify the precise risk an individual poses. Assigning risk to an 
individual offender based on the characteristics of a group can therefore lead to inaccurate 
assessments.96  
Combining the two approaches may achieve better results, but still creates ample opportunities for 
error.97  
The arguments in favour of preventive detention and supervision 
6.4.25 There are counter-arguments to the criticisms of preventive detention and supervision orders. 
It can be argued that preventive detention (or supervision) is not punishment and it follows therefore 
that it involves neither disproportionate punishment nor double punishment.98 It can also be argued 
that preventive detention and supervision regimes apply only to offenders who have been convicted of 
serious offences and who have not only already caused a level of grievous harm but are at risk of 
causing further harm. In such circumstances exceptions to rules such as proportionality, double 
punishment and the finality rule are justified to protect the public. Similarly, problems of unreliable 
predictions of re-offending can be countered with the argument that assessments may never get to the 
point of predicting future behaviour with complete accuracy. However, if preventive detention 
schemes are used sparingly when a past offender has all the traits that actuarial and clinical 
assessments predict as presenting a high risk of re-offending – the offender may even assert that they 
will re-offend – then concerns about over-prediction are diminished. 
The Institute’s view 
6.4.26 The post sentence preventive detention and supervision schemes are probably 
constitutionally valid. However, they conflict with long established and widely accepted principles 
such as proportionality, the finality rule and the prohibition on double punishment. Whether they are 
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punitive or preventive in purpose, the reality is that they will be experienced by the offender, who is 
subject to them, as punishment. The Institute acknowledges that it is possible to argue that the greater 
good of protecting the public from a real risk that an offender who has caused considerable harm by 
offending sexually justifies a scheme which allows preventive detention or supervision. However, sex 
offenders are currently subject to sex offender registration orders on their release from prison and they 
can be subject to a dangerous offender declaration if they have a prior conviction for rape or indecent 
assault and such an order is necessary to protect the public from harm. The Institute is not persuaded 
that it is necessary to create an entirely new preventive detention or supervision scheme purely for 
sexual offenders to better protect the public from the risks of the recidivisms of convicted sexual 
offenders. It notes that dangerous offender applications under s 19 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) 
can be made during a term of imprisonment as well as at the same time that the term of imprisonment 
is imposed. In effect, Tasmania already has a post-sentence preventive detention scheme.  
6.4.27 The Institute has given consideration to the issue of whether there is a need to change the 
trigger conditions for a dangerous offender declaration or to extend it to give the court the option of 
imposing supervision rather than detention. It is not persuaded of the need to change the trigger 
conditions by abandoning the requirement for a prior conviction for an offence of violence, for 
example. Dangerous criminal declarations should continue to be confined to exceptional cases. The 
option of ordering supervision as an alternative to detention is something that could be considered by 
the government. This would entail amendments to s 19 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) and would of 
course have significant resource implications.  
6.4.28 The literature shows that considerable advances have been made in the assessment of the risk 
of re-offending and that jurisdictions such as Scotland have endeavoured to improve the quality of 
information that is made available at the time of sentencing.99 The Institute acknowledges that in some 
cases it may be appropriate to make an application for a dangerous offender declaration during an 
offender’s term of imprisonment, but is of the view that where possible that the application should be 
made at the time of sentence. Currently the legislation provides that a dangerous offender application 
has to be made to judge before whom an offender is convicted or brought up for sentence after being 
convicted. This can create problems if the sentencing judge has ceased to hold office during an 
offender’s term of imprisonment because of death, retirement or resignation. It is therefore 
recommended that s 19 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) be amended to insert a provision to the effect 
that if the sentencing judge has ceased to hold office or in other special circumstances, another judge 
may consider an application to declare an offender a dangerous criminal.  
Recommendations 
76. The Institute does not recommend the introduction of provisions for post-sentence detention and 
supervision orders on the grounds that existing provisions for preventive detention and monitoring of 
released sexual offenders are adequate. The Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 19 already provides for 
dangerous criminal declarations, which can be made at any time during a sentence of imprisonment of 
an offender who is eligible for such an order. To add a new and separate set of provisions for post 
sentence detention would be unnecessary duplication and confusing. (6.4.25) 
77. The Institute does not recommend that the trigger conditions for a dangerous offender declaration 
should be extended. However, it does suggest that consideration be given to amending s 19 so that 
courts have the option of making a supervision order after the end of the offender’s sentence of 
imprisonment as an alternative. (6.4.26) 
                                                
99  For a description of Scottish orders of lifelong restriction scheme and the Risk Management Authority created to manage 
the scheme see McSherry, Keyzer and Freiberg (2006), above n 41, 49. 
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78. To ensure that an application for a dangerous criminal declaration can be heard when the 
sentencing judge is not available, it is recommended that sub-section (1A) be inserted into s 19 to 
provide that if the sentencing judge has ceased to hold office or in other special circumstances, another 
judge may hear an application for a dangerous criminal declaration. (6.4.27) 
US post sentence civil commitment schemes 
6.4.29 A number of US states have sexual offender predator laws. McSherry, Keyzer and Freiberg 
outline the typical components of such schemes:100 
• It commences when an offender convicted of sexually violent offence is scheduled for release.  
• The person is assessed to determine whether they meet the statutory definition of a sexually 
violent predator. 
• If there is sufficient evidence, a case is filed for a court or tribunal to determine if probable 
cause exists and if so the offender is taken into custody. 
• A trial is then held to determine whether the offender is a sexually violent predator. 
• If the court or jury so determines, the offender is committed to a state facility for control, care 
and treatment until he or she no longer poses a risk to the community. 
6.4.30 McSherry, Keyzer and Freiberg outline six criticisms of these schemes.101 First, sex 
offenders do not clearly fit within the boundaries of the mental health system, which is to detain and 
treat those with an identifiable mental illness. As Lievore has pointed out, the belief that the majority 
of sex offenders are mentally ill is not supported by research.102 Secondly, the use of civil commitment 
to encompass the detention of sex offenders has been criticised as representing nothing more than the 
transferral of preventive detention from the criminal to the civil system. Thirdly, the inpatient medical 
model may actually undermine treatment efforts for sex offenders who do not have a mental illness in 
a number of ways. For example, labelling them as mentally abnormal may detract from offenders 
taking responsibility for their conduct. Fourthly, using the civil mental health system to detain sex 
offenders after the expiration of their sentence may violate their civil rights. Fifthly, inadequate focus 
has been placed on the potential for restorative justice alternatives to the civil mental health model of 
managing sex offenders. Finally, the medical model approach has significant resource implications. 
The use of the mental health system to detain sex offenders may limit the availability of resources for 
the treatment of individuals with mental illnesses who have not offended. 
 The Institute’s view 
6.4.31  For the reasons outlined in para 6.4.30 the Institute does not support the creation of sexual 
predator laws which allow civil commitment procedures to detain sex offenders beyond the expiry of 
an offender’s sentence. 
Recommendation 
79. The Institute does not recommend the introduction of civil commitment procedures to detain sex 
offenders beyond the expiry of an offender’s sentence for the reasons given in para 6.4.29. 
                                                
100  Ibid, 50-51. 
101  Ibid, 55-57. 
102  Citing Denise Lievore, ‘Thoughts On Recidivism and Rehabilitation of Rapists’ (2005) 28 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 293. 
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Sex offender treatment and chemical castration 
6.4.32 As discussed in Part 3 (paras 3.2.31-3.2.33) there is now considerable evidence that some 
forms of treatment are effective for sex offenders. The Institute recommends that the government 
continues to fund sex offender treatment programs both in an out of prison and that in particular more 
resources be devoted to follow-up of offenders after their release whilst on parole. The Institute has 
also considered whether ‘chemical castration’ should be a sentencing option. 
6.4.33 Drug treatments are sometimes used in the treatment of sex offenders. Medroxyprogesterone 
acetate (MPA), for example, is a drug which slows the release of the male hormone androgen from the 
testicles and has a suppressing effect on male sexual desire. While its use is relatively uncontroversial 
in the case of volunteers and such drugs are used in the correctional context in Australia, court ordered 
‘chemical castration’ is not a sentencing option in any Australian jurisdiction. However, in some US 
jurisdictions such treatments can be a sentencing option with nine American states incorporating MPA 
treatment in their sentencing regime. There are differences between these jurisdictions in the sexual 
offences they apply to, the assessment preconditions and whether the treatment is discretionary, 
mandatory or voluntary. Some states (Louisiana and Oregon) mandate chemical castration for first 
time offenders in certain circumstances and three others (California, Florida and Iowa) mandate it for 
certain repeat offenders. In the other four states it is either discretionary or voluntary. In other words, 
if it is discretionary, the court has a discretion to make an order for compulsory treatment for certain 
sex offenders; if it is voluntary, the order is subject to the consent of the offender. 
The Institute’s view on chemical castration 
6.4.34 The Institute does not support making chemical castration compulsory – either as a 
mandatory order if the trigger conditions are satisfied or giving courts a discretion to make a 
sentencing order which compels the offender to submit to drug treatment. Coercive treatment of this 
nature infringes ethical and human rights principles and is contrary to the general right to refuse 
medical treatment and to submit to a number of known possible side effects of the drugs. Instrumental 
arguments about the effectiveness of such treatment as a means of reducing sexual recidivism are 
reasons for offering such treatment to sex offenders but do not justify compelling offenders to undergo 
such treatment as part of a sentencing order.103 However, if an offender chooses to have this form of 
treatment and it is medically indicated and appropriate for the offender, it should be made available by 
correctional authorities as part of an offender’s treatment program. 
Recommendations 
80. The Institute recommends that for the protection of the public the best possible evidence-based sex 
offender treatment programs should be made available in the prison system and in the community and 
that prisoners on sex offender treatment programs should be receive follow-up treatment and support 
after their release. (6.4.30) 
81. The Institute does not recommend that chemical castration should be a sentencing option or a 
condition of a sentencing order but when appropriate it be made available to offenders who consent as 
part of their treatment program. (6.4.32) 
                                                
103  Linda Weinberger, Shoba Sreenivasan, Thomas Garrick, Hadley Osran, ‘The Impact Of Surgical Castration On Sexual 
Recidivism Risk Among Sexually Violent Predatory Offenders’ (2005) 33(1) American Academy of Psychiatry and the 
Law 16; Grant Nichol, Paraphilic Sex Offenders: A Literature Review and Proposal for Program Development in 
Victoria, Research Fellow Working Paper No 17, Centre For Health Program Evaluation (1991); Fred Berlin, 
‘Commentary: The Impact of Surgical Castration on Sexual Recidivism Risk Among Civilly Committed Sexual 
Offenders’ (2005) 33(1) American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 37. 
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6.5 What is an appropriate response to the public 
perception that sentences for sex offenders are too 
lenient? 
6.5.1 The final issue to discuss in this Part is how to respond to the public perception that 
sentences for sex offenders are too lenient. It may be that while the protection of society cannot be 
shown to require measures in addition to dangerous offender declarations and sex offender registration 
orders such as extended detention orders, longer than proportionate measures or mandatory penalties, 
the existing penalties for sex offenders are regarded as too lenient on the grounds that they do not 
adequately reflect the seriousness with which the public views such crimes. To put this another way, it 
is not a question of giving courts the power to impose penalties for sex offenders that infringe the 
principle of proportionality. Rather, it is a question of whether existing penalties for sex offenders are 
disproportionately lenient – that they fail to adequately denounce such offences or to recognise the 
seriousness of such offences and the culpability of those who commit them.  
6.5.2 As stated above in para 6.2.12, the Institute is unable to answer the question whether current 
sentencing practices for sex offences are appropriate. This is an issue which requires further research 
and it has been suggested that this could be done as an extension of the University of Tasmania’s jury 
sentencing study and Mackenzie’s ARC research (see para 6.2.12). In Part 7 the Institute recommends 
that a Sentencing Advisory Council be established to bridge the gap between the community, courts 
and government by informing, educating and advising on sentencing matters. Exploring the issue of 
the appropriate sentencing levels of sexual offences is a matter that could be undertaken by such a 
body taking into account the research findings from the Jury Sentencing Study and the ARC study. 
While the mechanism of a guideline judgment application would be a means by which the Sentencing 
Advisory Council could advise the Court of Criminal Appeal of a recommended guideline for rape, the 
Institute at this stage has not recommended guideline judgments be introduced (see Part 7, 7.3.36). 
However, the advice of the Sentencing Advisory Council could be relied upon by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions in a Crown sentencing appeal if the advice were to the effect that current 
sentencing range for rape is too low. 
Recommendation 
82. The Institute recommends that the issue of the appropriateness of sentencing patterns for sexual 
offenders be referred to the proposed Sentencing Advisory Council. (6.5.2) 
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Part 7 
Role of the Community 
(a)  Consider the level to which the objective in section 3(f) of the Sentencing Act [of 
promoting public understanding of sentencing practices and procedures] has been met 
and make recommendations as to how the public can be informed of the sentencing 
process. 
(b)  Consider how community attitudes towards sentencing should be ascertained. 
(c)  Examine whether any mechanism could be adopted to more adequately incorporate 
community views into the sentencing process. 
7.1 Promoting public understanding of sentencing 
7.1.1 One of the stated purposes of the Sentencing Act is to ‘promote public understanding of 
sentencing practices and procedures’ (s 3(f)). The Attorney-General’s second reading speech indicates 
a clear understanding of the problems surrounding community perceptions of sentencing, but offers 
only consolidation of the legislation as a means of solving these problems and promoting public 
understanding of sentencing: 
Mr Speaker, the purpose of the bill is to consolidate into the one act, all the various 
legislative provisions in relation to sentencing in Tasmania. In recent years there has been a 
considerable degree of community interest in the criminal justice system, particularly in the 
sentencing process. With public disquiet about crime rates, there is a public perception that 
sentences imposed are generally inadequate as either a deterrent or for punishment 
purposes. This public dissatisfaction often arises from a misunderstanding of the law and 
the sentencing process, although one must say that one can appreciate the level of concern 
that is out there in the community. 
Public debate on sentencing issues often occurs in response to quite exceptional cases. It is 
therefore an opportune time for government to rationalise and consolidate existing 
legislative provisions into a single statute. By this means, the sentencing process will 
become more understandable to the general public, offenders, and those responsible for the 
administration of justice.1 
7.1.2 While consolidation of sentencing legislation may assist to promote public understanding of 
sentencing practice and procedure, at most it is a preliminary step. The Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) tells 
us very little. As far as sentencing legislation goes, the information on sentencing goals and factors 
relevant to the sentencing discretion is scant. While s 3(g) states the purpose of the Act is to set out the 
objectives of sentencing and related orders, the only orders which include objectives are adjournments, 
discharges and dismissals. Even the general aims of sentence in s 3(e) are stated indirectly, rather than 
as directions to judicial officers. Whether the Act should contain more detail in relation to sentencing 
goals and principles will be considered below. However, the usefulness of legislation as a means of 
educating the public about sentencing practice is doubtful. No matter how detailed, no matter how 
accessible in theory (the Internet has improved accessibility of legislation), sentencing legislation of its 
nature reveals very little about sentencing practice in a way likely to assist public understanding of 
sentencing practice and procedure.  
                                                
1  Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Attorney-General Ray Groom 13 August 1997. 
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The importance of a well-informed public 
7.1.3 In Part 2 it was explained that international evidence suggests that misperceptions about 
sentencing practice fuels public dissatisfaction, and that one of the ways of improving public 
confidence in criminal justice and perceptions of safety is to improve public understanding of 
sentencing. In addition, in Part 4 it was recognised that the information and advice provided to victims 
needs to ensure they have realistic expectations about the sentencing process. The views of victims 
and victims’ families feature prominently in media coverage of crime stories and feed into public 
perceptions of sentencing. 
7.1.4 Robust evidence of public opinion about sentencing in Tasmania is limited and research on 
public knowledge of sentencing and criminal justice issues scanty. Letters to newspapers, talkback 
radio and media polls convey the impression that the public thinks that sentences are too lenient and 
that judges are out of touch. Representative surveys similarly suggest the public considers sentences 
are too lenient. As mentioned in Part 2, the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes has consistently 
reported that over 70 percent of respondents agree that people who break the law should be given 
stiffer sentences.2 However, in recent years researchers have questioned the claim that surveys such as 
these demonstrate that public opinion supports harsher sentences and have highlighted ‘the 
methodological limitations of using a single abstract question to measure complex and nuanced public 
attitudes’.3 More sophisticated public opinion research has shown that,  
• people answering a general question respond punitively because they have the worst kind of 
offenders and the most serious cases in mind; 
• people recall particularly lenient sentences and do not consider whether the crimes and 
sentences that come to mind are representative of most cases; 
• people fail to consider the alternatives to incarceration; 
• people have very little accurate knowledge of crime, the criminal justice system and sentencing 
practices; 
• those with the lowest levels of knowledge hold the most punitive views; 
• when people are given more information, their levels of punitiveness drop dramatically.4 
7.1.5 The limited research on public knowledge of sentencing and criminal justice issues in 
Tasmania suggests that the Tasmanian public is probably as uniformed as is the public in other 
jurisdictions.5 The Australian Survey of Social Attitudes has found that just five percent of Australians 
stated that crime levels had decreased over the last two years, or, in other words, just one in 20 
respondents answered the question accurately. Tasmanian respondents were a little more accurate with 
one in 10 respondents giving a correct response.6 Preliminary findings from the University of 
Tasmania’s jury sentencing study have revealed that jurors perceive recorded crime to be increasing, 
overestimate the proportion of crime that involves violence and underestimate the severity of 
sentencing practices. For example, only one percent of respondents correctly stated that recorded 
crime had decreased in the last five years and 63 percent stated it had become more common.7 
                                                
2  D Indermaur and L Roberts, ‘Perceptions of Crime and Justice’ in S Wilson et al, Australian Social Attitudes: The First 
Report, (2005) 141, 155. 
3  K Gelb, Myths and Misconceptions: Public Opinion versus Public Judgment about Sentencing, Sentencing Advisory 
Council, Research Paper, (2006) 12. 
4  Ibid, 1-18; Julian Roberts, Loretta Stalans, David Indermaur and Mike Hough, Penal Populism and Public Opinion: 
Lessons from Five Countries (2003) 21-34.  
5  For other jurisdictions see Gelb (2006), above n 3, 13. 
6  Indermaur and Roberts (2005), above n 2, 143. 
7  K Warner, J Davis, M Walter and R Bradfield, ‘Talking to juries about punishment: investigating a new way to gauge 
public opinion and inform the public’ (paper presented the 2008 Supreme and Federal Courts’ Conference, Sydney, 19 
January 2008). 
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7.1.6 Low levels of public knowledge about crime and sentencing are a matter of concern because 
there is strong international evidence that dissatisfaction with sentencing practice is due, at least partly, 
to a number of aspects of public misperception and misinformation. Using British Crime Surveys, 
Hough and Roberts have found that a number of aspects of public misperception were significantly 
associated with a belief that sentences were too lenient: 
• those saying there was a lot more crime were more likely to think sentences were 
too soft; 
• over-estimators of the of proportion of recorded crime involving violence were more 
likely to think sentences were too soft; 
• under-estimators of the number of burglars and rapists sent to prison were more 
likely to think sentences were too soft.8 
7.1.7 Further, almost half of the respondents thought lenient sentencing was a major cause of 
rising crime rates. This belief in a direct relationship between severity of sentencing and crime rates is 
a concern because it leads many to blame judges and magistrates for failing to control crime despite 
the evidence that factors affecting crime rates lie largely outside the reach of judicial officers.9 
The mass media is primary source of information about crime and sentencing 
7.1.8 According to an Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) survey, the main sources of 
information about crime and sentencing are television and newspapers.10 Findings from the Australian 
Survey of Social Attitudes demonstrate that the accuracy of perceptions regarding crime fluctuates 
with the type of media upon which a person relies. For example, those who rely on internet sites for 
their news and information are most likely to believe that crime rates are stable or falling, whilst those 
who rely on talkback radio, family and friends and commercial television are least likely to believe 
this.11  
7.1.9 The mass media provides a distorted picture of crime and criminal justice issues. It is 
frequently criticised for selectively reporting crime stories. Decisions that are unremarkable are simply 
not reported.12 Quantitative analysis of media coverage does not always show newspapers are more 
likely to cover sentencing stories if the sentence is a light one, but the attention given to apparently 
lenient outcomes in serious cases and strident editorial comment distorts information about sentencing 
practice.13 The attention of the public is likely to be drawn to a specific case, which seems in the light 
of the reported facts to be too lenient. In Australia, studies show that while the ‘quality press’ neglects 
sentencing matters, the approach of the ‘tabloid’ press on the other hand is to ‘fan emotion, quash 
reason and present false impressions’.14 Just as listening to talk-back radio and watching commercial 
television predicts misperceptions of crime rates, UK research has shown that reading the tabloid press 
is a strong predictor of under-estimators of sentencing severity.15 As Indermaur and Roberts point out, 
unpacking the cause and effect in the relationship between media and perceptions of crime and 
sentencing is complex: 
                                                
8  M Hough and J Roberts, ‘Sentencing Trends in Britain: Public Knowledge and Public Opinion’ (1999) 1 Punishment & 
Society 11, 18 cited by Gelb (2006), above n 3, 14; M Hough and J Roberts, ‘Public knowledge and public opinion of 
sentencing’ in C Tata and N Hutton (eds) Sentencing and Society (2002) 157, 164. 
9  J Roberts and M Hough, Understanding Public Attitudes to Criminal Justice, (2005) 48 cited by Gelb (2006), above n 3, 
14; see above 2.1.20 on the relationship between crime levels and sentencing. 
10  Australian Bureau of Statistics Community Safety Tasmania, Cat no 4515.6 (1999) 4: 30.5 percent used television as their 
main source of information about crime, while 23.7 percent used newspapers. 
11  Indermaur and Roberts (2006), above n 2, 148. 
12  Report to Parliament by the Hon DK Malcolm, Chief Justice of Western Australia, (1998) referred to by N Morgan and B 
Murray ‘What’s in a Name? Guideline Judgments in Australia’ (1999) 23 Criminal Law Journal 90, 98. 
13  M Hough and J Roberts (2002) ‘Public knowledge and public opinion of sentencing’ in C Tata and N Hutton (eds) 
Sentencing and Society, 170. 
14  A Lovegrove, ‘Judicial Sentencing Policy, Criminological Expertise and Public Opinion’ (1998) 31 Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology 287, 293. 
15  Hough and Roberts (2002), above n 8, 164. 
Tasmania Law Reform Institute   Sentencing 
222 
While the media may feed negative stories and images to viewers, individuals are likely to 
seek out media sources that accord with their pre-existing opinions and beliefs. What is 
most likely then, is that individual views and audience-maximising media programming 
amplify each other though synergistic selection and reinforcement.16 
7.1.10 There is general agreement that by presenting an inaccurate and incomplete picture of 
sentencing practice, the popular media plays a significant role in contributing to a misinformed 
public.17 Whether it is the media’s role to ensure that the public is well-informed on criminal justice 
issues can be questioned. Media outlets are businesses with commercial imperatives. 
How should the public be better informed about sentencing? 
7.1.11 In the light of evidence that a lack of public confidence in the criminal justice system and 
punitive attitudes are linked with misperceptions about crime and sentencing patterns, improving 
public knowledge of crime and sentencing is a priority. The Issues Paper canvassed a number of ways 
in which this could be achieved. 
Statistics and website 
7.1.12 The Issues Paper contained a proposal for the production and publication of sentencing 
statistics on the Internet with an annual press release to media outlets. It was suggested this should 
provide simple factual information about crimes and sentencing indicating the range of sentences 
handed down in the Supreme Court and the Magistrates Courts each year for specific offences in such 
a way as to communicate the ‘going rate’ for specific sorts of crime. Links could be provided to the 
courts’ websites. This would be a resource for members of the public and the media. While there is no 
guarantee that the media would use this data to provide a context for discussion of particular cases, at 
least the media would not have the excuse that such data was unavailable or available in an 
indigestible form.18  
7.1.13 The Issues Paper explained that the usefulness of sentencing data is not confined to 
improving public knowledge of sentencing practice. It would also be useful for prosecutors, defence 
counsel, judges and magistrates, defendants, victims and other participants in the criminal justice 
system. Addressing the reservations expressed by Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Wong v The 
Queen19 it was argued first, that an indication of the percentage of custodial sentences and the ranges 
of penalty with a median is better than no knowledge at all about sentencing patterns for a particular 
offence and secondly, that the sentencing data will not be used by sentencers in isolation from 
appellate guidance and sentencing remarks.  
7.1.14 In addition to sentencing data, it was suggested that information on crime rates should also 
be made more accessible. Data on crime trends is available but it needs to be conveyed in a more 
understandable format. Studies have shown that even when crime rates have been consistently 
declining, the majority of the public view crime rates as increasing. ABS data or police data on crime 
rates for this State should be included on the same Internet site as the sentencing data. Data on parole 
release should also be included.  
                                                
16  D Indermaur and L Roberts (2006), above n 2, 148. 
17  Gelb (2006), above 3, 15. 
18  Hough and Roberts (2002), above n 8, 171. 
19  (2001) 207 CLR 584, 608. 
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Responses to the Issue Paper 
7.1.15 There was support for the publication of annual sentencing statistics in easily accessible 
form.20 The Director of Public Prosecutions strongly supported the production of Magistrates Courts 
sentencing statistics.21 The Manager of the Launceston Community Legal Centre supported the 
provision of a state-wide sentencing data base covering both the Supreme Court and Magistrates 
Courts. It was suggested that this should be maintained by the University to provide a degree of 
independence in the interpretation of the data.22 As well as supporting Internet availability of 
sentencing statistics, Tasmania Police also suggested that a regularly up-dated database of judges’ 
comments on passing sentence (COPS) be available on the Internet rather than the current practice of 
removing the comments after a few weeks.23 
The Institute’s view 
7.1.16 The Institute remains of the view that there are a number of deficiencies in sentencing data 
that need to be addressed. First, there is no available data on sentencing patterns in Magistrates Courts. 
This could partly explain the apparent disparities in sentencing outcomes between magistrates and 
regions revealed by the analysis of sentencing trends in Part 1 (see paras1.3.12-1.3.13). Secondly, the 
Supreme Court sentencing database has a number of limitations. While judges and practitioners have 
access to the whole database of all COPS since 1989 and can search it to obtain the tariff for any 
particular crime, this database is not available to the general public. A member of the public can only 
access sentencing comments for a few weeks after the sentence is handed down. Moreover, while the 
Supreme Court database may be easily searchable from the point of view of a judge who is familiar 
with it, it does not provide a quantitative overview of the sentencing pattern for a particular offence 
such as the percentage of custodial sentences, the range of sentences and the median for a particular 
offence. The same is true of the version of the database which is available to legal practitioners 
(TasinLaw). 
7.1.17 It is not appropriate that all COPS should be available publicly. Making them available from 
the date of the sentence for a period of two or three weeks ensures that the media and members of the 
public can access the comments to get a complete and accurate picture of the judge’s reasons for 
sentence in a particular case. Making the whole database available would carry the risk of jurors 
accessing the database to see if an accused has a prior record and could prejudice a trial. 
7.1.18 New technology provides an opportunity to disseminate crime and sentencing information. 
With 55 per cent of Tasmanian dwellings having access to the Internet24 there is the opportunity to 
provide complex up-to-date information in an accessible way. The Victorian Sentencing Advisory 
Council’s sentencing snapshots for particular offences provide an illustration of simple and accurate 
sentencing information that is available on line. The Tasmanian Justice Department now has a 
database, which records sentencing outcomes for the Supreme Court and Magistrates Courts for the 
whole of the State. However, it is not used to produce sentencing information in a regular and 
systematic way and the searches required to extract the data are complex. A lack of resources and 
personnel means that ad hoc requests for sentencing data to the Justice Department cannot be easily 
accommodated. The Institute recommends that protocols be developed for extracting the data and that 
the task of cleaning, sorting and analysing it be outsourced with appropriate funding to ensure that 
annual sentencing data is published. Similar data should also be published for the Supreme Court 
compiled from either the Justice Department’s or the Supreme Court’s data base. For the purposes of 
the Sentencing project, the Institute has compiled a database of Supreme Court sentences from 2001- 
2006 and this could be up-dated for the purpose of the publication of annual sentencing data. Because 
it would appear that public misperceptions about sentencing are related to misperceptions about crime 
                                                
20  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, submission, 2, 12; Tasmania Police, submission, 8; Jane Hutchinson and Olivia 
Montgomery, Hobart Community Legal Service, submission, 3. 
21  T J Ellis, SC, Director of Public Prosecutions, submission, 4. 
22  Bob Hamilton, Manager, Launceston Community Legal Centre, submission, 2. 
23  Tasmania Police, submission, 9. 
24  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Patterns of Internet Access in Australia, Cat no. 8146.0.55.001 (2006) 16. 
Tasmania Law Reform Institute   Sentencing 
224 
trends, in addition to sentencing information, information on crime trends and general sentencing 
information should be published.  
7.1.19 There are a number of possibilities for undertaking the task of analysing and publishing the 
data including the Tasmania Law Reform Institute, the Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement, or a 
designated person based at the Justice Department or a sentencing body of some kind. This will be 
considered further below.  
Recommendation 
83. The Institute recommends that the government allocate funding for the publication of easily 
accessible and digestible general crime and sentencing information including annual sentencing 
statistics to promote public understanding of crime and sentencing matters. This would also remedy 
the information deficit in relation to sentencing practices in magistrates’ courts and promote 
consistency. (7.1.18) 
Public education campaigns, printed booklets and sentencing workshops 
7.1.20 The Issues Paper recommended the publication of printed booklets as a means of improving 
public knowledge of the sentencing process. It was argued that contact with the criminal justice system 
provides an opportunity to make information about the system available and to shape participants’ 
expectations about it. This could be done relatively cheaply and easily by producing a booklet 
explaining crime rates, basic court procedures, the aims of sentencing, basic factors which are taken 
into account in sentencing, common aggravating and mitigating factors, and giving an indication of the 
range of penalties that can be expected for different offences. Such a booklet could be made available 
to victims and their families by placing it at police stations, courts and other appropriate places. The 
effectiveness of this format for providing simple factual information to a wide cross-section of the 
public is supported by Home Office research.25  
7.1.21 This strategy has the support nationally of the Judicial Conference of Australia which 
released a booklet in 2007 entitled Judge for Yourself: a Guide to Sentencing in Australia. The aim of 
the booklet is ‘to educate the public and journalists in the face of what it believes is often unwarranted 
criticism’.26 Publicising the booklet’s launch in September 2007, Debelle J, the Chairman of the 
Judicial Conference, was reported as saying it was intended to help the public understand the process 
of sentencing and to ‘weigh criticism in the media. It is also provided for the purpose of educating 
journalists to be more temperate in their criticism’.27 Another publication is planned to be ‘aimed at a 
more informed audience’. The booklet is available to members of the public at the Supreme Court in 
Tasmania and links are available to an electronic version of the booklet on the Supreme Court’s 
website.  
7.1.22 Sentencing workshops have also been used as a means of educating the public about 
sentencing matters. In You be the Judge sentencing workshops, members of the public participate in a 
seminar with a mock trial component. Participants are asked to discuss what sentence should be 
imposed.28 These workshops have been used in a number of jurisdictions.29 Many have been conducted 
by Victoria’s Sentencing Advisory Council and dates of forthcoming workshops are advertised on the 
Council’s website. Since August 2002, a number of workshops have been run in Tasmania involving 
judges and magistrates and using participants from organisations such as Neighbourhood Watch. The 
mock trial component of these workshops has been filmed as the basis of a multimedia educational 
                                                
25  Ibid. 
26  M Pelly, ‘Judges hit back on mandatory sentencing’, The Australian (Sydney) 28 September 2007, 39. 
27  Ibid. 
28  This has been done in a number of jurisdictions, see Neighbourhood Watch, Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission, 
Northern Territory Law Society and the Public Purposes Act, Trial of the Century: Final Report (2001); You Be the 
Judge, Supreme Court of Tasmania, <www.courtlists.tas.gov.au/Sentencing/home.html> at 12 November 2007. 
29  See Issues Paper at [110] for a description of the Northern Territories Trial of the Century Project. 
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package for schools that is available on the web.30 The Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council has 
developed a sophisticated You be the Judge educational package for Legal Studies and Civics students 
consisting of a Teacher Guide, case studies and notes. The package was released in April 2007 and the 
information is updated frequently. 
Response to the Issues Paper 
7.1.23 The Issues Paper invited responses about public education of sentencing and criminal justice 
issues. Many respondents supported the need for improved public education. Tasmania Police, for 
example, submitted: 
Public education on sentencing and crime trends should be a priority, particularly in the 
Tasmania Together context. Fear of crime is a significant problem in Tasmania, and lack of 
understanding about sentencing practices and the extent of crime is a contributing factor 
that needs to be addressed.31 
7.1.24 Tasmania Police also supported sentencing workshops and judges and magistrates’ 
involvement in presentations about sentencing to community groups such as Rotary and 
Neighbourhood Watch. The production of a sentencing booklet, which should be made available to 
victims as a matter of course and made available on the Internet, was also supported. There was 
considerable support for sentencing workshops.32 There was also support for a sentencing information 
booklet. The Legal Aid Commission suggested that rather than publishing hard copies of the booklet, 
it be made available online so that it could be continually up-dated and printed on demand. The 
Shadow Attorney-General supported public education about sentencing and suggested a monthly 
insert for each of the daily newspapers with sentences and sentencing comments including information 
about sentences in Magistrates Courts. On the other hand, in consultations with the Justice 
Department, Peter Hoult voiced scepticism about the effectiveness of public education campaigns. 
Letter box drops were criticised on the grounds that they have a 25 per cent readership rate at most.33 
Jim Connolly however, supported education in schools about crime and justice matters in order to 
inform people of the facts before their opinions became entrenched. In the Justice Department’s 
submission, it was suggested that rather than unrelated and piecemeal strategies such as booklets and 
sentencing seminars, a comprehensive public education program with clearly defined target groups 
would be more effective. However, problems with a lack of resources to devote to such a program 
were noted.34 
The Institute’s view 
7.1.25 In the Institute’s view a variety of approaches are needed to improve public information 
about sentencing. Existing approaches such as sentencing workshops should be continued. While 
Home Office research confirms that seminars are not an effective way of conveying information to a 
wide cross-section of the general public because of the low attendance rates and the unrepresentative 
nature of those attending (attendees were more likely to have educational qualifications and to read 
broad-sheet newspapers), such an approach received very positive ratings from those who did attend. 
Sentencing workshops may therefore be a means of stimulating interest in the criminal justice system 
and improving knowledge about it for those with no contact with the criminal justice system. The 
preparation of the multimedia package for schools and community groups by the Legal Aid 
Commission is to be commended. However, this could no doubt be updated and improved by the 
                                                
30  This can be accessed at <www.courtlists.tas.gov.au/Sentencing/about.html> or by accessing the Supreme Court website 
and following the Sentencing link. 
31  Tasmania Police, submission, 8. 
32  The Honourable Justice Cox, Chief Justice, submission, 5; The Honourable Justice Underwood, submission, 2; Criminal 
Law Subcomittee of the Law Society, submission, 2; Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, submission, 12. 
33  Peter Hoult, consultation with Justice Department, 7 October, 2002. 
34  Justice Department, submission, 18. 
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inclusion of more supporting material along the lines of the Sentencing Advisory Council’s You be the 
Judge package to ensure its ongoing usefulness for legal studies students.  
7.1.26 The Institute also supports the use of a sentencing information booklet and noted above that 
the Judicial Conference of Australia’s booklet Judge for Yourself: a Guide to Sentencing in Australia 
is already available in the Supreme Court and electronically on the Supreme Court website. However, 
the Institute is aware that the provision of accessible information by booklet and on websites has 
limitations. Not all commentators are convinced about the value of attempting to educate the public by 
providing accessible information. For example, Green has argued that public education programs 
embraced by the Home Office, such as distributing booklets or videos, are insufficiently bold to make 
a significant and lasting impact on public knowledge and attitudes.35 They are inherently flawed 
because they do not help the public work through the ambivalent attitudes that crime and punishment 
issues often produce to allow for the development of more considered views. Information, it is argued 
is a necessary condition for attitude change but it is not sufficient. Similarly, Maruna and King have 
cautioned that ‘public education will help, but is no panacea’.36 They argue that attitudes have an 
emotional dimension as well as a factual one, and when attitudes to crime, sentencing and penalties are 
not merely based on information deficits, they are not easily altered.37 In conclusion, they state: 
Schemes to educate and inform the public about the nuances of sentencing, the “facts” 
about crime, and so forth are noble, well-meaning efforts, but unlikely to have more than 
marginal impact on either public understanding of crime issues or punitive, prison-centric 
attitudes.38 
7.1.27 Maruna and King note that the most promising findings about the impact of education is in 
the context of active participation by citizens in the criminal justice process, such as serving on a jury 
or participating in restorative justice work. Research suggests active participation increases 
satisfaction with the criminal justice system and decreases punitiveness.39 This suggests that using 
jurors as a means of educating the public has some potential. Currently a study is underway in 
Tasmania which is exploring the use of jurors both as a means of educating the public about 
sentencing matters and using them as a source of public opinion.40 Jurors are recruited from trials after 
a guilty verdict is returned and invited to stay to listen to the sentencing submissions and participate in 
the study. At the first stage they are invited to fill in a questionnaire which asks them to state the 
sentence they consider should be imposed and tests their knowledge of crime and sentencing matters. 
They are then sent an information package containing the COPS, a booklet about crime and sentencing 
and a second questionnaire which explores their response to the judge’s sentence and assesses the 
impact of the booklet on their knowledge of crime and sentencing matters. The study will attempt to 
discover what impact the information has on jurors’ knowledge of criminal justice issues and 
perceptions of sentencing. There are obvious limitations in the study as a long-term strategy for 
informing the public about crime and sentencing issues. However, it may show that it is worthwhile 
engaging the jury in the sentencing process to the extent of not only inviting them to listen to the 
sentencing submissions but also sending them information about crime and sentencing and the COPS. 
It is hypothesised that as their interest has been aroused in the case by jury service and perhaps their 
emotions engaged, they are in a position to absorb knowledge and change their attitudes and 
perceptions. Preliminary results indicate that jurors do take an interest in the sentencing outcome and 
many discuss it with friends and family. 
                                                
35  D Green, ‘Public Opinion versus Public Judgment about Crime’ (2006) 46 British Journal of Criminology 131. 
36  S Maruna and A King, ‘Public Opinion and Community Penalties’ in A Bottoms, S Rex and G Robinson (eds), 
Alternatives to Prison: Options for an Insecure Society (2004) 83, 101. 
37  Ibid, 102. Others have also argued for the need to address the emotional attitudes to crime and justice, e.g. A Freiberg, 
‘Affective vs. Effective Justice: Instrumentalism and Emotionalism in Criminal Justice’ (2001) 3 Punishment and Society 
265.  
38  Maruna and King (2004), above n 36, 102. 
39  Ibid. 
40  Warner et al. (2008), above n 7. 
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7.1.28 The Institute agrees with the Justice Department’s submission that rather than piecemeal and 
unrelated efforts to improve public knowledge of crime and sentencing matters, a comprehensive and 
carefully targeted public education campaign may be more effective. However, resources for this will 
always be an issue. The issue of over-sighting public education efforts will be picked up below in 7.3. 
Recommendations 
84. The Institute recommends that a number of strategies are necessary to improve public education 
about crime and sentencing including:  
• continuation of sentencing workshops and making them available on a more regular basis by 
calling on more judges and magistrates to assist with them; (7.1.25) 
• updating and expanding the materials for the You be the Judge multi-media package to ensure 
that it is useful and relevant for school and community groups; (7.1.25) 
• ensuring that the ‘Judge for Yourself’ booklet is widely available or a booklet that includes data 
about crime trends as well as sentencing information; (7.1.26) 
• reviewing the outcome of the Jury Sentencing Study to see if it supports supplying COPS and 
an information booklet to jurors as a regular and ongoing procedure. (7.1.27) 
Public relations and court media officers  
7.1.29 The judiciary has for the most part been poor at developing strategies to defend itself from 
attack. While there is some evidence of an increasing willingness of judges to speak out on legal issues 
and at least one Chief Justice regards it as his role to defend his fellow judges from attack and 
criticism, the Issues Paper suggested consideration should be given to what else should be done. It was 
suggested that it is perhaps time that thought be given to obtaining the skills of public relation and 
communications experts to deal with the crisis in public confidence in the courts and the parole 
system. In Bartels’s interviews with magistrates and judges for the purpose of her suspended sentences 
study, some magistrates suggested that the appointment of a media liaison person might assist to 
correct misunderstanding about sentences, improve the flow of information and to correct public 
perception of suspended sentences in particular.41 
7.1.30 None of the submissions received addressed the issue of the appointment of a media liaison 
officer, although, as noted above, in consultations with the Justice Department one of the participants 
suggested that as the media was the primary cause of misperceptions they should also be the solution. 
The Institute agrees that media reporting does play a critical role in the development of public opinion 
on sentencing and by presenting an inaccurate and incomplete picture of sentencing practice, 
contributes to public misperceptions about it. However, it is not convinced that the appointment of a 
media liaison officer is a priority and recommends prioritising its recommendations to improve public 
knowledge of the sentencing process.  
Legislative statement of sentencing purposes 
7.1.31 As explained at the beginning of this Part, the Tasmanian Sentencing Act contains little detail 
in relation to sentencing principles and goals. The aims of sentence in s 3 are stated as a purpose of the 
Act rather than as directions to sentencers. Section 3 states the purpose of this Act is to: 
(a)  amend the consolidate the State’s sentencing law; and 
                                                
41  Lorana Bartels, Sword or Sever? The Use and Utility of Suspended Sentences in Tasmania (PhD thesis, University of 
Tasmania, 2008) 4.5. 
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(b)  promote the protection of the community as a primary consideration in sentencing 
offenders; and 
(c)  promote consistency in the sentencing of offenders; and 
(d)  establish fair procedures for – 
(i)  imposing sentences on offenders generally; and 
(ii)  imposing offenders on offenders in special cases; and 
(iii)  dealing with offenders who breach the conditions of sentences; and 
(e)  help prevent crime and promote respect for the law by allowing courts to – 
(i) impose sentences aimed at deterring offenders and other persons from 
committing offences;  
(ii)  impose sentences aimed at the rehabilitation of offenders; and 
(iii)  impose sentences that denounce the conduct of offenders; and  
(f)  promote public understanding of sentencing practices and procedures; and  
(g)  set out the objectives of sentencing and related orders; and 
(h)  recognise the interests of victims of offences. 
7.1.32 It could be argued that the purposes of sentencing in paras (b) and (e) should be a more 
explicit direction to judicial officers and that they be placed in a hierarchy with an indication of a 
dominant rationale. The sentencing objectives could also be criticised for the omission of retribution, 
the non consequentialist goal of imposing deserved punishment regardless of its effects. Legislating 
for sentencing purposes can be a contentious and complex question. The common law does not 
identify a dominant rationale and its failure to do so has been criticised. It is argued that to give judges 
freedom to choose which rationale of sentencing to adopt is a major source of inconsistency in 
sentencing. A distinction is made between discretion, which allows the sentencer to respond to 
particular facts of the individual cases, which is necessary, and a freedom to pursue individual penal 
philosophies, which is not. Recently, the issue was considered by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC). The ALRC recommended that federal sentencing legislation should contain a 
provision specifying the purposes of sentences rather than the current practice of including some 
purposes in the list of matters a court is required to take into account in imposing sentence.42 The 
recommendation was supported by the argument that it is currently standard practice to specify the 
purposes of sentencing legislatively and that doing so provides a useful means of communicating with 
the public about sentencing. Given ‘the fundamental importance of the purposes of sentencing to the 
sentencing process’, it was recommended that the list of purposes be exhaustive.43 Ranking the 
purposes or identifying a primary or dominant purpose was rejected on the grounds it would not 
necessarily enhance consistency and because of a lack of agreement about which purpose should be 
adopted and changing views as to which purpose should be dominant.  
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Responses to the Issues Paper 
7.1.33 The Issues Paper asked how the Sentencing Act should deal with sentencing goals. This 
question was asked in the context of a discussion of how the public can be better informed of the 
sentencing process. There was some support for including a list of aims of sentencing at the beginning 
of the Sentencing Act.44 For example, Tasmania Police submitted: 
The Sentencing Act should clearly define the goals of sentencing both to promote public 
understanding and ensure a more consistent approach between sentencers.45 
7.1.34 However, just as the ALRC found, there were conflicting submissions about the goals and 
their prioritisation. The then Commissioner of Police, Richard McCreadie suggested priority should be 
given to protection of the public as a goal, that ‘the sublimated vengeance of punitive sentencing has 
no place in a liberal democratic society’ and that the value of general or specific deterrence is often 
highly questionable.46 Tasmania Police submitted that currently too much weight is placed by courts 
on deterrence47 and in consultations with the Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania it was suggested that 
general deterrence is used by judicial officers as a cloak for retribution and denunciation and 
acknowledging these aims would assist in avoiding media criticism.48 The Tasmanian Catholic Justice 
and Peace Commission suggested that the primary goal of sentencing should be justice and 
rehabilitation.49 
The Institute’s view 
7.1.35 The Institute is somewhat sceptical of the educative value of including a list of purposes of 
sentencing in the Sentencing Act. Legislation may be easily accessible by members of the public but 
the extent to which the public access legislation to become better informed is open to question. 
However, there are no disadvantages in listing the purposes and it could be seen as having some value 
as a symbolic attempt to communicate with the public and improve the transparency of sentencing 
goals, particularly as the Act currently fails to acknowledge that retribution and restoration are goals of 
sentencing. It is therefore recommended that the Sentencing Act be amended by separating the objects 
of the Act from the purposes of sentencing. This would entail omitting from s 3, paragraph (b) and 
paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) from paragraph (e) and adding a new section which sets out the purposes 
of sentencing. Section 3(b) should be replaced with the following purpose: ‘to provide the courts with 
the purposes of punishment’. Paragraph (e) should be replaced with ‘to preserve the authority of the 
law and to promote respect for the law.’50 
7.1.36 The Institute does not recommend that priority should be given to any one sentencing 
purpose. While there are strong arguments in favour of selecting a dominant rationale of sentencing 
including a reduction in unwarranted sentencing disparity, the selection of the primary purpose is 
controversial. In the context of making suggestions to better inform the public about sentencing 
matters, it is sufficient to list the purposes without ranking them. The Institute is of the view that in 
addition to the goals of retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation and denunciation, the goal 
of restoration or repairing the harm caused by the offence and restoring relations between the offender, 
the victim and the community should be included in the list of aims. This is an important addition, 
complementing the recommendations in Part 4 that a compensation order be a sentencing option in its 
                                                
44  Tasmania Police, submission, 8; Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, submission, 12; Hobart Community Legal Service, 
J Hutchinson and O Montgomery, submission, 2. 
45  Tasmania Police, submission, 8. 
46  Submission, 1. 
47  Tasmania Police, submission, 8. 
48  Consultations with LACT, 1 October 2002; see further on this issue P Robinson and J Darley, ‘The Role of Deterrence in 
the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At its worst when doing its best’ (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal 949, 971-
974. 
49  Tasmanian Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Maureen Holloway, submission, 2. 
50  ALRC (2006), above n 42, 116 has a discussion about the objectives of a Commonwealth Sentencing Act. 
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own right (para 4.4.17) and that community conferencing for young adults be piloted (paras 4.3.5-
4.3.5). Together these recommendations are concrete ways in which the Act could promote the 
interests of victims in accordance with the objective in s 3(e) of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas). The 
Institute also recommends that the wording of these aims be clear and accessible and adopts the 
wording of in the ALRC’s sentencing report.51 
Recommendations 
85. The Institute recommends that the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) include separate sections for the 
purposes of the Act and the purposes of sentencing.  
86. In the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 3, para (b) and (e) should be replaced with the following: 
     (b)  to provide the courts with the purposes of punishment; 
     (e)  to preserve the authority of the law and to promote respect for the law. 
87. It recommends that to better promote the interests of victims and to complement the 
recommendations in Part 4, that the purposes of sentencing include restoration (reparing the harm 
caused by the offence and restoring the relations between the offender, the victim and the community).  
88. The purposes of sentencing should provide: 
A court can impose a sentence on an offender for one or more of the following purposes only: 
     (a)  to ensure that the offender is punished justly for the offence; 
     (b)  to deter the offender and others from committing the same or similar offences; 
     (c)  to promote the rehabilitation of the offender; 
     (d)  to protect the community by limiting the capacity of the offender to re-offend; 
     (e)  to denounce the conduct of the offenders; and  
     (f)  to promote the restoration of relations between the community, the offender and the victim. 
(7.1.35 - 7.1.36) 
Legislative statement of sentencing principles 
7.1.37 Another issue is whether the Act should incorporate a list of matters relevant to sentence as 
is done in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 16A(2) and sentencing legislation of all other states and 
territories.52  
7.1.38 The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A provides an example of such a 
list:  
(1)  In determining the sentence to be imposed on an offender, a court must impose a 
sentence of a severity that is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. 
(2)  For that purpose, the court must take into account such of the following matters as 
are relevant and known to the court: 
                                                
51  Ibid, 147. 
52  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2); Penalties and Sentences Act 
1992 (Qld) s 9(2), (4), (6); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33; 
Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5(2); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) ss 6-8. 
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(a) the nature and circumstances of the case, 
(b) if the offence forms part of a course of conduct consisting of a series of 
criminal acts that course of conduct, 
(c) the personal circumstances of any victim of the offence, including: 
(i) the age of the victim (particularly if the victim is very old or very 
young), and 
(ii) any physical or mental disability of the victim, and 
(iii) any vulnerability of the victim arising because of the nature of the 
victim's occupation, 
(d) any injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence, 
(e) the degree to which the offender has shown contrition for the offence: 
(i) by taking action to make reparation for any injury, loss or damage 
resulting from the offence, or 
(ii) in any other manner, 
(f) the need to deter the offender or other persons from committing an offence of 
the same or a similar character, 
(g) the need to protect the community from the offender, 
(h) the need to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence, 
(i) the character, antecedents, cultural background, age, means and physical or 
mental condition of the offender, 
(j) the prospect of rehabilitation of the offender. 
(3) In addition, in determining whether a sentence under Division 2 or 3 of Part 2 is 
appropriate, the court must have regard to the nature and severity of the conditions 
that may be imposed on, or may apply to, the offender under that sentence. 
(4) The matters to be taken into account by a court under this section are in addition to 
any other matters that are required or permitted to be taken into account by the court 
under this Act or any other law. 
(5) This section does not apply to the determination of a sentence if proceedings (other 
than committal proceedings) for the offence were commenced in a court before the 
commencement of this section. 
7.1.39 There are conflicting arguments about the merits of lists of relevant factors. The New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission recommended against such a list on a number of grounds: 
• it is likely to stultify the common law; 
• the common law of sentencing is not generally in need of restatement; 
• attempts to do so in other Australian jurisdictions do not add anything to the common law and 
there are dangers in such a list; 
• such a list is likely to make sentencing a more time consuming exercise.53 
7.1.40 Another objection is that there is a risk that such a list will be treated as a codification of the 
law, especially by less experienced judicial officers who may concentrate on the matters listed and 
overlook other considerations that my be relevant in a particular case.54 Introducing rigidity into the 
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sentencing exercise and fettering discretion have also been raised as a drawback to legislatively listing 
sentencing factors.55 
7.1.41 On the other hand, a legislative list of relevant factors has been claimed to assist in inspiring 
public confidence in the courts.56 In New South Wales the Attorney-General also justified the 
enactment of s 21A on the grounds it would give a greater level of protection to the elderly and 
vulnerable professions such as nurses and police officers.57 However, the most common justification 
for such a list is that provides useful guidance and promotes consistency in sentencing. Legislative 
specification of sentencing factors also promotes clarity where there is conflicting case law about the 
relevance of particular factor or the circumstances in which the factor should be applied.58 
Submissions to the Institute 
7.1.42 There was some support for the legislative listing of relevant factors but it was by no means 
unanimous. Legal Aid Commission lawyers advised against reproducing the common law on the 
grounds that it was a mess and instead suggested: 
• Clearly listing the factors that can be taken into account in determining sentence, along the 
lines of section 16A of the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914, but in a way that prevents it from 
becoming a process issue; 
• Clarify that drug or alcohol use is not a mitigating factor; 
• The one-third discount for pleading guilty should be specified in the Act; …59 
7.1.43 In consultations with Legal Aid, it was argued that such a list would be good for public 
education, improve accountability and transparency and provide a framework for giving reasons.60 
Transparency and accountability were also the reasons given by Tasmania Police for supporting such a 
list.61 The Justice Department submitted that listing relevant factors would clarify the sentencing 
process but doubted whether it would improve public awareness of it.62 On the other hand, the then 
Chief Justice opposed statutory attempts to incorporate the common law in respect of sentencing in the 
Sentencing Act on the grounds that ‘they serve no useful purpose’.63 
The Institute’s views 
7.1.44 As stated above in para 7.1.35, whether or not sentencing legislation can promote public 
understanding of sentencing is open to question. It may however have some benefits in terms of 
transparency and accountability and that may have an impact on public confidence. While the Institute 
has recommended a legislative statement of the purposes for which a sentence may be imposed, a 
legislative list of factors that should be taken into account is more problematic for a number of 
reasons. While the common law is clear about the factors that are relevant and not relevant, the 
process of listing factors is not so easy and there are issues about whether factors should be classified 
as aggravating or mitigating, whether certain factors should be mandatory or discretionary and to how 
the list should be structured.64 There are also dangers in such a list. Politicians can be subjected to 
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57  Ibid. 
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61  Tasmania Police, submission, 8. 
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Part 7: Role of the Community 
233 
public pressure to add and remove matters from the list as part of a tough on crime agenda. The 
Institute is of the view that the relevant factors are well known to judicial officers and the matter is 
best left to the common law which is not in need of restatement. The Institute is of the same view in 
relation to giving statutory recognition to sentencing principles such as the principle of proportionality, 
the totality principle and other fundamental principles. For the reasons stated the Institute does not 
recommend that there be a statutory listing of relevant sentencing factors or a listing of the 
fundamental sentencing principles.  
Recommendation 
89. The Institute does not recommend a legislative listing of common law sentencing principles or the 
relevant factors that should be taken into account in imposing sentence on the grounds that such 
legislative listing is unnecessary, complex and has dangers. (7.1.44) 
7.2 Ascertaining community attitudes towards 
sentencing  
7.2.1 The impetus for the Attorney-General’s terms of reference for this project on sentencing was 
community concern about the adequacy of sentences and amongst other things, the terms of reference 
required the Institute to consider how attitudes towards sentencing should be ascertained (5(b)). In the 
intervening years the media has from time to time focused on sentences which have been said to be too 
lenient, and suggestions that judges are out of touch and sentences are too lenient have continued to 
surface. In 2007 the print media in particular focused on this issue. Newspaper articles and polls 
suggested that most people were of the view that sentences were too lenient and that judges in 
particular were not responding to public concern about lenient sentences. Sentencing for sex offences 
was a particular focus (see 6.2.12). However, as indicated in para 7.1.4 above, ascertaining community 
attitudes towards sentencing is not an easy task. There is a difference between top-of the-head 
responses to polls and surveys and informed public judgment about sentencing matters. The 
importance of ascertaining informed public opinion as part of the development of appropriate policies 
directed at crime and sentencing cannot be over-stated. Politicians and judicial officers should not alter 
sentencing policies and practices in response to popularist calls for harsher penalties that are based on 
people’s perceptions of crime levels and sentencing severity. Appropriate decisions can only be made 
by acting on informed public opinion. In this part of the Report ways of ascertaining public opinion 
are critically evaluated. Considerable reliance is placed on the Victorian Sentencing Advisory 
Council’s report of a project which was designed to create a suite of methodological tools to gauge 
informed public opinion.65 
Ways of measuring public opinion 
7.2.2 Media polls inevitably report that the majority of respondents consider that sentences are too 
lenient suggesting there is widespread dissatisfaction with the severity of sentences.66 For example, 
results of a recent Internet poll in a Tasmanian newspaper on 15 December 2007 reported that 88 per 
cent of respondents believed sentences were too lenient.67 These polls inevitably have an impact on 
politicians and policy makers68 but they are fundamentally flawed. There are severe limitations on the 
generalisability of findings due to the self-selected nature of the sample and its unknown relationship 
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to the rest of the community. The polling organisation has no control over individuals or agencies that 
might provide multiple responses, allowing those with a vested interest in the outcome of the poll to 
have an undue influence on the results. Moreover, media polls tend to be linked with a controversial 
news item and so the response may be a momentary response rather than an enduring and transferable 
belief.69 For these reasons such polls should not be relied upon as a source of public opinion. 
7.2.3 Representative surveys are the most common method of measuring public opinion. They are 
more methodologically robust than media polls and if sufficiently large their findings can be 
generalised to the broader community. Based on findings that increasing the provision of information 
will decrease levels of punitiveness, researchers have moved away from general abstract questions 
about sentencing to providing much more information before seeking a response. The vignette 
approach uses case studies to provide more information about the offence, the offender and the impact 
on the victim. However, representative surveys have limitations related to conceptual concerns rather 
than sampling accuracy. In Gelb’s words, critics argue that ‘the survey method is ill-equipped to 
measure people’s complex, nuanced and shifting perceptions and opinions and instead provide at best 
a partial glimpse and a at worst a distortion of public perceptions.’70 Respondents are generally 
provided with a list of pre-determined responses and this limits the depth of the information elicited. 
Additionally, such surveys cannot determine whether what is being measured is an enduring attitude, a 
firmly held belief, a top-of-the head view, a judgment based on knowledge and experience or an 
answer created on the spot to fill out the questionnaire or respond to the question.71  
7.2.4 Focus groups are generally regarded as a superior method as they are able to elicit far more 
detailed, thoughtful and insightful responses from participants. Moreover, there is the opportunity for 
imparting information and allowing discussion and questions so that more considered and informed 
responses are obtained. Lovegrove’s recent study provides an example in the sentencing context.72 
Groups were first addressed about sentencing law and sanctions before a judge presented the group 
with the facts of the case and then asked for a view as to the appropriate sentence. In three of the four 
cases in which the judge had imposed a prison sentence, the median sentence was less than the judge’s 
sentence. In the other case the judge’s sentence fell just below the median of the group’s sentence. 
This accords with findings of more sophisticated representative surveys that use vignettes and supply 
other facts about crime and sentencing – when people are given more information their levels of 
punitiveness drop dramatically. 
7.2.5 Focus groups are regarded by researchers as a valuable adjunct to large-scale representative 
surveys but the have limitations: 
• very small samples are used due to the difficulty of gathering discussion groups and so there are 
problems with generalising the results to the broader community; 
• the cost involved in speaking at length to small groups means that this approach is impractical 
for those wishing to access broad community opinions on an issue.73 
7.2.6 Deliberative polls combine elements of the focus groups with the advantages of the 
representative survey. A sub-sample of several hundred respondents is drawn from a representative 
survey and brought together for an extended session of small group discussion and deliberation with 
academics, criminal justice professionals, offenders and victims. In small group sessions researchers 
use more open-ended questioning to elicit a more complete and nuanced view of public opinion. 
Participants then complete a questionnaire which elicits an informed and considered public judgment 
on the issue or issues. The disadvantage of this approach is that it extremely resource intensive and 
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this makes it prohibitive for widespread use.74 As Gelb concludes, each of these methodological 
approaches has its own advantages and disadvantages.75 
A comprehensive picture of public knowledge can only be obtained by a multi-method 
approach: representative opinion polls can be used to set the approximate bounds on public 
attitudes while focus groups are needed to evaluate the depth of a particular opinion. 
Responses to the Issues Paper 
7.2.7 The TLRI Sentencing Issues Paper highlighted the lack of research in Tasmania and 
nationally on the subject of public opinion on sentencing. It asked for comments on whether resources 
should be allocated to ascertaining public opinion on sentencing in Tasmania. Few respondents 
addressed this issue. Those that did supported doing so.76 For example, Tasmania Police submitted: 
Such a survey should be conducted by a reputable firm, and the survey sample should be 
representative and sufficiently large to identify any regional differences in community 
understanding and support for local sentencing practices, and to take into account variations 
in media coverage of cases being dealt with by the local courts. Such a survey should be 
repeated at regular intervals to help evaluate the effectiveness of strategies implemented to 
promote public understanding of sentencing.77 
7.2.8 Whilst supportive of efforts to ascertain public opinion, the Justice Department submitted 
that a public information strategy on sentencing was a greater priority. The then Chief Justice noted 
that ascertaining public opinion on sentencing would be of no assistance unless it were informed 
public opinion.78 
The Institute’s view 
7.2.9 Gelb’s research paper for the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council comprehensively 
reviews public opinion research on sentencing in Australia, finding just a handful of studies on public 
opinion in this country and confirming the Issues Paper’s lament about this research vacuum. Very 
limited information is available from the Australian component of the International Crime 
Victimisation survey and the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes has just three questions about 
public attitudes to sentencing. As Gelb points out, the danger of this vacuum is that policy will be 
created on the assumption of a punitive public. She argued that what is needed (in Victoria) is an 
understanding of the nature of informed public opinion in terms of both general perceptions and in 
relation to specific sentencing options for specific offences. She asserts: 
 We need a combination of large scale representative surveys with well-considered 
questions (using both the core simple question and the more complex crime vignette) 
combined with the qualitative aspects of the deliberative focus groups that can provide a 
richness of detail on specific issues.79 
7.2.10 There are now two research projects underway which will go some way to providing more 
information on both public knowledge of crime and justice issues and public opinion on sentencing in 
this State. The first, the Jury Sentencing Study has been referred to above. This study, which is funded 
by the Criminal Research Council,80 has considerable potential as a means not only of using jurors as a 
vehicle for better informing the public about sentencing issues, but as a means of ascertaining 
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informed public opinion on sentencing from jurors who have listened to the facts of the case, the 
sentencing submissions and the judge’s reasons for sentence. It has the potential to explore public 
opinion on sentencing severity in relation to particular offences and types of offender, on sentencing 
options and on relevant sentencing factors. Because jurors are given information on crime trends and 
sentencing patterns, the opinions elicited on sentencing severity are informed. And by asking jurors 
about aggravating and mitigating factors, the study has the potential to shed light on public opinion on 
factors that are included in statutory listing of sentencing factors. Preliminary findings are already 
available and confirm the potential of this approach to ascertaining public opinion on sentencing.  
7.2.11 The second project is an Australian Research Council study of public opinion which 
combines a large scale representative survey with a focus groups approach.81 The survey is national in 
scope and will be the largest representative survey undertaken (6,400 interviews with 800 for each 
state and territory) in Australia. Stage two of the study and the focus groups, which are drawn from the 
survey population, will only be conducted in Victoria and Queensland. However, by providing 
additional funding to the researchers, the opportunity exists to conduct stage two of the study and the 
focus groups in Tasmania as well. It is estimated that the cost of including Tasmania in the focus 
group phase of the study would be approximately $30,000. The Institute recommends that the research 
team be offered funding to extend the study to include focus groups in Tasmania.  
7.2.12 Public opinion research is a costly exercise. However, when policy decisions purport to be 
based on public opinion it is essential that it be done. Without it there is the danger that policy will be 
made on the run on the assumption of a punitive public when properly ascertained public judgment on 
the issue would have suggested a different policy outcome. ‘Bending to the perceived punitive desires 
of the public may be electorally popular but it comes with high financial costs.’82 Costs which are 
likely to be far more significant in the long term than determining informed public judgments on 
issues of crime and punishment. The criminal justice system (and therefore politicians and judges) 
should be responsive to the community it was designed to protect. But being responsive to the 
community means responding to informed public judgment not mass public opinion. For these reasons 
the Institute recommends that priority be given to public opinion research as a means making the 
criminal justice system properly responsive to the public. 
Recommendation 
90. The Institute emphasises the importance of research which aims to ascertain informed public 
opinion. It therefore recommends that priority be given to allocating resources to public opinion 
sentencing research in Tasmania. In particular it is recommends that the ARC research team on the 
Sentencing and Public Confidence project be invited to conduct focus groups in Tasmania with 
appropriate financial support. (7.2.12) 
7.3 Incorporating community views into the sentencing 
process 
7.3.1 As discussed in the preceding section, it is generally agreed that governments, policy makers 
and judicial officers should have regard to informed public opinion on sentencing when enacting 
sentencing legislation, formulating policy, imposing sentence or giving appellate guidance on 
                                                
81  G McKenzie, D Indermaur, R Broadhurst, K Warner, L Roberts and N Stobbs, Sentencing and public confidence: public 
perceptions and the role of the public in sentencing practice and policy, ARC Discovery Project, DP 0878042 (funding 
allocated by the ARC of $236,000).  
82  Arie Freiberg and Karen Gelb, ‘Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy’ in A Freiberg and K Gelb 
(eds), Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy (2008), 4. 
Part 7: Role of the Community 
237 
sentencing.83 New mechanisms are being developed to incorporate a public voice into the criminal 
justice system. Sentencing advisory bodies, councils, panels and commissions with a mandate to 
incorporate public opinion in their advice to policy makers and judges are the obvious example of such 
a mechanism. Before this new institutionalised means of incorporating public opinion into sentencing 
process is discussed, more traditional means of taking public opinion into account will be described. 
Specifically, the case law with respect to the relationship between public opinion and sentencing is 
briefly reviewed and the role of penalties set by parliament in reflecting public views of offence 
seriousness will be considered.  
Sentencing law and public opinion 
7.3.2 In Sargeant,84 a much cited English case, Lawton LJ asserted that sentencers are duty-bound 
not to ignore public opinion, however they do not have to reflect it. In his words: 
There is, however, another aspect of retribution which is frequently over-looked: it is that 
society, through the courts, must show its abhorrence of particular types of crimes, and that 
the only way in which courts can show this is by the sentences they pass. The courts do not 
have to reflect public opinion. On the other hand the courts must not disregard it. Perhaps 
the main duty of the court is to lead public opinion.85 
7.3.3 In a later decision, Broady,86 the Court of Appeal reiterated the view that while public 
opinion must not be disregarded, it is not overriding. They endorsed the view of the sentencing judge 
that ‘Judges are not here to gain approval or avoid disapproval from the public, and thus decide their 
sentences perhaps, on the basis of the lowest common denominator of public opinion.’87 The Court 
offered some guidance as to how public opinion is to be factored into a sentence stating that courts ‘… 
have a duty to the public to pass judgment in a way which is generally acceptable amongst right-
thinking, well-informed persons’.88  
7.3.4 Tasmanian judges have expressed similar views. In Canning v Smith89 Burbury CJ made it 
clear that in sentencing, judges and magistrates are sometimes obliged to make unpopular decisions 
and in Bayley90 he talked of the need to take into account ‘the restrained moral sense of the community 
as a whole’.91 In Hancox,92 one of the grounds of the Crown appeal against the sentence imposed for 
the sexual assault of a child in a public park was that the judge had failed to take into account the 
sense of public outrage which the circumstances of the crime excited. Green CJ said: 
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It is clear that when determining sentence it is proper for a court to take into account public 
feeling about the crime in respect of which the sentence is being imposed: see Austin v The 
Queen [1971] Tas SR 227. But it would be wrong for a court to take that factor into account 
to the exclusion of all others. That would not be in accordance with the common law 
requirement that all relevant considerations should be taken into account.  
Further, the public feeling which is to be reflected in a sentence is informed public feeling. 
Some knowledge of the circumstances of the particular case must be attributed to the 
notional reasonable man whose feeling of outrage the Court is attempting to reflect. I have 
no doubt that the same reasonable man who would express outrage at a sexual assault upon 
a child would also agree that a distinction ought to be drawn between the sentence which 
would be appropriate in the case of say, a mature, intelligent recidivist and the sentence 
which would be appropriate in the case of a young offender of low intelligence with only 
one relevant prior conviction.93 
7.3.5 According to Underwood J in Inkson,94 ‘informed opinion’ in this context means, ‘rational 
balanced opinion based upon all the material put to the court for the purpose of imposition of sentence 
and an awareness of the range of penalties imposed in the past in like cases.’95 
7.3.6 So the task of gauging public opinion is a matter delegated to the court and it follows, as the 
Court of Criminal Appeal held in Inkson, that the actual opinion of members of the public in a 
particular case is irrelevant. In Inkson, the Crown, in its submissions on sentence, told the Court of the 
sense of community outrage generated by the crime and this was expressly taken into account by the 
sentencing judge.96 The Court of Criminal Appeal made it clear that actual community outrage about 
the incident was not a relevant matter. This approach accords with the approach usually adopted by 
courts in other jurisdictions.97 While there are instances where courts have taken into account the 
attitude of a community to a particular type of crime98 or evidence of the fear felt by residents 
following a murder,99 this is distinguishable from paying heed to public petitions or public demands 
that a particular offender be severely punished.  
7.3.7 It has been shown that law as it stands allows for a limited role for taking public opinion into 
account.100 Because courts are concerned with maintaining public confidence in the administration of 
justice, judges cannot dismiss public opinion as having no relevance. In Markarian v The Queen101 
McHugh J observed: 
Public responses to sentencing, although not entitled to influence in any particular case, 
have a legitimate impact on the democratic legislative process. Judges are aware that, if 
they consistently impose sentences that are too lenient or too severe, the risk undermining 
public confidence in the administration of justice and invite legislative interference in the 
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exercise of judicial discretion. For the sake of criminal justice generally, judges attempt to 
impose sentences that accord with legitimate community expectations.102 
7.3.8 It is clear there is wisdom in sentencing courts refusing to respond to hysteria or clamour for 
a severe sentence for a particular offender. Taking into account the restrained moral sense of the 
community, opinion which is rational and balanced will exclude the views of bigots, racists and other 
extreme views. However it leaves open the question of how judicial officers are to discover what is the 
true nature of informed public opinion, legitimate community expectation or the restrained moral 
sense of the community. The Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia has addressed this issue 
when he asked: 
How should judges keep in touch? Should they employ experts to undertake regular 
surveys of public opinion? Should they develop techniques for obtaining feedback from 
lawyers and litigants? And what kind of public opinion should be of concern to them? Any 
opinion, informed or uninformed? What level of knowledge and understanding of a 
problem qualifies people to have opinions that ought to influence judicial decision-making? 
Who exactly is that judges should be in touch with? Whose values should we know and 
reflect?103 
7.3.9 The reality is that the judges are expected to reflect and be responsive to community attitudes 
to some extent but just how they should do this is unclear.  
Statutory maximum penalties  
7.3.10 Statutory maximum penalties can be viewed as one means of taking community attitudes 
into account. The maximum penalties set by parliament for particular offences are intended to reflect 
the relative severity with which the community perceives particular offences. It provides a legislative 
view of the gravity of the offence. Sentencing law views the maximum penalty for an offence as being 
reserved for the gravest instance of the offence likely to occur. In Tasmania almost all summary 
offences have their own statutory maximum but for indictable offences the Criminal Code is unusual. 
Instead of providing a separate maximum penalty for each offence, with the exception of murder, the 
Code provides an overall maximum term of imprisonment of 21 years and leaves it to the courts to 
place the various crimes into different categories of gravity. While this appears to be a radical 
departure from the position in other jurisdictions, in practice it is not so significant. Because the 
maximum penalty must necessarily be set at a very high level to allow for the gravest possible crime 
of that nature likely to occur, it bears little relationship to the usual sentence for the particular crime. 
So at most, the maximum penalty can reveal the relative seriousness of particular crimes. A related 
problem with statutory maxima as a method of taking public opinion into account is that most crimes 
cover a wide range of circumstances. It follows that little can be hoped to be achieved by imposing 
separate maxima for each crime in terms of public input into the severity of penalties.  
7.3.11 The Issues Paper did not seek submissions on the issue of whether separate statutory maxima 
should be introduced in Tasmania. However, the Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania suggested that 
Parliament should set maximum penalties for indictable offences taking into account such things as 
case law and public opinion. For the reasons stated above the Institute does not regard statutory 
maxima as an effective means of reflecting public opinion in relation to the gravity of particular 
offences. 
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Recommendation 
91. For the reasons outlined in para 7.3.10, the Institute does not recommend introducing a statutory 
maximum penalty for each crime in the Criminal Code to replace the general maximum in s 389 of 21 
years. 
Guideline judgments  
7.3.12 Guideline judgments promulgated by an appellate court after there has been the opportunity 
for community input can provide a mechanism for courts to take properly ascertained public opinion 
into account. A guideline judgment is a judgment of an appeal court which goes beyond the facts of 
the particular case before the court and suggests a starting point or range for dealing with variations of 
certain types of offence, or it may indicate relevant sentencing considerations without specifying a 
range or starting points, or alternatively it may deal with an issue of general principle such as pleas of 
guilty. Guideline judgments were pioneered in the United Kingdom in the 1970s as an initiative of the 
Lord Chief Justice. They have been adopted in New Zealand, Canada and Hong Kong. In Australia, 
New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia have legislation authorising appellate courts to give 
a guideline judgment on their own motion. 
US guidelines distinguished 
7.3.13 Guideline judgments should not be confused with United States-style sentencing guidelines. 
In the United States some twenty states and the federal government have introduced sentencing 
guidelines which are formulated by sentencing commissions independently of the court. In the case of 
the Federal Commission, there was a requirement that the guidelines be developed to reflect the views 
of the public, and public hearings and national surveys were conducted in the process of formulating 
the guidelines. There are different models of US guidelines, some are voluntary and some are 
mandatory. Many involve a sentencing matrix or grid, which provides numerical information 
depending on the type of offence and criminal history of the offender. US sentencing guidelines have 
been considered by a number of Australian law reform bodies and sentencing enquiries and rejected. 
They have been widely criticised on the grounds they have not removed discretion, are mechanical, 
unjust and have increased prison populations, dramatically, in some cases.104 It should be noted that 
there are important differences in the US and Australia with respect to sentencing. In the United 
States, guidelines were an attempt to reform a system characterised by indeterminate sentencing, broad 
and unfettered discretion, no appeals on quantum and an undeveloped common law of sentencing. The 
situation demanded drastic action. The purpose of guidelines and Sentencing Guidelines Commissions 
or Councils was primarily the structuring of judicial discretion rather than incorporating a public view 
into the sentencing process. Australia, with a well-developed common law system of sentencing 
presents a different picture. Matrix style sentencing, even if developed with a mandate that it be 
consistent with the views of public, is not an acceptable option. However, using guideline judgments 
as a mechanism for incorporating public opinion into the sentencing process as well as improving 
consistency has gained wide acceptance in many common law jurisdictions. 
Guideline judgments in England 
7.3.14 Since the delivery of the first guideline judgment in 1974,105 the Court of Appeal has handed 
down guideline judgments which they have expressly called ‘guideline cases’ or ‘guideline judgments’ 
and many of these offer numerical guidelines by specifying starting points for a particular type of 
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offence or sub-category of offence determined by specified aggravating factors (as for rape)106 or 
indicative penalties are linked to a quantitative measure relating to the facts of the offence (e.g. 
amount stolen in theft in breach of trust107 or weight of the drug in importing).108 Guideline judgments 
are not intended to be construed strictly. They merely set the general tariff, leaving judges free to tailor 
the sentence to the facts of the particular case. As Ashworth observes, the approach to guideline 
judgments has changed markedly in the last decade.109 The first important change was the 
establishment of the Sentencing Advisory Panel in 1999. The function of the Panel was to draft 
guidelines, consult widely on them and then advise the Court of Appeal about the form they should 
take. At the same time the Court of Appeal lost the power to create guidelines on its own. Introducing 
the Panel was intended to provide a source of guidance to the Court by researching the subject more 
thoroughly and bringing a wider range of views to it than the Court is able to do. When framing a 
guideline judgment the Court was required by the Act to consider the views of the Sentencing 
Advisory Panel and the need to promote public confidence in the criminal justice system. Promoting 
public confidence and the aim of providing a wider range of advice to the Court became important 
aspects of the role of guideline judgments. In the course of framing its advice the Panel has undertaken 
public opinion research. For example, it commissioned a public attitude survey on domestic burglary 
to help generate the idea of a typical burglary from which other varieties of burglary, more or less 
severe, could be differentiated.110 
7.3.15 The second change came with the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) which 
implemented the recommendations of the Halliday Report in relation to guideline judgments. The 
Sentencing Advisory Panel remains and continues to draft guidelines, however, that advice goes to a 
new body, the Sentencing Guidelines Council rather than the Court of Appeal.111 There were two 
reasons for the change: first, to divorce the function of creating guidelines from that of deciding 
individual appeals and secondly, to address the ‘democratic deficit’ in the previous arrangements by 
making provision for Parliament and the Minister for Justice to have a voice in the creation of 
guidelines. Courts are required to have regard to any guidelines that are relevant to a particular case 
and to give reasons for passing a sentence outside the range indicated by any guideline.112 The Court of 
Appeal has continued to issue guidelines on matters that the Panel and Council have not had time to 
consider.113 
7.3.16 The way in which the English guideline system, the Sentencing Panel and Sentencing 
Commission combine to provide a mechanism for incorporating public opinion into the sentencing 
process has recently been summarised by Ashworth: 
It is evident … that the English guideline system places a considerable premium on 
ascertaining the opinions of members of the public. In the first place, three of the members 
of the Panel are members of the public who have no other connection to the criminal justice 
system. Secondly, the Panel conducts a wide public consultation on its provisional 
proposals.114 
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Guidelines in New Zealand 
7.3.17 New Zealand is in the process of introducing quite radical sentencing reforms, implementing 
the recommendations of the New Zealand Law Commission.115 The current system of guideline 
judgments will be replaced by sentencing guidelines promulgated by a Sentencing Council. Rather 
than issuing guidelines incrementally, the Council will develop a comprehensive set of initial 
guidelines which will be released in draft for public consultation with a statement of the forecasted 
impact on the prison population. After public consultation the finalised guidelines will be tabled in 
Parliament for consideration and automatic ratification after 30 days. The reforms were designed to 
address six basic problems in the current sentencing structure: lack of legislative input into the overall 
quantum of punishment, the inadequacies of judicial guidance, lack of consistency, lack of 
transparency and a lack of consideration of cost effectiveness.  
7.3.18 The premise underlying the creation of a Sentencing Council to promulgate guidelines is that 
the quantum of punishment is fundamentally a matter of public policy and that a well resourced body 
such as a Sentencing Council composed of five judicial members and five non-judicial members 
representing a diversity of values is much better placed to make decisions about the appropriate range 
of penalties than an appeal court. Such a method of developing guidelines has the advantage of 
providing the opportunity for research in-put on matters such as the effectiveness of different penalty 
options, for consultation with a full range of stakeholders to ensure a wide range of perspectives are 
included and allows for a degree of parliamentary ownership of the guidelines. Sentencing guidelines 
will be developed for each common offence type; they will specify sentencing ranges and contain a 
brief commentary to provide a context for those ranges. At the lower end of the spectrum, guidelines 
are likely to concentrate on factors that are relevant to the custody threshold. Purely narrative 
guidelines will also be drafted covering such matters as aggravating and mitigating factors and 
sentencing discounts for a guilty plea. The guidelines will have statutory force and sentencing judges 
will be required to adhere to them unless ‘it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so’. The 
Council will be fully operational by mid 2008.116 As well as drafting numerical and narrative 
guidelines it will have related information and police advice functions. 
Guideline judgments in Australia 
7.3.19 Western Australia, New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria have legislation 
authorising appellate courts to give a guideline judgment on their own motion.117 In some states, the 
Attorney-General or other parties may request a guideline judgment without the need for a relevant 
appeal.118 Whatever the situation in relation to the validity of guideline judgments in federal matters, 
there is no doubt that with legislative backing guidelines judgments are lawful both when promulgated 
by appeal courts on their own motion and when applied for without a relevant appeal.119 
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Guideline judgments in New South Wales 
7.3.20 Whilst not the first state to legislate for guideline judgments, New South Wales is regarded 
as having pioneered them in Australia in 1998 when the Court of Criminal Appeal delivered its 
decision in Jurisic,120 a guideline judgment for culpable driving causing death or serious injury. In his 
judgment the Chief Justice made it quite clear that one of the purposes of guideline judgments is to 
reinforce public confidence in the integrity of the process of sentencing by showing that courts are 
responsive to public criticism of the outcomes of sentencing processes. He acknowledged that ‘public 
criticism of particular sentences for inconsistency or excessive leniency is sometimes justified’ and 
that such criticisms are not necessarily allayed by the usual case by case appellate process.121 He 
pointed out the limitation of Crown appeals as a means of correcting error and added that public 
confidence in the administration of justice would be best served by ensuring that the system minimises 
errors. Guideline judgments were seen as a means of doing this. Spigelman CJ stated: 
it appears that trial judges in New South Wales have not reflected in their sentences the 
seriousness with which society regards the offence of occasioning death or serious injury 
by dangerous driving. The existence of such disparity constitutes an appropriate occasion 
for the promulgation of a guideline judgment by a Court of Criminal Appeal.122 
7.3.21 The way in which the concept of guideline judgments was marketed by the Chief Justice 
demonstrates the importance placed on them as a public relations exercise. Not only did the Chief 
Justice appear on television, he wrote an article for the Daily Telegraph to explain the importance and 
impact of the decision.123  
7.3.22 Since Jurisic, the Court has promulgated seven more guideline judgments including 
guidelines for armed robbery, importing drugs, pleas of guilty, burglary, a revised guideline for 
culpable driving and a guideline for high range PCA (high range drink driving). On a number of other 
occasions requests have been made but refused or adjourned. There have been no new guideline 
judgments promulgated since the enactment of standard non-parole periods.  
7.3.23 The New South Wales Sentencing Council was established in 2002 with functions which 
included giving advice in relation to matters suitable for guideline judgments. However, to date it has 
given advice in relation to one guideline judgment only, namely the criteria for suspended sentences 
and recommended against the institution of proceedings.124 It seems that the introduction of standard 
non-parole periods has disrupted the flow of guideline judgments. Whether this will continue to be the 
case is not clear. However, it must be acknowledged that the potential of guideline judgments to be 
developed as a means of incorporating informed public opinion into the sentencing process through 
the assistance of advice from the Sentencing Council has not been realised so far. 
Guideline judgments in Western Australia, South Australia and Victoria 
7.3.24 Guideline judgments have not been embraced with the same enthusiasm in other states as 
they were in New South Wales. In Western Australia there have been a number of applications for 
guideline judgments but none have been handed down. Nor it seems have there been any guideline 
judgments handed down in South Australia utilising the legislative provisions. However, as explained 
in the Issues Paper, similar kinds of appellate guidance have been handed down in both of these states 
                                                
120  (1998) 45 NSWLR 209. 
121  Ibid, 221. 
122  Ibid, 223. 
123  Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘Making the punishment fit the crime’ Daily Telegraph (Sydney) 13 October 1998. 
124  A Abadee, ‘The New South Wales Sentencing Council’ in A Freiberg and K Gelb (eds), Penal Populism, Sentencing 
Councils and Sentencing Policy (2008) 126, 133. 
Tasmania Law Reform Institute   Sentencing 
244 
including numerical guidance such as starting points and standard ranges in cases that have not been 
tagged as guideline judgments.125  
7.3.25 As explained in the Issues Paper, because of the opposition of the judiciary and the legal 
profession to guideline judgments, the 2002 Victorian sentencing review did not recommend their 
introduction. However, the creation of a Sentencing Council with research and public education 
functions was strongly supported in consultations and recommended. In the event of a change in 
judicial and professional attitudes, the Report outlined how a scheme of guideline judgments might 
operate with broad community input and wide consultation.126 Despite the opposition from the legal 
profession and the Report’s recommendation, legislation for the creation of a Sentencing Council 
included provisions for guideline judgments.127 However, quantitative guidelines, starting points or the 
appropriate range of penalties for a particular offence or class of offence are omitted from the list of 
matters that can be covered by a guideline judgment. The statutory scheme envisages a major role for 
the Sentencing Advisory Council in the development of a guideline judgment. The Act provides that if 
the Court of Appeal decides to give or review a guideline judgment it must notify the Council and 
consider any views stated in writing by the Council. It must also give the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Victorian Legal Aid an opportunity to appear and make submissions on the matter 
and the Court is required to have regard to their views. Community input into the sentencing process 
can occur in two ways: through the membership of the Council, which includes members from 
victims’ support groups, members with experience in community issues affecting courts, and through 
the Council’s consultative process. Freiberg reports that to date the Court of Appeal had not yet 
decided to give a guideline judgment.128  
7.3.26 While the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council has not had the opportunity to provide 
community input into the sentencing process through advice on guideline judgments it has been very 
active in pursuing its statutory role of gauging public opinion on sentencing matters, consulting with 
the general public and providing policy advice to the Attorney-General on sentencing.129 In 
commenting on the nature and rationale for the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, Freiberg and 
Gelb have observed: 
A dominant reason for its establishment was that it would be a mechanism to incorporate 
community views in the sentencing process: it is probably singular in this respect. 
Compared to most other bodies, its terms of reference are broader and its independence of 
the courts and the executive greater. Its summary aim – to ‘bridge the gap between the 
community, the courts and government by informing, educating and advising on sentencing 
issues’ – encapsulates this unusual role.130 
7.3.27 Its functions also include providing statistical information on sentencing, conducting 
research and disseminating information on sentencing.131 
Arguments for and against guideline judgments 
7.3.28 While the issues of guideline judgments and sentencing commissions or similar bodies are 
related, both have independent functions and purposes. More specifically, while a sentencing 
commission or body and guideline judgments can together create a mechanism for providing 
community input into the judicial sentencing process, without guideline judgments sentencing councils 
can still have a role in providing community input into sentencing policy as the Victorian Sentencing 
                                                
125  N Morgan, ‘What’s in a Name? Guideline Judgments in Australia’ (1999) 23 Criminal Law Journal 90, 98; and see 
Issues Paper at 131.  
126  Freiberg (2002), above n 104, 206. 
127  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 6AB.  
128  A Freiberg, ‘The Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council: incorporating community views into the sentencing process’ in 
A Freiberg and K Gelb (eds), Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy (2008) 156. 
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Advisory Council demonstrates. Conversely, guideline judgments have functions and advantages in 
addition to their potential as a mechanism for community input into the sentencing process. The Issues 
Paper set out the following arguments for and against guideline judgments. 
Arguments in favour  
• Guideline judgments are an acceptable means of resolving the tension between maintaining 
flexibility in the exercise of sentencing discretion to ensure justice is done in the individual case 
and ensuring consistency of sentencing decisions. 
• Tagging a case as a guideline judgment increases the profile of the sentencing guidance 
minimising errors by the sentencer. 
• There may be fewer sentencing appeals because it is easier for both prosecution and defence to 
see whether a particular sentence falls within range. 
• They may assist the objective of general deterrence by publicising the level of sentence for 
particular offences. 
• Sentencing guidelines offer a more transparent approach to sentencing. They require greater 
disclosure of the way in which a decision is reached and can be contrasted with unexplained 
judicial intuition. 
• Promulgating a guideline judgment, formally so labelled, may assist in diverting unjustifiable 
criticism of sentences imposed in particular cases by making the public aware of attempts by the 
judiciary to address their concerns. 
• With statutory mechanisms for requests for guideline judgments, the appeals process’ 
shortcoming of uneven coverage of offences attracting appellate guidance can be redressed. 
• Sentencing guidance in guideline judgments is to some extent protected from short-term 
political pressures. 
• They can provide a mechanism for wider community input into the sentencing process. 
Arguments against 
• Guideline judgments unduly restrict judicial discretion because they cannot foresee all the 
innumerable factors that may arise in sentencing a particular offender. ‘Publishing a table of 
predicted or intended outcomes masks the task of identifying relevant differences.’132 The result 
is they ‘hazard inconsistency, incoherence and inadequate individualisation.’133 
• With the passage of time they can assume the status of rules of universal application which they 
were never intended to have. 
• They may require more work by the appeal courts and judicial administrators. The task of 
having regard to statistical and other research, evidence of community views and the need to 
make effective use of correctional facilities has significant resource implications.  
• Most sentencing is done in the lower courts and their work is unlikely to be covered by 
guideline judgments. 
• Guideline judgments do not permit a systematic appraisal of the sentencing system. They are 
unsuitable for debating the overall objectives of the system and do not allow penalties for a 
particular offence to be assessed in relation to other penalties. 
• Assisting or improving general deterrence has little weight when there is no conclusive evidence 
that increasing severity of penalties has a significant deterrent effect on crime. And if 
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publication of the maximum penalties has little effect, why will publishing a lesser sentence 
have such an effect?134  
• Those who endorse an instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing argue that guideline 
judgments, with their starting points followed by additions and subtractions for aggravating and 
mitigating factors, are not compatible with such an approach.  
• Publication of a table of future punishments is not within the jurisdiction or powers of a court. It 
is a legislative function rather than a judicial function. 
Responses to the Issues Paper 
7.3.29 The Issues Paper noted that broadly, the claimed advantages of guideline judgments focus 
around two matters: usefulness in improving consistency and improving public confidence in the 
criminal justice system. It was suggested there is reason to question whether sentencing inconsistency 
in Tasmania was a matter of real concern in the light of the research conducted for the Issues Paper 
and the size of the judiciary. However, it was submitted that there is a prima facie case for guideline 
judgments as a means of improving public understanding of the criminal justice system and as a means 
of incorporating community views into sentencing, thereby improving public confidence in sentencing 
and criminal justice. If informed public opinion is to be ascertained and consultations conducted to 
allow for public input into the formulation of guideline judgments, it was suggested that a sentencing 
body of some kind with resources needs to be created.  
7.3.30 The Issues Paper asked for responses to the following questions: 
• Should guideline judgments be introduced in Tasmania? 
• Should a modest ‘sentencing advisory council’ be established? 
• If so, what should its functions be? 
• Should Parliament have a role in considering and scrutinising draft sentencing guidelines? 
7.3.31 A number of submissions addressed these issues with divided responses. Both the then Chief 
Justice and Justice Underwood, as he was at the time, expressed opposition to guideline judgments. 
The then Chief Justice stated: 
Guideline judgments in the Tasmanian jurisdiction are unnecessary. The volume of cases is 
much smaller than the mainland States where guideline judgments have been published and 
the judicial community far more close knit and aware of current sentencing trends. 
Consistency can be maximised by correction in the Court of Criminal Appeal of aberrant 
penalties.135 
7.3.32 Justice Underwood reiterated his view, expressed in O’Brien v ADC Sport Pty Ltd136 that: ‘It 
is for the legislature alone to specify the range of penalties.’ He added that the Issues Paper makes it 
clear that they are unnecessary in this State to ensure consistency. In relation to their role in improving 
public confidence in sentencing he stated: 
                                                
134  However, the argument of assisting deterrence is not an argument for increasing severity – it is merely that if general 
deterrence is a goal then the public should know about penalty levels. 
135  Submission, 5. 
136  Serial No 57/1988, 6. 
Part 7: Role of the Community 
247 
I completely accept there is a need for public confidence in the judicial system. Indeed, 
absent public confidence, the Court is powerless. However, I have grave doubts whether 
guideline judgments on sentencing will boost public confidence. What boosts public 
confidence in the judicial system is the demystification of the law, plain speaking, and 
abolition of meaningless, ritualistic ceremonies. This coupled with a willingness on the part 
of judicial officers to accept responsibility of informing and educating the public generally 
about the work of the judiciary, will do far more to boost confidence in the work of the 
Courts than the issuing of guideline judgments.137 
7.3.33 The Director of Public Prosecutions was equally dismissive of guideline judgments, noting 
that in the Supreme Court, sentencing consistency is reasonable and therefore guideline judgments are 
unnecessary. He added that in Tasmania they would be ‘faintly ridiculous. Which three judges will tell 
the other three judges what is acceptable?’ He submitted that in the Magistrates Court disparate 
sentencing is more pronounced. However, the solution to achieving consistency was not guideline 
judgments but reliable and comprehensive sentencing statistics for the Magistrates Court and a change 
in the basis for appellate review so that the courts could substitute its view of an appropriate sentence 
for that of the court below without first having to establish that it was manifestly excessive or 
inadequate.138 The Director of Public Prosecutions also dismissed the idea of a sentencing advisory 
council which would merely give the illusion of a public input into sentencing, particularly given his 
rejection of guideline judgments. A sentencing advisory council was also rejected by the then Chief 
Justice. 
7.3.34 Other submissions saw some merit in guideline judgments.139 The Legal Aid Commission of 
Tasmania supported guideline judgments140 and asserted that there is a significant variation in 
sentencing practices between magistrates with magistrates in the north of the State imposing 
considerable harsher sentences than magistrates in the south and north-west.141 In consultations with 
Magistrates, some support was expressed for guideline judgments. Tasmania Police supported 
guideline judgments as a ‘means of improving transparency, addressing concerns about inconsistency 
and incorporating community views into sentencing. Tasmania Police also supported a Sentencing 
Advisory Council with ‘representation for the judiciary and magistracy, the legal profession, Legal 
Aid, the Crime Prevention and Community Safety Council and victims’ groups.’ The Council should 
have a role in advising the Court in relation to guideline judgments, preparing sentencing statistics and 
conducting research on public opinion on sentencing.  
7.3.35 The Shadow Attorney-General, Michael Hodgman submitted that the Liberal Party would be 
supportive of guideline judgments as a means of reducing disparity, increasing sentencing 
transparency, improving deterrence and allowing a broader input into the sentencing process.142 The 
establishment of some form of sentencing advisory council was also supported by the Liberal Party 
with the function of providing input into guideline judgments and undertaking sentencing research.143 
The Justice Department submission was also supportive of the idea of guideline judgments and a place 
for a sentencing review body. Its suggested role was to review sentencing patterns in relation to 
sentencing over each twelve months and annually present a public report that identifies the outcomes 
of that analysis. A submission received from Alison Ritchie, MLC, supported the creation of a 
Sentencing Advisory Council ‘to conduct research, consult on sentencing matters and most 
importantly gauge public opinion on sentencing’.144 
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140  Submission, 12. 
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The Institute’s views 
A sentencing advisory body 
7.3.36 Independently of the issue of guideline judgments, research undertaken by the Institute 
suggests that there is a role for some kind of sentencing body. The creation of such a body was also 
supported by a number of submissions responding to the Issues Paper. However, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions’ suggestion that such a body would be merely ‘window dressing, giving the illusion of 
public input into sentencing without the reality of it’ is noted. The Institute acknowledges that the 
functions of such a body were not well explained in the Issues Paper and that such a proposal seemed 
to be inextricably entwined with that of guideline judgments. Further consideration of the issue in the 
light of the evidence that has emerged since the creation of the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council 
in July 2004 and the New South Wales Sentencing Council in February 2003 demonstrates that such 
bodies can provide a mechanism to incorporate community views into sentencing by means of a 
broadly based composition and by gauging public opinion as a basis for policy advice to the Attorney-
General. The following tasks have been identified by this report as important ones for tackling 
sentencing issues in the criminal justice system: 
• the provision of accessible sentencing data for both the Supreme Court and the Magistrates 
Court which informs the courts and the public about what is happening in sentencing and may 
assist to address issues of inconsistencies in sentences in the Magistrates Court discussed in Part 
1;  
• the provision of accessible data on crime trends; 
• the provision of information about recidivism rates, program rates and completion and breach 
rates in relation to conditional orders such as suspended sentences and community service 
orders; (3.10.4) 
• reviewing procedures for breach of conditional orders; (3.12.3) 
• gauging public opinion on sentencing; 
• the co-ordination of strategies to educate the public on crime and sentencing issues;  
• a feasibility study of day fines; (3.9.14-3.9.16) 
• research on the value of VIS in Tasmania; (4.2.14) 
• a community conferencing pilot for young adults; (4.3.5) 
• a review of the administrative procedures associated with compensation orders; (4.4.21) 
• a review of the appropriate penalty range for rape and sexual offences. (6.2.12) 
7.3.37 If such a body were to be created, it should also have the following general functions: 
• a media-liaison role on sentencing issues;  
• to conduct research on sentencing matters; 
• to consult with government departments and other interested persons and bodies as well as 
member of the general public on sentencing matters; 
• to advise the Attorney-General on sentencing matters. 
7.3.38 These last three functions are squarely within the remit of the Law Reform Institute and so 
should be conducted in collaboration with it.  
7.3.39 An important issue in relation to the creation of a sentencing advisory body in Tasmania is 
one of resources. The Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council represents the ideal model. ‘It is an 
innovative organisation performing the functions of a specialised law reform commission, bureau of 
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statistics, sentencing guidelines panel and public education body combined.’145 In just three years its 
output and impact has been considerable. But it is very well-resourced and to reproduce such a body in 
Tasmania is not feasible. The Council of 12 members is supported by a grant of in excess of $1.5 
million which funds a secretariat of at least 12 employees including data analysts, legal policy officers 
and a criminologist.  
7.3.40 The New South Wales Sentencing Council is more modest. The Council has just two full-
time staff members and is also assisted by student interns.146 However, New South Wales has the 
benefit of having bodies such as the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research and 
the Judicial Commission of New South Wales providing research, public education and statistical 
functions. 
7.3.41 The Institute is of the view that a sentencing advisory body should be established in 
Tasmania. It should be noted that the State has no statistical secretariat with the capacity to produce 
sentencing statistics or data. It has the Law Reform Institute, but this body is not a specialised criminal 
law body and it has severe resource constraints which made the production of this report an onerous 
and drawn-out exercise. Any sentencing projects it undertakes are episodic and reactive forays into 
sentencing issues. A body which could address the need for information, education and advice on 
sentencing matters would fill an obvious vacuum. As proposed in the Issues Paper it should be a 
relatively ‘modest’ body. However, its composition should be drawn from a wide membership to 
facilitate broad community input and a balance of views. It should be an independent statutory body 
(called the Sentencing Advisory Council) which would act as a circuit breaker or policy buffer when 
contentious criminal justice issues arise and allow for a considered response drawing on a diverse 
range of views in formulating its advice. As with the composition of the Victorian and New South 
Wales bodies, membership should comprise persons with experience in community issues affecting 
courts, victim support or advocacy groups, judges and magistrates, academics in relevant disciplines, 
experienced defence and prosecution lawyers and those with experience in the operation of the 
criminal justice system (such as police officers and persons with experience in juvenile justice or 
corrective services). The Council should be supported by a modest secretariat with some of its tasks 
outsourced. However, while tasks such as gauging public opinion on sentencing issues, and some 
research projects could be outsourced, the urgent and ongoing need for statistical information to 
inform the courts and the public about what is happening in sentencing suggests that the Council 
should have support staff with some expertise in relation to this to ensure there is ongoing institutional 
expertise and memory in relation to sentencing data issues in this State. Without such support, the 
Council would be unable to undertake its overall task of bridging the gap between the community, the 
courts and government by informing, educating and advising on sentencing issues. The tasks of 
preparing papers, drafting project outlines, co-ordinated education strategies, running a webpage, 
producing annual sentencing statistics cannot be undertaken by a body of part time members without 
support. 
Recommendations 
92. The Institute recommends the creation of an independent statutory sentencing advisory council 
(the Sentencing Advisory Council) with a broad membership (of approximately 10 persons) drawn 
from persons with experience in community issues affecting courts, victim support or advocacy 
groups, judges and magistrates, academics in relevant disciplines, experienced defence and 
prosecution lawyers and those with experience in the operation of the criminal justice system. (7.3.36) 
93. The primary role of the Sentencing Advisory Council should be to bridge the gap between the 
community, courts and government by informing, educating and advising on sentencing matters. More 
specifically it should have the following functions: 
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•  the provision of accessible sentencing data; 
•  the provision of accessible data on crime trends; 
• gauging public opinion on sentencing matters; 
•  co-ordinating strategies to educate the public on crime and sentencing issues; 
• conducting research on sentencing matters; 
•  consulting with government bodies, stakeholders and members of the public on sentencing 
matters; and  
•  advising the Attorney-General on sentencing matters. (7.3.36) 
94. The Institute recommends that the proposed Council be supported by a full-time secretariat and a 
budget that can fund this and the outsourcing of some of its tasks and functions. (7.3.41) 
Guideline judgments 
7.3.42 In theory the Institute believes there is a case for guideline judgments. It notes that such a 
proposal was opposed by the then Chief Justice, the then senior puisne judge and the Director of 
Public Prosecutions. However, those views were expressed against the background of the Issues Paper 
which had found no evidence of inconsistency in sentencing practice. As discussed in Part 1 of this 
Report, the state-wide database for the Magistrates Court enabled sentencing practices between 
magistrates to be compared. This appears to confirm the view of a number of respondents to the Issues 
Paper that there sentencing disparities between some magistrates.147 It is worth repeating that different 
sentencing outcomes do not necessarily indicate unjustified sentencing disparity. Differences in 
outcomes can be justified on the basis of differences between cases. However, significant differences 
in outcomes for similar offences may indicate inconsistency in approach – that like cases are not being 
treated in a like manner. The comparison showed that in the case of one count of assault, the 
magistrate who made most use of custodial sentences was eight times as likely to imprison as the 
magistrate who used custodial sentences the least. For motor vehicle stealing, the magistrate who used 
custodial sentences most often was three times more likely to imprison than the magistrate who made 
least use of prison. For one count of stealing the disparity was even more marked with the most severe 
magistrate on this measure imposing custodial sentences more than twenty times more often than the 
most lenient magistrate. Comparing regions, offenders in the south were twice as likely to be 
imprisoned for assault and motor vehicle stealing than offenders in the north-west. 
7.3.43 In Part 1 of this Report it was revealed that a comparison between sentences imposed by 
judges for robbery and assault suggested that judges were quite consistent in the sentences they 
imposed. However, while this simple comparison of sentencing outcomes by offence type and judge 
revealed no evidence of disparity, more sophisticated analysis suggests that in two aspects of 
sentencing practice there are differences in sentencing outcomes between judges that may suggest an 
suggest inconsistent approach. As discussed in Part 5 (Parole), there is evidence of differences 
between judges in their willingness to extend non-parole periods and to deny parole, suggesting a 
difference in approach to parole eligibility (see para 5.2.11). Disparities between judges also emerged 
in Bartels’ study of suspended sentences.148 In her quantitative analysis of sentences imposed in the 
Supreme Court over a two year period (2002-2004) she found that one judge was almost twice as 
likely as two of the other judges to impose a wholly suspended sentence. As there were no statistically 
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significant differences in the cases coming before each judge as to the offender’s age, gender, prior 
record, plea, type or seriousness of the offence or number of counts, it would appear that the different 
outcomes were due in some measure to a different approach to suspended sentences.  
7.3.44 In the consultation with magistrates in 2002 there was some support for guideline judgments 
from the Court of Appeal and in Bartels’ interviews with judicial officers in 2006-2007, a guideline 
judgment on suspended sentences was suggested by one of the magistrates as a means of improving 
consistency in approach.149 While improved statistical information on sentencing patterns in 
Magistrates Courts could assist in addressing the issue of disparity, a guideline which sets out the 
sentence for a typical case of assault or stealing which concentrates on factors relevant to the custody 
threshold would be of much more assistance. There are other models for guidelines for magistrates. In 
the UK, guidelines for magistrates’ courts used to be prepared by the Magistrates’ Association and 
later by a group including justices’ clerks and district judges. However, now the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council has the responsibility for preparing guidelines for all courts.150 The Institute prefers 
the guideline judgment approach on the grounds that this mechanism does provide the opportunity for 
community input by obtaining the advice of the proposed sentencing advisory body. It would be 
important to include magistrates in the composition of this body to ensure that appropriate expertise 
were available in sentencing summary matters. Guideline judgments would be delivered by the Court 
of Appeal with the process initiated by the Court itself including referral from a judge hearing a lower 
court appeal, or on application from the Attorney-General, or on a recommendation from the 
Sentencing Advisory Council. Drawing on guideline judgment schemes from other jurisdictions, 
features that the model should include are provision for input into the guidelines by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions and the Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania in the form of submissions with 
respect to the framing of guidelines and arguments in support or opposing the giving of a guideline 
judgment by the Court. When the Court is considering framing a guideline it must notify the 
Sentencing Advisory Council. 
7.3.45 Guidelines for judges are more controversial in a small jurisdiction like Tasmania where 
there is no separate Appeal Court. The Director of Public Prosecution’s objection that it would be 
ridiculous for a bench of six to have a guideline judgment issued by three of their number can be 
answered by the observation that this is what always occurs in relation of appeal judgments decided by 
a court of three judges and by the point that the model proposed requires input from the proposed 
Sentencing Advisory Council. Justice Underwood (as he then was) opposed guideline judgments on 
two grounds: first, that he disagreed with the concept of judges embracing what he perceived to be a 
legislative function and secondly, that in the absence of inconsistency they are unnecessary. This 
report has found some evidence of inconsistent sentencing outcomes that suggests that there is a 
degree of inconsistency in approach to sentencing in this State. However, consistency is not the only 
purpose of guideline judgments. As argued in the Issues Paper, guideline judgments can assist in 
addressing the issue of public confidence in the sentencing process. They can improve transparency 
and assist in addressing perceptions of inconsistency. As Kirby J argued in Wong v The Queen,151 they 
‘replace informal, private and unrevealed judicial means of ensuring consistency with a publicly 
declared standard’. This has added force in Tasmania where the statutory maximum for crimes other 
than murder is a general 21 years imprisonment with no indication of the relative seriousness of 
crimes. An important benefit of guideline judgments is that they can be prepared in such a way as to 
allow public input into the sentencing process thus addressing the public perception that judges are out 
of touch and unresponsive to community concerns. 
7.3.46 Notwithstanding its support for guideline judgments, the Institute has determined that it 
would be unwise to recommend legislation for a statutory scheme for guideline judgments without the 
support of the judges and the Director of Public Prosecutions. Legislation introducing guideline 
judgments would be a waste of time if those who are required to promulgate guideline judgments were 
                                                
149  Ibid, 3.4.9. 
150  A Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, (4th ed., 2005) 141-142. 
151  (2001) 207 CLR 584, [93]. 
Tasmania Law Reform Institute   Sentencing 
252 
antagonistic to the concept. It may be that there would be less opposition to the non-numerical 
guidelines which set out the criteria to be applied in selecting among various sentencing alternatives 
for a particular offence, particularly a guideline for magistrates which focuses on factors relevant to 
the custody threshold. Guidance could be given in relation to the use of specific sentencing 
alternatives such as suspended sentences – including guidance in relation to how breaches should be 
dealt with. However, it is by no means clear that there is sufficient support for any kind of guideline 
judgment in the legal community in Tasmania for them to be used. The New Zealand model of 
guidelines issued by a Sentencing Council and ratified by Parliament so that they have statutory force 
could seem to solve any problems of judicial resistance. However, judicial co-operation would still be 
essential because of the importance of a strong representation of judicial officers on the Council. As 
Warren Young of the New Zealand Law Commission has noted, ‘judges are at the coalface of 
sentencing decisions and must have a significant input into the development of sentencing 
guidelines.’152  
7.3.47 The Institute has come to the same conclusion as Freiberg’s 2002 Victorian Sentencing 
Review in which guideline judgments were not recommended because of the strong opposition of the 
Court of Appeal and the Criminal Bar.153 However, the Institute recommends that, if the proposed 
Sentencing Advisory Council is established, the matter be reconsidered. The Council should be given 
some time, at least 12 months, to consolidate its operations before being given the task of reviewing 
the introduction of guideline judgments. 
Recommendations 
95. That guideline judgments should not be introduced at this stage in the absence of broad judicial 
and professional support for them from the legal profession. (7.3.46) 
96. That, if a sentencing advisory council is established, after it has had the opportunity to consolidate 
its operations, it be requested to review the introduction of guideline judgments for magistrates and 
judges. (7.3.47) 
                                                
152  Young (2008) above n 115, 186. 
153  Freiberg (2002) above n 104, 214. However, despite this criticism legislation has been passed in Victoria giving the Court 
of Appeal the power to give or review a guideline judgment (see above para 7.3.25). To date no guideline judgments have 
been issued. 
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APPENDIX A 
S=single count sentence (one count); G= global sentence (more than one count) 
Table 1: Offences against the person, Supreme Court sentences 1978-2006 
Section Crime Years 
Median 
Sentence 
No. cust Total 
no. 
% Custodial 
78-89 life   100.00 
90-00 24y 37 37 100.00 157 murder 
01-06 20y 17 17 100.00 
78-89 5y 12 12 100.00 
90-00* - 2 2 100.00 157 attempted murder 
01-06 4y6m 3 3 100.00 
78-89 3y 35 35 100.00 
90-00 3y 26 26 100.00 159 manslaughter 
01-06 2y 8 8 100.00 
78-89 9m 30 32 93.75 
90-00 9m 14 15 93.33 167A death by dang. driving 
01-06 9m 4 4 100.00 
78-89 1y 4 4 100.00 
90-00 2y6m 12 12 100.00 170 act intended cause gbh etc 
01-06 3y 5 5 100.00 
78-89 2y 5 5 100.00 
90-00 2y10.5m 12 12 100.00 170 (G) 
act intended cause 
gbh etc 
01-06 2y 5 5 100.00 
78-89 6m 66 77 85.71 
90-00* 9m 97 110 88.18 172 wounding or gbh 
01-06 9m 68 71 95.77 
78-89 9m 35 39 89.74 
90-00 18m 32 34 94.12 172 (G) 
wounding or 
gbh 
01-06 12m 29 29 100.00 
78-89 7m 16 17 94.12 
90-00* 6m 24 25 96.00 183 (115FA) aggravated assault 
01-06 6m 13 14 92.86 
78-89 3m 12 14 85.71 
90-00 - 2 2 100.00 114 assault police officer 
01-06 3.5m 8 8 100.00 
78-89 6m 17 18 94.44 
90-00 6m 11 12 91.67 114 (G) 
assault police 
officer 
01-06  5 6 83.33 
78-89 4m 146 201 72.64 
90-00 4m 179 229 78.17 184 assault 
01-06 4m 160 198 80.81 
78-89 6m 44 53 83.02 
90-00 6m 68 79 86.08 184 (G: 2-3) assault 
01-06 5.5m 64 73 87.67 
78-89 9m 10 11 90.91 
90-00 1y 18 18 100.00 184 (G: 4+) assault 
01-06 1y 21 21 100.00 
Notes: n a = not applicable: if less than ten sentences in one of the periods. 
gbh = grievous bodily harm. 
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Table 2: Sexual offences, Supreme Court sentences, 1978-2006 
Section Crime Years Median Sentence no. cust total no. % Custodial 
78-89 4y 27 27 100.00 
90-00 3y 27 27 100.00 185 rape 
01-06 2y1m 12 12 100.00 
78-89 5y 17 17 100.00 
90-00 3y9m 21 21 100.00 
185 
(G:2) 
 
rape 
01-06 4y 7 7 100.00 
78-89 4y 10 10 100.00 
90-00 5y 18 18 100.00 
185 
(G:3-4) 
 
rape 
01-06 5y 4 5 80.00 
78-89 6y 8 8 100.00 
90-00 7y 23 23 100.00 
185 
(G:5+) 
 
rape 
01-06 6y 9 9 100.00 
95-00 18m 15 15 100.00 
125A maintain a sexual rel/p 
01-06 2y4m 46 46 100.00 
95-00 2y6m 4 4 100.00 125A 
(G:2) maintain a sexual rel/p 01-06 2y9m 14 14 100.00 
95-00 - 2 2 100.00 125A 
(G:3+) maintain a sexual rel/p 01-06 5y6m 18 18 100.00 
78-89 3m 13 34 38.24 
90-00 3m 12 31 38.71 124 sexual inter. with <17y 
01-06 4m 12 19 63.16 
78-89 3m 5 12 41.67 
90-00 6m 8 11 72.73 
124 
(G:2) 
 
sexual inter. with <17y 
01-06 6m 3 3 100.00 
78-89 6m 5 8 62.50 
90-00 1y 5 9 55.56 
124 
(G:3-4) 
 
sexual inter. with <17y 
01-06 15m 1 1 100.00 
78-89 6m 10 12 83.33 
90-00 18m 9 9 100.00 
124 
(G:5+) 
 
sexual inter. with <17y 
01-06 19.5m 4 4 100.00 
78-89 6m 60 72 83.33 
90-00 3m 41 47 87.23 127 indecent assault 
01-06 4m 15 16 93.75 
78-89 9m 24 26 92.31 
90-00 6m 16 17 94.12 
127 
(G:2) 
 
indecent assault 
01-06 5m 14 17 82.35 
78-89 9m 21 24 87.50 
90-00 6m 16 16 100.00 
127 
(G:3-4) 
 
indecent assault 
01-06 6m 9 10 90.00 
78-89 9m 12 13 92.31 
90-00 12m 9 9 100.00 
127 
(G:5-9) 
 
indecent assault 
01-06 6.5m 4 4 100.00 
78-89 12m 7 7 100.00 
90-00 2y 5 5 100.00 
127 
(G:10+) 
 
indecent assault 
01-06 3y 3 3 100.00 
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Table 3: Robbery, property offences and other offences, Supreme Court sentences, 1978-2006# 
Section Crime Years Median Sentence 
no. 
cust 
total 
no. % Custodial 
78-89 12m 87 115 75.65 
90-00 18m 359 391 91.82 240 (S&G) robbery (all) 
01-06 15m 192 210 91.43 
90-95 18m 97 102 95.10 
96-01 18m 105 113 92.92 240 (3) and (4) S count 
armed robbery 
arm & ag arm 
02-06 18m 72 78 92.31 
90-95 9m 35 46 76.09 
96-01 12m 55 60 91.67 240 (1) and (2) S count 
unarmed robbery 
rob & ag rob 
02-06 12m 33 38 86.84 
83-89 6m 74 121 61.16 
90-00 6m 85 110 77.27 234 S count stealing 
01-06 6m 37 44 84.09 
83-89 9m 43 52 82.69 
90-00 12m 91 105 86.67 234 (G) stealing 
01-06 9.5m 56 62 90.32 
83-89 4.5m 26 39 66.67 
90-00 4m 55 80 68.75 258 receiving 
01-06 4m 29 43 67.44 
83-89 4m 26 32 81.25 
94-00 4m 33 45 73.33 244 and 245 (a)(iii) (S) 
burglary 
(intent steal) 
01-06 4m 11 12 91.67 
83-89 6m 133 187 71.12 
94-00 6m 278 397 70.03 (G: 2) burglary (& stealing) 
01-06 7m 95 125 76.00 
83-89 12m 60 64 93.75 
94-00 11m 92 103 89.32 
(G: 
5-10) 
burglary 
(& stealing) 
01-06 12m 36 41 87.80 
83-89 18m 43 55 78.18 
94-00 18m 70 75 93.33 (G: 11+) 
burglary 
(& stealing) 
01-06 24m 39 40 97.50 
83-89 9m 14 16 87.50 
94-00 12m 13 15 86.67 244(a)(i) and (b) S aggravated burglary 
01-06 8m 3 4 75.00 
83-89 12m ? ?  
94-00 12m 70 78 89.74 G aggravated burglary 
01-06 12m 44 47 93.62 
78-89 12m 29 34 85.29 
90-00 12m 58 64 90.63 268 arson 
01-06 12m 36 39 92.31 
78-89 6m 24 35 68.57 
90-00* 4m 27 42 64.29 268A setting fire to property 
01-06 4m 31 38 81.58 
78-89 6m 18 31 58.06 
90-00 6m 17 32 53.13 273 destroy or injure property 
01-06 4m 7 13 53.85 
85-89 6m 44 49 89.80 
90-00 5m 89 97 91.75 47 (3)(b) (S&G) 
traff. proh. plant / 
subst*. 
01-06 4.5m 59 59 100.00 
85-89 9m 8 9 88.89 
90-00 9m 30 30 100.00 47(1)(b) (S&G) trafficking in a narcotic** 
01-06 6m 37 38 97.37 
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78-89 3m 21 29 72.41 
90-00 3m 29 41 70.73 105 perverting justice 
01-06 3m 44 71 61.97 
#not all crimes include data from 1978 because of changes in definition for example. 
* Includes trafficking in a controlled substance under Misuse of Drugs Act that relate to ‘plants’. 
** Includes trafficking in a controlled substance under Misuse of Drugs Act that relate to ‘narcotics’. 
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Appendix B 
Data for average sentences 
Notes on the data sources and explanations for Tables 20 and 21 are as follows: 
Tasmania – Compiled from the Tasinlaw database of Supreme Court sentences (1989-2006). Includes 
partially suspended. Calculated on offender’s imprisoned and not total offenders. No rounding. 
New South Wales - JIRS 1 Feb 2003 – 30 Sept 2006 for sexual offences which includes s 61I – sexual 
assault and s 61J – aggravated sexual assault. 1 Feb 2003 – 31 March 2006 for robbery related 
offences which includes s 94 – robbery & stealing from the person; s 95(1) aggravated robbery; s 96 – 
aggravated robbery with wounding/gbh; s 97(1) robbery, being armed or in company; s 97(2) – 
aggravated robbery etc being armed with a dangerous weapon; s98 – robbery being armed and causing 
wounding/gbh . Excludes assault with intent to rob. Offenders sentenced to imprisonment. The data 
source that provided the basis for calculating averages was displayed in 6 month, 12 month, 18 month, 
24 month, 30 month, 36 month, 42 month, 48 month, 52 month increments, then 5 year, 6 year etc 
increments with the sentence rounded upwards, eg a term of 7 months would be shown in 12 months.  
Victoria – Sentencing Advisory Council Sentencing Snapshots concerning rape, robbery and armed 
robbery. Figures are total effective sentence and includes suspended sentences.  
Queensland – QSTS 1 July 1999 – 30 June 2006. Offenders sentenced to imprisonment. This does not 
include suspended sentences as not have that data. The data source that provided the basis for 
calculating averages was rounded upwards, eg a term of 7 months would be shown in 12 months. The 
data source that provided the basis for calculating averages was displayed in 6 month, 12 month, 18 
month, 24 month, 30 month, 36 month, 42 month, 48 month, 52 month increments, then 5 year, 6 year 
etc increments with the sentence rounded upwards, eg a term of 7 months would be shown in 12 
months. 
The rape figure excludes one offender who was sentenced to 20+ years but the data source did not 
specify the actual length. Of the 246 offenders convicted of rape, 195 were imprisoned and 43 
received a partially suspended sentence. The sentence length imposed for the 43 partially suspended 
sentences is not included in the average sentence data (as not have that data).  
Robbery includes s 411(1) – robbery; s 411(2) – armed robbery. Excludes assault with intent to rob. 
Of the 929 offenders convicted of robbery offences under s 411(1) and (2), 445 were imprisoned and 
252 received a partially suspended sentence. The sentence length imposed for the 252 partially 
suspended sentences is not included in the average sentence data (as not have that information). 
Removed SA and WA as this only shows most severe penalty for the major offence proved, and so 
does not include sentences for other charges. Makes it difficult to compare.  
UK – UK Home Office Annual Report on Criminal Statistics, England and Wales, Jan 2002 – 31 Dec 
2005, persons sentenced to immediate custody by average sentence length.  
 
